Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation

from December 6 to 25, 1941, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front held a Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation with the aim of defeating the 3rd and 4th German tank groups in the Klin, Solnechnogorsk and Istra.

"The troops of the 30th Army to the outcome of the third day of the offensive advanced by 20 km, freed Rogachevo, Yamuhu and the north of the wedge intercepted the Kalinin Highway - Moscow. 1st Impact army, freed Yahroma, developed an offensive on the wedge from the southeast." The 20th Army successfully developed the offensive on Solnechnogorsk, and the troops of the 16th army, knocking the opponent from the village of Krojok, they came to Istr. By December 12, the front line came to the Istra reservoir. The cities of Solnechnogorsk were liberated - December 12, Klin - December 15, Vysokovsk - December 16.

The mobile group of the 30th Army to the end of December 16 led battles at 17 km northeast of Volokolamsk. On December 20, the Red Army parts were freed from the Germans of the Volokamsk. In this direction, they advanced by 90 - 110 km from Moscow and caused a serious defeat of the 3rd and 4th German tank groups. At the turn of the Lama and Ruza rivers on December 21, Soviet troops met organized resistance and were stopped.

Yeletskaya offensive operation

Yeletskaya operation was carried out from December 6 to 16, 1941. The troops of the right wing of the South-Western Front in order to surround and destroy the eck of an enemy grouping. Starting the offensive on December 6, the shock group was adversary and distracted his attention from the main direction. "On December 7, the operational group of the troops of General F.Ya. Kostenko hit, entering the rear of the eck of the enemy to group. By December 10, Soviet troops managed to block the road of Livna - Elets," by depriving the Germans to the west way. By this time, the 13th Army liberated Elets, and on the front flanks switched to the offensive of the 3rd and 40th army.

The troops of the 3rd army liberated Efremov, and the 13th Army and the Kostenko group surrounded the main forces of the 34th Army Corps of the West Yelets. To the end of December 16, the troops of the South-Western Front almost completely defeated the enemy and ended with an elec surgery. The troops of the right wing of the south-western front have advanced by 80-100 km, distracted part of the forces of the 2nd Tank Army, thereby having assistance to the Western Front, who fulfilled the main task in a counteroffensiveness.

In the Klin-Solnechnogo offensive operation there was a place for many brave and memorable actions. There were sailors on skis, riders riding on tanks and soldiers emitting on the snow Tulups in a bodied frost. Tank attacks ended with hand-to-hand battles. Meanwhile, the command was looking for opportunities to strengthen their own positions and do not give a respite to the enemy.

Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation

By the time of the first autumn in World War II, the situation near Moscow was ambiguous: if there was a danger of a breakthrough of the defense of the Soviet troops and passing Moscow, which meant loss, then at the same time the German troops were waiting for counterattacks from the opponent every minute. Both army were exhausted, and only strategically correct solutions could help. Stalin played an important role, but this does not reduce the merit of Marshal. The role of Zhukov in the battle for Moscow is as decisive - his orders came on time, because of what the troops of the Red Army appeared a chance to win.

On December 1, Stalin ordered the Western Front to bypass the army of the top and go to the rear. Wedge tank group should have been destroyed. This order was treated by the 1st shock, the 30th, 20th, 16th and 5th army, which are located at that time on the river near Sverdlovo, Red Polyana and Dmitry. In order for the 1st shock and the 30th Army to surround the German tanks of the 3rd tank group, almost 75% of the air troops of the Western Front were allocated.

In addition, at about the same time, the 31st and 29th army were fighting with the Kalinin 9th tank group. After successful (and so intended), they were supposed to go to the wedge. Still, at that time, Vermhat had superiority in the number of tanks and artillery, losing only in the number of soldiers. To eliminate the numerical superiority of German troops in weapons, the Ural divisions, T-34 and 64 brigade tanks, were thrown into the Western Front. The latter consisted of sailors of the Pacific Front - high, well-trained soldiers.

Main events

Grouped, in the evening from 5 to 6th of December, all parts came to position for attack. Already on December 7, as a result of the day of the battle, the 30th Army broke through the border of the north of the wedge, and the 1st Army advanced through the river for 25 km, heading parallel to the 30th. So, they had to surround the 3rd tank group. Understanding this, the Hitler's command is tightened to a dangerous place 6 tank and 14 motorized divisions.

On the same day, fighting begins on Red Polyana, where with the close collision of opponents, they often moved to a hand-to-hand fight. Realizing the importance of supporting the 20th and 16th army, 64 brigade made unusual: most soldiers sat down on tanks and went to attack the enemy. Further, when the snow bothered to move, they raised Tulup and ran to the enemy. This is 20 degree frost!

December 9, the Germans are forced to move away. This is not satisfied with Zhukov: he planned the operation as a faster, and therefore it requires to block the Leningrad highway. Make it was to have a mobile seafarers detachment, numbering 800 people. When it took to send a small grouping bypass on skis, they, without knowing how to keep them, all caused the task! Together with the main forces, on December 10, the detachment blocks the highway, cutting off the road.

Throughout the December 11, battles were made for Solnechnogorsk, and the victory went into the hands of the Red Army. At this time, the 30th and 1st army surrounded the wedge, taking the Germans in the siege. Zhukov suggested a precipitated fighters to surrender, but the fire still had to open fire. For much persuasiveness on the road to the wedge, the landing of 214 brigades landed - it was the first deposit of the landing in 1941. When by December 15, Soviet troops completely, the street behind the street, cleared the wedge from the enemy, the Germans had to be extended to Volokolamsk. The path was blocked earlier than the landed landing. As a result, more than 400 soldiers were destroyed, not considered the combat vehicle decorated.

The 20th Army, using the ski troops and a seasherers of the maritime brigade, went to Volokolamsk, where the only largest tank clocks on the Western Front remained. On December 20, the enemy was knocked out by Soviet troops from Volokolamsk completely.

Outcome

As a result of events, an operational pause was again organized on the Western Front, which was possible due to the elimination of the threat from the west. From here the Germans could not attack. When on May 26, 1942, a union was signed between London and Moscow, the Messenger of the British side saw the consequences of Klianco-Solnechnogorsk offensive, and this was exactly what was decisive in making a decision in favor of the Union. So, this operation influenced the course of world politics.

