Stavka developed two main operations to be carried out against the Axis forces in the area of ​​Stalingrad, Uranus And Saturn and also planned was Operation Mars, designed to engage the German Army Group Center in an attempt to divert reinforcements and inflict as much damage as possible. Operation Uranus involved the use of large Soviet mechanized and infantry troops to encircle the German and other Axis forces directly around Stalingrad. As preparations for the offensive began, the starting points of the attack were located on sectors of the front to the rear of the German Fourth Army, basically preventing the Germans from reinforcing those sectors where the fast-axis unit was too overburdened to occupy effectively. The offensive was twice the Wrap; Soviet mechanized forces would penetrate deep into the German rear while another attack would be made closer to the German Fourth Army in an attempt to attack the German units there directly in the rear. While the Red Army was prepared, the German command, influenced by their belief that the Red Army, building up the Group opposite the German army center to the north, was in no position to mount a simultaneous offensive to the south, continued to deny the possibility of an impending Soviet offensive.

Comparison of forces

Axis

The Blue affair involved the German and other Axis forces sprawling across a front over 480 kilometers (300 mi) wide and several hundred kilometers deep, while the decision to conquer Stalingrad stretched the Axis forces even more subtly by retreating personnel eastward. For example, in early July, the Sixth Army defended a 160 km (99 mi) line while at the same time making an offensive that involved a distance of about 400 kilometers (250 mi). Army Group B, which was split from Army Group South (the forces operating around the Caucasus were called Army Groups), seemed strong on paper: it included the German 2nd and 6th, Fourth Panzer, 4th and 3rd Romanian, 8th Italian and Second Hungarian Army. Army Group B was the 48th Panzer Corps, which had the strength of a weakened panzer division and one infantry division as reserves. For the most part, the German flanks were passed by the arrival of the non-German-speaking Axis armies, while the German troops were used to initiate the continuation of the operation in Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

While Adolf Hitler expressed confidence in the ability of non-German Axis units to protect the German flanks, in reality these units relied on mostly obsolete equipment and horse-drawn artillery, while in many cases mistreatment by enlisted men on officers caused poor morale. In terms of mechanization, the First Romanian Armored Division was equipped with about 100 Czech-built armored 35(t) tanks, armed with 37-mm (1.5 in) guns ineffective against the armor of Soviet T-34 tanks. Likewise, their 37 mm (1.5 in) PAK anti-tank guns were also obsolete, and they were largely short of ammunition. Only after repeated requests did the Germans send Romanian units of 75 mm (3.0 in) PAK guns; six per division. These units were extended to very large sections of the front; for example, the Romanian Third Army occupied a line 140 kilometers (87 mi) long, while the Romanian Fourth Army defended a line at least 270 kilometers (170 mi) long. The Italians and Hungarians were located on the Don to the west of the Romanian Third Army, but the German commanders did not hold these units' fighting abilities in high regard.

As a rule, the German troops were not in the best shape; they had been weakened by months of fighting the Red Army, and while Bid raised a new army, the German command tried to maintain the existing mechanized units. In addition, during the German offensive between May and November 1942, two motorized divisions, the Elite Leibstandarte and Grossdeutschland, were transferred from the Army Group to the West to provide a mechanized reserve in the event of an Allied landing in France. The 6th Army also suffered many casualties during the fighting in the city of Stalingrad proper. In some cases, as, for example, from the 22nd Panzer Division, their equipment was no better than the First Romanian BRT. The German formations also stretched out along large sections of the front; The Eleventh Army Corps, for example, had to defend a front about 100 kilometers (62 mi) long.

The Red Army is allocated approximately 1,100,000 personnel, 804 tanks, 13,400 guns and over 1,000 aircraft for the coming offensive. For all of the Romanian Third Army, the Soviet Union supplied the redistributed 5th Panzer Army, as well as the 21st and 65th Armies, in order to penetrate and overrun the German flanks. The German southern flank was aimed at the 51st and 57th Armies of the Stalingrad Front, led by the 13th and 4th Mechanized Corps; they will break through the 4th Romanian Army, in order to link up with the 5th Panzer Army near the town of Kalach. In total, the Soviets amassed 11 armies and various independent tank brigades and corps.

Preparations for the offensive, however, were far from perfect; November 8 Bid gave the order to postpone the start date of the operation as transport delays prevented many units from being moved into place. At the same time, units at the front went through a series of war games in practice repelling enemy counterattacks and exploiting a breakthrough with mechanized forces. These movements were masked by deception campaigns by the Soviets, including reduced radio traffic, camouflage, operational security, using a courier instead of a radio, and active deception, such as increased troop movements around Moscow. Troops were ordered to build defensive fortifications to offer false impressions to the Germans, while fake bridges were put up to divert attention from real bridges being built across the Don River. The Red Army also stepped up attacks against the Army Group Center and created fictitious formations to support the idea of ​​a main German offensive in the center.

The Soviet troops of the Stalingrad Front were subject to heavy bombardment, making mobilization more difficult. The 38th engineer battalion assigned to the front was responsible for ferrying ammunition, personnel and tanks across the Volga River while conducting minor reconnaissance in sectors of the front that were supposed to be breakthrough points of the impending offensive. Three weeks later the Red Army transported about 111,000 soldiers, 420 tanks and 556 artillery pieces across the Volga.

On November 17, Vasilevsky was recalled to Moscow, where he was shown a letter, written to Stalin by General Volsky, commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, which called for a challenge from the offensive. Volsky believed that the offensive, as planned, was doomed to failure due to the state of the forces intended for the job; he proposed to postpone the offensive and redesign it entirely. Many Soviet soldiers were not issued with winter clothes, and many of them died from frostbite, "due to the irresponsible attitude of the commanders." Although Soviet intelligence made an honest effort to collect as much information as possible on the position of the Axis forces arrayed in front of them, there was not much information about the state of the German Fourth Army. Vasilevsky wanted to cancel the offensive. The Soviet commanders, canceled by Vasilevsky, agreed the offensive would not be called off, and Stalin personally telephoned Volsky, who confirmed his intention to carry out the operation if ordered to do so.

