During the Battle of Kursk, the city was liberated. They commanded fronts, armies in the Battle of Kursk

July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the German fascist invaders. The front in its configuration in the area near Kursk, the front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command was preparing an offensive operation as a revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: "I decided, as soon as the weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It must end with a quick and decisive success." The swift tanks "tigers" and "panthers", super-heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinands", according to the plan of the Nazis, were to crush, disperse the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German operation "Citadel" would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle ... The Military Council of the Front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two twenty minutes, silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until 23 August.

As a result, the events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into a defeat for the Hitlerite groups. The strategy of the operation "Citadel" of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead - crushing blows using surprise at the forces of the Soviet Army, their encirclement and destruction. The triumph of the Citadel plan was to ensure the implementation of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

The course of the Kursk battle

The actions of the Army Group Center and the Operational Group Kempf of the Army South, which came from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were supposed to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The repulsion of the blow from the direction of Orel was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The formations of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from the side of Belgorod.

The steppe front, as part of the rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, the Russian field under the Prokhorovka railway station took place the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians unprecedented in the world, the largest through tank battle in scale. Russian power on its own land withstood another test, turned the course of history to victory.

One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand casualties. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovskoye field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting to carry out Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat the enemy groupings in the Orel region. From 16 to 18 July, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groupings in the Kursk triangle and began pursuing it with the support of the air forces. The combined forces of the Hitlerite units were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The significance of the Battle of Kursk

An unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was the key in the development of further offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War;
The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the 1943 campaign plans;
As a result of the implementation of the "Kutuzov" plan and the "Commander Rumyantsev" operation, units of the Nazi troops were defeated in the area of the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkiv bridgeheads were liquidated;
The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance westward, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Kursk battle

The failure of the Wehrmacht operation "Citadel" presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of the Hitlerite company against the Soviet Union;
A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and the whole as a result of the "fiery" Battle of Kursk;
The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious, there was no longer any confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.

After the battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge in the next year, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the final turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.

Prehistory of the Battle of Kursk

During the counterattack from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the Wehrmacht's 6th Army to surrender at Stalingrad, and liberate vast territories. So, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to capture Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut the German defense. The gap reached about 200 kilometers wide and 100-150 kilometers deep.

Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front, the Hitlerite command at the beginning of March 1943 undertook a number of energetic actions in the Kharkov region. A shock group was created very quickly, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and made an attempt to cut off the ledge in the Kursk region. However, the German offensive was stopped here.

As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was almost flat throughout its entire length, and only in the Kursk region it bent, forming a large ledge that jutted into the German side. The front's configuration made it clear where the main battles would unfold during the 1943 summer campaign.

Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk

In the spring, heated debates flared up in the German leadership over the fate of the summer 1943 campaign. Part of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from the offensive in order to accumulate forces for a large-scale offensive campaign in 1944. However, most of the German military leaders were strongly in favor of the offensive already in 1943. This offensive was supposed to be a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.

Thus, for the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. It is worth noting, however, that from 1941 to 1943, the scale of these campaigns declined steadily. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht led an offensive along the entire front, then in 1943 it was only a small section of the Soviet-German front.

The meaning of the operation, which received the name "Citadel", consisted in the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and striking them in the general direction of Kursk. Soviet troops stationed in the ledge inevitably had to be surrounded and destroyed. After that, it was planned to launch an offensive into the gap formed in the Soviet defense and reach Moscow from the south-west. This plan, if it were successfully implemented, would become a real disaster for the Red Army, because there were a very large number of troops in the Kursk salient.

The Soviet leadership learned important lessons from the spring of 1942 and 1943. So, by March 1943, the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to a defeat near Kharkov. After that, it was decided not to start the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were also planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubts that the Wehrmacht would advance precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed to this as much as possible.

That is why, after weighing all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to wear down the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally securing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

For an offensive on Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large grouping, the number of which was 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were tank and motorized. From the sky, the German group was covered by the aviation of the 4th and 6th air fleets of the Luftwaffe. Thus, the total number of German troops at the beginning of the battle at Kursk was approximately 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern groups of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk Bulge were part of different army groups ("Center" and "South"), the leadership was carried out by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals General Kluge and Manstein.