Strictly speaking, the second phase of the German attack on Moscow began on November 15, when the 3rd tank group switched to the offensive of South Kalinin. The north of the Moscow Sea comes the infantry divisions, and the south of the LVI motorized corps as part of the 6th and 7th tank divisions, the 14th Motorized Division. The second rolling connection of the tank group, the XXXXI motorized housing under the command of V. Model remained under Kalinin. The place for applying the main strike of the coming was chosen almost unmistakable: the main blow came along a stretched at the front of the 10th km of the 107th motorized rifle division of Colonel P. G. Chanchibadze. The division was among the "boiler" released from the Vyazemsky and the beginning of the German offensive, there were 2 thousand people, 7 guns and 20 machine guns. The Division Tank Park was 2 T-34 and KB, 11 light tanks. The most appropriate definition for such a compound taking into account the front - "curtain". In the morning, on November 15, the enemy moved to the offensive throughout the front of the 30th Army. As a result, the battles on November 15 and on the night of November 16, the military units of the army were isolated north of the Moscow Sea and are pushed to the Volga. The left flank of the 30th Army was discarded, and a gap of 16-18 km was formed between him and the right flank of the 16th Army. The next day, the 46th Cavalry Division from the reserve of the front was put forward to the right flank of the 30th Army and changed the 21st tank brigade at the turn of the Volga. The tank brigade, which has numbered 5 KB and T-34 and 15 light tanks, was transferred to the bandwidth of the 107th Motorized Division. At the front of the 16th Army on November 15, the opponent began the onset of the left wing of the V Army Corps, the 106th Infantry Division of which provided a joint with the 4th tank group. Corps connections also exploited the fight at the front of the cavalry group of the Dovator.

By November 15, the army of the Western Front occupied the following position. The 16th Army K. K. Rokossovsky occupied on the Volokolamsky direction the front with a width of 70 km by three rifle and two cavalry divisions. The density was 18 km on the division. In the first echelon, the cadet regiment, parts of the 316th and 50th cavalry divisions, one shelf from the 18th and 78th rifle divisions were defeated. The main forces of the 18th and 78th rifle divisions were located on the second defense strip of 8-20 km from its front edge. Mozhaisk direction covered the 5th Army L. A. Govanov, ranking 50 km by the forces of four rifle and one motorized rifle division with a density of 12.5 km to the connection. 33rd Army M. G. Efremova held the front 30 km forces of four divisions with a density of 10 km on the division. Finally, the 43rd Army held the front 30 km with a density of 6 km. The wider fronts were in the 49th (85 km) and the 50th (70 km) of the armies, which ensured the density of 16 and 11 km to the connection, respectively.

Already in the conditions of the German offensive on the night of November 16, the 16th army made regrouping of troops and from 10.00 passed to the offensive. At the same time, the same morning the opponent began an offensive at the junction of the 316th Rifle Division and the Cavalry Group of the Dovator. All day on November 16, the 16th Army held in the state of offensive actions of his right wing and defensive - the left wing and the center. The unsuccessful were generally both both. The cavalry of the mobile group entered into battle in parts. At the beginning of the offensive at 10.00, the 17th and 24th cavalry divisions approached the original border only by 12.30. The rear is hopelessly behind. Very large losses suffered the coming 58th tank division, having lost the day of 139 tanks. The defended 316 division and the Cavalry Dovator group were forced to move away from the occupied positions. After the battle for Volokolamsk, the artillery grouping of the division I. V. Panfilov significantly decreased, in addition, part of the artillery forces of the 16th Army was used in the offensive in the Skirmanovsky bridgehead (in particular, one of the two guards anti-tank artillery regiments). As of November 16, the 316th division has a twenty-six-mm gun, twenty-six, 76.2-mm cannons, seventeen 122-mm warm-ups, five 122 mm body cannons and one 120 mm mortar. From 207 tools in mid-October 1941, some memories remained. Accordingly, the opportunity to confront German offensive was much more modest. The change for the better was the narrowing of the front to 14 km in comparison with 41 km under Volokolamsky in October. This happened due to arrival from the Far East of the 78th Rifle Division and the exit from the surroundings of the 18th Rifle Division. Also, Division I. V. Panfilova actually became four-dollar, she had the 690th rifle regiment of the 126th division, which came out of the environment near Vyazma. Opposed the 316th Rifle Division and the Cavalry Group of Dovator XLVI Motorized Corps (General Tank Forces Blades Vitokof, 5th and 11th Tank Divisions) and V Army Corps (General of Infantry Ruof, 2nd Tank, 35th and 106- I am infantry divisions). 1 tank battalion from the 11th Tank Division was later given. In other conditions, the blow of such a mass was irresistible. However, by the time the problem with the supply has reached its peak, and only parts of German tank connections that have become fuel participated in battle. By morning, November 17, the 690th rifle regiment was semi-road, the 1073rd and the 1075th shelves were shot down from their positions and went away. In the midst of the battle, November 17, 1941, the 316th Rifle Division received an order for renaming to the 8th Guards Rifle Division. The next day, on November 18, with the artillery-mortar shelling of the division team in the village of Gusevo, her commander I. V. Panfilov died. At the request of G. K. Zhukova, the 8th Guards Division received the name of his deceased commander.

Against the left wing of the 16th Army, the motorized building of the Tank Troops of Stmma has passed against the offensive of the HXXX. Both infantry corps (IX and VII) of the 4th tank group were to be moved after the upcoming tank divisions and ensure their flank. The composition of two buildings was five infantry divisions - the 78th, 87th, 7th, 197th and 267th.

In connection with the onset of the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front (5th, 185th Rifle, 107th Motorized, 46th Cavalry Division, 8th and 21st Tank Brigades) From 23 hours on November 17, was transmitted to Western Front. To strengthen the 30th army by order of the Western Front headquarters from the 16th Army, on November 18, the 58th Tank Division has already lost most of its combat vehicles. She put forward in the area of \u200b\u200bGolkovo - Savior Vile (15 km north-west of the wedge). From 18 to 20 November, the 58th Tank Division was already part of the 30th Army, leading fierce fights with the 3rd tank group of the enemy, detained her offensive. By November 20, the 58th tank division numbered only 15 tanks, 5 guns and 350 fighters of the first line parts.

There is nothing surprising that on November 20, L. Z. Mehlis reported I. Stalin on the state of the tank parts of the 30th Army as follows:

Meanwhile, on November 19, the Commander of the 3rd Tank Group, General of the Tank Troops, Rebanardt received an order to turn to the south with the aim of capturing the city of Wedge and the interception of the way to retreat for the Soviet 16th Army. On the same day, the upcoming XXXX tank corps was again occupied by Skirmanovo, shot down in the first half of November.

By November 21, parts of the 16th Army suffered large losses and were in a big nempoble: the cavalry and rifle shelves had 150-200 people, the 1st Guards Tank, the 23rd, 27th and 28th tank brigades had only 15 combat Tanks. The state of the upcoming German tank divisions was a little better. On November 21, in the 11th tank division, there were only 37 combat tanks (5 pz.ii, 22 pz.iii, 10 pz.IV). Losses from the moment of entering the battle on the Volokolamsk direction amounted to 19 tanks. Before the start of the Typhoon operation, the division numbered 146 combat tanks (11 pz.i, 44 pz.ii, 71 pz.iii, 20 pz.IV). In the 10th Tank Division, on November 21, there were 55 combat tanks. With such a seating of the number of combat tanks, the possibilities of German moving compounds were significantly reduced. This led to the fact that at the right flank of the 4th tank group, the IX hull of Geyer, consisting only of infantry divisions, was most quickly and efficiently advanced. November 22, the main forces of the Geyer Corps reached the Zvenigorod - Ista highway. Neighbors on the right and left behind 20 km. The left neighbor IX Army Corps was XXXX Corps, consisting of the 10th Tank Division and the Motorized SS Division "Reich".

