The concept of knowledge. The problem of scientific truth. The concept of scientific truth. Basic and additional criteria for truth. Truth, delusion and lies that there is a scientific truth

Under truth It is understood as an adequate reflection of reality in the consciousness of a person, independent of certain features of the learning entity. Inadequate reflection of reality is misconception.

Criteria Truth - What makes sure the truth and allows you to distinguish it from delusions:

• compliance with the laws of logic;
• compliance with previously open laws of science;
• compliance with fundamental laws;
• simplicity, economy of formula;
• paradoxics of ideas and practice.

Truth in philosophy

The main objective - achieving scientific truth.

With regard to the philosophy of truth is not only the goal of knowledge, but also the subject of the study. We can say that the concept of truth expresses the essence of science.

What is the truth?

The origins of the so-called classic philosophical concept The truths are torn to the era of antiquity. For example, it believed that "the one who talks about things in accordance with what they are, says the truth, the same who speaks about them otherwise - lies." For a long time, the classic concept of truth dominated in the theory of knowledge. In the main thing, it proceeded from the situation: what is approved by thought, really takes place. And in this sense, the concept of compliance of the thoughts of reality coincides with the concept of "adequacy". In other words, truth is the property of a subject, consistent with the consent of thinking with himself, with its a priori (emergency) forms. So, in particular, I said I. Kant. Subsequently, the truth was to mean the property of the ideal objects themselves, irrelevant to human knowledge, and a special kind of spiritual values. Augustine developed the doctrine of the contest of true ideas. Not only philosophers, but also representatives of private sciences face a question that understand the reality, how to perceive reality or the real world? Materialists and idealists The concept of reality, reality is identified with the concept of an objective world, i.e. With what exists outside and regardless of man and humanity. However, the person himself is part of the objective world. Therefore, without considering this circumstance, it is simply impossible to clarify the question of truth.

Taking into account the directions available in the philosophy, taking into account the originality of individual statements expressing the subjective opinion of one or another scientist, truth can be determined As an adequate reflection of the objective reality, the subject of the subject, during which the cognitive item is reproduced as it exists outside and independently. Consequently, truth is included in the objective content of human knowledge. But since we were convinced that the process of knowledge is not interrupted, then the question arises about the nature of the truth.

True - adequate reflection of the object with a learning subject; Reproduction of it as it exists by itself, regardless of human consciousness; Objective content of sensual empirical experience. Also under the truth, the knowledge corresponding to the object of knowledge coincides with it.

After all, if a person perceives the objective world of sensual ways and ideas about it forms in the process of individual knowledge and his mental activity, then the question is naturally the question - how can it make sure of his statement to the most objective world? Thus, we are talking about the criteria of truth, the detection of which is one of the most important tasks of philosophy. And in this issue there is no consent among philosophers. The extreme point of view is reduced to the complete denial of the criterion of the truth, for, according to its supporters, the truth is either absent at all, or it is characteristic of, briefly, everything and everything.

Idealists - Supporters of rationalism - as the criterion of truth believed itself, because it has the ability to clearly and clearly present the subject. Such philosophers as Decartes, Leibniz proceeded from the idea of \u200b\u200bthe self-evidence of the initial truths, comprehended by intellectual intuition. Their arguments were based on the possibilities of mathematics objectively and impartially in their formulas to display the diversity of the real world. True, the other question arose: how, in turn, make sure of the reliability of their clarity and explicitness? It was supposed to help here a logic with its severity of evidence and its irrefutableness.

So, I. Kant. Allowed only the formal-logical criterion of truth, in accordance with which knowledge should be coordinated with universal formal laws of reason and mind. But the support on logic did not save the difficulties in search of the criterion of truth. It turned out to be not so easy to overcome the internal consistency of the thinking itself, it turned out that sometimes it was impossible to achieve the formal logical consistency of the judgments developed by science, with initial or newly introduced statements (conventianism).

