Russian infantry in battle. Russian infantry in the Balkans: Fire and Control Russian Infantry

Thanks to the help of our colleague from Moscow, Maxim Bochkova, a famous photographer among fans of historical reconstruction, we met a wonderful club of the historical reconstruction of Infanoré from the Moscow region.

Members of the "Infanitorium" club reconstruct, thereby giving a tribute to the memory and respect for their countrymen from the 209th Infantry Bogorodsky Regiment, who fought in the First World War.

The regiment was part of the 1st Brigade of the 53rd Infantry Division of the XX Army Corps of the 10th Army of the Northern Front and fought in Eastern Prussia.

During the retreat of the 10th Army from Eastern Prussia in January-February 1915, the regiment covered parts of the XX Corps, was surrounded by an opponent in the August Forests and made huge losses. Only about 200 people reached Grodno. Only a small number of Bogorodtsev got into German captivity.

The regimental banner was saved by the regimental priests by Father Philofey, thanks to which the regiment was re-equipped.

On April 30, 1915, the newly formed 209th Infantry Bogorodsky Regiment, which was staffed by officers and soldiers from other regions of the country, entered the structure of the 34th Army Corps of the North-Western Front. In 1916, part of the XXIII Corps of the Army Corps participated in Brousilovsky's offensive on Volyn.

We recorded several stories of the commander of the club Andrei Bondar about the shooting arms of the First World War, which will be placed in the "Weapon Stories" cycle. Andrei has very impressive knowledge of the weapons of that time, sure it will be very informative.

But let's start our stories from the demonstration of the form and gear of the infantryman of the 209th Bogorodsky Regiment of the First World War.

For those who do not like to watch the video (although it is worth it), partially duplicate in the old way.

Russian infantryman, leaving the fields of the battle of the First World War, was equipped in no worse than his allies or opponents.

Let's start the review, naturally, from the form.

Consistent underwear consisted of a squance and shirt produced from cotton fabric. The shape consisting of halifa and gymnasters, also stacked from cotton fabric, or, for areas with a colder climate, from Sukna.

Equipment. What a Russian infantryman took with him.

Naturally, the belt belt. On the belt there were two cartridge peasons by 30 ammunition in the walls each. Plus additional peason for pamsypy cartridges. At the beginning of the war, each infantryman had another mounted Bandoller for 30 ammunition, but in the second half of the war, Bandoliers met less often.

Dry bag. There was usually a dry lady, the so-called "Ranger stock", consisting of crackers, dried fish, Solonin, canned food.

Shinel. From the so-called shine cloth. In the warm season in the rope. So that the ends of the overcoats are not sprawling, the bowler and two leather mounting straps were used.

A raincoat with a set of pegs and a pinch was attached to her overcoat. It was necessary to have a rope with a length of about 3 meters for fastening the collected tent.

In the cold season, when the sinel was on a fighter, a cloak-tent with accessories was attached in the wreck.

Dance. Designed for the storage and transportation of personal belongings of the soldier. Set of linen, portites, windings, personal care objects, tobacco stock.

Each fighter relied on a small infantry blade. Which later called the spernaya, but the correct name is exactly. The cover for fastening the blade was originally leather, over time it began to make it from substitutes, tarpaulin or cansins.

Flask. Glass or aluminum, necessarily in a closed case. The case played the role of the thermal insulator, and allowed not to heat the liquid in the heat or vice versa, do not freeze quickly into the cold.

An aluminum manner (charca) was attached to the flask for use, such as alcoholic beverages. Chard alcohol relying to the Russian soldier 10 times a year, on big holidays. So mostly Charca was intended for hot tea.

Cap. The standard headdress of the Russian infantryman was made either of the cloth or from cotton fabric, depending on climatic conditions. A steel spring was originally inserted into the cap, but it often broke, so it was not necessary to wear a cap without a springs.

In winter, the soldier relied the papa from sheep wool and camel bolk.

Shooting. The epaulets from the Russian soldier were field (green) and ordinary, red. Guards shelves wore straps, trimmed by the Cant of the "corporate" color of the shelf. On the pursuit of the regiment number was usually applied.

Boots. Boots in the Russian imperial army were leather.

With the flow of war, cheaper windings shoes entered the use of cheapest boots. Winter shoes were boots.

The last detail in the gear of the soldier was. In our case, the Mosina rifle of the sample of 1891. And bayonet. The bayonet should always be stopped.

The rifles were completed with a belt, which, however, was not intended for constant wearing. According to the charter, the rifle was rushed at the "on the shoulder".

We will tell about the most rifle of Mosina and its rivals in the following articles prepared with the participation of the Infanor's Club.

Infantry - the main and most numerous genus of troops. She can pass everywhere, to take everything and keep everything. The remaining kind of troops only help the infantry in its difficult and complex combat work.

The history of Russian infantry begins together with the history of our Motherland.

In 911, the prince of Kiev Oleg led War with Byzantia. By destroying the enemy army, he knobs his shield on the gates of Tsargrad. The success of this battle was solved by the infantry, consisting of free citizens of residents of cities and villages.

Russian infantry was distinguished by high discipline and courage, perseverance and endurance. In 1240, Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich, with his buddy and Novgorod infantry, broke the Swedes on the Neva. Armed with axes - the favorite weapons of the Russians, - Novgorod infantrymen from one strike split the Swedes' iron helmets like clay pots. Swedes, broken by Russians, fled and long after that were not solved again to go to our land.

In the famous battle with Livonian knights - Crusaders on the Church of the Lake in 1242, the Russian infantry again showed what the true military valor means.

With the king Ivan Vasilyevich Grozny in Russia for the first time, Sagittarius appeared. They shared on the shelves.

The Sagittari has already had a certain form of clothing and were armed with food (manual firearms), Berdych (ax in the shape of a crescent, on a long handle) and a saber. They lived in special approximations, protected border cities, and in wartime - in battles - were the whole of the combat order of Russian rati.

In 1700, Peter the Great formed a regular army - 27 infantry regiments and 2 regiments of the dragoon. With this army, he began the fight against Sweden, who seized Russian lands from Lake Ladoga and the Finnish Bay.

On November 19, that commemorative for Russia the enemy attacked our army, precipitated Narva. Young Russian troops who did not have more combat experience were defeated. But the new infantry Peter, Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments, - former "funny" - kept their position by beating all the attacks of the Swedes. They saved the army then from full defeat.

The war with Sweden won the infantry.