For five days of the offensive (November 16-20), German tank and infantry divisions have advanced to the east of Volokolamsk by 15-25 km. This pace of promotion, from 3 to 5 km per day, is quite low even for infantry. It did not manage to reach the operational scope of mobile units in the first days of their November offensive.

In fact, the main task of the western front armies was to hold out until the preparedness of the three armies formed - the 1st shock, 20th and 10th. The first was formed by the Directive of the Supreme Commander of November 20, 1941. Initially, the army received the number "19" instead of the army of M. F. Lukin in return in the Vyazemsky "Boiler". The army should include: 55th, 47th, 50th and 29th Rifle brigades with dislocation in Dmitrov, 43rd, 60th Rifle Brigades in Zagorsk, 71st Rifle Brigade in Yahroma, 44th Rifle Brigade in Khotkov, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 16th, 18th, 19th and 20th ski battalions in Zagorsk; 1st, 5th and 7th ski battalions in Dmitrov; 6th ski battalion in yachroma; The 8th ski battalion in Khotkov and the 517th artillery regiment in Zagorsk. The concentration of the compounds and parts of the army in these paragraphs was proposed to be completed by November 27. The 20th Army, as well as the 1st impact army, was formed on the basis of the Directive of the Supreme Commander of November 20, 1941. The army initially included: 11th, 12th, 13th and 16th rifle Brigades with deployment in Rannonburg, 78th Rifle Brigade in Proskurov, 35th Rifle Brigade (arrived from Tashkent) in Skopina, 23rd and 24th ski battalions in Rannonburg, 21st and 22nd ski battalions in Ryazhsk , 18th artillery regiment in Rannonburg. In addition, the 331th Rifle Division, the 36th, 37th, 40th, 53rd, 54th, 49th, 28th, 64th, 43rd, 43, were included in the army. 24th, 31st Rifle Brigades.

The concentration of the troops of the 20th Army was scheduled to finish by November 27, 1941 in the Lobnya area - Skhodnya - Khimki. The last of the three armies, the 10th Army, was a bit "older" of his fellow. On October 21, 1941, the ABC rate was given a directive for formation by December 2, 1941 of the 10th reserve army. The army included: the 326th Infantry Division - Penza; 324th - Inza; 322nd - Kuznetsk; 330 - Syzran; 323th Infantry Division - Petrovsk. In addition, two rifle brigades were supposed to arrive from the Ural Military District. The headquarters of the army was deployed in Kuznetsk.

However, the German command did not possess reliable information on the concentration of three armies. Especially about it did not know the coming on the snow-covered fields. They stubbornly moved forward, sacred believing that if they break off the Soviet divisions and brigades opposing them, nothing would stop them anymore.

The nearest goal of the upcoming German troops was Klin. His defense officer was led by the Deputy Commander of the Western Front F. D. Zakharov, who arrived in the city in the evening of November 19 with a small group of staff officers. To defend the wedge was to be part of the 126th rifle and 24 cavalry divisions, the 25th and 8th tank brigades and a separate cadet regiment. The attempt of the 7th Tank Division of the Germans on November 20 to take the city from the go failed. The next day, the 14th Motorized Division joined the storm. Finally, on November 22, parts of the 7th tank and 14th motorized divisions of the 3rd tank group seized wedge and continued to the east. Under the pressure of the coming group Zakharov went to Rogachev. Meanwhile, the southern flank of the 4th tank group gradually pulled up to Istra. By November 25, XXXX motorized building of the 4th tank group was released to Istra. The fighting group of the 10th Tank Division and the Motorcycle Battalion of the SS DAS "DAS RIECH" tied the fight for the city, which passed into hand-to-hand fights with the Siberians of the 78th rifle division "with stuck bayonets". Parts of Division A. P. Beloborodova by the time remained the only Soviet parts on the right bank of the Istra River, Saddle in Istra Volokolamskoye Highway.

After crossing the troops of the 16th Army through the Istra reservoir and p. Istra Waterproof reservoirs were blown up, as a result of which a water stream was formed up to 2.5 m height for 50 km south of the reservoir. The attempts of the Germans to close the waterproof were not crowned with success, and they had to organize forcing artificially erected water obstacles. The situation was somewhat complicated by the fact that on November 24, the 35th Infantry Division forced the reservoir and formed a bridgehead. Frosts also soon fastened the distilled river and the ice reservoir. This allowed, for example, a motorcycle battalion of the 11th tank division to force the Istra reservoir on the ice.

Only after three days of the battle on November 26-28, the Germans managed to knock off the Soviet parts from the Istra line.

In the process of battles on the approaches to the Istra reservoir, the Office of the 16th Army was greatly complicated: the maneuverable nature of the fighting was required by flexible and clear governance. A waste with restraining battles on a wide front in the conditions of complete superiority of the enemy in moving compounds (most of the opposing 16th army of compounds was tank or motorized) was successful. Despite the interception of the Communications of the Army with the seizure of the wedge on November 23, the headquarters of K. K. Rokossovsky provided an almost planned waste of his troops. The fighting of the 16th Army was proceeded by direct control and leadership of the commander of the front of the city of K. Zhukov, who he himself was in the troops and personally led them. The actions of the 16th Army troops in this period undoubtedly deserve the highest marks. It is natural that most of the joints of the army entered the guardian (78th Infantry Division became the 9th Guards, the Corps of the Dovator - the 2nd Guards). The departure of the 16th Army also led to a reduction in its front. If the army started a defensive operation at the front of 70 km, then in the future it decreased to 30-40 km, which made it possible to maintain the density of the construction of the compounds thinned in battles.