Even the rapid development of logic, its mathematization and separation into many special directions, as well as attempts by the semantic (semantic) and semiotic (iconic) explanation of the nature of the truth did not eliminate the contradictions in its criteria.

Subjective idealists - Proponents of sensualism - saw the criterion of truth in the immediate evidence of the sensations themselves, in the consistency of scientific concepts with sensory data. Subsequently, the principle of verification was introduced, which received its name from the concept verification of the statement (verification of its truth). In accordance with this principle, any statement (scientific assertion) is only then meaningful or meaning if it is possible to verify. The main emphasis is done precisely on the logical possibility of clarification, and not on the actual one. For example, due to the undevelopment of science and technology, we cannot observe the physical processes going in the center of the Earth. But through assumptions based on the laws of logic, it is possible to push the appropriate hypothesis. And if its positions will be logically consistent, it should be recognized as true. It is impossible not to take into account other attempts to identify the criterion of truth with the help of logic characteristic of the philosophical direction called by logical positivism.

Supporters of the leading role of human activity in knowledge tried overcome the limitations of logical methods in the establishment of the truth criterion. The pragmatic concept of truth was substantiated, according to which the essence of the truth should be seen not in accordance with it with reality, but in accordance with the so-called "final criterion". His destination is in establishing the utility of truth for practical actions and actions of a person. It is important to note that from the point of view of pragmatism, the use itself is not the criterion of truth, understood as a compliance of the knowledge of reality. In other words, the reality of the outside world is not available to a person, as a person directly deals with the results of its activities. That is why the only thing that he is able to establish is not the correspondence of the knowledge of reality, but the effectiveness and practical benefits of knowledge. It is the last, acting as the basic value of human knowledge, is worthy of referring to the truth. And yet philosophy, overcoming extremes and avoiding absolutization, approached a more or less correct understanding of the truth criterion. Otherwise, it could not: Mind before the need to question not only the consequences of the momentary activities of a person (in individual, and often, cases are very far from truth), but also to deny their own centuries-old history, life could not be perceived otherwise, as absurdity. Only the concept of objective truth, based on the concept of objective reality, allows you to successfully develop the philosophical concept of truth. We emphasize once again that the objective or real world exists not just by itself, but only when it comes to his knowledge.

Objectivity and subjectivity of truth

Objectivity Truth is due to the real existence of a knowledgeable object. This information about the real facility, which became the property of consciousness and gives knowledge objective. At the same time, reflecting consciousness, information inevitably takes the forms of abstract thinking, passing through the "filters" of the senses. Thereby knowledge inevitably has subjective component. Objectively existing objects - "Student", "House", "College" - in the consciousness of a person can acquire various shades. They can also be reflected by different concepts: "A student of a second special or higher educational institution", "Architectural building for residence or placement of any organizations", "secondary special educational institution"; In the end, these concepts can be completely different in different languages.

Thus, the truth is objective in content and subjective in form.

Relative and absolute truth

The limitations of human practical abilities is one of the reasons and limited knowledge, i.e. We are talking about the relative nature of truth.

- This is knowledge, reproducing the objective world approximately, incomplete. Therefore, the signs or features of the relative truth are approaching and infidelity that are related to each other. Indeed, the world is a system of interrelated elements, any incomplete knowledge about it as a whole will always be inaccurate, coarse, fragmented.

At the same time, the concept of absolute truth is also used in philosophy. With it, it is characterized by an important side of the development of the knowledge process. It should be noted that the concept of absolute truth in philosophy is not developed (with the exception of the metaphysical, idealistic branch, where the absolute truth is usually correlated with the idea of \u200b\u200bGod as an initial creative and creative strength). The concept of absolute truth It is used to characterize this or that particular aspect of all true knowledge and in this sense it is similar to the concepts " objective truth"And" relative truth". Concept " absolute Truth"It should be considered in an inextricable connection with the process of knowledge itself. The same process is like a movement in steps, meaning the transition from less perfect scientific views to more perfect, however, the old knowledge is not discarded, and at least partially included in the system of new knowledge. This is the inclusion reflecting continuity (in the historical sense), the inner and external integrity of knowledge and representing the truth as a process is the content of the concept of absolute truth. Once again, we recall that, first of all, the material activity of man has an impact on the material world. But when it comes to scientific knowledge, it is meant that of the variety of properties inherent in the objective world, only those that are historically determined by the subject of knowledge are distinguished. That is why the practice that has absorbed knowledge is a form of directly connected to the objective objects and things. This manifests the function of practice as the criterion of truth.