1702 - Russian infantry stormed and took the fortress Nothenburg. 1703 - Peter's infantrymen planted on fishermen boats attacked Astril's sea ships and "Gedan". This attack passed into a cruel hand-to-hand fight ending with the full victory of Russians. 1708 - Russian infantrymen and artilleryrs, together with Connection, rowed the Swedes with the village of Forest, and, finally, on June 27, 1709 - the very defeat of the enemy under Poltava.

Petrovskaya infantry especially distinguished himself in battle at Ganghet.

Sets on rowing vessels - galleys, - transformed into seafarers, the infantrymen thickened the enemy, capturing even the Swedish admirals. Clinging to the tackle, in hand-to-hand combat, the board of the board with Swedish ships, the Russians climbed into the guns, without fear of death - not from the fire, nor from the bayonet, or from the water.

"The abormal is so cruelly genuine that several soldiers are not cores and cards from the enemy guns, but the spirit of the guns are torn out of the guns ... In the truth, you can not describe the courage of ours, both the initial and ordinary", "wrote about the infantry of Petr.

The receivers of their glory were Suvorov.

The great Russian commander of Suvorov himself began his service with "Nizhnyin" - in the infantry, in the Guards Semenian regiment. He believed that the study of war should be started with infantry - the main and basic kind of troops.

The combat baptism of Suvorov occurred in a seven-year war. Russian infantry then distinguished itself in battles, inflicting the Prussian army, which was considered the best in the world, one defeat after another. Already in battle at the Tsorndorf in 1758, the Prussian King Friedrich was amazed by the courage of Russian infantry. Divided by the cavalry attack of Prussians into small groups, the Russian Grenadiers did not surrender and did not run. Becoming back to each other, they were sophisticated with bayonets, like hedgehogs, and until the last breath resisted.

In 1759, Friedrich was headed by Kunnersdorf. And a year later, the selected Russian infantry stormed the Berlin bastions and then solemnly, with fluttering signs joined the surrendered German capital. From this time, Friedrich had no longer risked to join the battle with the Russians, limited to the "adequacy maneuvering".

Together with the courage, the skill of Russian infantrymen.

In the Italian campaign of 1799, the Bagration General of General of Bagration was applied one very original military reception.

At the beginning of the XIX century, the Russian army was considered the best in Europe (respectively in the world). The Russian infantry was in service with the best samples of small and artillery samples in Europe, and in combination with the fighting qualities of the Russian soldier and the "Suvorov school" it made the Russian army the strongest military power of the continent. The experience of the Italian and Swiss company Suvorov, the Mediterranean Caming of Ushakov showed that Russian military art stands at the highest level and is not inferior to French, and in some moments surpasses. It was at this time that A. V. Suvorov developed the principles of the strategic interaction of the theaters of the war. In his opinion, the main way of war was a strategic offensive. It should be noted that the ideas and actions of Suvorov were carefully studied in France. It can be said that Napoleon Bonaparte was to a certain extent "student" Suvorov, having undergone his offensive manner of battle, a mannere war.

Suvorov applied the main tactical ideas, which will then use the Russian army: the offensive of a wide front (the battle on the Adda River April 15-17, 1799), a counter battle (Battle for the demand of June 6-8, 1799), the action of the looping and columns (battle At the new one August 1, 1799). In almost every battle, Suvorov played as an innovator. Decisitancy, speed, onslaught, clear calculation and the highest morale spirit of Suvorov "Miracle Bogati" brought in Russia one victory for another.

In the future, the foundations laid down by P. A. Rumyantsev and A. V.Suvorov, were used by other Russian commander. Thus, the student of these two great Russian commander, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov, the Suvorov School, was Peter Ivanovich Bagrationion and a number of other heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. It must be said that the defeat under Austerlitz, as well as the unsuccessful results of the anti-brass campaigns 1805, 1806-1807, were bound primarily not with the disadvantages of the Russian army, the preparation of its command staff and soldiers, but with geopolitical reasons. Russia and Emperor Alexander went on occasion to his allies (Austria, England, Prussia), played someone else's game. Alexander listened to the Austrian allies and pulled the army into battle under Austerlitz, although Kutuzov was against this battle. Even earlier, the Austrians did not expect Russian troops and invaded Bavaria, as a result suffered a heavy defeat. Kutuzov, retaining the army, was forced to commit an amazing march of a minor with a length of 425 km from Brownau to Olmyuts, during which a number of defeats were made by individual parts of the Napoleon army. In 1806, Prussic Warves committed a similar error. Completely confident in his invincibility, they did not expect Russian troops and suffered a crushing defeat in the battle of Jena and Aürshtedte. The Russian army completely successfully restrained the onslaught of the enemy, a number of battles were completed with a drawn result. This is despite the fact that the French army was led by Napoleon (after the death of Suvorov the best commander of Europe), and in the Russian army there was no leader of this level. Russia did not suffer a crushing military defeat, both armies were exhausted. And this is taking into account the fact that Russia could not focus against the enemy all its mainforces - the Russian-Persian war (1804-1813) and the Russian-Turkish war (1806-1812).

The Russian army and fleet for the war of 1812 did not inferior to the Armed Forces of France in the field of weapons, combat training, the organization and application of advanced war methods.

Organization, army device

Infantry. In the organization of Russian infantry in 1800 - 1812 You can select multiple stages. In 1800-1805 - This is the time recovery time, which corresponded to the principles of linear tactics. Emperor Paul transformed infantry, reducing the number of hunting parts and increasing the number of Musketer regiments. In general, the infantry was reduced with almost 280 thousand people to 203 thousand. The military commission of 1801 worked on the establishment of infantry uniformity in order to improve management in peaceful and wartime. To do this, in all shelves (Hhehersk, Grenader and Musketury), three-btar composition was established, each battalion had four companies. At the same time, the Grenadle and Hheer's shelves had a homogeneous composition. Musketer shelves have been strengthened by Grenadle battalions to strengthen their shock power.

Grenadiers were severe infantry and were considered the impact force of infantry. Therefore, the Grenadier parts traditionally took the most inclined and physically strong recruits. In general, the total number of Grenador was relatively small. Linear (medium) infantry were Musketeers. Musketer shelves were the main type of Russian infantry. Elegant infantry represented by huntsman. Henseri was often acted in the loose system and led the fire fight at the maximum distance. That is why part of the rangers was armed with rare and expensive for the period of riding weapons (fittings). Nursing people were usually selected by small growth, very movable, good shooters. One of the main tasks of light infantry in the battles was the destruction of officers and nonsense officers of the opponent units. In addition, it was welcomed if the soldiers were familiar with life in the forest, were hunters, as the hunting often had to carry out reconnaissance functions, to be in advanced disloise, attack the guard pickets of the enemy.