The Soviet group on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern face of the salient was defended by the troops of the Central Front under the command of General of the Army Rokossovsky, the southern one by the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of General of the Army Vatutin. Also in the Kursk salient were the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel-General Konev. The general leadership of the troops in the Kursk salient was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5,000 tanks and about 2,900 aircraft.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (5 - 12 July 1943)

On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive against Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the start of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-training, which made it possible in the first minutes and hours of the battle to inflict serious losses and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of the German troops.

Nevertheless, the German offensive began, and in the early days it managed to achieve some success. The first line of the Soviet defense was broken through, but the Germans did not manage to achieve serious success. On the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht struck in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, failing to break through the Soviet defenses, they turned towards the village of Ponyri. However, here, too, the Soviet defense managed to withstand the onslaught of the German troops. As a result of the fighting on July 5-10, 1943, the 9th German army suffered enormous losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of order. On July 10, parts of the army went over to the defensive.

The situation unfolded more dramatically in the south. Here the German army in the early days managed to break into the Soviet defense, but never broke through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the village of Oboyan, which was held by Soviet troops, who also inflicted significant damage on the Wehrmacht.

After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to transfer the direction of the main strike to Prokhorovka. Implementation of this decision would allow to cover more territory than planned. However, here, units of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of the German tank wedges.

On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, about 700 tanks took part in it, while on the Soviet side, about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on parts of the Wehrmacht in order to eliminate the enemy's penetration into the Soviet defenses. However, this counterstrike did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only succeeded in stopping the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk Bulge, but it was possible to restore the position at the beginning of the German offensive only two weeks later.

By July 15, having suffered huge losses as a result of continuous violent attacks, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and was forced to go over to the defensive along the entire front. By July 17, the withdrawal of German troops to the starting lines began. Taking into account the developing situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Supreme Command Headquarters already on July 18, 1943, authorized the transition of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counteroffensive.

Now the German troops were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, the Wehrmacht units, seriously exhausted in offensive battles, could not offer serious resistance. The Soviet troops, reinforced by reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.

To defeat the German troops covering the Kursk Bulge, two operations were developed and carried out: "Kutuzov" (to defeat the Oryol group of the Wehrmacht) and "Rumyantsev" (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).

As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groupings of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Oryol and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge practically ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow for the first time saluted the Soviet troops, who liberated the cities from the enemy.

The last battle of the Kursk battle was the liberation of the city of Kharkov by Soviet troops. The battles for this city took on a very fierce character, however, thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.

Losses of the parties

Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as of the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even more ambiguity is brought about by the large differences between the estimates of the parties' losses in different sources.

So, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. At the same time, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand killed and 700 thousand wounded. Losses of armored vehicles range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. The losses of the Soviet aviation are estimated at 1,600 aircraft.

However, regarding the assessment of the losses of the Wehrmacht, the data differ even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht servicemen at about 420 thousand. Losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.

Results and significance of the Battle of Kursk

Immediately after the Battle of Kursk and immediately during it, the Red Army began conducting a number of large-scale operations with the aim of liberating Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: "Suvorov" (the operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernigov-Poltava.

Thus, the victory at Kursk opened up a vast operational space for the Soviet troops. German troops, drained of blood and defeated as a result of summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this does not mean at all that the Wehrmacht was not strong at that time. On the contrary, snapping furiously, the German troops tried to hold at least the Dnieper line.

For the Allied command, which landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the Battle of Kursk became a kind of "help", since the Wehrmacht was now unable to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was of higher priority. Even after the defeat at Kursk, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and in their place send units battered in battles with the Red Army.

For the German command, the Battle of Kursk was the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and victory over the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for quite a long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from active operations.

The Battle of Kursk was the end of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which, by the end of 1943, vast territories of the Soviet Union were liberated, including such large cities as Kiev and Smolensk.

In international terms, the victory in the Battle of Kursk was the moment when the peoples of Europe enslaved by the Nazis perked up. The people's liberation movement in European countries began to grow even faster. It culminated in 1944, when the decline of the Third Reich became very clear.

If you have any questions - leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them.

Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many of the facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and writer, author of more than 40 publications on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Prokhorov, Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth Region.

The article is based on the material of the program "The Price of Victory" by the radio station "Echo of Moscow". The broadcast was hosted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the full original interview here.

After the encirclement of Paulus's group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which Soviet troops captured a significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk region, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Das Reich" - the Germans dealt a crushing counterattack. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that we got this battle dearly.