Concrete truth

Concreteness The truth is that it arises in the process of knowing specific objects and expresses an idea of \u200b\u200bspecific objects.

Abstract The truth is due to the fact that it is formed within the framework of abstract thinking and is some generalization (for example, "swans - white or black"; "In the spring in the northern hemisphere, the air temperature begins to gradually increase").

In order to prove the truth of one or another approval, it is necessary to somehow check it out. The means of such an inspection is called the criterion of truth (from Greek. Kriterion - Meril for evaluation).

Basic concepts of truth

Scientists proposed various criteria of how to distinguish true from false:

• Sensuals rely on the data of the senses and the criterion of truths consider sensual experience. In their opinion, the reality of the existence of something is checked only by feelings, and not abstract theories.
• Rationalists believe that feelings are able to mislead us, and see the foundations for checking the statements in mind. For them, the main criterion of truth is clarity and clearness. The ideal model of true knowledge is mathematics, where each conclusion requires clear evidence.
• Further development rationalism finds in the concept of coherence (from lat. Cohaerentia - clutch, communication), according to which the criterion of truth is consistency reasoning with a common knowledge system. For example, "2x2 \u003d 4" is true not because it coincides with the actual fact, but because it is in harmony with the system of mathematical knowledge.
• Proponents of pragmatism (from Greek. Pragma is a matter) consider the criterion of truth efficiency Knowledge. True knowledge is the knowledge of the proven, which successfully "works" and allows you to succeed and practical benefits in daily matters.
• In Marxism, the criterion of truth is declared practice (from Greek. Praktikos is an active, active), taken in the broadest sense as any developing personality of a person to transform itself and the world (from everyday experience to language, science, etc.). True is recognized only by the proven practice and experience of many generations a statement.
• For supporters of conventionalism (from Lat. ConvCntio - Agreement) Criterion of Truth is universal consent Regarding statements. For example, scientific truth is considered to be what according to the vast majority of scientists.

Some criteria (consistency, efficiency, consent) go beyond the classical understanding of truth, therefore they speak of non-classical (respectively coherent, pragmatic and conventional) interpretation of truth. The Marxist Practice Practice is trying to combine pragmatism and classical understanding of truth.

Since each criterion of truth has its drawbacks, all criteria can be considered and as complementary. In this case, the truth uniquely can only be called what satisfies all the criteria.

There are alternative trips to truth. So, in religion it is said about the ultra-proud truth, the basis of which is the sacred Scripture. Many modern flows (for example, postmodernism) generally deny the existence of any objective truth.

Modern science adheres to the classic interpretation of truth and believes that the truth is always objective (does not depend on the desires and sentiment of a person), specific (There is no truth "at all", outside clear conditions), procedural (located in the process of continuous development). The latter property is revealed in the concepts of relative and absolute truth.

Both the historical development of science and its current state convincingly indicate that there has never been a certain single and universal understanding of the scientific truth, its nature and criteria in science. The main objective reason for the ambiguity of solving the problem of truth in the philosophy of science is a qualitative diversity of various types of scientific knowledge. For example, one case, if the statement is an analytic (for example, derived by theorem in mathematics or a logical consequence of a natural science or socially humanitarian theory), and completely different if it is synthetic (for example, an empirical fact or a substantial axiom of some kind of theory). It's one thing when we are dealing with facts, and quite another - when we solve the problem of the truth of scientific laws, and even more so scientific theories. As much as qualitatively different are situations where we are dealing with the definition of the truth of private theories, and when the same problem takes place on the truth of fundamental, especially paradigm, theories in a particular area of \u200b\u200bscience. Such significant differences in the approach to the criteria for the truth of scientific knowledge take place in different areas of scientific knowledge: logic and mathematics, natural science, social and humanitarian or technical sciences. The main concepts of scientific truth in modern philosophy and the methodology of science are the following.