According to the state of peacetime, the Musketer and Grenador regions had 1928 construction and 232 non-building soldiers, in the state of military time - 2156 terrain and 235 non-stop soldiers. Henser's shelves had a single state - 1385 terrain and 199 non-building soldiers. On the states of 1803, there were 3 Guards Regiment in the army, 1 Guards Battalion, 13 Grenador, 70 Musketeer Regiment, 1 Musketeer Battalion, 19 Hsenther Regiment. In the guard, there were 7.9 thousand soldiers, 223 officers, in the field forces - 209 thousand soldiers and 5.8 thousand officers. Some transformations were then passed, as a result of January 1, 1805 in the infantry was the 3 Guards Regiment, 1 Guards Battalion, 13 Grenador Regions, 77 Infantry (Muskelethers) regiments and 2 battalions, 20 English regiments and 7 naval regiments. The number of guards (without marines) is set at 8 thousand people, field troops - 227 thousand people.

The second transformation period covers 1806-1809 years. At this time, the number of infantry, in particular the argertic parts, was increased. In 1808, the infantry was 4 guards regiment, 13 Grenador regiments, 96 infantry (musket) and 2 battalions, 32 Hsenthers regiment. On the states in the guard, 11 thousand people were listed, in the field forces of 341 thousand at 25 thousand lifting horses. True, neccomplete has 38 thousand people.

In the third period of transformations - 1810-1812, infantry restructuring was completed. The quantitative and qualitative composition of the infantry was significantly changed and began to comply with modern requirements. Grenadier shelves now had 3 fusille (infantry) battalions, each battalion had 4 companies (3 fusillers and 1 grenadier). Musketeering (infantry) shelves had 3 infantry battalions, each battalion had 3 musketeering companies and 1 Grenadier. Only the Life Grenadier regiment had 3 Grenadier battalion from the Grenadle mouth. Three-Ballen composition was also introduced in Hengean shelves: each battalion consisted of 3 huntors and 1 grenadier company. This was established the unity of linear infantry.

By the middle of 1812, the Russian infantry had: 6 Guards regiments and 1 battalion, 14 Grenadier regiments, 98 infantry, 50 huntsman, 4 naval regiments and 1 battalion. The total number of guards increased to 15 thousand people, and field infantry up to 390 thousand.

The main tactical unit of infantry was a battalion. The highest tactical compound of infantry was a division made up of two linear (medium) and one Hheer's team. Brigades were two-bedside. Later there appeared the housings of the two-function composition with the populated parts.

Cavalry. Similar processes (reform) went into cavalry. Emperor Paul disbanded the carabinier, equestrian and light-block shelves. The total number of cavalry was reduced from 66.8 thousand people to 41.7 thousand people. The transformations practically did not affect the tactical cavity, which provided direct support to infantry, but the strategic cavalry suffered greatly. In 1801, the Military Commission concluded that it was necessary to strengthen the strategic conee, which ensures the domination at the Theater of Military Action. It was decided to increase the number of drago regiments and enhance the light cavalry.

The composition of the regiments has not changed. The Kirassiy and Dragoon shelves had 5 squadrons, two companies in the squadron. The hussar shelves had 10 squadrons, 5 squadron in the battalion. Only added to the Kirassir and Dragoon shelves on one spare squadron (it will soon decrease to half composition), and in the hussar shelves there are two spare squadrons (decrease to one). According to the staff of 1802, the Kirassirian shelves had 787 construction and 138 uniform people; Dragoon - 827 buildings and 142 uniform; Gusar - 1528 buildings and 211 non-bloods.

In subsequent years, the total number of cavalry increased, the number of drago, hussar and Ulan parts increased due to the formation of new regiments and transformation of Kirassira. Draguns became the predominant view of the cavalry, which could perform deep marches and solve tactical tasks on the battlefield. The number of cavalry was enhanced, which made it possible to conduct intelligence at considerable depth. The number of cavalry regiments has grown from 39 - in 1800 to 65 - in 1812. The number of Guards regiments has increased, for the same years, from 3 to 5, Dragunsky from 15 to 36, hussars from 8 to 11. They began to form the Ulanian shelves, in 1812 there were 5. The number of pirassic regiments from 1800 to 1812. Reduced from 13 to 8. The regular number of cavalry in 1812 was 5.6 thousand people in the guard, in the field forces of 70.5 thousand.

The events did not fully solve the task of matching the cavalry of the battle tactics with the help of columns and loose system. The ratio of cavalry regiments to infantry was about 1: 3, it would be more correct to 1: 2 so that 1 cavalry regiment accounted for two infantry. True, this gap wanted to be covered at the expense of the Cossack cavity. Cossacks could lead both tactical and deep (strategic) intelligence, to act as part of infantry compounds. The total number of Cossack troops in 1812 was 117 thousand people. Cossack shelves were five hundredths, only two regiments had 1 thousand riders. With the help of the forces of the Cossacks, the number of cavalry could increase to 150-170 thousand people.

Don Army put up to the beginning of the war 64 shelf and 2 equestrian roots. In addition, during the war, the Don Army gave 26 regiments. The Black Sea army gave 10 regiments, but actually fought only one hundred (in the composition of the Life Guard of the Cossack Regiment), the rest of the parties carried the border service. Ukrainian, Ural, Orenburg Cossack troops were allocated for 4 shelf. Astrakhan and Siberian troops have carried the border service. Bug and Kalmyk troops were given by 3 shelf, etc.

In many ways, the combat capability of cavalry depended on its equestrian composition. In 1798, it was decided to acquire annually for each Dragunsky and Kirassirian shelf of 120 horses, and in Gusar - 194. The horse's service was 7 years old. For annual replenishment of 4 guards and 52 Army regiments, 7 thousand horses were required. In the further growth of cavalry was hampered by a shortage of horses. Therefore, in spare squadrons, they often used unwashed horses. To solve this problem, the government even allowed to supply it in the army not recruits, and horses increased purchased prices. In early 1812, the Kirassir horse cost 171 rubles 7 kopecks (in 1798 there were 120 rubles), Dragunskaya - 109 rubles 67 kopecks (in 1798 - 90 rubles), Gusarskaya - 99 rubles 67 kopecks (in 1798 - 60 rubles ). By the beginning of 1813, the cost of horses increased even more - up to 240 - 300 rubles. A certain help was provided with donations - in 1812, 4.1 thousand horses were obtained.