Romanian soldier at the front

Operation Uranus, postponed until 17 November, was again postponed for two days when Soviet General Georgy Zhukov was told the air units assigned to the operation were not ready; it was finally launched on 19 November. Shortly after 5 am, Lieutenant Gerhard Stock, sent with the Romanian IV Army Corps to the Kletsky sector called the headquarters of the Sixth Army stationed in Golubinsky, offering reconnaissance on the expectation of an attack that would take place after 05:00 am; However, since his call came after five and false alarms were common during that time, the attendant at the other end of the line was not keen on waking up the Army Chief of Staff, General Arthur Schmidt. Although the Soviet commanders offered to postpone the bombardment due to poor visibility from the thick fog, the front headquarters decided to continue. At 07:20 Moscow time (5:20 German time), Soviet artillery commanders received the code word "Siren", which triggered an 80-minute artillery barrage directed almost exclusively against non-German Axis units protecting the German flanks. At 0730, the Katyusha rocket launchers fired their first volleys and were soon joined by 3,500 guns and mortars, extending along several sections of the breakthrough in front of the Romanian Third Army and the northern shoulder flank of the German Sixth Army. Although thick fog prevented the Soviet artillery from correcting its target, their weeks of training and ranging enabled them to lay down accurate fire on enemy positions along the front. The effect was devastating, as lines of communication were disrupted, ammunition depots were destroyed, and forward observation points were destroyed. Many Romanian personnel who had survived the bombardment began to flee to the rear. Soviet heavy artillery aimed at the Romanian artillery positions and second echelon formations captured the retreating Romanian soldiers.

Against the third Romanian army: November 19

The offensive of the Romanian 3rd Army began at 08:50, led by the 21st and 65th Soviet armies and the 5th Panzer Army. The first two attacks were repulsed by the Romanian defenders, and the effect of the heavy shelling actually made it more difficult for the Soviet armor to move through the minefields and terrain. However, the lack of heavy anti-tank artillery caused the Romanian defenses to collapse; a breakthrough of the 4th Tank Corps and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was established at noon. Shortly thereafter, the 5th Panzer Army was able to get a breakthrough against the Romanian 2nd Corps, followed by the 8th Cavalry Corps. As the Soviet armor sailed through the thick fog on the compass, rolling over the Romanian and German artillery positions, three Romanian infantry divisions began to fall back in disarray; The third Romanian army was bypassed to the West and East. Upon receiving news of the Soviet attack, the 1st Army Headquarters failed to order the 16th and 24th Panzer Divisions, still engaged in Stalingrad, to reorient themselves to support the Romanian defenses; instead the task was given to the seriously understrength and ill-equipped 48th Tank Corps.

The 48th Tank Corps had less than 100 serviceable modern tanks to deal with Soviet armor. In addition, they did not have fuel, and the lack of tanks forced the commander to organize the tankers into infantry companies; The 22nd Panzer Division, which was part of the corps, was almost completely destroyed during the fighting that unfolded. The 22nd entered the battle with less than thirty working tanks, and was left with a company of tanks. The Romanian 1st Armored Division, attached to the 48th Tank Corps, engaged the Soviet 26th Tank Corps, having lost contact with their German corps commanders, and were defeated on 20 November. As the Soviets continued to push south, many Soviet tankers began to suffer from worsening snowstorms that affected men and equipment, and blocked gunsights. It is not uncommon for tanks to lose traction on the ground, and for a crew member to have an arm broken as he was thrown around inside the hull. However, the blizzard is also neutralized by the coordination of the German Corps.

The defeat of the Third Romanian Army began at the end of 19 November. The Soviet 21st Army and 5th Panzer Army managed to capture some 27,000 Romanian POWs of the bulk of the three divisions, and then continue their offensive southward. The Soviet cavalry was used to exploit the breakthrough, sever communications between the Romanians and the Italian 8th Army, and block any possible counterattack against the Soviet flank. While the Red Air Force fired on the retreat of the Romanian soldiers, then Luftwaffe provided only slight resistance. The withdrawal of the Romanian 1st Cavalry Division, initially positioned on the German 376th Infantry Division's flank, allowed the 65th Army to bypass the German defenses. When the German forces began to react late on 19 November, another attack developed against the Sixth Army's flank to the south.

Against the German southern flank: 20 November

Early morning November 20 Stavka called Stalingrad Front Commander Andrey Eremenko with a request if he would start his share of the offensive on schedule, at 08:00. He replied that he would only do so when the fog cleared; although the 51st Army was opened to artillery fire for the time being, because the front headquarters were unable to contact the unit, the rest of the forces prepared for the job were ordered to delay the attack until 10:00. The 51st Army was engaged by the Romanian 6th Corps, taking many prisoners. The 57th Army joined the attack at 10:00, the situation was such that the Stalingrad Front could throw its tank corps into battle. The German 297th Rifle Division watched as its Romanian support failed to offer resistance against the Red Army. However, the confusion and lack of control caused the Soviet 4th and 13th Mechanized Corps to stumble as they began to exploit the breakthroughs reached by opening the offensive.

The Germans quickly reacted to the redeployment of their only reserve in the area, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. Despite initial victories against Soviet armored forces, the Romanian collapse forced the division to redistribute again in an attempt to bolster the defenses to the south. the counterattack of the 29th Panzergrenadier Division cost the Red Army about fifty tanks, and made the Soviet commanders worry about the safety of their left flank. However, the redeployment of the German unit meant that by the end of the day only the 6th Romanian Cavalry Regiment was positioned between the advancing Soviet troops and the Don River.

Continued work: November 20-23

While the Stalingrad Front launched its offensive on 20 November, the Soviet 65th Army continued to put pressure on the German 11th Corps along the northern shoulder of the Sixth Army's flank. The 4th Tank Corps of the Red Army advanced further than the German 11th Corps, while the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps ran into the rear of the German unit. The German 376th Infantry Division and the Austrian 44th Rifle Division began redeploying to face the enemy on the flanks, but were hampered by fuel shortages. The 14th Panzer Division's remaining Panzer Regiment destroyed the flank regiment of the Soviet 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, but its anti-tank artillery suffered heavy losses when it was captured by the Soviets. By the end of the day, the Soviet 1st Tank Corps was pursuing the retreating 48th Tank Corps, while the Soviet 26th Tank Corps had captured the town of Perelazovsky, nearly 130 kilometers (81 miles) northwest of Stalingrad.