If at the turn of the Istra and the Istra reservoir, it was possible to at least temporarily keep the onset of the right flank of the 4th tank group, then from the wedge of the advancing almost freely spread both east, in the direction of Rogachev and the Canal Moscow - Volga and southeast, to Solnechnogorsk . Moreover, strong moving connections were moving through Solnechnogorsk to Moscow through Solnechnogorsk - 2nd and 11th tank divisions. The capture of Solnechnogorsk V Army Corps on November 23 was shortly used by German propaganda. The next day, on November 24, the newspapers of Germany reported that "after a stubborn struggle, the city of Solnechnogorsk, located 50 km of North-west of Moscow (127), was captured by the Tank Forces. The achievement really was essential. The capture of Solnechnogorsk caused great anxiety at the headquarters of the Western Front. G. K. Zhukov ordered immediately to apply Constridar to the flank of the Solnechnogian groupage of the enemy by the forces of the Cavalry Group of the Dovator. However, Consturdar brought only a day of delay in the spread of Germans to the east and southeast of Solnechnogorsk. Therefore, in parallel, for parrying of the crisis, the transfer was made with temporarily subsided areas. On cars from the Kalinin region, the 133rd Rifle Division was transferred (arriving in Dmitrov on November 25). Of the 49th Army of the Western Front, the 7th Guards Division was transferred to the Solnechnogorsk direction. The situation was evolving such that the reserves were collected in grains, separate shelves. So was removed from the Kalinin front one regiment of the 251th rifle division. The 11th motorcycle regiment was put forward to the Yahroma area (on the channel Moscow - Volga), the 11th motorcycle regiment was nominated. In the northeast, the 8th Guards (316th) Rifle division was also moved to the Kryukov district, along with his unchanged satellite - the 1st Guards Tank Brigade M. E. Katuku. In addition, the right wing of the 16th Army was strengthened by the 24th (of the 33rd Army, 3 KB, 11 T-34, 23 Light Tank on November 16), 31st (from the 49th Army, 9 Kb, 29 T-34, 29 light tanks on November 16) and the 145th (from the 49th Army, 140 Light Tanks on November 16) Tank Brigades and two separate tank battalions. In service with one of these battalions, Valentine's tanks arrived from England, beaten by the units of the 2nd Tank Division of the Germans on November 25. The technique of foreign production, the appearance of which was noted even in the diary of F. Galder, did not have so much practical as a psychological impact. German units who have not received replenishments that have not received replenishments have been held at the limit of physical and moral stress, met a new part of the Red Army in English technique. How many more such parts will have to meet, they were unknown.

While the tankers of the 4th tank band without enthusiasm considered "Valentine's", their colleagues from the 3rd tank band rushed to the Canal Moscow - Volga. Leaded offensive 7th tank division. On the night of November 28, the battle group of the division under the command of Hasso Background of Mainatofel (6th motorized rifle regiment and part of the 25th tank regiment), coming on Yahroma and without meeting the resistance of our parts, captured the intact bridge and broke into Yahrom's rapid blow. By 7 o'clock in the morning, a detachment background of Mainatofel crossed the East Coast of the Channel. With the onset of dawn, the enemy continued to promote east. By 10 o'clock, the surrounding villages were captured - a perceivers, Ilyinskoye, B. Semeski. The battle in the Yahroma region lasted with varying success all day on November 28. The flank strike of the residues of the 21st Tank Brigade and the 58th Tank Division (30th Army) from the north on Yahroma managed to slightly suspend the distribution of parts of the 7th tank division. The next day, the German tankers had to face parts, which, although they did not wear an exotic, like "Valentines", but foreshadowed the coming storm. These were the advanced parts of the 1st shock army. During the day on November 29, the Germans organized by the counterattack of the 29th and 50th small brigades, with the support of artillery and aviation, the Germans were discarded back to the West Bank of the channel. On this day, Halder recorded in his diary:

"The enemy's activity before the front of the 4th Army has slightly increased. In the reports it is said about the preparation of the enemy to the offensive (?). On the northern flank of the 4th Army and at the front of the 3rd tank group - no changes. The enemy moves strength (apparently filmed from the front of the front in front of the 9th Army and derived from the Yaroslavl region) against the 7th tank division, coming through the Moscow-Volga Channel in the Yahroma region "(128).

Next to the phrase about the coming offensive Franz Galder put a question mark, apparently considering such an option as something fantastic. Meanwhile, the account of the time before the start of the Soviet counteroffensive was already on the clock. The silhouette of the iceberg, with whom she had to face the "Titanic" of the German offensive, already appeared on the horizon through the snow charges.

However, so far the advance of the 1st shock and the 20th armies passed, the situation remained extremely tense. A breakthrough of the 3rd tank group to the Moscow-Volga Channel created a large gap between the right flank of the 16th Army and the left flank of the 30th Army of the Western Front. Along the channel, this gap was filled with parts of the arriving 1st shock army, and the lumen between Solnechnogorsky and Yahroma had to temporarily fill out the reserves overwhelmed from other armies combined into the so-called groups of Zakharov and Remizov. The situation was complicated by the fact that the command of the 3rd tank group was able to release a motorized hull from under Kalinin XXXXI and extend it in advanced arbitrariness. On the last day of November, the corps was located in the Wedge region. By the time in the 1st tank division of the case, there were only 37 tanks. In the 6th Tank Division there were 4 PZ.II warning tanks, and the FIGHT PZ.35 (T) and PZ.IV was absent at all.

In the recent days of November, the North of Moscow on the channel Moscow - Volga The situation has become critical. The Germans deeply advanced here and disassembled the main forces of the 30th and 16th armies. In the process of a long and intense defensive battle on the right wing of the Western Front, the reserves were mainly drawn from the armies of the front itself and from different sides were continuously directed towards threatened areas. Together with the troops of the two armies at the main operating direction, they detained and stopped the enemy, but they could not have achieved a fracture of the operation in our favor. The battle crisis on the right wing was crisis. The time has come to introduce large reserves of the Supreme Command.

To this end, from November 26 to December 1, the troops of the newly formed 1st shock army V. I. Kuznetsova (29th, 47th, 55th, 50th, 71st, 56th, The 44th rifle brigades) focused in the Zagorsk district - Dmitrov. The army put forward to the eastern shore of the Canal Moscow - Volga to the front of Nikolskoye (north of Dmitrov 15 km), Bol. Ivanovo (south of Dmitrov 22 km). The group of General Zakharov (parts of the 126th and 133rd rifle, 17th cavalry divisions, the 21st and 24th tank brigades) of the Western Front command was included in the 1st shock army. At the same time to the north-west of Moscow in the Lobnya area - Skhodnya - Khimki focused on the 20th Army AA Vlasov (64th, 35th, 28th, 43rd Rifle Brigades and 331m and 352th Infantry Divisions ). They ranked the front line between the 1st shock and the 16th armies.