After the German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization took place due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and 3rd "Stalingrad" corps, as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and 64th Army of General Shumilov (hereinafter it is 6 1st and 7th Guards armies). In addition, by the end of March there was a thaw, which, of course, helped our troops to hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very stuck and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were underway for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact, a certain balance, equilibrium was maintained, without abrupt, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such deafening defeat, so the political leadership had an important task - to consolidate its bloc, because Germany's allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; and what will happen if suddenly another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed after a fairly victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

Although no, not small. If Operation Citadel were crowned with success, which, of course, the German command hoped for, then two fronts would be in the ring - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they could pass there, and then, with a blow from above, from the north, press them down, throw them into the sea (in the lower part there were the Azov and Black Seas).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. First, he said that Germany cannot make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from the psychological point of view, but from the point of view of raw materials, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on developing Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that it was convenient for our troops to carry out flank attacks from the Kursk salient, so the area of the beginning of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the process of formulating the tasks and the preparation process took a long time because there were controversies. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation due to the understaffing, both in manpower and technical. And, by the way, the second date of the "Citadel" was set for June 10 (the first - for May 3-5). And already from June 10, it was moved even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only "Tigers" and "Panthers" were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these machines began to be produced in a relatively large series precisely in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 "Tigers" and 200 "Panthers" be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine group was not involved, because, like any new technology, both tanks suffered from "childhood diseases". As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers' carburetors quite often caught fire, the Panthers had transmission problems, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in combat during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each species would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more dire.

It is important to understand here that the German command originally planned the Belgorod grouping, that is, the Army Group "South", which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it had to solve the main task. The strike of Model's 9th Army was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to cover 147 kilometers before joining Model's troops, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (there were intelligence reports, photographs) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening the positions, and he realized that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he arrived at the beginning in Bohodukhiv, in the command post of the 4th Panzer Army to Gotha. What for? The fact is that Goth wrote a letter - there was also an attempt to develop Operation Panther (as a continuation in the case of the success of Citadel). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 mechanized tank corps, which the Russians had already prepared. That is, to destroy mobile reserves.

If this whole colossus moves on Army Group South, then, as they say, it will not seem a little. That's why it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the "Citadel". On May 9-11, Goth and Manstein discussed the plan. And it was at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and Kempf's operational group were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorov battle was also developed here.

It was at Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when the state of the German troops is assessed, it will be possible to speak of an offensive.

In the region of the Kursk salient, both in the north and in the south, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles at their disposal on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel. It was assumed that it was these forces that would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After that, under favorable circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

For the battles at Prokhorovka, an SS corps was planned, partly the 48th corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps. These three corps were supposed to grind mobile reserves, which were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why to the Prokhorovka area? Because the area was favorable there. In other places, it was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that they did not calculate the forces of our defense.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that the situation in Africa they already had a seam. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British would establish complete control over the Mediterranean. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was eventually carried out. That is, the Germans in other areas, too, were not doing it, thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania and other allies ...

The planning of the summer hostilities of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began at about the same time: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after the stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the retention of the enemy, which was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of the defense was controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal Zhukov. And after the stabilization of the front line, he was here, in the area of Belgorod; together with Vasilevsky they discussed further plans. After that, he prepared a note in which he outlined the point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became the commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before that he commanded the South-Western Front. He replaced Golikov, who was removed from this position by the decision of the Headquarters).

So, in early April, a note was laid on Stalin's desk, which outlined the basic principles of conducting hostilities in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with Stalin's participation, in which the proposal was approved to switch to deliberate defense, to prepare troops and defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the region of the Kursk salient suggested a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi operation "Citadel" failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the creation of such powerful defensive lines was not carried out by the Red Army. After all, the depth of these three lines of defense was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans had to plow, ram, drill 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just trenches dug up to their full height and reinforced with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, holes, this is the most powerful system of minefields made for the first time during the war; and each, in fact, settlement on this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the German nor our side has ever erected such a strong and full of engineering barriers and fortifications on the Eastern Front. The most fortified were the first three strips: the main army strip, the second army strip and the third rear army strip - approximately to a depth of 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groups for two weeks were unable to break through them, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German strike.