The Red Army offensive continued on November 21, with the troops of the Stalingrad Front achieving penetrations of up to 50 kilometers (31 mi). By this time the rest of the Romanian units in the north had been destroyed in separate battles, while the Red Army began to engage the flanking units of the German 4th Panzer Division and 6th Army. The German 22nd Panzer Division, despite attempting a short counterattack, was reduced to just over a panzer company and forced to retreat to the southwest. The Soviet 26th Panzer Corps, having destroyed most of the armored division of the Romanian 1st, continued its offensive to the southeast, avoiding the charming enemy left behind, although the remnants of the Romanian 5th Corps were able to reorganize and put up a hastily built defense in the hope that it would help German 48th Panzer Corps. Surrounded by the 5th Panzer Army on one side and the 21st Army on the other, most of the Romanian 3rd Army was isolated in the Raspopinskaya area, where General Lascar took control of the remnants of the 4th and 5th Corps, at that time as the adjacent 1st Armored Division was still trying to break free and communicate with the 22nd Panzer Division. On the same day, General German Paulus, commander of the Sixth Army, received reports that the Soviets were less than 40 km (25 mi) from his headquarters; In addition, there were no remaining units that could challenge the Soviet advance. In the south, after a short halt, the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps continued to advance north, removing the German defenders from several towns in the area, towards Stalingrad. When the German troops in and around Stalingrad were in danger, Hitler ordered the German troops in the area to set up an "all around defensive position" and designated forces between the Don and Volga rivers as the "Stalingrad Fortress", instead of allowing the Sixth Army to attempt break out. The Sixth Army, other units of Axis, and most of the German units of the Fourth Panzer Army were caught in the growing Soviet encirclement. Only the 16th Panzergrenadier Division began to fight its way out. The lack of coordination between Soviet tanks and infantry as the Red Army's tank corps attempted to exploit the breakthrough along the southern flank of the Germans allowed the Romanian Fourth Army's vast majority to avoid destruction.

On November 22, Soviet troops began to cross the Don River and continued their offensive towards the city of Kalach. The German troops defending Kalach, mostly made up of maintenance and supply personnel, were not made aware of the Soviet advance until 21 November, and even then were unaware that a force was approaching the Red Army. The task of taking the bridge to Kalach was given to the Soviet 26th Tank Corps, which used two captured German tanks and a reconnaissance vehicle to approach it and fire on the guards. Soviet troops broke into the city by mid-morning and drove the defenders out, allowing themselves and the 4th Tank Corps to link up with the Red Army's 4th Mechanized Corps approaching from the south. The encirclement of German troops in Stalingrad was completed on November 22, 1942. On that day, Soviet formations also continued to fight pockets of Romanian resistance, such as that put up by the Romanian 5th Corps.

The encirclement of the 6th Army was effective on 23 November. Around 16:00, near the village of Sovetsky, advance detachments of the 36th Mechanized Brigade from the Stalingrad Front of the 4th Mechanized Corps saw the approaching tanks of the 45th Brigade from the Southwestern Front of the 4th Tank Corps. At first they mistook them for the Germans, because they did not fire green flares, as was decided on the scout's signal, and several tanks were damaged in short firefights. After clarifying all the docking was achieved. He acted out later for the newsreel.

The junction between the armored forces of the 21st and 51st armies from the Vatutin and Eremenko fronts was completed by the encirclement of the Paulus group of forces: two German armies among the most powerful in the Wehrmacht, 22 divisions and 150 separate regiments and battalions, as well as a huge number of materiel. Never before in a war had so many troops of mighty Germany been caught together. Such a feat was so unusual that the Stavka's own initial estimate of the circled strength of the enemy was only a quarter of its real strength, because in addition to the combat troops there were a huge number of additional employees from various professions, engineering sections, Luftwaffe ground personnel and others. Fighting continued on 23 November as the Germans tried in vain to mount local counterattacks to break the encirclement. By this time, Axis personnel inside the encirclement had moved east towards Stalingrad to avoid the Soviet tanks, while those that managed to escape the encirclement had moved west towards the German and other Axis forces.

aftermath

Operation Uranus trapped between 250,000 and 300,000 Axis soldiers within a stretch zone 50 kilometers (31 miles) east to west and 40 kilometers (25 miles) north to south. The pocket contained four infantry corps, and tank corps belonging to the Fourth Panzer and Sixth Armies and the surviving elements of two Romanian divisions, a Croat infantry regiment and other specialized units. Trapped equipment included about 100 tanks, 2,000 guns and mortars, and 10,000 trucks. The withdrawal of Stalingrad left lines of retreat littered with helmets, weapons and other equipment, and heavy equipment that had been destroyed was left on the side of the road. The bridges over the River Don were clogged with traffic, and the surviving Axis soldiers hurried east in cold weather, trying to avoid Soviet armor and infantry, threatening to cut them off from Stalingrad. Many injured Axis employees were trampled on, and many who tried to cross the river on foot on the ice failed and drowned. Hungry soldiers filled the Russian villages clawing for supplies, while supply dumps were often plundered for cans of food. The last stragglers crossed the Don River on 24 November, and destroyed the bridges to depressurize the 1st Panzer and 6th Armies from the Soviets at Stalingrad.

The Sixth Army, in the midst of the chaos, began to build defensive lines, hampered by a lack of fuel, ammunition and rations, and hampered by the coming Russian winter. It was also instructed to plug gaps in the line caused by the disintegrating Romanian forces. On 23 November, some German units destroyed or burned down all did not need a breakthrough operation and began to pull back towards the northern end of Stalingrad. However, after the Germans abandoned their winter bunkers, the Soviet 62nd Army was able to destroy the infantry division of the German 94th in the open; the survivors of the German division were attached to the 16th and 24th Panzer divisions. Although the German military leaders believed that the Wehrmacht forces, trapped in the encirclement should break out between 23 and 24 November, Hitler decided instead to hold the position and try to resupply the Third Army by air. Personnel locked in Stalingrad will require at least 680 metric tons (750 short tons) of supplies per day, the task of which is dwindling Luftwaffe was unable to comply. In addition, restored

Zhukov. Ups, downs and unknown pages of the life of the great Marshal Gromov Alex

Operation Uranus

Operation Uranus

The operation conceived by Zhukov was codenamed "Uranus". During the preparations, a new Southwestern Front was created under the command of General N.F. Vatutin. The Stalingrad Front became the Don Front under the command of K. K. Rokossovsky, and the former South-Eastern Front became the Stalingrad Front under the command of General A. I. Eremenko.

