O the battle "hybrid war of Russia" has recently been regularly used by Western media. In some specialized publications, the term "Gerasimov doctrine" is additionally used. The meaning of these concepts and their origin is explained by an article by a former professor of applied systems sciences and a member of the Institute of Intelligent Systems Technology ( Instituts für Technik Intelligenter Systeme, ITIS) at the Bundeswehr University in Munich (Germany), Dr. Reiner K. HUBER.

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In the official estimates, experts very quickly united in the fact that the beginning of March [ 2018 Nov.] has become a landmark hacker attacks on the data transmission networks of the government of the Federal Republic and other states, primarily Scandinavia and Eastern Europe, probably controlled by the Kremlin. If this were confirmed, it would be another confirmation that Putin's Russia has long been waging a strategic information war against the West. Does Moscow want to regain the spheres of influence lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union through hybrid wars? Or is it aspiring to a “Eurasian Union from Vladivostok to Lisbon,” as it is presented by the ultra-conservative Kremlin consultant Alexander Dugin?

Regarding the term "waging a hybrid war"

The term hybrid warfare first appears in 2007 in an article by Frank HOFFMAN ( Frank HOFFMAN). In it, a former US Marine Corps officer describes an analytical framework to explain the gains that comparatively weak military adversaries - non-state actors such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda - could achieve against vastly outnumbered US forces.

F. Hoffman concludes that the conduct of a hybrid war is a coordinated use of military and non-military means, which, on the main battlefield (main battlefield), achieve synergy in the physical and psychological dimensions of the conflict (Frank Hofmann: “Conflict in the 21st century: The rise of hybrid wars "- Conflictinthe 21stCentury:TheRiseofHybridWars- Arlington, V.A .: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007). Along with "waging hybrid warfare," there is another term, such as "asymmetric warfare," which al-Qaeda spawned in the context of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington.

In the military scientific journals of Russia, the Western discussion of F. Hoffman's ideas about hybrid warfare was initially rejected. But that changed when scholars in the West tried to find in Russian military literature a hint of the concept of a successful annexation of Crimea. At the same time, they came across an article by the Chief of the General Staff of Russia Valery GERASIMOV from 2013. Although the term “hybrid war” is not mentioned in it, later V. Gerasimov was advanced by “the father of the concept of hybrid war” (Maria Snegovaya: “Putin's information war in Ukraine : the Soviet origin of the hybrid war of Russia "- Putin's information war in Ukraine: Soviet origins of Russia's hybrid warfare, - Institute for War Research, Russia Report No. 1, September 2015).

The concept of "waging a hybrid war", as it was applied in Ukraine, is mentioned in the West as an example of the use of state power below the military threshold. Seen as a means by which Russia is trying to achieve the strategic goals of the Russian revisionist foreign policy. These tools include cyber operations, as well as information and propaganda campaigns run by the international television news channel Rossiya Segodnya ( Russia Today) and its agents. This also includes financial and ideological support for right-wing or left-wing populist movements and parties, especially on social media in the respective target countries.

Gerasimov's doctrine

The aforementioned article by V. Gerasimov is based on a speech he gave in January 2013 to officers of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. It was a provocative appeal to the military establishment. V. Gerasimov presented innovative military considerations as a prerequisite for the further modernization of the Russian Armed Forces. He referred to the Chinese general and military strategist Sun Tzu (previously 496 BC), who proclaimed the motto: "The best strategy is to conquer the enemy without a fight." Now it has become a necessary form of warfare - the usual rules of war have changed.

Political goals currently can be achieved not only with conventional firepower, but also by

widespread use of disinformation, political, economic, humanitarian and other non-military measures that are used in conjunction with the protest potential of the [hostile] population.

These ideas were implemented in the concept of a "new generation of Russian war", which was called in the West the "Gerasimov doctrine" ( Gerassimow-Doktrin). American political scientist Molly McCue ( Molly mckEW) ironically comments on Gerasimov's theses: “ It is better to split the society of the enemy than to attack him head-on.«. ( Politico Magazin, September / October 2017 /).

Late in the West, it became clear to independent experts and NATO observers that Russia was waging a war in Ukraine in accordance with the rules of this doctrine. The Kremlin has covered the conflict between pro-Russian forces and ultranationalists in Ukraine, starting with the protests in Kiev against President Yanukovych. Thus, a pretext was obtained for the annexation of the Crimea and the beginning of the war in the east of Ukraine.

