Theoretical foundations of the study. Xi. Speech Act, Communicative Act
Since the speech act is a type of action, then when it is analyzed, the same categories that are necessary for the characteristics and evaluation of any action are used: subject, goal, method, tool, means, result, condition, success, etc. The subject of the speech act - the speaker produces a statement, as a rule, designed to perceive its recipient - listening. The statement acts simultaneously both as a product of a speech act, and as a tool for achieving a specific purpose. Depending on the circumstances or on the conditions in which the speech act is performed, it can either achieve the goal and thereby turn out to be successful or not reach it. To be successful, the speech act at least should be appropriate. Otherwise, the communicative failure is waiting for the communicative failure, or communicative failure.
The conditions whose compliance is needed to recognize the speech act appropriate are called the terms of success of the speech act. So, if the mother tells his son: Sit down!, It thus makes a speech act, the purpose of which is to encourage the addressee to take action marked in the statement used to achieve this goal. If the lessons have not yet been made if the Son is able to do and if it is not a duty that he usually performs without any reminders, then this speech act is applied appreciated, and in this, communicative, sense - successful. If at least one of the following conditions is not compared (the lessons are already made, or the son lies in bed with a high temperature, or himself, as usual, was going to sit for lessons), the relevance of the mother's speech act could be questioned, and because of this he May fail communicative failures. But even with all the conditions that ensure the relevance of the speech act, the result to which it will lead can correspond or not correspond to the speaker target. So, in our example, the result of a mother's speech act can be both the consent of the Son to perform the specified action and the failure to perform it. The refusal can be as motivated (for example, the desire to watch the favorite TV shows or the fact that the lessons are not specified) and inemployed.
So, the speech act - the phenomenon is quite complex. The theory of speech acts highlights three levels, or aspects of the analysis of the speech act. First, the speech act can be viewed as actually speaking something. Considered in this aspect, speech act acts as a location act (from Latin locutio. "Speaking"). Actual act, in turn, is a complex structure, since it includes the pronouncement of sounds (act of lamp), and the use of words, and the binding of them according to the rules of grammar, and the designation with their help of certain objects (act of references), and attributing these objects of certain properties and relationships (act of predication). Linguistics for a long time was focused on the study of exactly the location aspect of the speech act. Considering the statements regardless of the communicative situation in which they were used, phonetics described their sound side, lexicology - their vocabulary, syntax - the rules of the connection of words in the proposal, the semantics gave this proposal to the interpretation, reducing it to objective, i.e. The deprived of a truly assessment, the content of the judgment expressed by the proposition, in other words, to expressed by propositional content, or the proposition.
However, a person, as a rule, says not for the sake of the speaking process itself: not to enjoy the sounds of his own voice, not to draw up a proposal from words and not even to mention some objects and attribute to them Those or other properties, thereby reflecting some state of affairs in the world. In the process of speaking (in Latin in Locutio.) A person simultaneously makes some other action that has some extra-speaking, goal: he asks or responds, informs, assures or warns, appoints someone someone, criticizes someone for something, etc. The speech act, considered from the point of view of its non-language target, acts as an illocutionary act. Integral, i.e. The generalized and holistic characteristic of the statement as a means of carrying out an illocutionary act is called an illustrative function, or an illustrative statement.
Crawling the content of the statement on the illocutional level of analyzing the speech act, the two main components are isolated in this content: the illocution function (F) and the proposition (P) is generalized representing it as a formula F (P). Thus, the content of the statement in the above example is declined to the propositional part "you are sitting for the lessons" (with the confined approval, i.e. without a trusted estimate) and the illocutional function "Movement". Question expressed with the help You're sitting for lessons?, it has the same propositional content, but another illustrative function is the function of the question; The meaning of the statement I promise to sit down for lessons In a typical situation of its use consists of the proposition "I will sit for the lessons" and the illustrative function "Promise"; The meaning of the statement He promises to sit for lessons In a typical situation of its use, it consists of the proposition "He promises to sit for the lessons" and the illustrative function "Message".
Finally, by speaking (Latin per Locutio.) A person reaches certain results, producing certain changes in its surrounding reality, in particular, and above all - in the consciousness of its interlocutor, and the resulting result of the speech action may correspond or not correspond to the wrong goal, to achieve which it was intended to speaking. The speech act considered in the aspect of its real consequences acts as a perlocut act. So, in our example, the statement of the mother could, for example, distract the son from computer Game And for this reason, it is discontent for this reason or surprise him (if the mother already checked their lessons learned, but at the absentmission managed to forget about it) or somehow affect his psyche. The perlocut act and the corresponding concept of the translocative effect is the aspect of speech activity, which has long been engaged in rhetoric, studying optimal methods The impact of speech on the thoughts and feelings of the audience.
Thus, the main innovation described above the three-level speech analysis scheme proposed by the English philosopher and logic J. Site is the concept of an illocutionary act and the corresponding semantic concept of illocurative function (strength), since they reflect such aspects of the speech act and the content of statements that are not Received an adequate description either in traditional linguistics, nor in classical rhetoric. Naturally, it is this aspect of a speech act in the theory of speech acts a focus.
J. Site, who laid the foundations of the theory of speech acts in his lectures of the second half of the 1950s (they were posthumously published in the form of a book. How to Do Things Words In 1962, Rus. Per. Released in 1986 called Word as action In the 17th issue of publication New in overseas linguistics) did not give the concept of an illustrative act accurate definition. He only led the characteristic examples of such acts - the question, answer, informing, assurance, warning, appointment, criticism, etc., noting that in each language there is its own nomenclature of such actions. In the future, in the theory of speech acts were identified features Illokutic act: it differs from the location act on the sign of intentionality, i.e. Configilities with a certain goal, intention, and a perlocutal act, it is contraved by the sign of conventional, i.e. By availability certain rulesThe action in accordance with which automatically provides the speaking successful implementation of this illustrative act. Some of these rules are the rules of the language: in the languages \u200b\u200bof the world there are special formal agents, directly or indirectly indicating the illustrative function of the speech act.
First of all, there is a special class of proposals, directly explicating an illustrative function of the statement, which is made with their help. These are the so-called performance proposals. The basis of the lexico-semantic structure of these proposals is the so-called illochetic verb, i.e. verb belonging to the verbs of saying and containing in its lexical meaning Components indicating the purpose of speaking and certain conditions for the implementation of speech action, for example ask, congratulate, assure, promise etc. However, the presence of an illustrative verb is not a sufficient condition so that the proposal is performative. To do this, it is also necessary that the illochetic verb is not used not to describe some situation, and in order to clarify which speech act makes a speaker, using this proposal. In other words, an illochetic verb should be used to be formative (and not descriptive).
The semantic specificity of the performative proposal, its difference from the usual narrative offer is that the usual narrative offer is used to submit a certain state of affairs, i.e. For the purpose of description, reports, approval, etc., and the Performative proposal is not used to describe the action that performs saying, but for the explication of what action he performs. A reference of the usual narrative supply, for example I paint youis some situation that exists independently of the speech act, and the referential of the Performative Offer I welcome you With the normal use for it, the speech act of its use itself is. In short, the pepperformative statement has the property of the autumn. The usual narrative proposal, being used, becomes a statement that can be assessed as true or false, while to performing proposals in the typical context of their use, this type of assessment cannot be applied. So, we can say that the offer I paint youwill depend on the real state of affairs in the world of discourse or true or false (cf. Possible reactions - Yes this is true or No, it's not like this: you do not draw, but just take a pencil on paper / you don't draw me at all), but we cannot say the same about the proposal I welcome you. In the normal case of the use of such a proposal, the question of the truth or felt of the words of the speaking does not get up. The corresponding statement can only be evaluated as relevant or inappropriate, but not as true or false. In this regard, they also speak about the self-satisfaction of the performance proposals, i.e. Their truth is due to the very fact of their use.
The classic formative proposal form is subject to a personal pronounter of the first person single number, and agreed with him led in the form expressive challenge of the current active collateral. For example, ( I) I promise you to correct.However, Austin indicated that the performance was not an exceptional privilege of the sentence model with the verb-tajam in the named form. For the Russian language to the above form, you can add the following, differing from it along the line of any of its part of its description of grammatical categories: (1) The person may not only be the first, but also the third, for example, in the text of the official Epistle Verb in the Third Face thank Used amative: Emergency and Plenipotentiary Russian Federation and M.P.Ivanov thanks for the invitation...; (2) the number can be multiple; (3) time may be future Let's remind You, that tomorrow the subscription period ends; (4) Pledge can be passive You are appointed by my deputy; (5) inclination may be subjunctive I would advise you to stay.In addition, for the performance of the verb, it is not necessarily not necessarily that it was a syntactic vertex (led) offers, Wed: I would like to give thanks who speakers nice words. I have a hurry to congratulate you on the birth of a son etc.