"Uranus" was prepared in deep secrecy. Even the commanders of the fronts almost until the last moment did not know the details. In most reports, the offensive was called "resettlement", and the commanders were listed under pseudonyms - Vasiliev (Stalin), Konstantinov (Zhukov), Mikhailov (Vasilevsky) ...

And the Soviet troops continued to fight for every piece of Volga land, exhausting and exterminating the enemy.

Zhukov recalled this time in this way: “September 13, 14, 15 were difficult, too difficult days for the Stalingraders. The enemy, regardless of anything, step by step broke through the ruins of the city closer and closer to the Volga. It seemed that people could not stand it. But as soon as the enemy rushed forward, our glorious fighters of the 62nd and 64th armies shot him point-blank. The ruins of the city became a fortress. However, with each passing hour, there was less and less strength left.

The turning point in these difficult and, as it seemed at times, last hours was created by the 13th Guards Division of A. I. Rodimtsev. After crossing to Stalingrad, she immediately counterattacked the enemy. Her blow was completely unexpected for the enemy. On September 16, the division of A. I. Rodimtsev recaptured Mamaev Kurgan. The Stalingraders were helped by air strikes under the command of A. E. Golovanov and S. I. Rudenko, as well as attacks and artillery shelling from the north of the troops of the Stalingrad Front against units of the 8th German army corps.

It is necessary to pay tribute to the soldiers of the 24th, 12th Guards and 66th Armies of the Stalingrad Front, the pilots of the 16th Air Army and long-range aviation, who, regardless of any victims, provided invaluable assistance to the 62nd and 64th armies of the South-Eastern front in holding Stalingrad.

Many Soviet soldiers distinguished themselves in the battles for Stalingrad. One can recall Sergeant Yakov Pavlov, who became a living legend, who defended the same house, the commander of a machine gun company, Captain Ruben Ruiz Ibarruri (son of the leader of the Communist Party of Spain, Dolores Ibarruri), Vasily Zaitsev, a sniper of the 62nd Army, Alexander Kuznetsov, commander of a rifle battalion, pilot Gavriil Ignashkin, Captain Sergei Pavlov, commander of a tank company, senior sergeant Georgy Khachin, gunner of a separate artillery brigade, Lieutenant Eduard Utukin, commander of a rifle platoon ...

Zhukov reproached Marshal Chuikov for the fact that in his memoirs he "did not consider it necessary to pay tribute to his comrades-in-arms - the soldiers of the 1st, 24th and 66th armies of the Stalingrad Front, the 16th air army and long-range aviation, those who, apart from with no sacrifice, provided invaluable assistance to Stalingrad in this difficult time.

And here is what a German officer from the Paulus army wrote about the Battle of Stalingrad: “At the same time, parts of our corps suffered huge losses, reflecting the fierce attacks of the enemy in September, who tried to break through our cut-off positions from the north. The divisions that were in this sector were bled dry, as a rule, 30-40 soldiers remained in the companies.

In a moment of calm, Zhukov, Eremenko, Khrushchev, Golovanov, Gordov and Moskalenko gathered at the command post of the 1st Guards Army to discuss the situation around Stalingrad and further actions.

Zhukov didn’t even say too much there: “Since the Supreme Commander warned me about keeping the projected plan for a large counteroffensive in the strictest confidence, the conversation was mainly about strengthening the troops of the South-Eastern and Stalingrad fronts. When A. I. Eremenko asked A. I. Eremenko about the plan for a more powerful counterattack, I did not shy away from answering that the Stavka would conduct counterattacks of much greater force in the future, but so far there is neither the strength nor the means for such a plan.

In preparing Operation Uranus, Zhukov tried to take into account the shortcomings of the recent counter-offensive near Moscow. Where it was planned to deliver the main blows, artillery was concentrated, capable of suppressing the enemy's defenses and coping with his tanks. Huge masses of troops and equipment were regrouping in an atmosphere of deep secrecy. Thirty thousand cars and almost one and a half thousand railway cars were involved. German intelligence did not detect what was happening, and by mid-November the regrouping was completed. And the enemy consoled himself with the certainty that “the Russians were seriously weakened during the last battles and would not be able to have the same forces in the winter of 1942/43 as they had last winter.”

For two days he worked for Eremenko. I personally examined the enemy positions in front of the 51st and 57th armies. Worked in detail with the commanders of divisions, corps and commanders of the upcoming tasks on "Uranus". The check showed that Tolbukhin is preparing better for Uranus ... I was ordered to conduct combat reconnaissance and, on the basis of the information obtained, clarify the battle plan and the decision of the commander ...

The two rifle divisions given by the Stavka (87th and 315th) to Eremenko have not yet been loaded, since they still have not received transport and horse trains.

So far, only one of the mechanized brigades has arrived.

Things are going badly with supplies and with the supply of ammunition. There are very few shells for "Uranus" in the troops.

The operation will not be prepared by the due date. Ordered to prepare for 11/15/1942.

It is necessary to immediately throw Eremenko 100 tons of antifreeze, without which it will be impossible to throw the mechanical parts forward; send the 87th and 315th rifle divisions faster; urgently deliver warm uniforms and ammunition to the 51st and 57th armies with the arrival of the troops no later than 11/14/1942.

If Eremenko and Vatutin's air preparation for the operation is unsatisfactory, then the operation will end in failure. The experience of the war with the Germans shows that an operation against the Germans can be won only if we have air superiority. In this case, our aviation must perform three tasks:

The first is to concentrate the actions of our aviation in the area of ​​the offensive of our strike units, to suppress the German aircraft and to firmly cover our troops.

The second is to break the way for our advancing units by systematically bombing the German troops standing against them.

The third is to pursue the retreating enemy troops through systematic bombing and assault operations in order to completely upset them and prevent them from gaining a foothold on the nearest defense lines.

If Novikov thinks that our aviation is not in a position to carry out these tasks now, then it is better to postpone the operation for a while and accumulate more aviation.

Talk to Novikov and Vorozheykin, explain the matter to them and let me know your general opinion.