Russian justifications, in both cases, it is about the democratic right to self-determination of the local population, were taken up by pro-Russian separatists in the region. At the same time, cyber operations arose - and are still being carried out - to monitor the situation, to purposefully influence the political leadership in Ukraine and the population. Cyber ​​operations should lead to sabotage and destabilize Ukraine, as well as other states, including the Baltic states.

Phases of the new generation of the Russian war

Based on the diaries of the Russian campaign in Ukraine - Janis BERZINSH ( Janis BERZINS), Director of the Center for Security and Strategic Studies ( Center for Security and Strategic Research, СSSR) at the Latvian National Defense Academy, one of the first in the West to present a publicly available description of the Gerasimov doctrine.

In it, he identified eight phases, in each of which it is necessary to achieve set goals. Each phase is based on the next stage, therefore it is a prerequisite for the success of the next phase. In the first five non-kinetic phases, only non-military means and methods are presented, in the last three (kinetic) only stages and methods with the use of weapons. However, in five non-kinetic phases, military means of intimidation of the enemy are defined in the form of false air attacks, temporary military exercises and large maneuvers near the borders of enemy territory from Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries.

• Phase 1. Creation of favorable political, economic and military conditions for internal destabilization through ideological, diplomatic and economic operations, as well as disinformation actions and methods of psychological warfare.
• Phase 2. Misleading the political and military leadership of the enemy through the dissemination of erroneous data through diplomatic channels, the media, and later through their own government and their armed forces.
• Phase 3. Actions that result in government and adversary officials leaving their positions intimidated, deceived, or bribed.
• Phase 4. Growing discontent of the population through the activation of the "fifth column", the penetration of militant groups and the intensification of subversive activities.
• Phase 5. Preparation of hostilities, during which various kinds of problems are created in the attacked country and separate combat groups are thrown (“ little green men") Who interact with the armed opposition.
• Phase 6. Beginning of hostilities after thorough reconnaissance and subversion. All (Russian) troops, including special forces, must take their positions.
• Phase 7. Destruction of the main enemy defense forces by coordinated actions of all forces, including the conduct of electronic warfare.
• Phase 8. The defeat of the remaining hotbeds of resistance and the destruction of the resisting units through special operations.

Although from the Russian point of view the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was successfully completed in phase 5, the attack by Russian-backed separatists in Donbas against the resistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was stuck in phase 6. Peter POROSHENKO and Russia Vladimir PUTIN and the Minsk agreements aimed at de-escalation and restoration of peace have so far changed little the confrontation between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and separatist forces.

Over the past four years, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has cost more than 10,000 human lives. As part of the Minsk Agreements, the negotiated observation of the ceasefire in the region has failed because neither side has taken the required steps. At present, there is also no progress in the so-called Minsk process. Since the agreements specified in the Minsk Agreements do not formally oblige Russia to anything, it cannot be ruled out that Putin, given a convenient international situation for him, will not reactivate phase 6 and - if Ukraine does not surrender earlier - will launch phases 7 and 8 to annex Donbass, and then also annex the rest of Ukraine.

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Output

This "new generation of Russian war" blurs the line between war and peace, as was the case with the annexation of Crimea. Is Russia experiencing cyber attacks on the states of the Western world, their readiness and ability to respond to such hybrid strategies? If we agree with this, then Russia is on the way to a new conflict - in the hope that it can be won without the use of military force. For example, pulling out, for example, a state from the ranks of the Baltic countries would be a great success for Russia on the way to the “New Russia” described several years ago.

If only the West and the NATO states could cohesively and timely respond to at least one "test conflict" of Russia, conducted in accordance with the Gerasimov doctrine. However, this is compounded by the fact that key evidence that cyber attacks are controlled from the Kremlin in the early stages of a conflict can hardly be obtained. As a result, political support for an effective response is not easy to obtain at this time. This is precisely the calculation of the new generation of the Russian war.

Based on the materials of the magazine " Europäische Sicherheit & Technik»

Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov on hybrid warfare

A general meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences (AVN) was held at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Traditionally, it was held in the form of a military scientific conference. The topic of discussion was the organization of the country's defense in order to counter military and non-military threats. General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, made a speech at the conference "Modern wars and topical issues of the country's defense"..