In two properties of an illocutionary act - intentionality and conventional - the contradiction inherent in a speech act between the two moments inextly linked in it: subjective (the goal of the speaker) and objective (independent of the speaker methods to ensure the recognition of this goal listening).
So, the main sign of an illocutionary act is its goal. It does not mean any purpose to achieve which we commit a speech action, but only the one, which in accordance with our intention should be recognized by the addressee. Only such - open to recognition - the target is called illocutic, and it, in principle, may not coincide with the true goal of the speaking. So, wanting to pay a boning guest and knowing that he is in a quarrel with NN and hardly wants to meet him, the owner can say: Yesterday called nn and said it will go about nine. The true goal of the speaker is to encourage listening to leave - cannot be considered as an illustrative goal of his speech act, because it is hidden and it is not necessary to achieve it at all (and in some case it is undesirable) that the addressee to recognize it. Illocurate the purpose of the speech act in this case will be the purpose of providing the addressee by some information. This goal, and in this case it is only submitted to be identified as such. Therefore, this speech act on the illocutic level of analysis will be considered as a message, and not a motivation.
Illokut acts vary with each other not only in their own goal, but also for a number of other signs. The most famous universal classification of illocutionary acts is built by American logic and philosopher J. Surlem (r. 1932). The base of this classification is a group of features that the author himself calls "directions of differences between illustrative acts." The most essential of them are:
the goal (for example, to report - to reflect the state of affairs in the world, for the order - to encourage the addressee to action for the promise - to make an obligation for congratulations to express a certain emotion of the speaker);
the direction of conformity between showing and reality (for example, in the case of a message, the statement is brought into line with reality, in the case of an order, on the contrary, reality must be aligned with the statement);
the internal state of the speaker (for example, when approving - the presence of an appropriate opinion in his promise - intentions, at a request - desires, with thanksgiving - a sense of gratitude);
features of the propositional content of the speech act (for example, in prediction, the proposition content refers to the future of time, and the report to the present or passed; the promise of the proposition is speaking, and the request is listening to);
communication of a speech act with off-list establishments or institutions (for example, a speech act of appointing anyone with its deputy, usually drawn up in the form of a document, suggests the existence of a certain organization, within which the speaker must be endowed with the appropriate authority, part of which it gives it using this speech act another member of this organization; cf. with similar in the target parameter, but institutionally not regulated by cases, when we ask someone to replace us - to act as a "deputy" - in any informal role: to visit our relative in the hospital instead of us Instead of us on the parent meeting to school, etc.)
Taking into account these parameters, all sets of illustrative acts were divided by steerlem divided into five basic classes.
Representatives focused on reality to the statement are intended to reflect the state of affairs in the world, assume the presence of a speaker relevant opinion, and their propositional content is not limited. Examples of Representatives: Message (cf. The exam in chemistry is scheduled for June 2), condemnation (cf. You do wrong), Forecasting (cf. This conflict will turn into a full-scale war.), qualifications (cf. Such actions are a gross violation of the Charter), recognition (cf. I was deceiving you all this time), Description (cf. The house is located on the top of the hill and is surrounded by a magnificent garden.).
Directives, with an attitude orientation to reality, are intended to encourage the addressee to do / not do anything, assume the presence of a speaking of the relevant desire, and their propositional content is always the fact that the addressee will perform / do not make some action in the future. This class includes requests, prohibitions, tips, instructions, appeals and other types of motivating speech acts.
Commissions, oriented, as well as directives, from statements to reality, are used by the speaker to associate themselves to do / not do anything, suggest that he has the appropriate intent, and their proposition always has its own subject of the speaker. Examples of the Commissions: promise, oath, guaranteeing.
Expressions are aimed at expressing a certain psychological state of the speaker (a sense of gratitude, regret, joy, etc.) as a reaction to the state of affairs, determined in the framework of the proposition. The direction of conformity between showing and reality is not essential for them, since the state of affairs serving the reason for expression (what we congratulate, for which we thank or apologize, etc.), it is not the main content, but a premise of such a speech act - His supposition. The propositional content of expression attributes some predicate to a subject, which can be either speaking (so when we speak Sorry for being late!, T. we are talking about our own delay) or listening (so when we speak Thank you for help!, I mean the action committed by the address of the statement). For expressives, phrase-generalized phrases are especially characteristic ( cm. Phraseology) Expression - Speech Clichés, specific for each language, cf. Russian sorry! - The shape of the impertness of the verb excuse (or not recommended by speech etiquette I apologize! - the form of expansive inclinations returnal Glagol apologize) with his English equivalent Sorry.!, in form - adjective with the meaning "distressed", or English Thanks.(letters. "Gratitude") and functionally equivalent Russian idiom Thank you, etymologically ascending to the wish "Save [You / You] God!".
The fifth illuminating class - declaration - differs from the remaining four in the parameter of communication with off-speech institutions and arising from this fact the specificity of conformity between the statement and reality: declaring (declaring) a certain state of affairs existing, the speech act of the declaration. Thereby makes it existing in real world. Examples of declarations are the appointment of the post, declaration of war or truce, excommunication from the church, dedication to the knights, reception in the party, assigning the title to a person or the name institution, etc.
This classification, like most other classifications of language phenomena, does not give the splitting of the multiple classes. There are speech acts with signs characteristic of different illocution classes, and formulations, so to speak, "mixed" types. For example, an invitation is both directive, since the speaker encourages the addressees to come to a certain place, and the Commission, since thereby the speaker binds itself to the obligation or personally, or through other persons to ensure the invited admission. A complaint (for example, girls teacher on a classmate pulling her for pigtails) is simultaneously representative, because it reflects some state of affairs in reality, and expressive, since he expresses discontent with this situation, and the directive, the purpose of the complaint - not just to inform the addressee, but Encourage him to take appropriate measures.
Within the framework of the five major illuminational classes, speech acts differ in a number of additional parameters:
the ratio of the speech act with the preceding text (for example, as a response and approval of the essence of the representative, but the answer, in contrast to the approval, implies a preceding question);
the ratio of social statuses of communications (for example, the order and the requirement of the essence of the Directive, but when ordering the status of the speaker should be higher than the status of the listening status, and upon request it is not necessary, and therefore we can demand from our chief so that it is polite with us, but we cannot he can order it);
the method of communication of the speech act with the interests of the speaking and listening (for example, congratulations and condolences to the essence of expression, differing from each other not only by a sense of joy and sorrow, respectively, but also because the event with which congratulates is considered as a good for the listening, but an event , on which they condoles, - as the grief comprehended);
the degree of intensity representation of the illustrative goal (so, the request and plenty, which are directives, differ from each other first of all by this parameter).
Reflecting on what can distinguish one illocutionary act from the other, we conclude that the illustrative function of the statement to theoretically can be represented as a beam of specific values \u200b\u200bof the signs like the above, and these values \u200b\u200bthemselves correlate with the terms of the success of a speech act with a given illocutional function. The variety of distinctive signs of illustrating acts is reflected in the division of the conditions for the success of speech acts by four types: (1) the conditions of propositional content, (2) preparatory, or preliminary conditions, (3) the conditions of sincerity, (4) a substantial condition, or condition of destination. Conditions of the first type The essence of restrictions on the propositional content of the utilization used. The essential condition corresponds to an illustrative goal - the goal that the speaker seeks to convey to the consciousness of hearing with his statement. Preparatory conditions reflect objective and subjective prerequisites compatible with the extension of this illustrative goal, i.e. The circumstances of the speech act, in the absence of which he will suffer communicative failure. The conditions of sincerity reflect the internal (psychological) state, which can be attributed to the speaker, based on the assumption about the sincerity and seriousness of this speech act. (Thus, the preparatory conditions and the conditions for the sincerity of the speech act form one of the types of implicit information transmitted by the utterance, along with consequences and suppuses.) Unlike preparatory conditions, the violation of the speaking conditions of sincerity usually happens unnoticed for the addressee and therefore directly does not entail Communicative failure, although the fake, the fake of this speech act can be exposed in the future. As an example, the system below provides a system of conditions for the success of a speech act of a promise carried out with a certain statement by T.