The horse composition of the Russian army was better than French. Horses differed more endurance, better fitness to local conditions. Therefore, in the Russian army, cases of mass case of horses are not marked, despite serious difficulties in supplying fodder, especially during the retreat.

Cavalry shelves were combined into higher tactical compounds: divisions and hulls. In the cavalry division there were three brigades, two shelf in every brigade. In the cavalry building there were two cavdivias. In 1812, 16 cavalry divisions were formed: 3 Kirassirski (two brigades in each), 4 Dragunsky, 2 equestrian, 3 hussars and 4 Ulan (three brigades each).

Artillery. According to the state of 1803, there were 15 battalions in artillery: 1 Guards, 10 lungs, 1 equestrian and 3 sieges. The number is 24.8 thousand soldiers and officers. Artillery also has undergone a number of transformations. By 1805, artillery had: 1 Guards battalion (4 hiking and 1 equestrian artillery companies), 9 artpolkov two battalions in each (there were 2 battery companies with field weapons and 2 light rods with regimental guns), 2 equestrian battalions (by 5 mouth in each). The war of 1805 showed that the number of artillery park needs to be increasing. Therefore, this year formed 2 artillery regiments and 6 mouths, and 1806 another 8 regiments and 4 horse rots.

The lowest tactical unit was an artillery company, and the Higher-Brigade, which Division was given. In 1806, the regimental and field artillery was reduced in 18 brigades, in 1812 there were already 28 (by the number of infantry and cavalry divisions). In addition, 10 reserve and 4 spare brigades have formed, and 25 mouth. The Guards Brigade had 2 hiking batteries in its composition, 2 slight and 2 horse rates, field brigades - 1 battery and 2 light rots. Reserve brigades had an unequal composition. Spare brigades had 1 battery and 1 equestrian company, plus 4 pontoon companies.

Batteryons (heavy) companies had 12 guns: 4 semi-dodged unicorn, 4 duodenal instruments of the middle proportion and 4 duodente-cylinder implements of a small proportion. In addition, each brigade was given 2 three-founded unicorn. The light company had 12 guns: 4 duodenal minor unicorn and 8 six-founded guns. Equestrian companies also had 12 guns: 6 duodenal minor unicorns and 6 six-founded guns.

To achieve greater maneuverability and independence, each company had its own traffic for the carriage of ammunition and wild forge. 120 ammunitions were taken to each gun: 80 cores or grenades, 30 carts and 10 firecakers (incendiary projectile). The number of guns servants was 10 people on a light weapon and 13 for severe. For every two guns was an officer.

By 1812, the field artillery had 1620 tools: 60 guns of the Guards artillery, 648 battery guns, 648 light guns and 264 equestrian guns. In addition, there were 180 weapons of siege artillery. The personnel of artillery numbered about 40 thousand people.

Semi-dandal "unicorn" of the sample of 1805. The mass of the gun is 1.5 tons. The length of the barrel is 10.5 caliber.

Engineering troops.By the beginning of the 19th century, the engineering troops included: 1 pioneer (sape) regiment and 2 pontoon companies. According to the staff of 1801, there were 2 Minor and 10 pioneer mouth with a number of 150 people in a servant shelf. The regiment had 2.4 thousand people and more than 400 lifting horses. Two pontoon companies had 2 thousand convoyed and non-blood soldiers, more than 300 terrain and lifting horses. Each company served 8 depot by 50 pontoons each.

Military Commission of 1801, having considered the state of engineering troops, concluded that the number of engineering mouth is not enough. In 1803, a second pioneer regiment was formed. Taking into account the fact that the need to connect the artillery parts and engineering compounds was not understood, in 1806, in the formation of artbrigad, they began to include in them on a pioneer company. Pioneer shelves began to make up three battalions. In 1812, shelves had 3 battalions of a four-year composition, the number of pioneer mouth was brought to 24. The staff of the regiment consisted of 2.3 thousand people.

In 1804, a pontoon regiment was created with a number of 2 thousand people. The regiment consisted of two battalions of the four-dimensional composition, had on the state of 16 depot of 50 pontoons each. Usually pontoon growths were stationed in the fortresses. In 1809, the Russian Empire had 62 fortresses: 19 - first class, 18 - second, 25 - third. They were served by the engineering staff of 2.9 thousand people. Each fortress accounted for one artillery company (or half a half) and engineering team.

By the beginning of 1812, the Russian army consisted of 597 thousand people: 20 thousand guardsmen, 460 thousand field and garrison troops, 117 thousand irregular troops.

To be continued…

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The traditional military history is inclined to operate with a large scale - the commander-in-chiefs give orders, the troops conduct operations that end with success or failure. The historian's view is rarely distracted from the game of the fighting theater and descends "down" to separate parts. In this article, we will look at the typical activities of Russian infantry mouths and battalions in the Balkans in 1877-1878 and the problems faced with soldiers and officers.

In the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, more than a hundred infantry regiments and rifle battalions participated on the Russian side. They were the main participants in such bright events as crossing through the Danube Sestosovo, the first baroon campaign of the advanced squad of General I.V. Gurko, Nicky Defense, Capture and Three Poren Sturm. We will not analyze specific battles, but we will try to bring examples illustrating typical actions and problems of Russian infantry in field fights 1877-1878.

Start of battle

The battle began long before contact and even visual contact with the enemy. The troops were rebuilt from a hiking order in a combat at the distance of an effective artillery fire (usually about 3,000 steps). The regiment occurred, having two battalions in the first line and one battalion in reserve, or vice versa - with one battalion ahead. The second option allowed maintaining more reserves, which means the commander expanded its ability to parry unexpected strikes. The bosses were more profitable to be located with reserves in order not to lose control of the fight, but it was not always respected. So, Colonel I.M. Cleinguz, the hero of the first assault on July 8, 1877, died, being in the advanced parts of his Kostroma regiment. General MD Bowls in front of the storm of the green mountains on the approaches to Plevne asked his subordinate Major General V.A. Vakina, who commanded the Kazan regiment, was in reserve, but he could not resist the temptation personally to lead his regiment in the attack and was fighting a grenade.

It is worth making a retreat, which will serve the "guiding thread" in our story. Contrary to popular belief, by the 1870s, the Russian military has already understood the rifles well that the rifles and new artsystems are able to create a hard-grade fireproof vest. In this regard, tactical changes became necessary - for example, the transition to more rare buildings. No less clearly the question of how to protect people from fire, without losing control over the battle.