1. In recent days, in the areas of Ivanov (Eremenko - A.G.) and Fedorov (Vatutin), no new enemy reserves have been established, only internal regroupings and pulling closer to the front line of army reserves, in particular the Romanian tank division in the Romanenko area. Small groups of tanks were set up 5-6 kilometers from the front line of defense, apparently, with these groups of tanks the enemy strengthens the defense of his front line. The enemy sets up a wire at the forefront, creates minefields.

Until now, antifreeze has not been delivered, all cars are filled with vodka. There are also no winter oils and lubricants. Many units, especially reinforcement artillery, did not receive warm uniforms.

2. To date, all parts of Fedorov have reached their original areas and are working on their tasks. Now everyone is working on organizing the rear, speeding up the delivery of ammunition, fuel and food.

In the period from 9 to 12.11, enemy aircraft systematically attacked the areas where Fedorov's units were concentrated. Since 12.11 aviation activity has sharply weakened. From a survey of prisoners captured in various sectors of the Fedorov front, it was established that there was no talk in the enemy troops about our impending resettlement, apparently, the enemy did not disclose our grouping and our intentions.

3. According to the condition of the units and the course of preparations for Ivanov and Fedorov, the resettlement period can be set for November 18 or 19. I don't think it's worth postponing any further. Please let me know about your decision and the date of relocation.

4. On 14 and 15.11 I will check the progress of preparations with Chistyakov and Batov. On the evening of 16 I suppose to be in Moscow. Mikhailov from Ivanov will arrive at Fedorov on November 16 at 12 o'clock.

You can set the day for the resettlement of Fedorov and Ivanov at your discretion, and then report it to me upon arrival in Moscow. If you have the idea that one of them will start resettlement one or two days earlier or later, then I authorize you to decide this issue at your discretion ...

Zhukov proposed that the forces of the South-Western Front and the 65th Army of the Don Front go on the offensive on November 19, and the Stalingrad Front on November 20. Firstly, this made it possible to smooth out the difference in distance that had to be overcome by troops advancing from different points, and secondly, this was supposed to mislead the enemy. Stalin agreed.

And on November 17, the Supreme Commander summoned Zhukov to Headquarters and ordered the organization of a distraction operation in the Moscow direction by the forces of the Kalinin and Western fronts.

During the preparation of Operation Uranus, Zhukov was twice on the verge of death. Both times - during flights.

“Before reaching Moscow, I felt that the plane was suddenly making a U-turn and descending. I figured we must have veered off course. However, a few minutes later, A.E. Golovanov drove the car to land on an unfamiliar area. Landed safely.

Why did they park the car here? I asked Golovanov.

- Say thank you for being near the airfield, otherwise we could have fallen.

- What's the matter?

- Icing.

And once, during an urgent flight to Moscow, on the orders of Stalin, the plane with Zhukov miraculously did not crash into a brick pipe. “The flight to Moscow was not bad, but on the approach to Moscow, visibility did not exceed one hundred meters. On the radio, the pilot was given a command from the Air Force flight department to go to the alternate airfield. In this case, we must have been late for the Kremlin, where the Supreme Commander was waiting for us.

Having assumed full responsibility, I ordered the pilot E. Smirnov to land on the Central Airfield and remained in his cockpit. Flying over Moscow, we suddenly saw the mouth of a factory chimney 10–15 meters from the left wing. I looked at Smirnov, he, as they say, without batting an eyelid lifted the plane a little higher and after 23 minutes led him to land.

- It seems that we have successfully got out of the situation about which they say "trumpet case"! I said as we landed.

“Everything happens in the air if the flight crew ignores the weather conditions,” he replied smiling.

- My fault! - I said to the pilot, while shaking his hand firmly.

This text is an introductory piece. From the author's book

"Operation X" The Spanish Civil War has been brewing for a long time. In January 1930, King Alfonso XIII of Spain decided to return to an alternative electoral system. However, the authorities failed to keep under control the left wing of the socialist republican parties, whose influence in

From the author's book

Chapter 14 "Uranium" By mid-November 1942, large, by German standards, aviation forces were operating in the Stalingrad direction: - eight bomber groups: I. and III./KG1, I. and part II./KG51,1. and II./KG55, as well as KG27 in full strength; - three assault groups: II./StGl, I. and II./StG2; - four

From the author's book

Operation Blue Bat After the flow of weapons of the Soviet bloc poured into the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, the situation there became unsettled. In April 1958, the 6th Fleet held a show of force in the Eastern Mediterranean to support the King of Jordan, who

From the author's book

BOOK THREE. PROVIDING OPERATION "URANUS" ... Under the current circumstances, I absolutely need to deliver information about the enemy as often as possible, because, without having fast and reliable news, the army made one march in the wrong direction, as it should, which is why

From the author's book

Operation "Lyon" Until March, despite some losses of aircraft, the air bridge across the sea continued to function successfully. Meanwhile, the Allies carefully studied the traffic of German air transport and finally realized, belatedly, what an important role played by

From the author's book

Uranium for Israel By that time, our action had already been planned and prepared in the city of Lashkargah and several districts of the Helmand province: Girishke, Nadali, Musakala, Nava, Garmsir, Kajaki. We worked there from February 10 to February 22, 1985, having barely returned from Andarab. Were

From the author's book

Normandy Landing Operation (Operation Overlord) 1944 The Red Army's victories at Stalingrad and Kursk radically changed the strategic situation in World War II. Hitler was now compelled to send all possible forces to the Eastern Front. Soviet

From the author's book

Uranium for Military Purposes At the end of January 1941, the chairman of the Uranium Commission, Academician Khlopin, sent another note to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. It began with a phrase that could very well be the beginning of an exciting detective story: “Work on the problem

From the author's book

The spring attack on uranium on April 5, 1942 was again reminded of himself by Georgy Flerov, who by that time had become a lieutenant technician. He again wrote a letter to Stalin: “Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! It has already been 10 months since the beginning of the war, and all this time I feel myself, and really

From the author's book

What is the nomenclature of US munitions using depleted uranium? In the process of the scandal that broke out, caused by the consequences of the use of uranium ammunition in Yugoslavia, their nomenclature is stubbornly hushed up. In other words, it did not become public

From the author's book

Practical application of the Uran-6 sapper robot in the Itum-Kalinsky district of the Chechen Republic