The terms of success of the speech act promise.
1. Prerequisite condition:
Giving T, g expresses the idea that he will make action D in the future.
2. Preparatory conditions:
a) g is able to commit d;
b) C preferred to perform the speaking actions of his imperfect, and g is convinced that it is so;
c) nor do nor do not believe that the performance of the speaking actions is something of granted.
3. Condition of sincerity:
G intention to make D.
4. Significant condition:
G intentionally with the help of the statement of tie itself to commit d.
The inextricable link between the illustrative function of the speech act and the conditions for its success allows the recipient of the speech act to correctly recognize its illocutional function even when some of its essential features does not have special formal indicators in the language structure of the expression used: the missing information is extracted from the circumstances of the communicative situation. So, that statement Make a work plan for the next quarter Refers to the type of incentive (directives), we are talking to the grammatical form of the imperative lifestyle, but nothing in the language form of this statement, including intonation, does not tell us, the order is or request. But if we know what the speaker - the boss, and the listening - his subordinate, we will understand that this is an order, since the control of the speaker over the addressee (and it is in the sphere of activity to which the propositional content of the statement belongs to the terms of success An order, but contradicts the condition of success for requests.
On the same connection between the illustrative function and the conditions for its success, the understanding of indirect speech acts - speech actions carried out using statements that have an explicit indicator of one illumination function in their structure, but at the same time their illustrative function is different. Examples of indirect speech acts are polite requests, "disguised" under question deals ( You ?), or approval revealing the type of questions (the so-called rhetorical issues).
The opinion was expressed that indirect speech acts should be viewed as a manifestation of language polesia ( cm. Poland), i.e., for example, assume that in Russian, the question design with negation is a formal indicator not only the illustrative function of the question, but also the illustrative function of a polite request. Stew, challenging this point of view in his article Indirect speech acts, revealed the mechanism of indirect expression of the intention of the speaker. Resorting for one reason or another (for example, from politeness or for a deeper impact on the addressee) to the indirect method of expressing its illustrative goal, the speaker counts not only on the language knowledge of the interlocutor (and thereby knowledge of the formal indicators of the illustrative function), but also on Its ability to conclusted on the basis of various non-language knowledge: knowledge of the conditions for the success of speech acts, the principles of communication of the type of Maxim Cooperative dialogue P.Grais and, finally, the knowledge of the world, often referred to as "encyclopedic", although these two terms may vary. So, the question of You could not leave me this book for another week?, Generally speaking, can be used according to its intended purpose, i.e. With an ill-cultural function of the question (for example, with an abstract discussion of the limits of the possibilities of the librarian), but in a typical communication situation that excludes non-affected abstract ranting, this question is the addressee will understand as a request, knowing that the opportunity to implement an action for it - prerequisite The success of the speech act of requests and that asking such a question that actually actually expresses the corresponding request.
Speech act is an elementary unit of speech communication. It is really embodied in human speech activity. Phrases and suggestions that are component parts The speech act is obtained in human speech specific lexical filling and become carriers of concrete information.
The basis of the speech act is the intention of the speaker, i.e. Desire for the implementation of which certain steps will be taken. The intention can be manifesically (manifest) and latent (hidden). Latent intention, as writes O.G. Popular, linguistic analysis is not amenable to, and manifesically intention can be given and displayed. Indirect speech acts correlate with the depotable input. Communication at the level of depreciated meaning is always present in normal human interaction, communication participants always have something speculate. However, the measure is clearly pronounced and the measure of implied meaning can go beyond the expectations of the addressee. Much depends on the genre and conditions of communication [Alpores 1994: 116].
Increased use in speech implicatov, V.V. Bogdanov, increases the status of the recipient's speaker and the status of the addressee in his own eyes: the speaker looks smart, dismantling in the subtleties of speech communication, and the addressee understands that the speaker trusts his guessness. Communication at the level of implikators is a more prestigious type of verbal communication, so it is widely used among the formed part of the population, because to understand many implicators, the addressee must have an appropriate level of intellectual development [Bogdanov 1983: 117].
The speech strategy of a hint is not only in increasing communication. The hint makes it possible to talk to keep a person in case of a request, make a request and seem to not express it. There are three types of partner's sample reactions to the request made in the form of a hint:
1) The recipient of the speech will not understand a hint, but on his own initiative will do what was part of the intention of the sender of speech;
2) the recipient of speech can pretend that I did not understand the hint;
3) The recipient of speech can show that he understood the hint, but at the same time he risks, as the sender of the speech is entitled to say that there was no second point from the statement.
A similar promising strategy of requests is associated with the status uncertainty of the speaker, with the experience of uncertainty and exacerbate attention to the observance of the distance: the request in the form of a hint says that the speaker does not want to be addicted to the addressee. Often, in such cases, the speaker is insured and commented on his statement, noting that he does not hint at anything that his words do not need to be understood as a request, and the partner must, somehow react to the pre-evavoable information. The recipient of the speech is forced in such a situation to demonstrate the communicative initiative and offer to the interlocutor what the interlocutor seems to be going to ask [Leager 200: 64].
The theory of speech acts makes it possible to identify the characteristics of communication situations: informativeness / non-informative, the official / informality of communication, dependence / independence of the author from the addressee and on the contrary, constant / variable status of the speaker and recipient, a constructive / performative situation, explicit / implicit performance, emotional / rational impact on Address and others.
Speech acts have a field structure, there are prototype speech acts of the order, requests, apologies and more complex "blurred" speech acts, which with known reservations can be attributed to a particular group. Thus, the core of imperatives constitute orders (voluntative imperatives) based on legalized social power. The next layer of imperatives make up nutentative imperatives - tips, instructions, recipes, warnings. Even further from the system-forming kernel of imperatives, there are proposals in which the conditions for the implementation of the action are negotiated, and finally there are paraimpes, including promises and oaths, plans and schemes, intentions and desires [Kobzev 1986: 88].
What is a speech act
I. Introduction
In a typical speech situation, including the speaker, listening and saying the speaker, the most diverse is connected with the statement different types acts. When expressing the speaker leads in motion the speech apparatus, pronounces sounds. At the same time, he performs other acts: informs listening or causes irritation or bored. It also carries out acts consisting in mentioning certain individuals, places, etc. In addition, he expresses a statement or asks a question, gives the team or reports, congratulates or warns, that is, performs an act of those that Austin (see . Austin 1962) called Illocutic. It is this type of acts is considered in this work, and it could be called "What is an illocutionary act?". I am not trying to define the term "illocutionary act", but if I manage to give the correct analysis of a separate illocutionary act, this analysis can form the basis for such a definition. Examples of English verbs and verbal phrases associated with illocutionary acts are: state "to state, state, assert, assert" argue, declare ", Describe" Describe ", WARN" WARNING ", REMARK" NOTE ", COMMENT" Comment ", Command "Command", Order "Order", Request "ask", criticize "criticize", apologize "apologize", Censure "Purchase", Approve "approve", Welcome "Welcome", promise "promise", express approval "Express Approval" and express regret "express regret". Austin argued that english language There are more than a thousand such expressions.
In the order of administration, it is likely that it makes sense to explain why I think that the study of speech acts (or, as they are sometimes called, language, or linguistic, acts) are of interest and is important for philosophy of language. I think that a significant feature of any type of language communication is that it includes a language certificate. Contrary to popular belief, the main unit of language communication is not a symbol, not a word, not a proposal and not even a specific instance of the symbol, words or suggestions, but the production of this particular copy during the commitment of a speech act. More precisely, the production of a specific sentence in certain conditions There is an illocutionary act, and an illokut act is a minimum unit of linguistic communication.
I do not know how to prove that acts make up the creature of language communication, but I can give arguments with which you can try to convince those who are tuned skeptical. As the first argument, attention should be attracted to the attention of the fact that if he perceives some sound or icon on paper as a manifestation of language communication (as a message), then one of the factors caused by his perception is that it should consider this Sound or icon as a result of the activity of a creature having certain intentions. He cannot consider it simply as a phenomenon of nature - like stone, waterfall or wood. To consider it as a manifestation of language communication, it must be assumed that its production is what I call a speech act. So, for example, the logical prerequisite of the attempts undertaken to decrypt the Mayan hieroglyphs is a hypothesis that the badges that we see on the stones were produced by creatures, more or less similar to us, and are made with defined. intentions. If we were sure that these badges appeared as a result of erosion, then no one would think to engage in their decryption or even call them hieroglyphs. Summing up under the category of language communication with the need to entail an understanding of their production as committing speech acts.