However, the coming German parts have not yet known about what an unpleasant surprise is waiting for them, and moved closer to Moscow. On November 30, 1941, the 2nd Tank Division was made from Solnechnogorsk along the highway from Solnechnogorsk with his combat group. German troops now stood 17 kilometers from the border of Moscow and 27 kilometers from the Kremlin. The 106th infantry division of one of his regiments at the junction of the 2nd and 11th tank divisions at the junction of the 2nd and 11th tank divisions captured on December 2-3, Railway Station Krukovo. A kilometer pillar showed a distance of 22 km from Moscow. The 8th Guards Panfilovskaya Division, together with the 7th Guards Division of the 49th Army, led a fierce fight for Kryukovo, the station passed from hand to hand. Motorcyclists of the 62nd Saporic Battalion of Army subordination approached Moscow, they got to Khimki Station, 16 km from Moscow. Pretty close to Moscow approached the detainees of the Istra reservoir of the Motorized Division of the SS "Das Reich". SSEsovtsy, coming in the Istra direction, reached the Lenino station, 17 km from Moscow. Almost the same closestly approached the Populatory Infantry Divisions of the 4th Tank Group of the IX Army Corps of Herman Geyer. The infantry division of the building in the center of the building of the building, the infantry division in the first days of December advanced along the Valley of the Moscow River to Dmitrovsky. She was 34 km from the Kremlin, and the dome of his churches were visible from the advanced position. However, the possibilities of further promotion of IX corps were practically exhausted. There was only one body division, the other two covered stretched flanks.

The transition of Soviet troops in the counteroffensive passed gradually. In the first few days of December 1941, a picture of the Sunset of the Army Group "Center" and fuzzy, spokenly the first rays of the rising sun, began the beginning of the offensive actions of newly formed and receiving replenishment from freshly informed joints of the army of the right wing of the Western Front. Already at night on December 1, the BGK rate in the Directive the Commander of the Kalinin Front stated that "private attacks in different directions taken by the troops of the Kalinin Front 27-29.11, ineffective." As a result of this thesis, the Kalinin front was put more large-scale offensive tasks. At the same time, the commander of the Western Front addressed the focusing 1st shock army order to perform the following tasks: 1) in the morning on December 2, by all the forces to switch to a decisive offensive in the general direction of Dedenevo - Fedorovka - South Wedge's outskirts and on the same day, to release a group of General Zakharov in the area of \u200b\u200bKamenka - Fedorovka; 2) In collaboration with the 30th and 20th armies, break the Klin-Solnechnogo enemy grouping.

Simultaneously with the concentration of fresh armies, there was a strengthening of the armies of the armies with fresh divisions, which passed the preparation, and the dedication of units at that time when the West Front reflected the blows of German tank groups. To strengthen the 30th army, new compounds arrived from the head of the chief command of the main command - 348th, 371st and 379th rifle divisions. Divisions arrived in the railway and fought on December 2-5. In the offensive, the 30th Army was supposed to go on December 6. Replenishment also received the most affected by the 16th Army's victim in November battles. On December 3, the 354th Infantry Division was included in its composition.

Began a counteroffensive near Moscow attack through the Canal Moscow - Volga against the combat group of Mainatofel part of the 1st shock army. This army was in the first days of December the leader of offensive actions.

Troops under the command of V. I. Kuznetsova in the morning of December 1, part of the forces (44th and 71st rifle brigades) moved to the offensive and advanced by the end of the day by 5-7 km west of the canal Moscow - Volga. The fresh strength of the Soviet troops soon collided with the 1st tank division of the V. Model plotted recently from under Kalinin. However, the offensive rolled on the Germans as a snowball, gradually turning into avalanche. By December 2, the 56th Rifle Brigade joined the upcoming troops of the 1st strike army. On the morning of December 2, parts of the 20th Army (331th Infantry Division, 134th Tank Battalion, 7th Separate Guards Mortar Division, 28th Rifle Brigade, 135th Tank Battalion, 15th Separate Guards Mortar Division) In the offensive with the task to surround and destroy the enemy in the Red Polyana area. From the evening of December 2, the 7th Army was transferred to the 20th Army as reserves of the 7th Guards Rifle Division, 282th Rifle Regiment, 145th, 24th and 31st Tank Brigades. In the morning on December 3, the 20th Army was prescribed to go to the offensive in the overall direction of Khimki - Solnechnogorsk. By December 3, the 44th, 50th, 56th and 71st rifle brigades, 701th artillery regiment, 3rd and 38th mortar divisions took part in the onset of the 1st shock army. On the same day, the 354th 354th Infantry Division was transferred to offensive actions. The transition of the 16th Army to the offensive in collaboration from the 20th Army was scheduled for December 7.

11.10.2007 22:17

Klin-Solnechnogorsk defensive operation, 1941.
Operation of the troops of the Right Wing of the Western Front, held on November 15 - December 5, 1941 during the Moscow battle. After the failure of the Oktyabrsky attack on Moscow, the German fascist command has prepared a new strike forces of the Center for the Center for the Center for the seizure of the Soviet capital by circumventing it from the north and south. For the offensive of the north of Moscow (Operation "Volzhskoye reservoir") on the front of Kalinin - Volokolamsk - the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy (7 tank, 3 motorized and 4 infantry divisions) were concentrated. The 30th (Major D.D.Lelyushenko gene) and the 16th (gene-lieutenant K.K. Crosovsky) of the army, who were the right wing of the Western Front (General of the Army, G. Zhukov) were defended before them.

The German fascist troops had a numerical superiority in humans in 1.6, guns and mortars in 2, tanks 3.4 times. The Soviet command promptly solved the idea of \u200b\u200bthe opponent in a timely manner and conducted a number of measures to strengthen defense, but could not change the relationship between forces and funds to the beginning of the operation (with the exception of aviation, which was numerically exceeding enemy). The idea of \u200b\u200bthe Soviet command provided for a stubborn defense to disrupt the plans of the enemy, to win time to concentrate strategic reserves in order to continue to go into counteroffensive. November 15, the 3rd enemy's tank group struck the 30th Army; On November 16, the 4th tank group was transferred against the 16th Army. Under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the troops of the 30th Army were forced to move away to the Volga, and the south of the Volzhsky reservoir - on the line east of envy, Yamuga, which allowed the enemy to develop success in the Klin direction. Especially persistent battles unfolded on the Volokolam-Istra direction, where the compounds of the 16th Army were selflessly fought. On November 23, the fascist troops bypassed the Soviet troops northeastern and south-west of the wedge. To avoid the environment, parts of the 16th army left the city. The enemy was also able to capture Solnechnogorsk, Yahroma, Red Polyana, a few villages on the eastern bank of the canal. Moscow.

The Soviet capital remained about 30 km. By this time, the troops of the Right Wing of the Western Front were transferred from the reserve of the BGK rate 1st shock and the 20th Army, reinforced with fresh parts of the 30th and 16th army. By the end of November - the beginning of December as a result of counterdresters in the areas of Dmitrov, Yahroma, Red Polyana and Kryukov, Soviet troops stopped promoting the enemy, which, who lost huge losses was forced to go to the defense. As a result of Klin-Solnechnogorsk defensive operation, as well as the Tula defensive operation, the Soviet command won the time to focus on the Moscow direction of strategic reserves and ensured the necessary conditions for the transition to a decisive offensive.

Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation, 1941.
Operation of troops of the right wing of the Western Front, held on December 6 - 25, 1941 during the Moscow battle; Part of the counteroffensive near Moscow. The goal of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation is the defeat of the 3rd and 4th enemy tank groups (7 tank, 3.5 motorized and 9 infantry divisions) in the area of \u200b\u200bKlin, Istra, Solnechnogorsk, liquidation of the threat of Moscow bypass from the north, creating favorable conditions for Further on the west. By the beginning of the operation of the troops of the right wing (30th, 1st percussion, 20th, 16th, 5th Army) of the Western Front (General G.K. Zhukov) occupied the turn of the west of Sverdlov, Dmitrov, kr. Polyana, River Nara. The idea of \u200b\u200bthe Soviet command provided for appreciation on the enemy of shocks on the converging directions from the Northeast and East by the 30th, 1st shock, 20th and 16th armies. The 5th Army on the onset of his right-legged connections along the left bank of the Moscow River was to provide the left flank of the shock grouping. To support the offensive from the air, up to 75% of the front aircraft, as well as the Aviation of the TBC reserve were distinguished.

With the troops of the Western Front, the troops of the left wing of the Kalininsky front were interacted (Gen.-Colonel I.S. Koniev), which arrived in the rear of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk group of the enemy (Kalinin operation 1941-42). The enemy was superior to Soviet troops in artillery in 1.2, in tanks 1.5 times, only in the human resources of the army of the right wing of the front had 1.6 times superiority. On December 6, Soviet troops switched to the offensive, which developed by increasing pace. Overcoming the opponel resistance of the enemy and reflecting his counterdads, they have advanced to 40-60 km during the 1st half of December, liberated Istra (December 11), Solnechnogorsk (December 12), Wedge (December 15), Vysokovsk (December 16) and then continued to pursue the retreating enemy. Cavalry and tank groups and detachments under the command of Generals L. M. Dovator, M. E. Katuku, F. T. Remizov and Colonel P. G. Chanchibadze destroyed the opponent's arielices, widely applying a communion maneuver. On December 20, Volokolamsk was liberated. On December 21, Soviet troops reached the turn of the Lama and Ruza rivers, where they met the organized opponation resistance at pre-prepared positions. Until December 25, the Soviet troops led battles in order to improve their position. As a result of the Klin-Solnechnogo offensive operation, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front defeated: the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy, they threw their broken compounds by 90-110 km, destroyed and captured a large number of guns, tanks, other military equipment, ammunition and Miscellaneous property, eliminated the threat of Moscow bypass from the north.

Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation

(6.12-25.12 1941)
The counteroffensive against the main shock grouping of the German troops was begun forces of the 30th, 1st shock, 20-1, 16th and right wing of the 5th armies of the Western Front. These troops had in their composition 20 rifle, one motorized rifle, one tank and 9 cavalry divisions, 17 rifle and 11 tank brigades, as well as several separate tank, machine-gun and ski battalions. The 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy in the midst of their occurrence of their occurrence of the four motorized and two army buildings had 17.5 divisions (infantry - 7, tanks - 7, motorized - 3 and one motorized brigade). The average number of the rifle division of the Western Front at this time was a little more than 7,200 people, a rifle brigade - about 4,400 people. The operational density of our troops was approximately 4.2 km per division.
In the process of an offensive in Moscow, the 4th tank group performed a maneuver bypassing the Istra reservoir through the city of Wedge. Through the same city, the route of the 3rd tank group was held, which by the end of November provided the left flank of the German offensive. Wedge became the most important node of communications, on which the division of several buildings of two tank groups depended. At the same time, the onset of the offensive to the north and northeast was discarded in the initial phase of the 30th Army D.Delushenko hung over the stages of German troops, while in dangerous intimacy from the wedge. Before the Soviet command, there were ample opportunities for the interception of communications published to the neighboring approaches to Moscow of German tank and infantry divisions. At the same time, the decisive factor in the planning of operations was the transition to counteroffensive after a long period of defensive actions. This led to the fact that the arriving reserves were relatively evenly distributed from the front armored armies. The 1st percussion and 20th Army occupied the starting position, closing a large breach formed as a result of the looping of the 40th and 16th armies. The absence of a pronounced shock fist forced to plan an operation in the form of several crushing strikes that were applied by all those who participated in the army occurrence.
The plan of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk Operation was to strike the 30th Army from the North, the 1st shock, the 20th and 16th armies from the east to the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups of the enemy in the area Wedge, Istra, Solnechnogorsk and create favorable conditions for the further development of the offensive to the West. The 5th army on the onset of his own powers along the north shore r. Moscow was supposed to provide the left flank of the 16th Army. Accordingly, these tasks shock grouping was created in each army.
In the 30th Army (107th Motorized, 185, 365, 371, 379 and 348th Rifle Divisions, 8th and 21st Tank Brigades, 18, 24, 46 and 82nd Cavalry Divisions) was decided to apply Two impacts - the main and auxiliary. The main efforts focused in the center, where it was assumed to adopt the wedge with the forces of the 365th and 371th rifle divisions with the support of the 8th and 21st tank brigades. The auxiliary blow was applied on the left flank by the 348th rifle, the 18th and 24 cavalry divisions towards Rogachevo. German historians are often referred to as a counteroffensive under Moscow compounds "Siberian". The use of this term is very conditional. For example, the 348th rifle division of Colonel A.S.Lukhtikova was Ural, 371st Lieutenant Colonel I.F. Shaglova - Chelyabinsk, and the 82nd Cavalry Division N.V.Gorin was formed in Bashkiria.
In accordance with the task of December 6, the troops of the 30th Army broke through the front of the two motorized enemy divisions defended against them. By the end of the day, the troops D.D.Lelyushenko advanced 17 km, expanding the breakthrough site to 25 km on the front. At noon, on December 7, the advanced parts of the 30th Army came to the village of Schapovo, in eight kilometers to the north-west of the wedge, where the LVI Motorized Corps team was located. From the defeat of the headquarters of the German compound, only numerous anti-aircraft designed to defend him from the strikes of Soviet aviation was removed. To the outcome of the day on December 7, bypassing schupovo and other resistance nodes, the troops of the 30th army were advanced towards a wedge to a depth of 25 km. German command began to turn to the city nearby combat groups of tank divisions. The first to revenue by the garrison of the wedge of the Avangard of the 25th Tank Regiment of the 7th Tank Division, headed by the already known to us on the battles for Alitus by Lieutenant Orlov. However, despite the increasing resistance, in the evening of December 9, the troops of D.D. Lelushenko came close to the North and North-Western wedges.
In the 1st shock army, two directions of impact were also scheduled. The main efforts focused on the right flank and in the center, in the Yahroma area. By December 6, the army that joined his units on December 29, the army mostly forces (29, 50, 44, 56, 71 and 55th Rowers, the 133rd and 126th rifle divisions) already led fierce battles, overcoming stubborn resistance enemy.
The troops of the 20th and 16th armies led December 6 battles of local importance against the main forces of the 3rd and 4th tank groups that were held in Moscow. The transition to the counteroffensiveness of these two armies was the most difficult, since they were accepted against the flank curtains not stretched along the front, but relatively strong compounds that have not yet lost their hostilities. Under these conditions, the narrowing of the strip of the increased 16th army to 20 km was also helped, almost four times less than in mid-October 1941 under Volokolamsky. The first day of the occurrence of December 7 did not bring significant success to the troops of the 16th Army, the actions of the majority of subordinates of the K.K. Crosovsky compounds could be described as "fell, they did not have success." The saturation of the army of artillery was helped. In early December, in the 16th Army there were 320 field and 190 anti-tank guns, much more than in the rest of the armies of the right wing of the Western Front. Suffice it to say that only 785 field and 360 anti-tank guns were in the four advancing armies. Some success marked only on December 8, and on December 9, the departure of the opposing 16th army of German troops in the North-West and West directions began.
Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the 3rd and 4th enemy tank groups on the night of December 10 began a departure to the line of the Istra reservoir. The north of the last enemy tried to keep the Wedge district, where in the evening of December 11 focused on a strong grouping of his troops as part of four tank and one motorized divisions. In connection with the yield on the line of the Istra reservoir, the 16th Army lost its key value, and the 7th and 8th rifle divisions were launched from its composition to the front reserve. For action on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy, two shock groups were created by the commander of the 16th army, one for the actions of the north of the reservoir, and the second is south of him. Both groups moved to the offensive in the morning on December 10th.
The main battles on the right wing of the Western Front turned around the wedge, where the troops of the 20th, the 1st shock and the 30th armies tried to surround and destroy the opponent departing from Moscow. In the evening, on the evening of December 13, the advancing army semi-siblues to the Klin group of the enemy in the city and its nearest surroundings. However, the city itself and its surroundings were by the time the "strong nutrition", in which parts of several mechanized compounds departed from Moscow were gathered. Actually, the wedge defended from December 9, the 1st tank division. Due to the inability to take the wedge to the struggle, the struggle unfolded for communications. The main "corridor" for waste by the German command was elected highway Klin - Vysokovsk, leading to the West in the direction of Volokolamsk. Soviet troops who arrived around the wedge from the West, met strong counterattacks of the enemy and could not cut the Wedge's highway - Vysokovsk.
An important node of communications on the way from the wedge to Volokolamsk was Terryaev Sloboda. This small settlement for a time has become a parable in languages \u200b\u200bin the operational documents of the Soviet and German command. After the wedge coverage, both tank corps of the 3rd tank group were deprived of the opportunity to retreat the same route as they went to Moscow in November 1941, respectively, XLi, and the LVI of the building was separated from one road. The seizure of the Terry Sloboda of the 30th Army troops could intercept the route for the departure of the main forces of the 3rd tank group. The task of capturing the terry settlement was assigned to the mobile group of the commander of the 107th motorized rifle division of P.G. Schainchibadze (regiment of the 107th motorized rifle division and the 82nd Cavalry Division). On the part of the Germans, the main participant of defensive battles in the region of Terry Sloboda was the 1st tank division. The capture of this settlement was so tempting that the command of the Western Front even decided to throw a parachute landing in the area. For the landing operation, 14 TB-3 aircraft of the 23rd air traffic was allocated. The order for landing followed on the outcome of the night on December 14th. However, due to organizational troubles, instead of two flights with a transit through the air, 300 people each plane made only one departure. It was planted a total of 147 people. Such a detachment could not have a significant impact on the waste of German mechanized compounds. The Chancibadze group took the Terry Slobod only in the middle of the day on December 18.
Already during the offensive, the 30th Army was strengthened by the 363rd rifle division from Sverdlovsk, who arrived on December 14. But the garrison of the wedge was knocked out of the city before entering the fresh division into battle. The offensive of the troops of the 30th Army in the area of \u200b\u200bthe north and north-west of the wedge and the yield of the Malflanies of the 1st shock army to the southeast outskirts of the city ended with his liberation. On December 14, the city left parts of the 7th tank and 14th motorized divisions. On the night of December 15, part 371th and 348 rifle divisions of the 30th Army entered the wedge. The fierce fight for the city was walking during the day. After its completion, December 16, 1941, the 30th Army was transferred to the Kalinin Front.
While the 1st shock and the 30th Army were fighting for the wedge, the 16th and 20th army advanced to the West. They moved along the same route to which the troops KK Kozhosovsky were forced to go away in November 1941. Only now the 16th Army shared his former band from the 20th Army A.A.Vlasov. For mastering the Istra line of the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General K.K. Crosovsky created two shock groups. The first of the 145th Tank Brigade, the 44th Cavalry Division and the 17th Rifle Brigade was intended to bypass the Istra reservoir from the north. The second as part of the 9th Guards Rifle Division, the 17th Tank, 36th and 40th Rifle Brigades and the 89th Separate Tank Battalion - bypassing the reservoir from the south. Part of the forces of the 16th Army crossed through the reservoir and caused a frontal blow.