Correspondent: The scientific truth is accurate and complete compliance ("identity") content of knowledge about the object of the object itself (its "copy") (Aristotle, J. Locke, French materialists of the XVIII century, the theory of reflection of dialectical materialism, etc.). This concept of truth is often also called in honor of its creator by Aristotelian understanding of truth.

Cherent: Scientific Truth is a logical compliance of some statement by other statements adopted for true. The limiting case of compliance is to eliminate one statement from the others adopted for true (logical evidence) (Labnitz, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein and others).

Conventional: scientific truth is a convention, a conditional agreement on adequacy (truth) of some statement (primarily by axioms of theory and definitions) to its subject (A. Poancare, P. Duhm, R. Karnap and others).

Pragmatist: Scientific Truth is a statement, theory, the concept, the adoption of which brings practical benefits, success, effective solution to the existing problems (C. Pierce, J. Dewey, R. Rorty and others).

Instrumentalist: scientific truth is knowledge, which is a description of a certain set of actions (operations) leading to the achievement of a specific (specific) goal or solving a specific task (P. Bridgeman, F. Frank and others).

Consensual: Scientific Truth is the result of long cognitive communications ("negotiations"), the result of which is the achievement of cognitive consensus between the members of the disciplinary scientific community on the recognition of certain statements and theories as true (M. Malkay, Laudan, S. Walgar and others) .

Intuitionist: scientific truth is such knowledge, the content of which is intuitively obvious to the experienced researcher and does not need any additional empirical substantiation or logical proof (R. Descart, Galilee, I. Kant, A. Gaging, A. Bergson and others) .

Emparist: Scientific Truth There is either the statement of observation data, or such a general knowledge, the consequences of which are confirmed by the data of observation and experiment (F. Bacon, I. Newton, E. Makh, Rainhengach and others).

Psychological: the scientific truth is such knowledge, in the adequacy of which scientists (scientist) believe (M. Planck, M. Fouco, T. Kun and others).

Poststructuralist: scientific truth There is such knowledge that in this context is conditionally adopted by a subject for adequate, definite and unconditional knowledge (J. Derrida, J. Lacan, R. Bart and others).

It is necessary to emphasize that each of the above concepts of scientific truth has certain bases and rational grain, representing various approaches that take place in real science when dealing with scientists about the truth of scientific concepts and its criteria. At the same time, all listed concepts of truth have one common enough serious philosophical flaw. It lies in the claim of each of them on the universal solution to the problem of scientific truth. However, when trying to consistently conducting its complaints with universalism, each of them faces fundamental and practically unresolved problems. Let us dwell on them in detail.

The question of the possibility of achieving the science of truth was with a special force, as you know, put in a new time, in the formation of modern natural science. Two alternative approaches were formulated here in solving this problem: rationalist and emparist. One was presented and developed in the philosophy of R. Descarte, the other in the epistemology of F. Bacon. According to the rationalistic concept of Descartes, the embryos of scientific truth are already in the human mind and have "congenital character." The truth is detected in its full amount not immediately, but gradually, the "natural light" of the mind by using a certain set of cognitive means (doubts, critics, intellectual intuition and deduction). Bacon denied the innate nature of scientific knowledge and developed an alternative concept of finding scientific truth, the source and the basis of which systematic observations, experiment, hypothesis and induction as a method of rejection of false hypotheses and approval of true. He also set an important philosophical question about factors that hinder the achievement of the science of objective truth. The concept of such factors has received the name of the theory of idols or interference ("ghosts") of the knowledge of the truth: the ghosts of the genus, the crowds, theater, market, etc. Attempt to reconcile the rationalism of the Descartes and the Empirism of Bacon in matters of scientific truth and smooth out the contradiction existing honey and . Kant. The basis of such reconciliation of Kant considered the recognition of the existence of a priori prerequisites of knowledge, both sensory and rational. Although scientific knowledge, as Kant asserted, begins with experience, but this does not mean that it "occurs", logically follows from experience. The condition for obtaining scientific knowledge about knowledgeable objects is the structuring of the sensual information obtained about them in the experience of sensual information using a priori forms of contemplation (in particular, space and time), and subsequently with the help of categories of reason (main ontological categories, as well as forms and laws of thinking). All these a priori structures of consciousness and knowledge form a cognitive structure that creates the possibility of producing and constituting true judgments and true evidence. However, Cant's a priori is also not destined to become a common theory of scientific truth.