The commission of an illocutionary act refers to those forms of behavior that are governed by the rules. I will try to show that actions such as questions or statement statements are governed by the rules in the same way as reported by the rules, for example, a basic blow in baseball or a horse in chess. I want to explicate the concept of an illocutionary act, setting many necessary and sufficient conditions for committing a specific type of illocutionary act and revealing a set of semantic rules to use that expression (or syntactic), which marks the statement as an illochetic act of this species. If I can formulate such conditions and the corresponding rules for them at least for one type of illocutionary acts, then our disposal will be a model for analyzing other types of acts and, therefore, for explication this concept at all. But to prepare the soil to formulate such conditions and extract from them the rules of making an illocutionary act, I must discuss three more initial concepts: rules, judgments and importance. I will limit the discussion of these concepts by those aspects that are essential for the purposes of this study, and yet, in order to at least some fully state everything I would like to say about each of these concepts, three separate work would be required. However, sometimes it is worth sacrificing with a depth of latitude, and therefore I will be very brief.
II. REGULATIONS
In recent years, the concept of rules for the use of expressions has repeatedly discussed in the philosophy of the language. Some philosophers even said that knowledge of the meaning of the word is simply knowledge of the rules of its use or use. It is alarming in such discussions that no philosopher, as far as I know, has never suggested anything similar to an adequate wording of the rules of use of at least one expression. If the value comes down to the rules of use, then we must be able to formulate the rules for the use of expressions so that the importance of these expressions is explicated. Other philosophers, possibly scared by the inability of their colleagues to offer any rules, rejected the fashionable point of view, according to which the importance comes down to the rules, and stated that there are no such semantic rules. I tend to think that their skepticism is premature and that its source lies in the inability to distinguish between different types of rules. I will serve to explain what I mean.
I spend a distinction between the two types of rules. Some rules regulate the forms of behavior that existed to them; For example, the rules of etiquette regulate interpersonal relationships, but these relations exist independently of the rules of etiquette. The other rules are not simply regulated, but create or define new forms of behavior. Football rules, for example, do not just regulate the game of football, but so to speak, create the possibility of such activities or determine it. Activated by the game of football is to implement actions in accordance with these rules; Football outside of these rules does not exist. We will call the rules of the second type of constitutive, and the first type is regulatory. Regulatory rules regulate the activities that existed before them - activities, the existence of which is logically regardless of the existence of the rules. Constitutional rules create (as well as regulate) activities, the existence of which is logically dependent on these rules. "
Regulatory rules usually have an imperative form or have imperative periprase, for example, "using a knife while eating, keep it in right hand"Or" at dinner officers should be in ties. " Some constitutive rules take a completely different form, for example, the king of Dan Mat, if it is attacked in such a way that no move can bring it out of the strike; The goal when playing rugby is counted when the player during the game crosses the head of the enemy with the ball in his hands. If the sample of the rules for us will be imperative regulatory rules, the nelevice constitutional rules of this kind are likely to seem to be extremely strange and even few similar to the rules at all. Note that by nature, they are almost tautologically, for such a "rule" seems to have a partial definition of "mat" or "goal". But of course, a quasitavological nature is the inevitable consequence of them as constitutive rules: the rules relating to the heads should determine the concept of "goal" in the same way as the rules relating to football define "football". The fact that, for example, a rugby goal can be counted with such and such conditions and is estimated at six points, in some cases can act as a rule, in others - as analytical truth; and this opportunity to interpret the rule as a tautology is a sign that this rule It can be assigned to constitutive. Regulatory rules usually have the form "do x" or "if y, then do x". Some representatives of the class of constitutive rules have the same form, but along with it there are also those that have the form "X is considered uth".
Neon understanding of this has important consequences for philosophy. For example, some philosophers ask a question: "How can a promise generate an obligation?" A similar question would be: "How can a goal generate six points?" You can only answer both of these questions only by formulating the rule of the type "X is considered uth."
I tend to think that the inability of some philosophers formulate the rules for the use of expressions and the skeptical relationship of other philosophers to the very possibility of the existence of such rules result in at least partially, from the inability to distinguish between constitutive and regulatory rules. Model, or sample, rules for most philosophers is the regulatory rule, but if we look for purely regulatory rules in semantics, we are unlikely to find something interesting in terms of logical analysis. Undoubtedly, there are rules for communication (Social Rules) of the species "should not be obstacious in official meetings," but hardly such rules belong to the decisive role in the explication of semantics of the language. The hypothesis on which this work is based is that the semantics of the language can be viewed as a number of systems of constitutive rules and that ill-fiction acts are the essence of acts committed in accordance with these sets of constituent rules. One of the objectives of this work is to formulate many constitutive rules for one type of speech acts. And if what I said about constitutive rules is true, we should not be surprised that not all of these rules will take the form of the imperative. In fact, we will see that these rules disintegrate into several different categories, none of which coincides with the rules of etiquette. An attempt to formulate rules for an illustrative act can also be considered as a kind of testing of the hypothesis, according to which constitutive rules are based on speech acts. If we cannot give satisfactory wording of the rules, our failure can be interpreted as evidence against a hypothesis, partial refutation.
III. Judgments
Different illokut acts often have something in common. Consider pronouncing the following sues:
(1) "John will come out of the room?"
(2) "John will come out of the room."
(3) "John, get out of the room!"
(4) "John would have come out."
(5) "If John comes out of the room, I'll go out too."
Giving each of these proposals in a certain situation, we usually make different illocutionary acts. The first will usually be a question, the second - approval of the future, that is, the prediction, the third - asking or order, the fourth - the expression of desire, and the fifth - hypothetical expression of intention. However, when performing each act, the speaker usually makes some additional acts that will be common to all five illocutional acts. When uttered each sentence, the speaker performs a reference to a particular person - John - and predicts this person to exit the room. In no case, this is not exhausted what it does, but in all cases it is part of what he does. I will say, therefore, in each of these cases, with the difference in illustrating acts, at least some of the non-focal acts of references and predication coincide.
Reference to some John and predication of the same action to this person in each of the Illocutal acts under consideration allows me to say that these acts associate some general content. What can apparently be expressed by the presidency "that John will come out of the room", there is a common property of all offers. Do not fear too distorting these suggestions, we can burn them so as to highlight this of their common property: "I argue that John will come out of the room", "I ask whether John will come out of the room" etc.
For the absence of a more appropriate word, I suggest to call it a general content of judgment, or a proposition (Proposition), and I will describe this line of data of illocutionary acts, saying that when pronouncing proposals (1) - (5) Speaker expresses judgment that John will come out of Rooms. Note: I do not say that judgment is expressed by the relevant proposal; I do not know how suggestions could carry out acts of this type. But I will say that when pronouncing the sentence, the speaker expresses judgment. Note also that I spend the distinction between the judgment and the assertion (Assertion) or statement (statement) of this judgment. The judgment that John will come out of the room, expressed when they uttered all the proposals (1) - (5), but only in (2) this judgment is approved. The statement is an illocutionary act, and the judgment is not an act at all, although the act of expression of judgment is part of the commission of certain illocutionary acts.
Summarizing the concept described, I could say that it is distinguished by an illocutionary act and the propositional content of the illocutionary act. Of course, not all statements have a propositional content, for example, do not have his exclamation "Hurray!" or "Oh!" In one way or another, this distinction has been known for a long time and somehow noted by such different authors as Friege, Schaeffer, Lewis, Reichenbach, Hair.
From a semantic point of view, we can distinguish between the proposal a proposition rate (indicator) and an illustrative function. That is, the big class of proposals used to perform illocutionary acts can be said in order to analyze that the proposal has two (not necessarily separate) parts - an element that serves as an indicator of judgment, and means that serves as an indicator of the function. The function indicator allows you to judge how it is necessary to perceive this judgment, or, in other words, which illocuration should have a statement, that is, what an illocutionary act performs a speaker, uttering this proposal. The indicators of the function in English include the order of words, the emphasis, intonational contour, punctuation, the ignition of the verb and, finally, the set of so-called performing verbs: I can point out the type of an illocutionary act performed by me, starting the offer with "I apologize", "I I warn you "," I argue ", etc. Often in real speech situations, the illustrative function of the statement clarifies the context, and the need for the corresponding indicator of the function disappears.
If this semantic distinction is really essential, it is very likely that it should have some kind of syntactic analogue, and some of the latest achievements in transformation grammar are confirmed by the fact that it is. In the structure of the components underlying the proposal, there is a distinction between the elements that correspond to the function indicator, and those that correspond to the propositional content.