Even Clausewitz compared war with extended single combat, defining it as an act of violence aimed at making the enemy do our will.

Outstanding Russian and Soviet theorists of the early 20th century made a significant contribution to the development of the science of war Andrey Snesarev and Alexander Svechin... The subject of their research was the main tendencies in the conduct of war, which is a consequence of not only political, but also economic, social relations. By the beginning of the 90s, a stable understanding of war had developed as a means of achieving political goals solely on the basis of armed struggle.

In the United States, a classification has formed that includes traditional and non-traditional wars. And at the beginning of the XXI century, American theorists proposed to supplement it. They refer to it actions during a period that cannot be attributed in pure form to either war or peace.

In domestic science and practice, a more balanced approach to the classification of modern armed conflicts. It takes into account more features. At the same time, there is no definition of war in international and domestic official documents. In the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, it is called a form of resolving interstate or intrastate contradictions with the use of military force.

An active discussion on the clarification of the concept itself continues. Some scientists and specialists adhere to the classical interpretation. Others propose to radically revise the views on the content and essence of the term "war", considering that armed struggle is not an obligatory attribute. Currently, you can find such definitions as information, economic, hybrid war, and many other options.

The General Staff pays due attention to the discussion of this problem. In 2016, on the basis of the VA GSh, a discussion of the essence of the concept of "war" in modern conditions was organized. This issue was considered at a meeting of the scientific council section of the Security Council. In the course of the discussions, a general orientation was developed on the need to analyze the characteristic features and characteristics of modern armed conflicts, to identify trends in their emergence and development.

Hybrid replaced contactless

Such conflicts of the late XX - early XXI centuries differ from each other in the composition of the participants, the weapons used, the forms and methods of actions of the troops. And at the same time, they do not go beyond the general content of the war, but include, as components, various types of struggle - both directly armed, and political, diplomatic, informational and others.

Now new features have emerged. This is a change in the ratio of the contribution of this or that type of struggle to the overall political success of the war, the overwhelming superiority of one of the parties in military strength and economic power.

A number of features are characteristic of modern conflicts.

Experience of the NATO operation in Yugoslavia, which opened the era of the so-called contactless or distance warfare, did not become widespread. The reason is objective - geographical and economic restrictions are imposed on the achievement of the goals of the war. The factor of the cost of weapons and war as a whole began to play an important role in the choice of methods of conducting military operations.

An essential feature is the growing use of the latest robotic systems and unmanned aerial vehicles for various purposes and actions.

New forms of using diverse forces and means have appeared. For example, during operations in Libya at the same time, a no-fly zone was created, a naval blockade was carried out in combination with joint actions of private military companies from NATO member states and the armed formations of the opposition.

In the concepts of using the armies of the leading states, the conquest of information superiority is declared an indispensable condition for hostilities.

To solve this problem, the media and social networks are used. At the same time, forces and means of information-psychological and information-technical influence are involved. Thus, in conflicts in the Middle East, for the first time, mobilization opportunities of social networks.

A good example of the use of hybrid methods was conflict in syria... It simultaneously used traditional and non-traditional actions of both military and non-military nature.

At its first stage, internal Syrian conflicts were transformed into armed opposition demonstrations. Then, with the support of foreign instructors and active information support, they were given an organized character.

Subsequently, terrorist groups supplied and sent from abroad entered into confrontation with government forces.

Hybrid actions are being actively introduced by the United States and NATO countries into practice in the international arena. This is largely due to the fact that such a course of action does not fall under the definition of aggression.

The combination of these methods has been dubbed "hybrid war" in the Western media. However, it is too early to use this term as an established one.

New perception of the familiar word

The analysis points to a number of trends that indicate the transformation of armed conflicts at the beginning of the 21st century. Today, the blurring of the line between the state of war and peace is evident.

The flip side of hybrid action is new perception of peacetime when military or other open violent measures are not applied against a particular state, but its national security and sovereignty are threatened and may be violated.

At the same time, the question of defining the essence of war is not closed, it is relevant and requires constant study and careful study.

To this end, the scientific and business program of the international military-technical forum "Army-2017" in August of this year, a "round table" was included on the topic "Modern Wars and Armed Conflicts: Characteristics and Features"... AVN scientists should take an active part in this. It is necessary to continue work on interdepartmental standardization of military-political and military terms and definitions.