To fix objective conditions and prerequisites, scientific knowledge is more appropriate, in our opinion, to use such a concept as a cognitive (cognitive) reference system. It can be considered as a generalization or at least as an analogue of such a concept of science as a physical reference system. As is known, only the spatial-temporal and other characteristics of physical systems have a real meaning towards a specific reference system. The cognitive reference system as a more general epistemological concept includes the following points in its content: 1) fixation of the cognitive installation of the researcher, from the position of which a certain scientific problem is considered, 2) fixation of the external conditions of knowledge (in particular, experimental and instrumental reasons for the study of the object) and internal conditions Cognition (cash empirical and theoretical knowledge used by the researcher). It is obvious that the cognitive reference system, like a physical reference system, can be attributed to the objective conditions of knowledge.

The concept of truth.

The question is what truth is and whether it exists is one of the eternal issues of gnoseology. Its solution depends on the general worldview of the worldview. Materialists and idealists are in different ways.
The question of the scientific truth is the question of the quality of knowledge. Science is interested only in true knowledge. The problem of truth is related to the issue of the existence of objective truth, that is, truth, which does not depend on tastes and desires, from human consciousness in general. The truth is achieved in the interaction of the subject and the object: without the object, knowledge loses its meaningfulness, and without the subject there is no knowledge. Therefore, in the interpretation of truth, objectivity and subjectivism can be distinguished. Subjectivism is the most common point of view. Her supporters note that the truth does not exist outside a person. From this they conclude that there is no objective truth. The truth exists in concepts and judgments, therefore, there can be no knowledge of human and humanity independent. Subjectivists understand that the denial of objective truth questioned the existence of any truth. If the truth is subject to, it turns out: how many people, so much and truths.

Objectivists Absolitize objective truth. For them, truth exists outside of man and humanity. Truth is the very reality that does not depend on the subject.

But truth and reality, are different concepts. Reality exists independently of the learning entity. In the reality of the truths, but there are only objects with their properties. It appears as a result of the knowledge of the people of this reality.

True objective. The object exists, regardless of a person, and any theory reflects this property. Under objective truth, the knowledge dictated by the object is understood. Truth does not exist without man and humanity. Therefore, truth is human knowledge, but not the reality itself.

Truth is never given immediately and entirely. There are the concepts of absolute and relative truth. Absolute true - This is knowledge that coincides with the display object. Achieving absolute truth is an ideal, not a real result. Relative truth is knowledge characterized by relative compliance with its object. Relative truth is more or less true knowledge. Relative truth can be clarified and supplemented in the process of cognition, so it acts as knowledge to be changed. Absolute truth-knowledge is unchanged. It has nothing to change in it, since its elements correspond to the object itself.

1. abs. and rel. Truths, as it were, exclude each other, but in fact they are interrelated. Path to abs. Truth lies through a series of rel. Truth. \\ Opening atom \\.
2. In each rel. The truth is a particle ABS. Truths are two tendencies in the development of knowledge.

ABS is achievable. true?

There is an opinion that the ABS. Truth is not achievable. This point of view enhances the position of agnosticism.
At any time, the development of science remains things that are not known to people. Knowledge depends on the complexity of the object of the object. Cognition comes from simple to complex: conclusion: ABS. The truth about the world as a whole exists only as the limit and the ideal to which humanity is striving.