From the author's book

OPERATION "IND" With the arrival in August 1931 to the leadership of the Foreign Department (INO) of the OPTU Artur Artuzov, foreign intelligence activities were intensified, aimed at combating one of the long-standing opponents of the Soviet state security agencies - the Russian

From the author's book

Operation "TA" American landing ships are approaching the coast of Leyte Island. The landing that began was the reason for the operation "TA"The adventurous drama in nine convoysThe escort operation carried out by the Japanese fleet during the battle for the Philippines differs among

From the author's book

"PARADE OF THE PLANETS": "URANUS", "MARS" AND "LITTLE SATURN" None of the strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War can be considered in isolation from those that took place earlier, simultaneously with it or immediately after it. So the Moscow battle not only affected

Alexey Zakvasin, Svyatoslav Petrov

On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops launched Operation Uranus to encircle the Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht. As a result, 300 thousand German troops ended up in the boiler. Despite the desperate attempts of the Nazi troops to break out of the encirclement, they failed to do so. The Germans capitulated, more than 90 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, including the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus. At Stalingrad, Nazi Germany suffered a crushing defeat. This battle changed the course of World War II. About how the Red Army managed to achieve strategic success - in the material RT.

• Captured Nazis on the streets of Stalingrad
• RIA News

“People just fell from the sky. They fell from above to the ground and again found themselves in the Stalingrad hell, ”said 94-year-old Hans-Erdman Schönbeck, who was surrounded by the Red Army at the end of 1942, in an interview with Der Spiegel. The former Wehrmacht soldier recalled how his colleagues tried to board a plane that was leaving the battlefield.

German soldiers and officers called the battle for Stalingrad hell on earth and red Verdun (meaning the unsuccessful attack of the Kaiser troops on the positions of the French in 1916 ). The Nazi soldiers, who did not know serious defeats, were amazed at the capabilities that the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) demonstrated.

Soviet troops defeated the invaders during the operation, codenamed "Uranus". Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky in his book "The Work of All Life" argued that the code names for all strategic operations of the Red Army were personally invented by the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin.

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with successful attacks on the Romanian positions located on the flanks of the Stalingrad group. On November 23, 1942, the most combat-ready German units fell into the cauldron of the Red Army, and on February 2, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, capitulated.

• Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, commander of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht, captured by Soviet troops
• RIA News
• Georgy Lipskerov

"No step back!"

The Battle of Stalingrad began on July 17, 1942, after the Wehrmacht troops crossed the Chir River. The 6th Army of General Friedrich Paulus was supposed to cover the left flank of the Nazi troops operating in the North Caucasus from counterattacks. The capture of Stalingrad as an important transport hub was intended to ensure the success of the Germans in the south of the USSR.

Having lost industrially rich Ukraine, in the summer of 1942 the Soviet Union found itself in a difficult situation. On July 28, 1942, Joseph Stalin signed the famous order No. 227, which forbade even a forced retreat and was popularly called "Not a step back."

Initially, the Wehrmacht concentrated 14 divisions of about 270 thousand people from Army Group B in the Stalingrad direction. Subsequently, the grouping to capture Stalingrad was increased to 1 million.

In the second half of July, the Nazis were opposed by about 160,000 Soviet troops. The Red Army was inferior to the enemy troops in tanks, artillery and aircraft. As a result of the regrouping in November, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) increased the number of troops in the Stalingrad region to 800 thousand people.

Thus, before the start of Operation Uranus, the Red Army was unable to concentrate on the front, the length of which was up to 850 km, superior forces to the enemy. Moscow was still under the threat of a strike, and the Supreme High Command decided not to risk a massive transfer of troops from Central Russia.

• Joseph Stalin
• globallookpress.com

In the context of a shortage of human and material resources, non-standard actions were required to defeat the Wehrmacht near Stalingrad. According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, one of the main keys to the success of "Uranus" was the brilliantly conducted intelligence operations to disinform the Nazi command.

red herring

Back in March 1942, the Stavka was aware that Hitler had set his generals the task of occupying the southern part of the USSR, masking preparations for the next attack on Moscow. At the same time, the Soviet leadership was aware that the Wehrmacht had enough forces to launch an offensive against the capital in the event of a weakening of the positions of the Red Army in Central Russia.

Also on topic

“Stalingrad will remain Soviet”: the Ministry of Defense published declassified documents about the key battle of World War II

On the eve of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Russian Ministry of Defense declassified archival materials...

As General Sergei Shtemenko recalled, in the summer of 1942, "the Soviet command did not have the opportunity to ensure decisive action to defeat the advancing enemy grouping in a short time."

The reason for the lack of reserves, as the RF Ministry of Defense explains, was not only the need to defend Moscow, but also the frequent offensive operations initiated by Stalin.

The situation near Stalingrad was largely saved by Soviet intelligence. In 1942, the Abwehr (German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency) received a lot of disinformation information of an operational-strategic nature. The headquarters sought to hide from the Nazis the fact of the concentration of units of the Red Army in the Stalingrad region.

For this purpose, a diversionary operation called "Mars" was carried out. Soviet intelligence officers had to convince the German generals that the Red Army under the command of Georgy Zhukov would go on a large-scale counteroffensive in the Rzhev region (200 km west of Moscow), and not near Stalingrad.

According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, if the disinformation measures had not achieved their goal, Operation Uranus could have ended in failure. The victory of the Nazis in the Battle of Stalingrad would have led to the entry into the war against the USSR of Turkey and Japan and the inevitable defeat of the Soviet Union.

Scouts and analysts of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces knew that the Germans were monitoring Zhukov's movements. His appearance in certain sectors of the front was interpreted as a sign of the intensification of the actions of the Red Army. The famous commander skillfully performed the role assigned to him, and this helped to confuse the Nazi command.

“Zhukov was appointed by Stalin to manage the Central Front in order to mislead the Germans about the real plans of the USSR,” Mikhail Myagkov, chairman of the scientific council of the Russian Military Historical Society (RVIO), explained in an interview with RT. “The Wehrmacht knew about the authority of Marshal Zhukov and, of course, had to assume that since such a strong commander was placed at the head of the Central Front, it means that the main forces of the Red Army would be located there.”