The fact is that in May, fairly accurate data were received about the enemy's plans for the summer: from time to time they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the supreme command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would deliver the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally transferred to significant artillery forces, a whole artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting in the south developed. Vatutin was forced to repel the attacks of the enemy's main tank grouping with tanks, not having sufficient artillery means to fight; in the north, there were also tank divisions, which took part directly in the offensive against the Central Front, but they dealt with Soviet artillery, and numerous at that.

But let's smoothly move to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov's film "Liberation": the defector says that the Germans are concentrated here and there, a colossal artillery attack is being carried out, almost all Germans are killed, it is not clear who else is fighting there for a month. What was the case in reality?

There really was a defector, and not one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on 4 July, a reconnaissance soldier from the 168th Infantry Division came over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy preparing for the offensive, it was supposed to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike the aviation of the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies on the airfield. Let's say about the air raid - it failed. Moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the time was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, it had partial success in the zone of the 6th Guards Army: mainly telephone communication lines were disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which took up defenses along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, respectively, are on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they had to cross the river. They pulled up significant forces, watercraft to certain settlements and sectors of the front, and preliminarily set up several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineering reconnaissance, by the way, worked very well), and the artillery strike was carried out precisely in these areas: along the crossings and in settlements where these assault groups of the 3rd Panzer Corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the zone of the 7th Guards Army was much higher. Losses from it both in manpower and in technology, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places paralyzed.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy's strike grouping, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempf's army group, to cover the right flank of the 2nd Hausser Panzer Corps. That is, the offensive of the main strike group and the auxiliary one along diverging lines began. This forced the enemy to attract additional forces to cover their flanks from the edge of the blow. This tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and was perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky are famous people, but the latter has a reputation, perhaps, of a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, since he still fought with fewer forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, it is safe to say that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very sensibly and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main group, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusively, when the situation practically changed, when the Germans had already sent shock groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and, of course, control went very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander in chief.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov's tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before that, at the turn of the German attack, at the forefront, there was the notorious Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did this happen? The fact is that the defense was structured as follows: in front, at the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans would most likely strike along the Oboyanskoye highway. And then they had to be stopped by the tankers of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th, they advanced to the second army line and almost in the morning took the brunt of the attack. By the middle of the day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was split into several parts, three divisions were scattered, and we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and resilience of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held until the 9th inclusive.

The commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, accepts the report of one of the commanders of the formations, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin received the Voronezh front in a very deplorable state. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. The replenishment came at the expense of the call of the local population, which left the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as at the expense of the replenishment arrived from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in 1942 in the spring was made up for by officers from academies, from rear units, and so on. And after the battles at Stalingrad, the situation with the command staff of the tactical echelon, especially the commanders of battalions and regiments, was disastrous. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that was possible was done.

The Battle of Kursk is regarded by many as the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is it so? At the first stage - undoubtedly. No matter how we now assess the battle on the Black Earth Region, it was precisely after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct any major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He just had nothing to do it with. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was tasked with exhausting the enemy's forces and knocking out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they could not completely do this. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to the repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a re-base of the 10th tank brigade. There the Germans blew up a part of the "Panthers", up to forty units, we captured a part. And at the end of August Germany was no longer able to replenish all the panzer divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave another name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to the Wehrmacht's plans, was to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army first began to retreat during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army began a decisive offensive that could only be stopped at the Kursk Bulge, and the German command understood this. The Germans had established a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it had to withstand any attack.

Forces of the parties

Germany
At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to a huge amount of human strength, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which there were tanks of all the latest models: these are more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant "Among about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank troops there were three elite tank divisions, which had not suffered a single defeat before - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the ground army, an air fleet was sent with a total number of more than 1000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

the USSR
To slow down and complicate the enemy offensive, the Soviet Army placed approximately 1,500 mines for each kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same Wehrmacht Tigers.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Battle progress