The growth of the conflict potential in the world underlines the urgency of a number of tasks in the field of the country's defense.

High precision measures

The main one remains the same - guaranteed repulsion of possible aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies from any direction. At the same time, in peacetime, during the implementation of measures of strategic deterrence, it is necessary to ensure the neutralization of threats to the country's security, relying on the available forces and means. In this regard, the role and importance of forecasting military dangers and threats is increasing, which is advisable to carry out in conjunction with an assessment of economic, informational and other challenges.

The improvement of the capabilities of the Armed Forces is realized through (forces), the development of high-precision weapons and modern means of communication, reconnaissance, automated control and electronic warfare.

Currently, there is a large-scale equipping of the Strategic Missile Forces with modern complexes. The fleet receives new nuclear submarines with ballistic and cruise missiles that have no analogues in the world. Strategic aircraft, our legendary Tu-160 and Tu-95MS missile carriers are being actively modernized. This will make it possible by the end of 2020 to bring the equipment of the strategic nuclear forces with modern weapons in general to 90 percent.

The strike potential of high-precision weapons in the Armed Forces will quadruple, which will ensure the security of Russia along the entire perimeter of the borders.

By 2021, the share of modern weapons and military equipment in the Ground Forces will reach at least 70 percent. The Aerospace Forces will receive aircraft of a new generation, which will increase the combat capabilities of aviation by 1.5 times. The Navy will receive modern ships equipped with long-range high-precision missiles.

Robotics plays a significant role in enhancing combat capabilities. Large-scale, but well-grounded use of RTKs for various purposes will increase the effectiveness of troop actions and ensure a significant reduction in personnel losses.

Preemptive science

Today the Armed Forces are gaining combat experience in Syria. They got a unique opportunity to check and test new weapons and military equipment in difficult climatic conditions. It is necessary to continue to generalize the experience of using the means of armed struggle in the Syrian campaign, to draw lessons for their refinement and modernization.

It must be remembered: victory is always achieved not only by material, but also by the spiritual resources of the people, by their solidarity and desire to resist aggression with all their might. The military-political leadership of the Russian Federation is making serious efforts to restore people's confidence in the army. Today, the Armed Forces are reaching a fundamentally new level of combat readiness, and this finds all-round support in society.

In the interests of further enhancing their authority, it is important to develop ties between the army and society, and for this to improve the systems of training military personnel and the patriotic education of young people.

The solution of urgent tasks of the country's defense is impossible without their careful and advanced study. In this regard, it is worth focusing on the priority tasks of the Academy of Military Sciences.

First of all, this is the study of new forms of interstate confrontation and the development of effective ways to counter them.

An urgent task is the formation of scenarios, long-term forecasts of the development of the military-political and strategic situation in the most important regions of the world. It is necessary to quickly study the features of modern armed conflicts. On their basis, develop methods for the operation of military command and control and actions of troops in various conditions.

A separate study is required for the problems of organizing and carrying out regrouping of troops (forces) to remote theaters of operations. The general tasks of military science, which need further elaboration, do not lose their relevance.

Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, General of the Army

REFERENCE

Valery Vasilievich Gerasimov was born on September 8, 1955 in Kazan in a working class family. Graduated from the Kazan Suvorov Military School (1971-1973), the Kazan Higher Tank Command School named after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR (1973-1977), the Military Academy of Armored Forces named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky (1984-1987), Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (1995-1997).

Military ranks

lieutenant general (February 2002).
Colonel General (February 22, 2005).
General of the Army (20 February 2013).

He served as a platoon, company commander, battalion chief of staff in the 80th tank regiment of the 90th Guards Tank Division of the Northern Group of Forces in Poland, battalion chief of staff in the Far Eastern Military District (1977-1984), chief of staff - deputy tank regiment commander, commander tank regiment, chief of staff - deputy commander (1987-1993) and commander (1993-1995) of a guards motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District and the North-Western Group of Forces.

In August 1994, he led the withdrawal of the division to the Moscow Military District (the city of Yelnya). Since 1995 - studying at the academy. From 1997 he served as 1st Deputy Commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Moscow Military District (1997-1998), Deputy Commander, from February 1998 Chief of Staff, and from February 2001 as Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army in the North Caucasian Military District.