The distinction between the indicator of the function and the indicator of judgment will very help us when analyzing an illocutionary act. Since the same judgment can be common to all types of illustrative acts, we can separate the analysis of judgment from the analysis of the types of illocutional acts. I think that there are rules for expressing judgments, rules for things such as reference and predication, but these rules may be discussed regardless of the rules for specifying the function. In this paper, I will not discuss propositional rules, but focusing on the rules for the use of certain types of function indicators.
IV. VALUE
Speech acts are usually produced when pronouncing sounds or writing icons. What is the difference between just uttering sounds or writing icons and committing a speech act? One of the differences is that the sounds or icons make it possible to commit a speech act, usually say that they matter (meaning). The second difference associated with the first is that a person is usually said that he meant something (Meant), using these sounds or badges. As a rule, we mean something under what we are talking, and what we say (that is, the Morpham chain produced by us) is important. In this paragraph, by the way, the analogy between the commission of a speech act and the game is again violated. About the figures in the game, similar to chess, it is not customary to say that they matter, and, moreover, it is done, it is not customary to say that there is something in mind under this move.
But what does it mean "we mean something under what has been said" and what does it mean "something important"? To answer the first question, I guess borrow and revise some of the ideas of Floor Floor. In the article entitled "Meaning" (see Grice 1957), the church gives the following analysis of one of the understanding of the concept of Meaning say that and something meant under x (and Meant Something by X) means to say that "and intended, By consulting the expression, this use to have a certain impact on listening through the fact that listening to identify this intention. " It seems to me that this is a fruitful approach to the analysis of the subjective value, primarily because it shows a close relationship between the concept of meaning and the concept of intention, and also because it catches what I think is essential for the use of language. Speaking in any language, I'm trying to inform something to my listener by summing up it to the identification of my intention to inform exactly what I meant. For example, when I make a statement, I try to inform my listener about the truth of a certain judgment and convince him of it; And the means of achieving this goal is to utter certain sounds with the intention of the desired impact on it through the fact that he identifies my intention to make exactly such an impact. I will give an example. I could, on the one hand, try to convince you that I am French, all the time speaking in French, dressed in a French manner, showing no harmonious enthusiasm against de Gaulle and trying to keep familiar with the French. But, on the other hand, I could try to convince you that I am a Frenchman, just telling you that I am a Frenchman. What is the difference between these two ways of exposure? The indigenous difference is that in the second case, I am trying to convince you that I am a Frenchman, making you to know what to convince you of this and there is my true intention. It enters as one of the moments in the message addressed to you that I am a Frenchman. But, of course, if I try to convince you that I am a Frenchman, playing the above described performance, then the means that I use will not recognize your intention. In this case, you, I think, would be suspected of a non-carry, if my intention would recognize.
Despite the great advantages of this analysis of the subjective value, it seems to me in some respects is not accurate enough. First, it does not distinguish between different types of influences that we can want to have on the listeners - deploying, unlike illocurative, and, moreover, it does not show how these different types of influences are associated with the concept of subjective value. The second drawback of this analysis is that it does not take into account the role that the rule, or the Convention, is played in the subjective value. That is, this description of the subjective value does not show the links between, the fact that it means talking, and the fact that his statement does indeed because of the language of the language. For the purposes of the illustration of this provision, I will give a counterexample for this analysis of subjective value. The meaning of the counter-terminim is to illustrate the relationship between what is in mind the speaker, and what the words he says.
Suppose I am an American soldier who, during the Second World War, was captured by the Italian troops. Suppose also that I want to make them take me for the German officer and freed. It would be best to tell them in German or in Italian that I am a German officer. But suppose that I do not know the German and Italian so well to do it. So I, so to speak, trying to pretend that I tell them that I am a German officer, in fact, pronouncing in German, then a little that I know, in the hope that they do not know German so well to solve my plan. Suppose that I know in German only one line from the poem, which was taught by heart on German lessons in high school. So, I, Packed American, I appeal to the ITAVI, Captured Italians with the following phrase: "Kennst Du Das Land, Wo Die Zitronen Bluhen?" Now we will describe this situation in the terms of Greys. I intend to have a certain impact on them, namely, convince them that I am a German officer; And I intend to achieve this result thanks to the identification of my intention. According to my design, they should think that I am trying to tell them that I am a German officer. But should I have from this description that when I say "Kennst du das Land ...", I mean "I am a German officer"? No, it should not. Moreover, in this case, it seems clearly false that, when I say this to a German offer, I mean "I am a German officer" or even "Ich Bin Ein Deutscher Offizier", because these words mean nothing but "you know Are you a country where bloom lemon trees"? Of course, I want to make a deception to make those who took me in captivity, think that I mean "I am a German officer," but that this deception can, I have to make them think that this is what I mean the words I say german language. In one place in
The theory of speech acts arose and formed in the framework of linguistic philosophy, primarily in the works of representatives of the Oxford School (J. Austin, P. Stroson) and philosophers close to them (J. Serl and others). The creator of the theory of speech acts was the English philosopher J. Austin. The main ideas of the new theory, he outlined in the lectures read at Harvard University in 1955. In 1962, they were published by a separate book called "How to Do Things Words".
There are many different definitions of a speech act. This concept is one of the most popular in modern linguistic science and it does not have a single definition.
One of the founders of the theory of speech acts is recognized by J. Austin. The first of its task when creating the theory of speech acts of J. Austin considered the characterization of the nature of relations between the constructive and the performance of the performances and the conditions for the imbalance of the performance. Having had time to make sure that there is no rigid border between the performance and structures (when leaving the limits of a set of emplecitila performances), J. Austin began to be inclined to the idea that there are not only the performance, but also all the statements.
Walking on questions about the structure of speech acts and their taxonomy, he made a transition from response to illocitation, now leading the concept of illustrative power in the theory of speech acts.
The emphasis was transferred from the principle of the activities of the speaker on the production of statements on the principle of their communicative focus (intentionality).
In the speech Act J. Austin allocates three levels, also called acts: Local, illocution and perlocutic acts.
The location (location, from the English Locution) is the utterance of the statement possessing phonetic, lexico-grammatical and semantic structures. He is inherent in value. The implementation of the sound structure is accounted for by a phonetic act, the lexico-grammatical structure is implemented in the fatic act, and the semantic structure is in the retic act (Austin J.L. 1962: 167).