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to pull it off. The Soviet command struck at the Germans with a powerful artillery strike to weaken the initial attack of the enemy.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht inflicted powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern face of the arc, German tanks launched an offensive, but soon met very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the strike, but did not achieve significant results, by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, while losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
On July 5, an attack began on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. First, a powerful artillery barrage followed. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
The famous battle of Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the battle was at its height on July 12. On a small sector of the front, 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided. Tanks from both sides mingled and throughout the day many tank crews left their combat vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of July 12, the tank battle began to decline. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken through a little inland, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army began an offensive.
The losses of the Germans in the battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were almost completely drained of blood and lost their attack potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went over to the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large number of equipment and guns. The Soviet army lost, according to various estimates, up to about 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure - irrecoverable losses.
The first offensive operations from the Soviet side began on July 5, their purpose was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this sector of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkovo operation began from the side of the Soviet army. The Soviet command set out to encircle the German Donbass grouping. The Soviet army managed to force the Northern Donets, capture a bridgehead on the right bank and, most importantly, pin down German reserves in this sector of the front.
During the Miussk offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the arc itself.
On July 12, an offensive began in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to knock the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Oryol and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So on August 5, the first fireworks for the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War was organized in the capital. During the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
On the southern phage, the offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 and was named Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). The Germans made attempts to counterattack during this offensive, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the offensive operation "Kutuzov" was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the "Center" group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 - September 22), the Donetsk basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost all of the Left-Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued its offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
Losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers were killed on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans say the figure is less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns were lost.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went over to defensiveness. In 1944 and 1945, local offensives were launched, but they did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that a defeat at the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.

A people forgetting their past has no future. This is what the ancient Greek philosopher Plato once said. In the middle of the last century, the "fifteen sister republics" united by "Great Russia" inflicted a crushing defeat on the plague of mankind - fascism. The fierce battle was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - the Kursk Bulge, one of the fateful battles that marked the final mastery of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers of the strategic initiative. From that time on, the German invaders began to smash at all lines. The purposeful movement of the fronts to the West began. Since that time, the Nazis have forgotten what it means "forward to the East."

Historical parallels

The Kursk confrontation took place on 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943 on the primordial Russian land, over which the great noble Prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His prophetic warning to the Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about imminent death from the onslaught of the Russian sword that once again gained strength. It is characteristic that the Kursk Bulge was somewhat similar to the battle given by Prince Alexander to the Teutonic knights on 04/05/1242. Of course, the armament of the armies, the scale and time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles is somewhat similar: the Germans, with their main forces, tried to break through the Russian battle formation in the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of the flanks.

If, however, pragmatically try to say what is unique about the Kursk Bulge, a brief summary will be as follows: unprecedented in history (before and after) operational-tactical density per 1 km of the front.

Battle disposition

The offensive of the Red Army after the Battle of Stalingrad from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by the defeat of about 100 enemy divisions driven back from the North Caucasus, Don, Volga. But due to the losses suffered by our side, by the beginning of the spring of 1943 the front had stabilized. On the map of hostilities in the center of the front line with the Germans, towards the Nazi army, a ledge stood out, which the military gave the name Kursk Duga. The 1943 spring brought a lull to the front: no one advanced, both sides forcibly accumulated strength in order to again seize the strategic initiative.

Preparing Nazi Germany

After the Stalingrad defeat, Hitler announced mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew, more than covering the losses incurred. There were 9.5 million people “under the arms” (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready active troops (5.3 million people) were on the Soviet-German front.

The Fuhrer was eager to seize the strategic initiative in the war. The turning point, in his opinion, should have occurred precisely on that section of the front where the Kursk Bulge was located. To implement the plan, the Wehrmacht headquarters developed a strategic operation "Citadel". The plan involved strikes converging towards Kursk (from the north - from the region of Orel; from the south - from the region of Belgorod). In this way, the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts fell into the "cauldron".

For this operation, 50 divisions were concentrated in this sector of the front, incl. 16 armored and motorized troops, with a total of 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this group, the transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: the Panther and Tiger tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns.

In preparing Soviet troops for battle, one should pay tribute to the commanding talent of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov. Together with the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky, he reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin the assumption that the Kursk Bulge would become the main upcoming battlefield, and also predicted the approximate forces of the advancing enemy grouping.

On the front line, the Nazis were opposed by Voronezh (commander - General Vatutin N.F.) and Central Fronts (commander - General Rokossovsky K.K.) with a total number of 1.34 million people. They were armed with 19 thousand mortars and guns; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As you can see, the advantage was on their side). The reserve Steppe Front (commander I.S.Konev) was located behind the aforementioned fronts secretly from the enemy. It consisted of a tank, an aviation and five combined arms armies, supplemented by separate corps.