Borders of scientific knowledge.

Science is developing unevenly. There are two trends in its development: differentiation and integration. Diff. - division and reproduction of scientific directions. Int. - Association of scientific directions. Science develops through problems, and any problem limits the field of research. Unrecognizability means unavailable knowledge, and the limitations of scientific knowledge - that the object is highlighted in a certain perspective.

Vera I. knowledge.

Along with scientific methods of knowledge, there are various types of unscientific. It reflects the immediate conditions of human existence - natural environment, life, government processes. The basis of ordinary knowledge is elementary correct information about the world, which is called common sense. This species includes and beliefs, ideals of a person, his belief, folklore as a concentrated knowledge about the world.

Mythological knowledge.

M. P. appeared in the most ancient times, when there was no individual person, but there was only the consciousness of the genus. Myth is an emotional-shaped perception of the world, legend, legend and legend. The myth is characteristic of the humanity of the forces of the outside of the outside, which are incomprehensible to man. Religious knowledge is a complex of ideas about the world, which is based on Vera in supernatural. Artistic knowledge is a figurative thinking of a person embodied in various forms of art. His appointment is to express aesthetic attitude to the world. Philosophical knowledge is the desire for the synthesis of all other forms of cognitive activity and personal attitude to the world. Philosophy is an organic unity of scientific knowledge and everyday wisdom.

Conclusion: Forms and ways of knowledge are diverse and sufficiently perfect. They characterize a person as a unique phenomenon with intellectual power and, almost infinitely, expanding the range of its research and opportunities.

The importance of the criterion

In reality, a person in the process of knowledge is constantly facing a large number of problems, the very existence of which refutes the classical concept of truth, somehow:

Problem nature. cognizable reality and subjectivity of thinking. A person in his knowledge directly deals not with the objective world "by itself", but with the world in his form, as he is sensually perceived and comprehended. That is, in the human sense of truth initially laid subjectivity, and various questions appear from this approval, for example: different people think in different ways - does this mean that all the truth is different? Could it be that for some number of people understanding the truth in common? And, of course, how to achieve this community and is it necessary?

Problem character compliance thoughts reality. The classical concept of truth in its "naive" form considers this compliance as a simple copy of reality thoughts. Studies of compliance of knowledge reality show, however, that this compliance is not simple and unequivocal. After all, there are always properties of the subject that people may simply cannot understand directly. Our knowledge of such properties is reduced only to the instrument reading, but is it an absolute copying of reality? So, such an obviousness of which the adherents of the classical theory speak may not be.

Relativity and absolitness truth. In my opinion, every person in his judgment on truth is still purely subjective, and therefore it is necessary to distinguish between the concept of common, in other words, the absolute truth from the concept of the truth of each particular individual. And in the classical theory, such distinction is actually absent.

So what is relative true? Perhaps it can be described as knowledge that approximately and incomectively reproduces the objective world. It is approximateness and incomplete - the specific properties of relative truth. If the world is a system of interrelated elements, then it can be concluded from here that any knowledge of the world abstracts from some of his parties will be obviously inaccurate. Why? It seems to me that a person cannot know the world, without fixing his attention on his parties alone and not distracted from others, internally inherent internally inherent in the cognitive process.

On the other hand, the search for absolute truth is being made in the framework of the knowledge of specific, or even single facts. As examples of eternal truths, suggestions usually appear, which are a statement of fact, for example: "Napoleon died on May 5, 1821." Or the speed of light in vacuo is equal to 300,000 km / s. However, attempts to apply the concept of absolute truth to the more significant provisions of science, such as universal laws, are unsuccessful.

Thus, a peculiar dilemma arises: if the absolute truth is considered as absolutely complete and accurate knowledge, it lies beyond the limits of real scientific knowledge; If it is considered as a totality of eternal truths, the concept of absolute truth is not applicable to the most fundamental types of scientific knowledge. This dilemma is the result of a one-sided approach to the problem that is expressed in the fact that the absolute truth is identified with the type of knowledge separate from relative truth.