The Russian infantry regiment consisted of three battalions. Each battalion shared on five mouths, one of which was called the shooter. Usually, this company formed the rifle chain ahead of the construction of the battalion - the fighters crumbled forward at the distance of 2-5 steps from each other. The rest of the companies were built into closed columns behind the rifle chain.

Ordinary construction of the battalion. Author's scheme

As a rule, four closed companies lined up in a checker, having a small chain ahead. Thus, three combat lines were obtained - the chain, the first two companies (1st battle line) and the second two companies (2nd combat line). The intervals between columns in one combat line were rarely exceeded the length of the columns on the front, and the distance between the chain and the 1st battle line was clearly stipulated by the charter - exactly 300 steps. Such a rigor was concerned that the 1st battle line could come to help the chain in case of a threat, but practice showed that the distance was chosen unsuccessfully. First, the proximity of the 1st line to the chain was led to in vain losses; Secondly, the 1st line is to the chain, which led to the concentration of the last and premature reserves. Colonel A.N. Kuropatkin celebrated this mistake from the Kazan regiment during the battle for catching 20-22 August 1877.

After the war in the Balkans, some Russian military leaders offered to increase the statutory distance to 500-600 steps, but at the insistence of the then military authorities in the new instruction it was said that the chain, the 1st and 2nd lines should determine the distance themselves. In general, the construction of the battalion was distinguished by an excessive thickness, and three battle lines often "filled" each other.

Difficulty management

Specialists, among which the participant of the Russian-Turkish war General Major L.L. Zedder, Soviet theoretical A.A. Cushkin and modern American researcher B.U. Menning, criticized the scattering in the chain of just one company. From their point of view, in this case, the battalion used only 1/5 of his firepower, but in practice, even one company did not always develop their fire in full force, since the distant shooting in the Russian army was not welcomed. "Good infantry sauard on fire, - quoted General M.I. Dragomirov of the prominent French theorist Marshal T.-R. BEJO, - Frequent shooting is a means to which the panties are trying to drown in themselves the feeling of fear ".

The control of the infantry chain and its fire was a difficult task, so they tried to appoint the most intelligent and competent officers in the rifle company - however, and their capabilities were limited. The officer could more or less control what is happening within a radius of 20 steps, the rest of the space was not covered with his voice and was often hidden from his gaze. The horns, who once been a symbol of light infantry, specializing in the actions in the loyal rank, were recognized as unfounded by the 1870s. On maneuvers for feeding signals, the whistles were trying to use, but in battle they, apparently, did not apply - the teams were usually filled with voice, and private chiefs, ensigns and university officers repeated it and passed on. The difficulties of management are clearly visible from the description of the battle on the chips on August 11, 1877, which was the company of the Orlovsky infantry regiment:

"[...] the handful of fighting each hour decreased and decreased; In some places, the chain has been kept that one person occupied space at 20 or more steps. The right flank was threatened by bypassing whole columns, and therefore this flank this flank began to be filed back, and behind him. Driving a chain at such a crossed terrain, as a real, positively there was no possibility: the voice was drunk in the thunder of shots, and the tenth of the chain hidden, hidden by bushes. Thus, the unwitting digression began, although step by step. "

From a regular commander in battle depended very much - it is usually much more than from the battalion, which after entering your battalion in the combat line usually lost the opportunity to influence the events and joined one of the mouth. Rotty needed to manage its chain, to take many independent decisions, adapt to the area, maintain communication with other companies, take care of their flanks - all this prevented a lot of circumstances, inevitable in any battle.

First of all, the regular commanders often died and injured, so they were recommended to familiarize their subordinates with combat tasks and appoint several substituents in advance. If the regular commander dropped out of the order, the company faced a serious problem characteristic of the whole Russian army. The fact is that all its commander managed to all in the company (often through the head of commander of platits and offices). Thus, the younger bosses (ensigns and headquarters) lost initiative, credibility and command skill. In different parts with this problem, they fought in different ways - in the 14th division, glorified by crossing through the Danube and the defense of the chips, the strict transfer of orders across the entire command chain and the initiative of the junior officers were cultivated, the replacement of the retired chiefs was worked out. As a result, the companies of this division continued to clearly fulfill their tasks even in case of injury or death of commanders.

Russian troops at the pieces, drawing of a contemporary.
andcvet.narod.ru.

The second circumstance, adding difficulties to the Rotten Commander, was the problem of reinforcements. During the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871 was noted that the infusion into the reinforcement chain often leads to mixing parts and complete loss of control over them. The best minds of the Russian army took to solve this problem, but the disputes did not subside for a hike to the Balkans, nor after him. On the one hand, the decision was to form a strong chain at once, on the other - in this case, its density increased, and therefore losses from fire. In addition, the military, who after many years of peaceful service fell under the fire, was waiting for an unpleasant discovery - the real battle is much more chaotic and incomprehensible than slender lines in textbooks and at the receipt. Gloss adrenaline in blood, whistling bullets and hum of nuclei, the type of falling comrades completely changed the perception of the battle.

For many years, the military tried to streamline and structure chaos battle. This approach can be conventionally called "Jolovini's way" (Zhomini - Swiss theoretics of the 1810-1830s, not lost authority and in the 1870s). K. von Clausevitz, on the contrary, emphasized that the war is an area of \u200b\u200bdanger, physical tension, unknown and chance, to deal with which is useless. Russian Military Theorist General G.A. Leer, leaving for the works of Zhurovin, offered to replenish the chain strictly from the "native" part. In turn, Dragomirov, one of the most careful Russian readers of Clausevitz, proposed torturing with stirring parts and teach soldiers to him still on maneurs.

Chain actions

The chain was supposed to perform the following tasks:

tie fire fight;
make the enemy reveal their strength;
protect companies following her, from an unexpected attack;
if possible, prepare their attack.

To successfully perform these tasks, the chain was to step as possible as possible, observing the statutory 300 steps of the distance from the 1st battle line. At the same time, under the fire, the movement of the chain slowed down, and the speed of the rear mouth, on the contrary, increased, hence the most "stealth" from the side of the 1st battle line, which criticized Kuropatkin.