Illokut Act (Illociation, Lat. Il- The perlocut act (perlocration, lat. Per- `by") is intended to affect the addressee, achieving a result. This act is not conventional (Austin J. L. 1970: 237). All three private acts are performed at the same time, and not one by one. Their distinction is necessary for methodical purposes. Exercising a location acting simultaneously performing an illocutionary act when asks or answering a question; informs, assures or warns; declares the decision or intent; declares sentence; prescribes, calls or criticizes; identifies, describes, etc. Plindocution consists in the impact on the informational state of the addressee, on his mood, plans, desire and will. But the addresis will answer either will not consider it necessary to answer, it is already beyond the framework of the initiative speech act of the speaker (Sousov 2006: 9-14). So, M. Hallida considers the speech act as a choice of one of the numerous intertwing alternatives forming the "semantic potential" of the language. Speaking, we choose one of the forms: approval, question, generalization or refinement, repetition or adding new. In other words, as opposed to a look at the tongue as a set of rules, or formal regulations, a language concept is proposed here as a set of elections, which individuals can be estimated in different ways. It is in this sense that the speech act is associated with the "Speech Planning" and is a complex entity in which cognitive, etc. Functions are combined with interpersonal at a particular specific weighing of these functions in a specific situation (Halidity 1970: 140-165). We give a brief list of the main characteristics of the speech act (hereinafter RA), which allocates M. Halidide according to various linguistic concepts: We gave various definitions of speech acts, and also gave a brief list of the main characteristics of the Republic of Armenia, then I would like to consider which classifications are offered by linguistic scientists. Main questions. The theory of speech acts (tra) as a center of pragma-linguistics. J. Austin and J. Serl is the founders of the tra. Key-mmic parameters for the classification of Ra Serral. Classification of RA, SERM. 7-membered classification of RA. Direct and indirect ra. Indirect conventional and situationally contextual ra. The concept of a communal act. The importance of trafficers for the practice of teaching Russian as a foreign language. The speaker and his addressee, I and you are the most vivid expression find in the speech act. The theory of speech acts (new in foreign linguistics ... - 1986) is repeatedly described and analyzed, so we will dwell only at its main points. The theory of speech acts (TR) constitutes the center of Pragmalingvice, so capacious, which is buded into an independent discipline. The founder of the tra, the English philosopher J. Austin ("Word as action"), and his follower of J. Serl ("What is a speech act?") Put the beginning of research "Words-Actions", a speech act, when the utterance of the statement and turns out to be committed or other action (see section on the imformative statement). Within the framework of linguistic philosophy, the authors of the theory studied ordinary communication, goals and motives of speaking, practical results and benefits received during speech actions. Continuing and developing the ideas of linguists and philosophers about the active nature of the language (V. Gumboldt et al.), Austin and Serrel found such an explanatory approach to human activity with the help of a language that deepened the idea of \u200b\u200bthe meaning and sense of statements, first of all, Oral contact direct communication. Thus, under the speech act it is understood as a statement, generated and pronounced with a certain purpose and a certain motive for making a practical or mental (usually addressed) action using such a tool, as a language / speech: I ask you to do this - the case of a request; I advise you not to do this - the case of the Council; Thank you - the matter thanks and others. RA is according to the tra, complex education consisting of three simultaneous phases, levels, acts. The choice and organization of language agents is carried out in the location phase (a firing act). It, in Serral, act of references and predication, expressed in the proposition of statements, i.e., the content that is provided by semantics of language units reflecting the situation in the world. The phase of illustration (illocutional act) is the most essential component of RA. This is the implementation of the communicative intention of the speaker to accomplish something with the help of speech. The concept of illocuration as a destination, the functioning functions is associated with the concept of intention, the intention of the speaker, its motive and goals to influence the listeners with speech. Thus, the statement gets intentional importance, along with an illocutic function. The term "illokut" is used in combination: illustrative force, function, purpose. The force, the function of impact on the destination with the help of a statement endowed with the intentional value - the basis of the foundations of speech action. The relationship between the propositional (in a location) value and the intentional (illocurative) appointment is ambiguous. So, the statement I will come tomorrow at seven o'clock in the proposition Semantic indicators of a subject of speech as a talking person, predicate - verb of movement in the future time of owls. in. and temporal components - a pointer of the future and concretizer of time. Interaction and illustrative function depending on the communicative situation may be interpreted in this statement as a message, promise, threat, etc., but this is exactly the essence for which the speaker performs his statement and sends it to the addressee. The addressee, focusing in the situation, gives the utterance, as a rule, the unequivocarity to which the address was calculated. The Phase of Phase (PERLOCUS Act) occurs when an illustrative impact on the addressee and obtaining expected (or less often - an unexpected) result. The term "perlocuty" is combined with the word "effect". The perlocutic effect is usually recognized on a particular or emotional response of the CP destination. Expected by speaking and explicable translocutic effect from speech action "Warning you": "- Take it seriously, Pankrats, - the hardening of the runaway or assistance can have serious consequences for you. Consider yourself warned "(A. Fishermen). Here at the addressee, together with the understanding of the warning as a threat, an additional emotional state of fear may occur. Since the action of perception and understanding of the address from the addressee is assumed to be a speech action of the speaker, then the translocutic effect seems to be given by the act of communication. However, to predict what kind of perlocutic effect will arise and will arise at all, and if it occurs, then what language means is expressed, it is difficult. So, the already given statement: I will come tomorrow at seven hours - it can cause an additional effect of joy (desired communication), or grieving (again torn away from affairs, you will have to sue the table and under.), Or fright (comes and check the lessons, and It will scold) and others. Since pragmalinguistics cannot formulate unambiguous rules for the occurrence and linguistic representation of perlobutory effects, their consideration is not yet in detail. But it is safe to say that the progressive effect planned by the speaker is most likely to be carried out. So, the requirement, and even more so the order must be fulfilled, thanks or apology bring satisfaction, the appeal makes it becomes a recipient and send attention to the speaker, the promise must be fulfilled, etc. If the progressive effects were messy, people's communication, their dialogue It would not be possible. Most of all consideration of the deployment effects adequately in the communicative act, i.e., in the dialogical interactive interaction of partners. The classification of the RA is based on the illustrative strength that the statement is posted. The first classification belongs to the founder of TRA J. Ostin. After analyzing about 1000 verbs in the dictionary, capable of forming a statement-action type I promise, I order, I say ... He allocated five class on the basis of what speaking, pronouncing a statement: 1. Verdic fees - verdicts, sentences . 2. Exterior - the exercise of power, rights, influence (forced, order). 3. Commissioners - commitments, promises. 4. Beanbiti - you - expressions of social behavior, etiquette. 5. Exposives - units of a metacomynical nature, indicating the place of statements in the text - dispute, conversation. This classification, according to the Austin itself, is far from perfection. Many linguists made attempts to classify RA. Among them are J. Serl and D. Vankeken, J. Lich, R. Oman, B. Mill, 3. Wenndler, J. Mak-Kolya, D. Wunderlich and MN. Dr. V. V. Bogdanov offers a dichotomic classification (see at least Bogdanov - 1990). And yet the typology of J. Serlli is more convincing, given in 1976 in the work "Classification of Illokut Acts" (new in foreign linguistics ... - 1986). Serral identified 12 significant parameters with a linguistic point of view, relying on which it is possible, in his opinion, to substantiate the principles of assigning statements to a particular class of the Republic of Armenia: 1. The goal of the speaker in this act. 2. The direction of the device between the words and the world (some illoks are designed to make the words match the world - thank you; others are designed to make the world to meet the words - I ask you to do it). 3. Expressed mental states (faith, conviction, desire, need, pleasure, etc.). 4. Strength, energy of illustrative purposes (ask and order). 5. Status and position of the Communications (ordering and praying). 6. The method that says is correlated with the speaker and listening (advise - in favor of the listening, ask - in favor of the speaker). 7. Relations with the rest of the discourse and with the context (now consider ..., I conclude from this ..., I bring the total ...). 8. The propositional content of the statement relative to the illustrative strength (predicted - about the future, to report - indifferent to time). 9. Acts that are always speech (asking), and acts that can be carried out both speech and neustal means (punish). 10. Acts requiring or not for their implementation of out-of-voice establishments (to overcome from the church, declare war). I. Acts formed by the Performative Glagol, and acts without such a verb (I proceed with you - with impossible: I am in LSU). 12. Differences in the style of the implementation of RA [solemn oath and an ordinary promise; To declare (official) and tell (sex)]. About p. And you need to explain the following. 