Awards of the USSR and Russia

Hero of the Russian Federation (2016)
Order of St. George IV-th degree
Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 3rd class with swords (2014)
Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 4th class with swords
Order of Military Merit
Order of Honor
Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" III = grade
Medal for Military Merit
Medal "For military distinction"
Medal "For Military Valor" 1st degree
Medal "60 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Medal "70 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Medal "For Strengthening the Combat Commonwealth"
Medal "200 Years of the Ministry of Defense"
Medal "For Distinction in Military Service" 1st degree
Medal "For Impeccable Service" 2nd degree
Medal "For Impeccable Service" 3rd degree
Medal "For participation in the military parade on Victory Day"
Medal "For the Return of Crimea"
Medal "For strengthening the state information security system" 1st degree
Medal "For Merit in Ensuring National Security"
Medal "For the Commonwealth in the Name of Salvation"
Honored Military Specialist of the Russian Federation (2009)

Foreign awards

Order of Friendship of Peoples (Republic of Belarus, 2010)
Order of the Army of Nicaragua (Nicaragua, 2013)
Medal "For Merit in the Field of Military Cooperation" (Azerbaijan, 2014)
Medal "Marshal Baghramyan" (Armenian Armed Forces, 2015)

Public awards

Imperial Military Order of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker

He served as chief of staff of the Far Eastern Military District from March 2003, from April 2005 - chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training and Service of the Armed Forces. In December 2006 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District.

From December 11, 2007 to February 5, 2009 - Commander of the Leningrad Military District, from February 5, 2009 to December 23, 2010 - Commander of the Moscow Military District.

On December 23, 2010, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, he was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Since April 26, 2012 - Commander of the Central Military District. After the resignation of Anatoly Serdyukov from the post of Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation on November 9, 2012, the new Defense Minister S.K.

On November 9, 2012, he was appointed by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Since November 13, 2012 he is a member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

During the absence of Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov is the Acting Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Organizer of the Russian military operation in Syria, which began in September 2015. For courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty, in May 2016 by a closed decree of the President of Russia, Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov was awarded the highest state award - Hero of the Russian Federation.

According to a number of foreign military experts, he is considered the creator of the so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine", which formed the basis of the Russian concept of a new generation of war.

On August 5, 2015, the military prosecutor's office of Ukraine declared Valery Gerasimov "the main ideologist of the war in Donbass." The Security Service of Ukraine reported on the suspicion of Gerasimov and ten other military personnel of the 98th Airborne Division of the Russian Federation in organizing, preparing and unleashing an armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine (in fact of the events near Ilovaisk). The Shevchenko District Court of Kiev made a decision on the arrest in absentia by the indicated 11 military men.

In turn, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation stated that the decisions of the Ukrainian authorities to search for and arrest Valery Gerasimov and other Russian military personnel in absentia were a political and provocative decision, and the Security Service of Ukraine itself was called a "reserve of idiocy" in this regard.

2019-03-24T12: 33: 16 + 05: 00 Sergey SinenkoDefense of the Fatherlandarmy, war, armed forces, hybrid war, information war, RussiaChief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov on hybrid warfare A general meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences (AVN) was held at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Traditionally, it was held in the form of a military scientific conference. The topic of discussion was the organization of the country's defense in order to counter military and non-military threats. Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces ...Sergey Sinenko Sergey Sinenko [email protected] Author In the middle of Russia

When it seems that it is impossible to distort the image of Russia in the West even more, the Western media prove the opposite. The once-competent Financial Times has published a gripping story about a defunct military doctrine. They might as well write about crop circles or the Priory of Zion.

This is a dummy called the "Gerasimov Doctrine" generated by a 2013 article. In it, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Valery Gerasimov, lists various modern methods of warfare, which in a broad sense can be called hybrid warfare. At the same time, he talks about the operations of the West, not Russia, in particular, on the example of Libya, Syria and the efforts related to the events of the "Arab Spring" aimed at "regime change."

Gerasimov's report does not contain the term "hybrid war". The closest concept to it can be called an asymmetric conflict, which is mentioned three times. In addition, one should not forget that this expression first became known after the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia in 2008 and the Kremlin's reaction to Mikhail Saakashvili's gambit. At that moment, the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces was occupied not by Gerasimov, but by Nikolai Makarov. So, if such a doctrine existed, it would have to bear exactly his name.