The attack of the chain was usually carried out: one section of the chain (for example, the department) was assumed, and the other supported it with fire. To keep such an offensive, coordination and mutual support was required, the heads of the plots were to have a good eye of the neighborhood, so as not to fall under the fire of neighbors and competently calculate the fool (it should not have been too tired of fighters, the recommended distance was not more than 100 steps). The slightest barrier or irregularity of the terrain served as shelter for the chain, but the relief had to be able to use. Kuropatkin describes such a case in a fight for catching:

"It was necessary to run along the valley of 500-600 steps completely openly. The first closure from the enemy bullets on the path of the shelf was a mill with several dozen trees surrounded her. Part of people overwhelmed the valley, as they say, in one spirit; Others, using the small ridges of pebbles, formed by the flow of water [River Osma], lay down for them, the rear and places were joined before the arms were formed. But these closures were poorly protected from the enemy fire directed from two thousand steps and therefore hitting at a large angle. [...] Meanwhile, there was no need to run this space. It was worth moving further to the gardens, then go through the outskirts of the city and, finally, to go to the very mill, about which mentioned above. The difference was that instead of chords would have to describe the arc. "

Attack of the Pskov Regiment at the Redhead Guldiz Tabia in the battle on the Nandornic, November 17, 1877.
andcvet.narod.ru.

The fire could be opened only by the officer. Usually he ordered the best shooters to make trial shots to determine the height of the sight, then the height was reported to the soldiers, and the team was given to open shooting. The officer was supposed to ensure that there were no vain shots, the soldiers correctly exhibited the sight on the rifles, and he changed it right on time. To do this, it was necessary to know who can entrust trial shots, to be able to determine the distance to the target, finally, competently choose the goal itself.

In addition, the officer solved what type of fire apply. At a distance of 300-800 steps shot by single shots and quite rarely. Opening the fire was recommended from the distance of 800 steps, as it was believed that from that distance there is a chance to get into a single person. Sometimes, if a suitable goal was presented (for example, an artillery battery or a dense formation of enemy infantry), a volley was given by the team. If it was necessary to produce an intense shelling, but I did not want to spend a lot of cartridges, let the "frequent fire" team and added the number of cartridges that need to be released. This technique was criticized, as the officer could not control the actual number of cartridges consumed by soldiers. Finally, the officer could give the team to heal. In general, the one who controlled his part was considered the administrative commander even under strong fire.

The soldiers were clogged for the shelter, it was not easy to raise and move forward. In addition, the requirement to take care of people from fire contradiction with the need to control the troops. Kuropatkin continues his story about Catching:

"In vain, one young officer shouted by the hoarse voice" forward "," Hurray ", and Mahal Sabley, the crowd [hidden behind the mill] was not yet located to go behind him, and the young man, ranging with several soldiers ahead, did not have time to run a few steps as was already killed. "

Saving Cartronts

Dragomirov did not in vain led the aphorism of the Bureau on the connection of firing with cowardice. He and other military authorities believed that it was necessary to restrain the desire of the soldiers to open fire from far distance. Standard ammunition was pretty scanty 60 shots, and the sight on the RCR rifle could be set to a distance of no more than 600 steps (in university officers and fighters of rifle battalions - 1200 steps). The soldier risked to shoot all the ammunition before his part comes out on the so-called decisive distances (800-300 steps), not to mention the fact that the maintenance of fire served as a convenient pretext, so as not to move forward. Archery training ended at a distance of 1500 steps - from this distance it was already difficult to distinguish between a separate person, and in battle the fire was usually headed for haze from enemy shots. Nevertheless, the temptation of the far shooting was great, especially since the Turks actively used the fire from large distances (from a distance of 2000 steps he became sensitive).

Its apologists of distant fire were in the Russian army. One of them, Baron Zedder, urged to introduce a long shooting into statutes as a special and effective kind of battle fire. According to his thoughts, the far shooting should have been conducted on the squares, calculating not to accuracy, but on the mass of the fogged lead. This type of shooting is episodically applied by Russian troops, like another type of long-range fire - firing shots. Bullets, bruised in a long arc, fell over earthworks that were so loved by the Turks. "Furious, far and more concentrated fire, perhaps, will again be a shovel on the place-like place", - Colonel V.F. Argamakov. After the war, most military authorities recognized the far fire to the legitimate means in the hands of the commanders, but called for caution in its use. Instructions for learning the company and battalion, published immediately after the war, demanded to use them "With extreme caution" and argued that the neighbor is still "Belongs the main thing in battle".

The experience of war 1877-1878, rather, confirmed this conclusion. In an advanced detachment, successfully operating at the Balkans in the initial period of the war, General I.V. Gurko forbade the infantry to shoot from large distances so as not to waste time wasted. Colonel DS Nellaskiovsky, who participated in Gurko's raids, described the actions of the 4th Rifle Brigade, which used to appear, "I do not produce a single cartridge until it is suitable for the Turks half the distance of your rifle shot"that is, 600 steps. Orlovsky regiment, who captured the mountain of the disbel next to the chip just at a time when, on the other side of the ridge, the squad Gurko, did not shoot on a more prosaic reason - "I regret the cartridges, and there was little hope for the delivery of Gabrov's remoteness, where the cartridge boxes were".

Is the lack of cartridges been a serious problem? Statistics collected by the artillery department shows that in the campaign of 1877-1878, the regiment was extremely rarely shot in one battle of more than 30 cartridges on a rifle. However, this is only the "average temperature in the hospital": one company regiment could have every battle to stand in reserve and not to make a single shot, the other could be in the chain, to conduct an intense shootout and test acute cartridge deficits. Nevertheless, statistics allows you to make some interesting observations. For example, it is striking that rifle battalions usually spent much more cartridges than infantry shelves. This is also explained by the specialization in the conduct of fire, and the fact that the rifle battalions most often went ahead of the infantry regiments, tied the battle, and therefore remained longer under the fire. A peculiar record set the 13th rifle battalion of the 4th Rifle Brigade, spent in battle with Shipka-Shaynov (December 27-28) 122 shot on a rifle - twice as much standard ammunition.

General MD Bobeliev in the battle on August 30, 1877 for the splena.
andcvet.narod.ru.

Among the infantry regiments, the greatest consumption of cartridges in one thing was at the Vladimir Regiment during the third assault on August 30-31 - 91 shot on the rifle (however, this is an exceptional case). For example, such an intense battle as a battle for Mountain Dubnyak on October 12 demanded 25-30 cartridges on the guards regiments. Life Guard Hherst Regiment, attacked on the same day nearby Telish, made 61 shot on the trunk, which significantly exceeded the "normal level". At the first assault on July 8, the Kostroma regiment was not enough of the cartridges (the flow was more than 56 shots per person), which served as the reasons to Colonel I.F. Tullimina write in the report:

"The Kostroma Regiment retreated first because there was no cartridges, secondly because there was no reserve".