3. Wenndler proposed the concept of "illocution suicide", associated with the fact that not every speech action can be expressed by a statement with a retecting verb predicate of the type: I thank you, I swallow you and under. (Vendler - 1985). There are a number of RA, in which the consumption of the verb is an increasing form, as it may kill the illustrative strength of the statement. So, you can lie (in any way), but it is impossible to implement Ra Lie by saying I can LDG. Z. Vadler indicates the verbs leading to illocutional suicide: to insinuate, alternately declare, fell, incite, push, encourage, threaten, boast, bragging, hint, lie, scold, donate, sawing, pick up, make fun, mock, ulcery, flatter. The list can be significantly expanded. It is poisoned, cannorable, braking, force, force and MN., MN. Dr. Vendler rightly notes that the reacted statements with the predicates listed (I am a flattery, I donate you) contain a "subversive factor": the secret becomes clear. However, our communication is replete with speech actions of an unfavorable nature, but methods for expressing these values \u200b\u200bare different (see the corresponding section), they do not "fit", as a rule, into one statement. In later work, "the basic concepts of the calculus of speech acts", made jointly with D. Vanderweken (new in foreign linguistics ... - 1986), Serral and its co-author allocate seven support distant signs of RA: 1. Illokutic goal. 2. The way to achieve an illustrative goal (ordering and begins). 3. The intensity of the illustrative goal (order and advise). 4. Conditions of propositional content (prediction relates to the future). 5. Prerequisites (promise preceded confidence in the ability to fulfill it). 6. Conditions of sincerity. 7. Intensity of sincerity conditions (solemn and ordinary promise). Let's return to classifications. The RA Typology belonging to J. Serma includes the following classes: 1. Representatives - messages, allegations about a certain state of affairs (I argue that the exam is not difficult). 2. Directives - the desire of the speaker to encourage listening to committing something (I ask you to move). 3. Commissioners - promises, obligations (I promise you to do it). 4. Expression - expressions of the mental state of the speaker, launch behavior in relation to the listening (thank you). 5. Declarations - declarations, ads, appointments that change the state of affairs in the world and successful in the event that such declarations have been identified with social right (I announce a meeting open on the part of the meeting chairman). These five classes of RA also do not cover all types of statements, the pronouncing of which is the implementation of the case, therefore numerous attempts continue to clarify the existing classifications and create new ones (see Funnikov - 1984, Doroshenko - 1986, Belyaeva - 1987, Bogdanov - 1990, Pisarek - 1995 and MN. Dr.). It is possible to count from 5 to 18 themselves from 5 to 18. It seems that the fact is that researchers come from varying degrees of abstraction when allocating a group of speech actions. In fact, representatives - messages like RA may be allegations and denials (argue that it is so; deny that it is so), bringing to the attention (I bring to your attention ...), alert (I notify ...), reporting (I repent ...), informing (informing you ...), and MN. Dr. Directives - motivations can be requests (I ask you ...) And orders (order ...), advice (I advise you ...) and invitations (I invite you) and MN. Dr. Commissors - obligations can be promises (I promise you ...), oaths (swear ...), oaths, etc. Liquid signs can be greetings (welcome you), congratulations (congratulations on the holiday), apologies (I apologize , Excuse me), condolences (I sympathize with you) and MN. Dr. Declarations - Classifieds are implications (call the baby Maria), sentences (speak ...), appointments (I appoint you to the old-age) and MN. Dr. An attractive classification of the performative verbs (not RA, and the verbs!) In the work of Yu. D. Apresan "Performed in grammar and in the dictionary." It highlights 15 classes of such verbs: 1. Messages, approval. 2. Recognition. 3. Promises. 4. Requests. 5. Offers and tips. 6. Warnings and predictions. 7. Requirements and orders. 8. Bans and permissions. 9. Consent and objections. 10. Approval. 11. Condemnation. 12. Forgiveness. 13. Speech rituals. 14. Socialized transmission acts, cancellation, failure, etc. 15. Names and destination. For all these groups, Apresian lists only those verbs that allow direct performance (I inform you, I accept, I promise, etc.). The question arises about the nomenclature of speech actions and the nomenclature of those speech intentions that serve as an incentive force to the production of a speech act and form the values \u200b\u200bof repetitive statements (not only in direct formative form). Attempt to create the list of nominations of speech intentions in Russian is undertaken in dissertation by E. P. Savelieva (Savelyeva - 1991). We emphasize that we are talking about the nominative aspect of the name (with the help of the verb or the exclusive noun) speech intention (ask, request), which in the communicative unit - a repetitive statement - acquires its form and illustrative strength (I ask you ...) and many ways of expression in different statements. In real communication, everything is much more complicated than in the examples given: one statement may have several illocutic functions, the definition of illustrative force may be difficult to blur the intentional significance, etc. Wed. Grandmother's speech sent to the grandson: - I watch, what he was thrown - high and beautiful! The mind would just have enough, and then you have a friend, the mother writes, some not such (recording oral speech). In the statements indirectly reflected several intentions and emotions of the speaker: approval, admiration, wish, condemnation, fear. The source of information is also indicated (mother writes). Thus, here are a number of speech acts: I am glad and admire you; I wish you to behave wisely; I rely on your mother's information about your friends; I condemn them; I fear that you will follow the behavior of your friends. If we turn to the records of colloquial speech, it will become noticeable that the intentional plan in the statements is intertwined by emotional, as well as with the estimated, which often makes it difficult for classification work. But despite this, the reference classification is needed. We will make some comments to the above classification of Serral. In our opinion, those researchers who are distinguished from the directive RA to a separate class of rich nuts in a separate class. In fact, despite the fact that the question is the impulse of the addressee to give an answer, information, nevertheless there are those semantic components that are not in typical motivation. To make a question, the following preliminary conditions should be in the mental field: a) I do not know (otherwise the question could not arise); b) I want to know (otherwise the question will also not arise); c) I encourage you to give me knowledge. Only this third condition relates questions with urges. By the way, the multiplicity of types of questions and methods of their expression also speaks in favor of the deduction of a separate class of questionnaire rates. Further, in our opinion, it is advisable to leave the expressive expression of emotions in the class of expressive (behabetives, by octin). Most of all are required for such a repetitive expression. Interdisciplons (Blokhin - 1990): And what about!, Still!, Well, well!, That's time! and mn. Dr.; as well as statements with a location component: what there is (smart)!, where there (settled)!, what else (talk)!; Negative understanding of the statement: you really need me to me, I need your chicken; Transpositia of etiquette / arms: no, thanks! , Well, you wondered, congratulations! Hello, how can I handle it with that?! and mn. dr. As for the expressions of social etiquette (see section on speech etiquette), they are connected not so much with emotions and estimates, as with socially specified rules of speech behavior and are intended to establish and maintain the socio-speech contact of the interlocutors, so it is advisable to consider them as a separate class of etiquette rates - etiquette expressions, contacts, sociatives. By the way, by performing a launchy ritual of greetings or congratulations, etc., who says may not experience any emotions or experience opposite to those indicated in the statement: Glad to see you; I sincerely thank you; I so sympathize - and MN. Dr. The class of etiquette RA (contactives) relieves the issue of highlighting the voucher-appeal to a separate class of the Republic of Armenia (D. Vunderlich, G. G. Pokheftov, L. P. Cha- Hoyang), since Vogivati \u200b\u200bis a bright representative of etiquette means of contacting and maintaining and maintaining and maintaining serves as an indicator of socio-etiquette relationships of communication (see the corresponding section). In connection with those who said, install seven classes of RA as the generalized minimum on which you can rely on. As for more fractional classifications, they, in our opinion, go to a lower level of abstraction and member, specify a larger class. (See below from this point of view a more detailed consideration of the class of policy makers.) So, we rely on the following taxonomy of the initial membership of the Republic of Armenia: 1. Representatives - messages. 2. Commissioners - obligations. 3. Directives - prompting. 4. Rogatima - questions. 5. Declarations - ads (declarations). 6. Expression - expressions of emotions. 7. Contacts - speech etiquette expressions. Communication communication, which is obvious, is within the framework of social regulations and establishments, therefore the social consequences of the use of certain RA also in the field of view of researchers. According to the role that one or another Ra plays in the socio-communative interactions of partners, J. Lich (see the principles of pragmatics) allocated 4 groups: 1. Competing RA - the illustrative goal of the speaker competes with social equilibrium (strict requirements, orders and Dr.). 2. Festive RA - Illokutic goal of the speaker coincides with social goals (gratitude, congratulations, etc.). 3. Cooperating RA - Illokutic goal of speaking indifferent to the social goal (reports, instructions, etc.). 