The meaning of the concept of "absolute truth" is revealed only in the process of developing scientific knowledge. It is that in the transition of scientific knowledge from stage to a step, for example, from one theory to another, the old knowledge is not completely discarded, and in one or another form is included in the system of new knowledge. It is this inclusion, continuity characterizing the truth as a process, and perhaps the content of the concept of absolute truth.

Thus, many unresolved problems arose, each of which one way or another is associated with the need to determine the degree of conformity between human representations and the real world. This implies the need to search for the most strict criterion of truth, that is, a sign that could be determined by the truth of one or another knowledge.

In addition, only after the establishment of the criterion of truth, many categories have meaning with which a person has to interact in one way or another. Among them, I allocated two, which seemed to me the most important.

Scientific true. Scientific truth is a knowledge that responds with double demand: first, it corresponds to reality; Secondly, it satisfies a number of criteria for scientific relations. These criteria include: logical harmony; Empirical verifiability, including testing time; the ability to predict on the basis of these knowledge new facts; The consistency of the knowledge, whose truth is already reliably established and so on. These criteria, of course, should not be considered as something unchanged and once the forever. They are a product of the historical development of science and in the future can be replenished. Such an understanding of the truth is generally unusually important for the development of science, since if the data obtained using specific science, comply with all the above criteria, it can be concluded that the usefulness of such data can be concluded. That is, an incentive appears for the further development of science.

True in everyday life. The problem of the criterion of truth is of great importance even in the daily life of people, as it is one of the basics of the system of the world's worldview. Responding to the question of what is the criterion of truth, a person largely determines its own place in the world and its ideals and values. For many, the concept of "truth" (as justice, justice and completeness of knowledge) is closely related to the concepts of "sincerity, calm, well-being, happiness." So this so-called everyday truth is a higher social and personal value.

True and criteria

Exploring the problem of truth, I had two questions. 1) What is truth? 2) What is the criterion of truth? The answer to the first question is the definition of the concept of truth, the response to the second is the formulation of methods that allow you to establish the truth of this thought and distinguish the true thought of false.

But first a few words about the structure of this article and the method of presentation of the material. Those thoughts that will be offered to your attention below are taken from such a philosophical direction as dialectical materialism (in the future Diamat). The sources of these ideas were the works of the founders of Diamata K. Marx "Theses about Feyerbach", F. Engels "Anti-Dühring", V. Lenina "Materialism and empiricriticism", as well as some other books that I will tell in the course of the story. I understand that my work may seem one-sided, because It will only be represented by the view of the diamatic on the problem of truth and its criterion. But try to understand me. "We are tolerant of someone's opinions, until we have our own," I said, in my opinion, Solzhenitsyn. Therefore, here you will not meet the coherent theory of truth, neither the pragmatic, nor the semantic theory of the truth of Tarsky, nor the views of non-constitutionalists, etc. My merit in creating this work is that from the above books and textbooks on diamata, I detected everything that relates to the truth; Then got rid of the ideology of the ideology and outlined in simple and clear (I hope) form.

TRUE - Proper, adequate reflection of objects and phenomena of reality with a learning subject. I took this definition from the philosophical encyclopedic dictionary of the 97th year. Strictly speaking, the concept, according to which the truth is the correspondence of the thoughts of reality, is called classic. It is called so because it is ancient of all concepts of truth. Plato belongs to the following characteristic of the concept of truth "... The one who speaks about things in accordance with what they are, says the truth, the same who speaks about them otherwise - lies ...".

Similarly, characterizes the concept of truth and Aristotle in his " Metaphysician":" ... talk about the judge that there is no, or about the non-luck, what it is, - it means to say false; And to speak, there is not there, there is not there, it means to say true. "

Supporters of the classical concept of truth at first were believed that its purpose was the correspondence of the thoughts of reality - can be achieved relatively simply. They are explicitly or implicit form proceeded from the following assumptions: the reality with which the person is directly dealing with and which is the subject of his knowledge, does not depend on the knowledge itself; Thoughts can be shown in a simple definite correspondence with reality; There is an intuitively clear and non-doubt criterion, allowing to establish, correspond to the thought of reality or not.