Rapid with an opponent

Moving fuses and hiding behind the folds of the terrain, the chain approached the enemy to the close distance, and the main mass of the battalion moved behind it. Oddly enough, at a distance of 800-300 steps, the fire, as a rule, was felt less - many bullets were already flying over her heads. This meant that the Turks feel the proximity of the enemy, forget to rearrange the sight on their rifles, shoot, not target or not even having tangled due to shelters. The shooting of the rifle raised above the head was not uncommon for Turkish infantry. Attacking, on the contrary, the fire was rapidly, bringing it to the limit. According to the calculations of peacetime, from a distance of 400 steps, about half of the bullets had to fall into the target.

Although the excitement has affected the attackers, the distance of 400-200 steps was considered decisive. At this stage of the battle, the "game of nerves" began, which most often determined the winner. It was possible to increase your chances of success by covering the flank of enemy positions, and this technique was actively applied. So, the 4th Rifle Brigade carried out a partial coverage of the Turkish position in battle with the village of Uflan at the southern foot of the chipper on July 4, 1877. Once under the crossfire, the Turks trembled and began to randomly retreat - the battle did not have to bring to the bayonet contraction.

Flange coverage had its own characteristics. Make a chain involved in shooting, to change the front was not easy. Therefore, more often coverage was carried out by the reinforcements, which were attached to the flank of the chain and occupied the covering position. The same could be done by the enemy - in this case, tactics tactics recommended not to delay the front of the chain back, but to send a reinforcement, which should not be attached to the side of the threatened parts, but to get out behind them. Then the enemy parts covering the Russian flank, fell under an indirect or even longitudinal fire - as General Leer said, "Who is bypass, he himself is offended".

Receive coverage and opposition to it by turning the front and expulsion of reinforcements.
Dragomirov M.I. Tactics tactics. SPB., 1879

It was when the chain came closer to the enemy by 400-200 steps, the 1st and 2nd line had a legitimate right to catch up with it, to join the chain and strengthen her fire, preparing, in case of need, to blow to the bayonets. In practice, it was often happening by itself, in addition to the will of the chiefs. The chain stopped, and the 1st and 2nd combat lines approached it, forming one or two thick masses of the fighters (the second - in the event that the procedure of the offensive was observed).

In the 1870s it was believed that one fire could not make the resistant enemy. However, the Turks did not relate to the category of persistent opponents - indeed, they often retreated during the shelling, and the case did not reach the bayonet battle. For example, General Skabeliev, when moving through the Imitli Pass in December 1877, used a small rifle, armed with trophy rifles of Pibody Martini, and she forced the Turks to leave their positions. Of course, I had to retreat and Russian troops - in such cases they carried the greatest losses. The soldiers lost their composure and threw back the heads, the officers could no longer stop the sound, and sometimes they were flee themselves. During the unsuccessful second assault on July 18, 1877, the Serpukhov Regiment was scary losses - the commander of the regiment was killed or injured, two out of three battalion commanders, many officers and lower ranks. Only a handful of several dozen soldiers remained to the ranks, two officers and one banner - apparently, the most part of the losses of Serpukhovs suffered precisely when retreat.

By reducing everything together, it is worth noting that the basis of successful infantry battle tactics lay a reasonable balance between the preservation of fighters from the fire and control over the part. Good tactical training, initiative, the ability to make decisions in extreme situations and personal authority in front of soldiers were required of the road commanders and other chiefs.

Sources and literature:

"Military Collection", 1878-1900
Dragomirov M. I. Textbook tactics. SPB., 1879
Collection of military stories. T. I-Vi. SPB., 1879
Krushin A. A. The Evolution of Military Art. M.-Zhukovsky, 2002
Collection of materials in the Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878. Vol. 5, 10, 88, 93
Argamakov V. F. Memories of the war 1877-1878. // Irvio magazine. - KN.6, 7. - 1911
Established, Lieutenk. First Pleven and 19th Infantry Kostroma Regiment in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. SPb., 1900
Sobolev L. N. Last battle for the chip. Regarding the memories of V. V. Vereshchagin. 1877-1878 // Russian old man. - 1889. - №5
Vereshchagin V. V. Memories of the artist. Transition through the Balkans. Skobelev. 1877-1878 // Russian old man. - 1889. - №3

Infantry tactics

The Russian military doctrine at the beginning of the reign of Empress Anna Ioannovna was based on the Petrovsky Charter of 1716. He, in turn, was largely an arrangement of "institutions for battle for now" 1708 - tactical leadership, which united the experience of the first half of the Northern War.

According to the example of the English-Dutch troops, the infantry battalions unfolded into a line in four ranks, and the soldiers were taught to lead a palm tree with rows or platforms, along the modern Prussian system. In 1831, Prussian military advisers appeared in the army, who should have helped the introduction of the latest Prussian infantry charters of 1726. Batalions were divided into four divisions, each of which, in turn, was divided into two platforms. The soldiers were still built in four ranks, but the last fire was not led, but was used to fill the ruptures of the system. If Grenadiers remained at the battalion (they were often taken to form consolidated-grenadier regiments), they occupied the place on the right flank of the battalion line. The new Prussian invention is the "cadence" marching (with the beat of the whole foot) - in the Russian army did not appear until 1755

General Peter Semenovich Saltykov, who commanded the main forces of the Russian army in battles at Pilzig and Kunesdorf. This popular and talented commander was dismissed in the winter of 1759-1760. because of illness. (Museum Suvorov, St. Petersburg)

During the miniha campaigns against the Turks, much attention was paid to the maintenance of fire fight, and the Russian infantry was taught shooting at the "Karakol". This method was canceled in published in 1736 "Dispositions for military preparations and promotions under the general battle against the Turks" General Farmor, which provided for a combination of offensive and defensive tactics. Farmor understood that the shooting of the rang of whole mouth or battalions after a short time ceases itself due to a thick smoke caused by the use of black powder. In the "Disposition" recommended the shooting of posters consisting under the team of knowledgeable officers; Only in this case, the maintenance of fire on the battlefield could continue how long.