Control and coordination of the actions of this group was carried out personally by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Tactical battle plan

Marshal Zhukov's plan assumed that the battle on the Kursk Bulge would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

A deeply echeloned bridgehead (300 km deep) was set up. The total length of its trenches was approximately equal to the "Moscow - Vladivostok" distance. It provided for 8 powerful lines of defense. The purpose of such a defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to deprive him of the initiative, making the task of the attackers as easy as possible. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, two offensive operations were planned. First: Operation Kutuzov with the aim of eliminating the fascist group and liberating the city of Oryol. Second: "Commander Rumyantsev" for the destruction of the Belgorod-Kharkov group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk Bulge took place from the Soviet side “on the defensive”. For offensive operations, as tactics teaches, two or three times the number of troops was required.

Shelling

It so happened that the time of the offensive of the fascist troops became known in advance. On the eve of the German sappers began to make passages in the minefields. Soviet front-line reconnaissance began a battle with them and took prisoners. The time of the offensive became known from the "tongues": 03/05/1943

The reaction was prompt and adequate: In 2-20 July 5, 1943, Marshal K.K.Rokossovsky (commander of the Central Front), with the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov, carried out a preventive powerful shelling by the forces of the frontline artillery. It was an innovation in combat tactics. Hundreds of "Katyushas", 600 guns, 460 mortars were fired at the invaders. For the Nazis, this was a complete surprise, they suffered losses.

Only at 4-30, regrouping, they were able to conduct their artillery preparation, and at 5-30 go on the offensive. The Battle of the Kursk Bulge began.

The beginning of the battle

Of course, not everyone could have predicted our generals. In particular, both the General Staff and the Headquarters expected the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, to the city of Orel (which was defended by the Central Front, commanded by General Vatutin N.F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk Bulge by the German troops was focused on the Voronezh front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks, eight tank divisions, a battalion of assault guns, and one motorized division moved on to the troops of Nikolai Fedorovich. In the first phase of the battle, the first hot spot was the village of Cherkasskoye (practically wiped off the face of the earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions held back the offensive of five enemy divisions for 24 hours.

German offensive tactics

This Great War is glorious for martial art. The Kursk Bulge fully demonstrated the confrontation between the two strategies. What did the German offensive look like? Heavy equipment was moving ahead along the front of the attack: 15-20 Tiger tanks and self-propelled Ferdinand guns. They were followed by from fifty to one hundred medium tanks "Panther", accompanied by infantry. Thrown back, they regrouped and repeated the attack. The attacks were like the ebb and flow of the sea, following each other.

Let's follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Matvey Vasilyevich Zakharov, we will not idealize our defense of the 1943 model, we will present it objectively.

We have to talk about German tank battle tactics. The Kursk Bulge (this should be admitted) demonstrated the skill of Colonel-General Hermann Goth, he “jewelry”, if I may say so about tanks, brought his 4th Army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, the most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko was much to the left, i.e. out of work. The opposing 6th Guards Army (commander I. M. Chistyakov) had a density of guns per 1 km - 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly the 6th Army, which was far from the most powerful, was hit by Army Group South, commanded by the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht, Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was one of the few who constantly argued about strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which in 1944, in fact, he was dismissed).

Tank battle at Prokhorovka

In the current difficult situation, in order to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army introduced strategic reserves into battle: the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander P.A. Rotmistrov) and the 5th Guards Army (commander A.S. Zhadov)

The possibility of a flank attack by the Soviet tank army in the area of the village of Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General Staff. Therefore, the divisions "Death's Head" and "Leibstandart" the direction of the strike was changed to 90 0 - for a head-on collision with the army of General Rotmistrov Pavel Alekseevich.

Tanks on the Kursk Bulge: 700 combat vehicles went into battle from the German side, and 850 from ours. An impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses recall, the roar was such that blood flowed from the ears. They had to shoot at close range, which caused the towers to collapse. Coming to the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire on the tanks, from which the tanks burst into flames. The tankers were, as it were, in prostration - while they were alive, they had to fight. It was impossible to retreat, hide.

Of course, it was unreasonable to attack the enemy in the first phase of the operation (if during the defense we suffered one to five losses, what would they have been in the offensive ?!). At the same time, Soviet soldiers displayed real heroism on this battlefield. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In our time, the day of its end - August 23 - is annually met by the inhabitants of a country like Russia.