Military maneuvers sometimes have a very strange effect on people. For example, the Zapad-2017 exercises currently being conducted by Russia and Belarus frightened the countries of the Baltic region so much that they transferred control of their airspace to America. The President of Ukraine suggested that these maneuvers were just a cover for the invasion of his country, and the Deputy Minister of Defense of Poland saw in them a pretext for the permanent deployment of the Russian military contingent participating in the exercises in Belarus.

From the Financial Times article we learned that Moscow is conducting "war games" and NATO is conducting "maneuvers"; and that in the minds of many American and European officials, Vladimir Putin has involved exactly 100,000 troops in the exercises. Obviously for the love of impressive round numbers. However, according to the Kremlin, only 13 000 human.

Imaginary threat

Like the FIFA World Cup, the Zapad exercise takes place every four years, which means it is unlikely to come as a surprise to the rest of the world. But the very fact of their existence is very good at fueling the industry that is inflating the "Russian threat." Significantly, American defense industry lobbyists at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) have even created a countdown site to help their sponsors' businesses a bit.

Another common scary story lately is the nonsense about the "Gerasimov Doctrine", which is being promoted with all her might by the lobbyist Molly McKew, who has suddenly become an "expert on Russia" - apparently because her nonsense fits perfectly into the current rhetoric of the United States. The catch, however, is that this grand strategy simply doesn't exist. No one in Russia has even heard of her, not a single credible source confirms the fact of her existence.

Of course, there are Western "experts on Russia" and "Kremlinologists" who speculate about this, but these crooks should not be taken seriously. After all, if soup was pouring from the sky in Moscow, they would be standing on the streets with forks. Moreover, hundreds of kilometers from the capital.

And now let's dot the "i" s: there is no "Gerasimov doctrine". This phenomenon is of the same order as the Loch Ness Monster or The Curse of the Pharaohs. At the same time, adults argue about her with a clever look, often hiding behind intricate pseudo-scientific titles.

The last of the Mohicans

A few years ago, the Financial Times could be called the only Western media that came even a little closer to understanding Russia. But then the journalist Charles Clover was transferred to another position, and his successors clearly lacked the experience, competence and abilities of their predecessor. In the end, all this led to the fact that last weekend the Financial Times was led to this nonsense with the "Gerasimov Doctrine." Having spiced it with pompous arguments about the Russian-Belarusian exercises, the publication issued a phantasmagoria inflated to caricature proportions.

Indeed, as Mark Galeotti, an expert at the US government-funded Radio Liberty, noted, “this is, in fact, an article concocted in an hour in the spirit of Molly McKew's rubbish, interspersed with a biography of Gerasimov taken from Wikipedia.” And this, by the way, is still putting it mildly.

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of the Army

Biography

Was born on September 8, 1955 in Kazan. In 1977 he graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank Command School named after the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR. He commanded a platoon, company, battalion in the Northern Group of Forces and the Far Eastern Military District.

After graduating from the Military Academy of Armored Forces named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky served as chief of staff and commander of a tank regiment, chief of staff of a motorized rifle division in the Baltic Military District. From 1993 to 1995 - commander of a motorized rifle division in the North-Western Group of Forces.

After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 1997, he served in the positions of first deputy commander of an army in the Moscow military district, deputy commander, chief of staff and commander of the 58th army in the North Caucasian military district.

From 2003 to 2005 - Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Military District. Since 2005 - Chief of the Main Directorate of Combat Training and Service of the Troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and since December 2006 - Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District.

In December 2007, he was appointed Commander of the Leningrad Military District, and in February 2009, Commander of the Moscow Military District.

Since December 2010 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

By the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of November 9, 2012, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Hero of the Russian Federation.

He was awarded the Orders of St. George, III and IV degrees, the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, III class with swords, the Order for Merit to the Fatherland, IV class, with swords, the Order for Military Merit, the Order of Honor, the Order For Service to the Motherland. in the Armed Forces of the USSR "III degree and a number of medals.

Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov is a Russian military commander, as well as a military commander of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. He currently carries the honorary title of General of the Army and has been a Hero of Russia since 2016.