After the eight of the throne in 1740, the Empress Elizabeth Prussian tactics were mainly set - the queen demanded to return to tactical doctrines introduced by Peter Great. This regular episode of the fight against the German domain in the army led to the appearance of a new infantry charter written by General Field Marshal Lassi: "The infantry regimentation regimentation regiment for the Russian Imperial Army". Although many Petrovsky ideas were preserved in the charter, a new look at the fire fight in the document was preserved, with the addition of the requirement so that when battles in the deployed bayonet lines were adjusted. It was a consequence of the experience gained in battles against the Turkish light cavalry, when the bayonet was considered as a good defense against the cavalry.

The following and most significant change in the Russian infantry charter occurred in 1755, during the Shuvalovsky army reform. "The description of the infantry regimentation" was the processing of the new and advanced infantry charter of the Prussian army. Shuvalov consulted with Russians, and with Austrian specialists in the field of tactics, but the document that appeared as a result became one of the most complex infantry charters of the Russian army, which appeared before the very beginning of the seven-year war. As a result, at least until 1759, infantry commander due to insufficient experience were not able to apply the provisions of the new charter in the troops.

Battle at Pillars, July 23, 1759. The Russian army in dense defensive orders in two lines, artillery covers the only possible approach to its positions, as shown on the plan. Russians won mainly due to the careful choice of position and the use of reserves from the observation case. (From the author's collection)

The main construction of the battalion still remains the four-seat, but it was complicated by the fact that when approaching the enemy to 70 steps, it was advised to restructure into three ranks. With a four-buttered strict, the first two rods descended when shooting knee; When constructing in three ranks, only the first of them got up onto the knee. The Prussian battalion division system for four divisions, eight semi-concurrents and 16 platforms was considered convenient to increase control over soldiers on the battlefield. The battalion grenadiers were put on both flanks, and the reserve for three platforms was at a distance of 25 sages (about 50 meters) behind the battalion line. The reserve was given the same role as the fourth rank not entering the firing of 1731; In the period from 1740 to 1755, the allocation of the reserve was not performed.

In practice, Svuvalov's charters revealed a number of shortcomings, including fast stops in the shooting of platforms - the problem with which Prussians also collided. "Our Musketes and Cannon responded, but, of course, not a volley, and the truth speaking, in great disorder, but the shooting was much more often than the enemy," the contemporary wrote. Such a shooting speed, presumably, three Russian shots for every two Prusskiki was a direct consequence of the old Petrovsky doctrine, regenerated by minich and ferormor. Fire power and closure of the ranks under the enemy's fire throughout the entire seven-year war remained the cornerstone of the Russian military practice, and not a bayonet blow, as the historians of the late period believed.

The experience gained in the first fights of the war was based on the second leadership of Fermor of 1758 - "General Disproption for battle with the enemy". In this document, it was necessary to "open a duration of the officers rounded by the team, ahead of the enemy's height. When Prussians are closer, to open the fire by divisions and continue the battle on the bayonets, as far as the Russian enemy will be broken through the courage of the army, and there will be no expense from the field of battle.

The Prussian Charter demanded that the shooting was not targeting the middle of the construction of the enemy, but Fermorovsky instructions were more practical; In this case, a much larger percentage of bullets was to hit the target. Higher accuracy of the shooting, with greater rapidity, was given by Russian soldiers a significant advantage in the fire fighting, which was usually conducted at a distance of 50-70 steps.

Emperor Peter III, Spouse Catherine II, is depicted on this engraving in the Uniform of the Cavaliangard Commander. After the death of Empress Elizabeth Peter III intended to conclude an alliance with Friedrich Great - this decision was worth him of the throne and life: Peter was killed as a result of a conspiracy headed by his wife Empress Catherine. (From the Walter Yarboro Jr. collection)

The weakness of the Russian army was another, and this weakness largely reduced the benefits for no. The British Observer reported that "Russian troops ... under no circumstances can act with hasty." Wearing prescribed rebuilding and maneuvering is hardly in a state of lethargic sleep led to the fact that the Russian troops barely moved on the battlefield. Russian is an eyewitness noted that when Gross-Jersdorf "our army stood in the ranks throughout the battle, with the first Shero, sitting on the knee." Prussians noticed that "... Although they have [Russian] and adopted a linear construction, the infantry regiment is hardly able to align the line in less than an hour, and there is always a big mess." By 1759, the situation improved somewhat, and with the adoption of the Charter of Fermor, the deployment of the column in the line was facilitated.

The nomination of troops in the composition of large divisional columns was taken by Russian infantry during the miniha campaigns against the Turks, and in the early years of the seven-year war, this practice was preserved. Such a construction was unusual for rapprochement with the enemy, but the closest battlefield under the core (1758) forced the troops to get into the columns, so that the shots of Prussian artillery pierced huge bare bags. Although Shuvalov's instructions recommended the use of battalion columns as an offensive system, Russian commanders on the battlefield continued to deploy their parts in the line, because with such a construction, the entire battalion could fire. After entering the position, the entire line opened a volley fire, and then continued the attack striking the bayons to expel the enemy from the battlefield. In 1761, during the Campaign in Colberge, a brigade was made, in which two battalions moved in columns, forming a moving square, and the soldiers had to either deploy the FAS Kare when the hazard appears, or if necessary to unfold in line. It provided greater mobility on the battlefield compared to the first years of the seven-year war.

The principles of building an army on the battlefield during the war also underwent changes. At the beginning of the century, it was customary to deploy the infantry in two lines, and the third line remained behind them, forming a reserve. With flanks, the infantry covered the cavalry. If you do not take into account the huge columns that have formed during the war with the Turks, the first improvement can be considered to be built into two main lines with the release of a small intermediate line of the shelf reserves. Cavalry still remained on the flanks, the infantry relied on fire fighting and mobile field fortifications (slingshot) to prevent the front cavalry attack. Under Palzig (1759), the Russian army chose to build field fortifications in order to break the system of the enemy, and the second line of mixed reserves was ready to support troops in the event of a breakthrough of the enemy.

Empress Ekaterina II Great (years of reign 1762-1796). After the overthrow of her husband Peter III, Catherine reigned as an absolute monarch and continued to strengthen his army. Almost immediately after the end of the seven-year-old war, her troops were involved in a long war with Turkey (1768-1774). (From the Walter Yarboro Jr. collection)

Another important innovation during the war was the experiences of use in the Russian army of light infantry. In the period of the siege of Kolberg (1761) two battalions of the five-dimensional composition were formed. They had to carry out a cover, acting independently with small groups, mainly relying on the label. During the reign of Catherine, the great idea will also be supported and light infantry will develop into a special kind of troops, but in 1761 their units were intended only for confrontation with Prussian arrows in the Kolberg area.

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