• Army General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (left)
• RIA News
• Peter Bernstein

The operation near Rzhev under the leadership of Zhukov really began in the second half of November 1942. However, it was not as large-scale as the Abwehr expected, and pursued a strategic plan that was the same as Uranus.

The fact that the Headquarters managed to outwit the Germans is evidenced by the erroneous forecasts of the Wehrmacht commanders. In particular, the head of the Foreign Armies of the East department of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Reinhard Gehlen, was sure that the Red Army would inflict the main blow on the 9th Army of the Center group, which was located just near Rzhev, in the fall.

“On the German Eastern Front, it is more and more convincingly confirmed that the point of application of the main efforts of the upcoming operation is in the sector of Army Group Center.<…>The preparation of the enemy for an offensive in the south is not carried out so intensively to believe that a major operation in the south in the near future will begin simultaneously with the expected offensive against Army Group Center, - reported on November 6, 1942 Gehlen.

The head of intelligence of the 9th Army, Colonel Georg Buntrok, reported in a report received by the headquarters of Army Group Center: "The enemy is preparing for a major offensive against the 9th Army, intending to strike from the eastern and western sides of the (Rzhevsky) trapezoid ..."

Buntrok believed that the Red Army was going to "surround the troops stationed in it (trapezoid), destroy the 9th Army, break through the front line, eliminate Army Group Center and consolidate the victory with a triumphant advance to Smolensk and taking it by storm."

Secret "Uranus"

In an interview with RT, Mikhail Myagkov noted that the Soviet command made every effort to classify Operation Uranus. According to the expert, the cost of the defeat of the Red Army at Stalingrad was too high. The Soviet army was supposed to deliver a powerful and completely unexpected blow.

“Radio silence was introduced, troop movements were carried out at night, documents on the start of the counteroffensive were written by hand, and not dictated to the machinists. It was also decided to make a distraction in the form of an offensive operation on the Central Front. The Wehrmacht was misinformed about the Red Army's offensive plans and did not expect a serious blow on the Southern Front, ”Myagkov said.

The expert believes that the Headquarters came to the right conclusion, deciding that it was near Stalingrad that a radical turning point in the war with Germany would be made. Success directly on the battlefields of the Red Army was ensured thanks to the improvement of the training system for military personnel. The encirclement of the German group was carried out by trained and well-armed fighters.

“The experience gained by the Soviet army during the two years of the war also played its role, and, importantly, the army learned to interact with different branches and types of troops,” Myagkov explained.

According to the expert, due to the fact that the Soviet army held back the onslaught of the enemy for quite a long time, the rear was significantly strengthened, the production of weapons was established, and new formations were formed.

• Soviet soldiers storm a house in Stalingrad, February 1943
• RIA News
• George Zelma

“Sufficient forces were accumulated for a decisive counteroffensive, when Soviet soldiers and officers, remembering the shed blood of their comrades-in-arms, broke the enemy and reached from Stalingrad to Berlin itself. The bet of the Soviet leadership turned out to be correct, and the victory on the southern front really brought success in the war as a whole, ”summed up Myagkov.

"Uranus" - this is the code word that was assigned to the offensive operation on the Stalingrad front during the Great Patriotic War. Chronological period - nineteenth november 1942 on the second February 1943 d. The main stake was placed on a counteroffensive on three fronts at once. Thanks to coordinated actions, the Germans were eventually to be destroyed near Stalingrad.

The situation before the operation.

Before the start of the actions of the Soviet army, the German offensive on Stalingrad was blocked. Part of the city was under the complete control of the Russian army. But the Germans did not give up, although their situation was difficult, the soldiers stretched out for more than 2000 km, their flanks were completely unprotected. Many were ready to give up their positions, but a directive came from Germany to stay, because after long battles the Soviet army is unlikely to go on the offensive, if this happens, then not earlier than spring 1943 year., and before that time, reinforcements will come.

The balance of forces of the USSR and Germany before the operation.

• Soldiers - one million one hundred and three thousand people;
• Mortars and guns - fifteen and a half thousand units;
• Tanks - one thousand four hundred units;
• Aircraft - one thousand three hundred units.

Germany:

• Soldiers - one million eleven thousand people;
• Mortars and guns - ten thousand two hundred units;
• Tanks - six hundred and seventy-five units;
• Aircraft - one thousand two hundred units.

The result - in terms of personnel, as well as aircraft, the Soviet side and the Wehrmacht army were approximately equal, but in terms of equipment and tanks of the USSR it surpassed the enemy.

Master plan of the operation.

Back in September, it was decided to start developing an offensive plan by the General Staff and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. thirteenth november the plan was personally approved by I.V. Stalin. Its main meaning was that the South - Western Front under the leadership of N.F. Vatutin, was supposed to deliver crushing blows from the sites of the right bank of the Don, the total depth of the offensive was more than 110 km. The group of the Stalingrad Front conducted an offensive operation from the area of ​​​​the Sarpinsky reservoirs, their breakthrough was to be 100 km. Thanks to coordinated actions, in the end they were supposed to meet near the town of Kalach-Soviet, so the main forces of the Germans were supposed to fall into a dense ring of captivity. At the same time, the armies had to ensure the possibility of creating external conditions for a large-scale encirclement.

The Don direction was supposed to provide support and inflict two crushing blows, the first in the Kletsky region, the second in the south side, across the left bank of the Don. All actions according to the plan had to be implemented in those places where the enemy was weakest, while attacks were delivered both on the flanks and in the rear. The plan was developed and approved in the strictest secrecy, so the offensive of the Wehrmacht forces was taken by surprise.

Operation progress.

Soldiers of the South-Western Direction and the Don Front began their actions 19 November, after a powerful shelling from the air. Bloody battles began, the Germans tried to block the way, organizing a counteroffensive, but it was not successful, the introduced tank army put an end to this idea. 20 november 1942 year, the Stalingrad group entered the offensive. Three days later, Kalach was taken, at the same time the tank corps of the South-Eastern Front, as well as the mechanized wax of the Stalingrad group, met, thereby closing the circle, then more than 300- thousand German soldiers.

24 november the successful operations of the South-Eastern Front continued, completely defeating the Romanian troops allied with Germany, they managed to capture 30 thousand people and a large number of units of military equipment. To end november 1942 the coordinated actions of the Don and South-Western fronts took place. They managed to compress the enemy forces on a territory not exceeding 80 km. from the west and no more 40 from North.