At the turn of the reservoir, German troops tried to provide our troops serious and long-term resistance. The water from the reservoir was the enemy lasted, the ice dropped a few meters and the western shore was covered with a layer of water at 35-40 cm. In addition, the West Bank of the reservoir was mined. Artillery quickly advanced the 16th Army lagging behind. All this created additional difficulties for our advancing troops and facilitated the enemy the maintenance of defensive actions. However, on December 15, the release of two flanking groups to the north and south of the reservoir forced the German command to quickly retreat in the western direction. Thus, the defense of the enemy at the turn of the Istra reservoir was broken. Our troops have the opportunity to develop an offensive towards Volokolamsk. However, it should be indicated that the forcing by the troops of the 16th Army of the Istra reservoir was delayed for three days, due to the fact that measures were not taken to ensure the crossing. This facilitated the Germans and the organization of defense on the river. Rouze.
In the second decade of December, the 5th Army General Lieutenant General Artillery L.A. Smash joined the onset of the right wing of the Western Front. Echelon Development of success in the army was the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General Major L.M.Dovator, transmitted on December 7 from the 16th Army to the 5th Army. On December 13, the front of the German troops at 10 km south-west Zvenigorod was broken. The body of the Dovator, with the support of the Rifle compounds of the 5th Army, began to develop an offensive to the North-West in the direction at Oz. The Tostensky in the rear of the enemy's troops, which defended the west of Zvenigorod. The breakthrough of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps put under the strike not subjected to attacks in the first days of the onset of the LVII motorized building and excluded its use by the German command on the Volokolamsk direction.
It must be said that cavalry played an exceptional role in the battle for Moscow both in the defensive and in the offensive phases. Independent mechanized moving junctions of a tank or motorized division of the Soviet command at that time were absent. The largest moving compound were cavalry divisions. The tank brigades are about one and a half thousand people themselves as an independent means of struggle were weak.
Therefore, the persecution of exhaust German troops in the December offensive was carried out by mobile groups consisting of cavalry and tank parts.
On December 16, the command of the Western Front set the task of persecution to everyone (!) Arms included in its composition. Now the offensive tasks were raised not only by the armies of the right and left wings of the front, but also accustomed to the defendant in the construction center of the Soviet troops at the Moscow direction 33, 43 and 49th armies. The main task of the armies was formulated as "non-stop persecution of the enemy" (Russian archive: Great domestic. T.15 (4-1). M.: Terra, 1997, p.191). As a means of solving tactical tasks The Military Council of the Front demanded "more active use of mobile advanced units to capture road nodes, bridges and tactically important borders. For parallel persecution of the enemy, it is widely used to move on virgin skiing detachments "(ibid., P. 192).
During this period, the German command sent orders to his troops, in many ways reminding the directives of the Soviet command in October and November. In particular, the Commander of the Center for the Center "Center" background side December 16, 1941 was addressed to the headquarters 2, 4, 9 and the 2nd tank armies the following words:
"Only where the enemy will meet fierce resistance, he will be forced to abandon new breakthrough attempts. His retreat to this not to encourage. Fully break away from the enemy at an existing position will not be possible. The retreat only then has the goal and meaning when it creates more favorable conditions for the fight or releases reserves. Since any waste affects neighbors, then seemingly insignificant local movements can lead to severe operational consequences. Therefore, I order that any waste can be made with the permission of the commander of the army, and the retreat of compounds from the division and above is only with my personal permission. The opinion that the defensive battle is the case of infantry divisions and that motorized connections should be bred from the battle, is currently incorrect. No one can be removed from the front. Reinforcement is not expected in the near future. Reality You need to look into the eyes "(Russian archive: Great domestic. T.15 (4-1). M.: Terra, 1997, p.213).
According to the directions of the army of the right wing of the Western Front, in the morning of December 17 continued persecution. The enemy assigned the remains of the 3rd and 4th tank groups on the line of the Lama rivers and ruses, hiding behind the arielices. They were preparing to take the line of defense to keep it in harmony with the ideas described above in the order of the Boc Background. But in the period from December 17 to December 20, the fighting at the front of the 1st shock, the 20th and 16th armies were the nature of the continuous persecution of the Germans. Connections of two tank groups rolled back to the West, losing people and equipment. On December 19, the artillery park of the entire 3rd tank group consisted of sixty-three 10,5-cm lungs, twenty-one 15-cm heavy field warmness and one (!) 10-cm gun.
The fast rollback from Moscow led to personnel permutations in the leadership of the Army Center for the Center and the Supreme Command of the German Army. Feldmarshal Brauhich on December 19 was forced to hand over the responsibilities of the commander-in-chief of the land forces, and now the command of the army accepted himself personally Hitler. On the same day, Feldmarshal Fedor von Side was shifted from the post of commander of the Center for the Center for the Center, and its place at 11.00 on December 19, he had previously commanded the 4th Army Günther Blizzhe. For the leadership of the 4th Army, Ludwig Kyubler, General of the Morning Army, was summoned from the group of Army "South", who had proven himself well during the summer and autumn campaigns as the XLIX Mountain Corps commander of the 17th Army.
As the front of the 3rd and 4th tank groups decreases, the resistance of German troops to the West gradually increased. It was quite brightly manifested during the battles for Volokolamsk. The city was in the offensive lane of the 20th Army. The commander of the army A.A.Vlasov sent the main efforts of the troops subordinated to him on December 17 to capture Volokolamsk. Mastering the Volokolamsky has nated a group of General Remizov (131st and 145th tank, 17th rifle and 24th tank brigade). Due to the increased opponation resistance (parts of the 106th infantry, 2nd and 5th tank divisions) the task of the day was not fulfilled. The group of General Remizov in the morning on December 18, together with the group of General Katukov (1st Guards and 17th tank brigade, the 89th separate tank battalion) of the 16th Army led during the day the fight with the enemy in the region of the number. Fights lasted until December 19. Only on December 20, parts of the 106th infantry and 5th tank divisions were knocked out of the city of Volokolamsk.
In the meantime, on the afternoon of December 20, the municipal part of the 1st shock army, developing the persecution of the enemy, went to the river. Lame. So the coming army of the right wing of the Western Front reached the turn of the river. Lama and Ruza, on which the German command planned to stop the Soviet offensive. The attempt of the 1st shock, the 16th and 20th armies with the move to break through the defense of the enemy did not give essential results, and they were forced to stop in front of this fortified border. Until December 25, the troops of the right wing of the front were fighting in order to improve his position, and then began to organize a thorough preparation for the enemy defense breakthrough on this line. The fighting at the turn of the two rivers took a protracted character.
Results of the operation
For the period from December 6 to 25, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front with battles have advanced to the west to a depth of up to 100 km (the average daily rate is up to 6 km). Such a relatively low rate is explained by the fact that in the upcoming Soviet troops there were no large mechanized compounds that could come out forward and intercepting waste paths. Large mechanized connections replaced primarily cavalry, and in the case of an attempt to intercept communications of the 3rd tank group, "vertical coverage" was even applied using a parachute landing.
From an operational point of view, the scenario of the development of events was quite characteristic. In the process of the offensive, the German troops stretched flanks, as a result of which the density of the construction of troops on them was reduced. This allowed the Soviet command to strike for stretched infantry and motorized divisions and put two tank groups on the edge of the environment. The departure of the Lama and Ruza rivers led due to an increase in the density of troops to the construction of a relatively durable defense, the breakthrough of which from the go, without long-term preparation, was impossible. A characteristic feature of the operation, like other battles of the winter campaign of 1941/42, was the massive use of Soviet cavalry. Selected in November, the German troops, a wooded terrain north-west of Moscow in December contributed to the use of the Soviet command of large masses of the cavalry. The massive use of cavalry compounds was also conducive to the relatively low activity of enemy aviation.
At the tactical level, following the results of the Klin-Solnechnogorsk operation, the following conclusions can be drawn. The main means of fighting tanks continued to remain artillery. According to statistics, the loss of tanks of the Western Front in December 1941 was distributed as follows. 65% was beaten by anti-tank and middle-caliber artillery. 15% suffered from the enemy tanks. 10% blew up on mines and 5% accounted for technical malfunctions and fire of large-caliber machine guns (20 mm and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns) of the enemy. There was no loss from aviation. For German tank compounds, the rapid waste led to the leaving of the bubbers, faulty and remaining without fuel and other techniques. So, for example, the 6th tank division remained by the end of December at all without tanks, and the artillery regiment decreased to two divisions.

A source

Isaev A.. A short course of history of the Second World War. The offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikova. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. - 384 p. / Circulation 8000 copies. ISBN 5-699-10769.