Childhood

The birthplace of Valery Gerasimov is the city of Kazan in the Republic of Tatarstan. He was born on September 8, 1955. His family is simple and ordinary. But even in early childhood, playing war games, the boy decided that he would become a military man, and he strove for this all his life.

But his interest in the military profession began to manifest itself only after the colorful and detailed stories of his uncle, who was a participant in the war, were listened to. The uncle of the future general was in command of a tank company.

During his school years, the boy was greatly influenced by the stories of Konstantin Simonov, which he not only read quickly, enjoying this reading, but also reread them several times in order to remember all the details and details.

Education

Realizing his son's desire to become a military man, Valery's father sent his documents to the Suvorov School as soon as he graduated from the fourth grade. But all the places in the Kazan school were occupied, so Valery Gerasimov waited four more years to try again. But the boy's desire during this time did not disappear, but only became even stronger.

In 1971, his wish came true, and Valery Gerasimov became a Suvorovite. And in 1973 he graduated with honors, but the training did not end there. Already in the same year, he entered the Higher Tank School, which was located in his hometown. After graduating in 1977 with a bronze medal, he immediately entered the military academy named after Marshal Malinovsky. After graduating with honors, the young man soon submits documents to the military academy of the General Staff, where Valery Gerasimov was able to establish himself as the best student and student of courses. At this time, he already had the rank of colonel.

Military career

General of the Army Valery Gerasimov began his military activity in 1977 in the troops of the Northern Group, where at first he was the commander of a tank platoon. After graduating from the Academy of the General Staff in 1987, he was immediately sent to the Baltic Military District, and then to Poland.

In 1991, when the state system was changing in the country, Valery Gerasimov was in the Baltic States, where he held the post of deputy commander of a motorized rifle division. At the same time, he also began to head the headquarters, so a transfer to the Moscow military district soon followed. Valery Gerasimov was appointed first deputy commander of the Russian army.

Then he served in the Far Eastern District for two years. And only after that, in 2005, Valery Vasilievich Gerasimov received the post of Chief of the Main Directorate of the Armed Forces. But Valery Vasilyevich's career did not end there.

Participation in hostilities in the North Caucasus

Military people do not seek to look for simple and easy ways in their lives, so they always strive to go where their experience, knowledge and skills can be useful and serve for the benefit of the people. The same desires are constantly driven by many military leaders, among whom was Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov. As soon as hostilities began in the North Caucasus, he immediately asked to go there.

For the first time, he took part in the military events in the Caucasus in the period from 1993 to 1997. He served as a commander of a motorized rifle division. He showed himself as a brave and courageous person. But the biography of Valery Gerasimov has never been easy. Therefore, in 1997, he was transferred from the North-Western Military District to the North Caucasian Military District, where he participated in hostilities even before 2003. Having chosen the fifty-eighth army, he was able to lead the headquarters.

At the same time, he became a participant not only in fierce battles, but also in counter-terrorism operations. But first, at headquarters, he was engaged in recruiting personnel and closely monitoring the combat training of all personnel. But there was not only work in the rear. So, he was assigned to lead one of the operations in Chechnya, which took place in the Bamut direction.

The battle group, commanded by a general of the Russian army, was ambushed and barely managed to break through to its troops thanks to helicopters that fought from the air. Soon a reverse operation followed, in which there were absolutely no losses among the Russian soldiers, but those militants who had recently shot at point-blank range Russian commanders and fighters were killed and taken prisoner. After that, there were several more operations, which, under the command of Valery Vasilyevich, were very successful.

Participation in Ukrainian events

In 2014, when the crisis occurred in Ukraine, Valery Gerasimov was included in the sanctions list of the European Union, and then Canada. He was accused of being involved in the delivery of the Buk to the territory of the DPR, and was also accused that it was at his command that a rocket was launched that shot down a Boeing-777, where all the passengers were killed.

Therefore, already in 2015, the Ukrainian military prosecutor's office issued a decision according to which he was considered not only the main military ideologist, but more than ten military cases were attributed to him. A decision was made to arrest him in absentia, and Valery Gerasimov was put on the wanted list.

Personal life of General Gerasimov

In his family life, Valery Vasilyevich is very happy, since his wife throughout the marriage is his reliable assistant, friend and support. In this marriage there is also a child - a son.

Currently, Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov has a huge number of awards, but continues to serve his Fatherland.