At first December the rapid advance ended, the fighting dragged on, and all because of the underestimation of the power of the enemy army, which could still offer fierce resistance. At the end november Hitler rejected the proposal of a breakthrough in a southeasterly direction, he instructed not to surrender Stalingrad until reinforcements arrived.

twelfth December 1942 year, the German command is preparing an offensive, the main purpose of which was to release the captured German units. Didn't even last three days 15 December their plans failed, the offensive was stopped, another attempt was made four days later, but it also did not succeed.

Seeing the onslaught of the German soldiers, the Soviet command decides to launch an offensive, the South-Eastern Front is included in the battle, for three days, thanks to the courage and stamina of the Soviet soldiers, the defense of the German soldiers was interrupted in five directions at once. By the end December 1942 years, the losses of the German side became catastrophic.

Breakthrough stage.

At first January 1943 The Soviet Union offered Hitler to surrender, but in response came a harsh refusal. Immediately after that, two days later, the operation to destroy the "ring" began. At that time, there were about 250 thousands of German soldiers, this operation was to be carried out by the Don Front, the number of which did not exceed 210 thousand. The German stood to the end and continued to resist. To simplify the task at the end January 43 years, the German parts were divided into southern and central parts. Thirty first January the south surrendered, after a couple of days the center ceased to exist. The battle of Stalingrad was over.

Results of Operation Uranus.

At the end of the offensive, two German armies were completely destroyed, the Romanian allies of the Germans and one Italian unit were defeated. Wehrmacht losses reached 800 thousand people, the Soviet side lost more 480 thousands of people. This offensive showed the whole world the excellent skill of the Soviet army, just as the success of Stalingrad inspired the allied armies of the USSR. In Germany, a commotion began, the states included in the anti-Soviet coalition thought about continuing the war, a crisis began in them.

Germany Commanders Georgy Zhukov
Alexander Vasilevsky Friedrich Paulus
Herman Goth

Operation Uranus- the code name of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War (November 19, 1942 - November 30, 1942). The counteroffensive of the troops of three fronts: the South-Western (gen.), Stalingrad (gen. A. I. Eremenko) and Don (gen. K. K. Rokossovsky), with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy group of troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Stalingrad.

Military situation before the operation

By the end of the defensive period of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 62nd Army held the area north of the Tractor Plant, the Barrikady plant and the northeastern quarters of the city center, the 62nd Army defended the approaches to its southern part. The general offensive of the Nazi troops was stopped. On November 10, they went over to the defensive on the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, with the exception of sectors in the areas of Stalingrad, Nalchik and Tuapse. The position of the Nazi troops became more complicated. The front of Army Groups A and B was stretched over 2,300 km, the flanks of the shock groups were not properly covered. The German command believed that after many months of heavy fighting, the Red Army was not in a position to carry out a major offensive. For the winter of 1942/43, the fascist German command planned to hold on to the occupied lines until spring, and then go on the offensive again.

The balance of forces on the fronts

Before the start of the operation (November 19, 1942), the ratio of manpower, tanks, aviation and auxiliary forces in this section of the theater of operations according to the "History of the Second World War," was as follows:

Operation plan

Since September, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff began to develop a counteroffensive plan. On November 13, the strategic counteroffensive plan, codenamed "Uranus", was approved by the Headquarters under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin. The plan was as follows: the Southwestern Front (commander N. F. Vatutin; 1st Guards A, 5th TA, 21st A, 2nd Air and 17th Air Armies) had the task of inflicting deep strikes from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don from the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya (advance depth approx. 120 km.); The strike force of the Stalingrad Front (64th A, 57th A, 51st A, 8th Air Army) advanced from the Sarpinsky Lakes region to a depth of 100 km. The shock groupings of both fronts were to meet in the Kalach-Soviet region and encircle the main enemy forces near Stalingrad. At the same time, part of the forces of these same fronts ensured the creation of an external encirclement front. The Don Front, consisting of the 65th, 24th, 66th, 16th air armies, delivered two auxiliary strikes - one from the Kletskaya region to the southeast, and the other from the Kachalinsky region along the left bank of the Don to the south. The plan provided for: to direct the main blows against the most vulnerable sectors of the enemy's defense, to the flank and rear of his most combat-ready formations; strike groups to use terrain advantageous for the attackers; with a generally equal balance of forces in the breakthrough areas, by weakening the secondary areas, create a 2.8-3.2-fold superiority in forces. Due to the deepest secrecy in the development of the plan and the enormous secrecy achieved by the concentration of forces, the strategic surprise of the offensive was ensured.

Operation progress

October 1942, fighting in the area of ​​the Krasny Oktyabr plant

Start of the offensive

The offensive of the troops of the South-Western and right wing of the Don Fronts began on the morning of November 19 after a powerful artillery preparation. Troops of the 5th tank armies broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army. The German troops tried to stop the Soviet troops with a strong counterattack, but were defeated by the 1st and 26th tank corps introduced into the battle, the advanced units of which went into the operational depth, advancing to the Kalach area. On November 20, the strike force of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. On the morning of November 23, the advanced units of the 26th tank corps captured Kalach. On November 23, the troops of the 4th Panzer Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front met in the area of ​​​​the Sovetsky farm, closing the encirclement of the Stalingrad enemy grouping in the interfluve of the Volga and Don. The 6th and main forces of the 4th tank armies were surrounded - 22 divisions and 160 separate units with a total strength of 330 thousand people. By the same time, a large part of the outer front of the encirclement was created, the distance of which from the inner one was 40-100 km.

The Soviet command estimated the size of the grouping that was to be surrounded in the final version of Operation Uranus in the range of 80-90 thousand. The original version had a more modest scale. The underestimation did not have a significant impact on the rapid encirclement, which occurred within 4-5 days (instead of the estimated 3 days), but greatly slowed down the liquidation of the encircled troops. Such a large underestimation with a final brilliant result is not the only example in military history. A similar example is the Battle of Novi. The prolonged presence of a huge pocket, which riveted all the forces and attention of the enemy to itself and sharply limited the possible options for its actions on the entire southern wing, allowed the Soviet command to brilliantly build on the success of the encirclement and inflict new huge losses on the enemy.