4. Conflict RA - Illokutic goal speaking conflict with social goals (threats, accusations, etc.). It is appropriate to touch the question of direct and indirect r a (Serl - 1986). Direct RA is called the production and pronouncement of such a statement, in which his illustrative force is unequivocally expressed: I thank you for the assistance rendered - in the statement in accordance with its form and importance. However, it is often (and even often) in the statement against the background of the explicated illustrative force (for example, messages), the other is also manifested, that is, more content turns out than its surface structure transmits, and the listening should be guessed about it. So, you are late, you are late containing reproaches and, in fact, for the sake of the blast; RA, designed as a question, is essentially a request: - Could you move? Many RA, who cannot receive direct statements (also by virtue of the "illocution suicide"), are indirectly: - What kind of spares you are - reproach and swearing (with impossible: I reproach you, I scold you). A lot of messages that obviously carries additional illocutional functions. In the event of non-resident speech deeds, this is the concealment of the "subversive factor", in the case of some motivations (see ways to express a request) - giving the issue of awareness of the possibilities of recipient of greater courtesy. A speaking, using an indirect RA, calculates, as mentioned, to understand the listening listener associated with the background knowledge, preapposition, as well as the Convention - an unwritten agreement, the establishment adopted in this community. So, the uzual use of issues instead of motivation (especially requests) made such indirect RA conventional: you can't move?; Are you not hard to transfer to another chair? and mn. Dr. The meaning of the statement is closely related to situitation. Cf. Question of the teacher at the beginning of the lecture: - Does anyone remove the clock? In suspension here: Forgot the clock, there are no hours. Background knowledge suggest: the lecture begins and ends at a certain time. The implications: Since the teacher must follow the time, he needs a clock. Therefore, the question will perceive the audience as please give a clock. It is clear that the question: Does anyone remove the clock? - From one of the passengers of the bus or lead to communicative failure, misunderstanding, or will be understood as a "polite" robbery. Separating indirect RA from direct, it is necessary, besides the conventional indirect, mention and contextual indirect. The fact is that the conventional is recognized in their intentional meaning / illustrative strength in a single statement, isolated from context, although situationally defined. So, in the subway, the statement is not difficult for you to move? It will be unambiguously perceived as a request, not a question: in response, no one will spread about their difficulties, and either make a physical action that they ask, accompanying it or not speech, or refuses to fulfill, accompanying the refusal of speech actions apologized, arguments, regrettable, etc. From such ra, in our opinion, to distinguish between the rules, which are not recognized by the native speakers from the side of the intentional value, for which the RA was produced. So, a separate message I have a sore throat does not contain failure, although it may be obtained within the communicative act, interaction, dialog interaction with a partner: - Let's eat ice cream. - My throat hurts - a refusal in the form of argumentation with implications I can not eat ice cream, as I have a throat hurts. Communications carrying additional intentional meanings in our communication are many. Moreover, we are much less likely to use straight RA, rather than indirect, conventional and contextual situational, especially when you need to show high politeness, hide the non-resident of speech action, give a hint, Irony, use speech manipulations and MN. Dr. Special RA researchers consider meaningful silence. Cf. Radder of the Drama "Boris Godunov" at A. S. Pushkin: "The people silent." In fact, often silent - this is the lack of statements to express their opinion, the attitude, evaluation of the event. However, in our opinion, it is difficult to talk about the Unified RA of Silence, because this action (inaction) is hidden a variety of intentional and emotional significance. Cf. Silence as a refusal, silence - a sign of consent, silence as ignorance, insult, reproach, discontent and MN. Dr. At the same time, as a rule, significant silence is accompanied by non-verbal means of communication: facial expressions, an expression, gesture (see the corresponding section). Apparently, it is advisable to consider significant silence by one of the non-verbal ways to express the intentional significance, closely related to the specific situation of communication. Wed: "- Gorynych, so it is impossible, "Ivan cared," I can't throw out the song songs. Gorynych silently looked at Ivan; Again, this bad silence reigned"(V. Shukshin). Another example: "- We are going, Peter! Which jester is smoking here. In extremes, see the southern country. Strachnaya was silent, thought about his family. And Pukhova Baba died, and it was drawn to the edge of the world. - Made, Petrukha! In fact, what an army without locksmiths. Starry again silently, sorry to his wife Aksinhu and son. - We are going, Petruch! - exhorted the downs. - Horning horizons will see "(A. Platonov). As you can see, the replicas of the refinement proceed from one of the communicants, the second participates in the "dialogue" of silence. The insistent component of the RA silence explains in his remarks: I thought about my family; I regretted his wife Aksinhu and Silenka (see Crested - 1990). Speech act / action, as a rule, is sent to the addressee, an influential illustrative force and a perlocutic effect is calculated on the addressee, and the addressee is expected to respond. In this regard, T. Van Duck (Van Dyek - 1978) argued that RA is the unit only communications, the genuine unit of communication is the communicative act (ka). According to Van Dequee, CA consists of a) RA, or an act of a speaking, b) an auditive act, or an act of listening, c) a communicative situation, including the characteristics of the speaker and listening, their relationship, accompanying events, etc., and yet, In accordance with what was said above, we consider the minimum unit of communication, a separate addressed RA, as a rule, included in the interaction - dialogue interaction of partners, which can be considered a genuine communicative act. Despite the disadvantages of the theory of speech acts and criticizing this theory (these theories) (see Frank - 1986), the allocation of RA as an object of pragmalinguistics played an outstanding role in the modern scientific paradigm (see Demyankov - 1986, as well as numerous subsequent publications and dissertation studies) . In the practice of teaching foreign languages, the Russian language as a foreign language, on the basis of the communicative method of supporting the RA, can lead to optimization of students' training and additionally motivate the study of language as a communication tool - both in oral forms and in reading fiction, since communicative intentions of communicative, intentional Sessions, the choice of the optimal method of expressing the intention (see below) is included in the pressing communicative needs of learning language. The question of the selection of RA and the methods of their presentation are solved depending on the specific methodological tasks: the preparedness of students, the stage of training, specialization -, etc., and so paragraph. Relevant work: M. N. Vyatytnov. The theory of the textbook of the Russian language as a foreign (methodological basis). - M., 1984; A. R. Harutyunov. Communicative intensive rate of rock for a given contingent of students (methodological manual). - M., 1989; A. R. Harutyunov, P. G. Chebotarev, N. B. Murrukov. Gaming tasks in the lessons of the Russian language: a book for the teacher. - M., 1984 - and MN. Dr., including dissertation research on the method of teaching Russian as a foreign language. 1.What should be understood under the speech act (RA)? 2. What phases (levels, acts) are Ra? 3. How can I characterize the illustrative strength / statement function? 4. What kind of relationships are Illociation and the intention? 5. List 12 parameters allocated by J. Serm to classify RA. 6. Name 5 classes of RA, SERM. 8. Describe the concepts of "direct and indirect speech act". 9. What is included in the concept of a communicative act? Examples for analysis Highlight speech acts in the texts, their leading illocutional functions and intentional values. Name RA on these features. Describe the RA as direct and indirect. 1) "- I do not share your thoughts! And listen to me if from this moment you will deliver at least one word, speak with someone, beware of me! I repeat: Beware "(M. Bulgakov). 2) "- Required Protocol! - with Paphos shouted Ostap "(I. Ilf, E. Petrov). 3) "- I order to keep it all in the strictest secretion" (M. Bulgakov). 4) "- No ninkie is not here. Is it really incomprehensible. Shock here at night. To be careful, what are you? - Egor thought out loud and blurted out the matches in his pocket. - BUT?" (V. Shukshin). 5) "- I do not touch anything, I do not touch anyone, I replenish the primus," the cat said unfriendly, "and I also consider a debt to warn that the cat ancient and an inviolable animal" (M. Bulgakov). 6) "He: Yes, I feel sorry for me, but I can help you? You tell me, I will do everything. Want, I'll start glue the wallpaper now? Do you want to wash the floor in the kitchen? She: ... nothing needs. Sit down You just wish. Sit next to. Silently ... "(L. Timofeev). 7) "I confess, to bury people like Belikov, this is a great pleasure" (A. Chekhov). 8) (the courtyard girl did not immediately come running on the call of the Countess). "- What are you, honey." Do not want to serve, or what? So I will find the place "(L. Tolstoy). LITERATURE 1. New in overseas linguistics. Issue XVII. Theory of speech acts. - M., 1986. 2. Bogdanov V.V. Speech communication. - L., 1990. 3. New in overseas linguistics. Issue XVIII. Logic analysis of natural language. - M., 1986. 4. Vendler 3. Illokutic suicide // New in foreign linguistics. Issue XVI. Linguistic pragmatics. - M., 1985. 5. Funny B. N. To the problem of structuring of a speech act / speech action // Questions of Linguistics, 1984, No. 6. 6. Doroshenko A.V. The motivating speech acts and their interpretation in the text. Diss ... Cand. Philol. science - M "1986. 7. Belyaeva E. I. Modality in various types of speech acts // Philological sciences, 1987, No. 3. 8. Pisarek L. Speech actions and their implementation in Russian in comparison with Polish (expression). - Wroclaw, 1995. 9. Apresan Yu. D. Performatives in grammar and in the dictionary // News of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Serve L and I, vol. 45, No. 3,1986. 10. Savelyeva E. P. Nominations of speech intentions in Russian and their semanti-pragmatic interpretation. Diss ... Cand. Philol. science - M., 1991. I. Blokhina Ya. L. Typological properties and communicative meanings of interddent statements. Diss ... Cand. Philol. science - M., 1990. 12. Serral J. R. Indirect speech acts // New in overseas linguistics. Issue XVII. Theory of speech acts. - M., 1986. 13. Van Dyk T. Questions of the pragmatics of text // New in foreign linguistics. Issue VIII. Linguistics text. - M., 1978. 14. Frank D. Seven sins of pragmatics ... // New in foreign linguistics. Issue XVII. Theory of speech acts. - M., 1986. 15. Demyankov V. 3. - "Theory of speech acts" in the context of modern foreign linguistic literature (direction review) // New in foreign linguistics. Issue XVII. Theory of speech acts. - M., 1986. 16. Krestinsky S. V. Interpretation of the acts of silence in discourse // Language, discourse, personality. - Tver, 1990.
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