However, this concept faced a number of problems that served as a reason for its critical revision:

The problem of the nature of a reasonable reality. A person in his knowledge directly deals not with the objective world "by itself", but with the world in his form, as he is sensually perceived and comprehended.

The problem of the nature of conformity of reality thoughts. The classical concept of truth in its "naive" form considers this compliance as a simple copy of reality thoughts. Studies of compliance of knowledge reality show, however, that this compliance is not simple and unequivocal.

Problem criteria truth. This problem played an extremely important role in the development of a classic concept. Partly it is associated with the first problem. If a person directly contacts the world "in himself", but with a sensually perceived and conceptualized world, then it is asked: how can he check if his statements correspond to the world itself?

The problem of the criterion of truth is not exhausted, however, mentioned aspect. Ancient skeptics paid attention to the fact that the question of the criteria of truth leads to the paradox of infinite regression. Sex Empirik believed that in order to prove the truth of the approval, some criterion of truth should be adopted. However, this criterion itself, which is a method of recognizing true statements, should be proven on the basis of another criterion of truth, etc. to infinity.

The classical concept in its version in which the truth is considered as a correspondence not only objective, but also any other reality leads to a logical contradiction, which received the name of the paradox of the liar. This is a paradox, news still ancient Greeks (Epimeid, Evbulid) is as follows.

Imagine that I am a lawyer. And declare: all lawyers are liars. The question arises: truly or false this statement?

I think I do not need to clarify you this paradox. The problem of this theory is that it does not limit the selection of statements referents. And thus, the statement itself may be a reference statement. I want to emphasize that the paradox of a liar who played a significant role in the development of modern logic is a paradox of the classical concept of truth.

What is the classical concept of truth to diamatic? In the most general form, the answer to this question can be formulated as follows: the diamatic doctrine of the truth, in my opinion, is the successor of the classical concept and at the same time represents something new. This is "something" I will try to set out now.

Objectivity truth. Here I have to quote Lenin (I generally think that the contribution of Marxism-Leninism into philosophy is now unreasonably forgotten; another question is that Marx and Lenin It was very mistaken with the historical materialism and the economy of communism): "... the concept of objective truth characterizes such a content of human representations, which does not depend on the subject, does not depend on a person or from humanity. This does not mean that objective truth is an element of the objective world . Describing human knowledge, it is manifested in a subjective form. But it characterizes human knowledge not from the point of view of this subjective form, but from the point of view of their objective content. " From this quote, it can be understood that a person in his cognitive activity is able to establish the connection of logical structures not just with the world of sensations, but with the objective world lying outside it. And here the most important place is occupied by the concept of practice. The role of practice as a factor connecting and comparing human knowledge with the objective world is manifested in the fact that it performs, on the one hand, as material activities that form an objective subject of knowledge through the allocation of certain properties of the objective world, and on the other, as an activity forming a subject knowledge. In the diabeta, truth is not just the compliance of thoughts to the objective world, but the conformity of thoughts to the objective world given through the practice (despite the fact that these "thoughts" should also meet certain criteria, but about it further).

ABOUT quality of things, items mat. The world, about what they represent can be judged only by those properties in which these qualities are manifested. But the properties of this subject can be revealed through its interaction with other objects. And on the nature of this interaction, it depends on which properties of the subject are detected. It is these properties that make up the proceedings of our statements about the outside world, the subject of objective truth.

Relativity and absolitness truth.

Diamat connects together such as knowledge as truth and variability. This synthesis finds its embodiment in the concept of relative truth.

Relative true - This is knowledge that is approximately and incompletely reproduces the objective world. Approach and infidel - the specific properties of relative truth. If the world represents a system of interrelated elements, then it follows that any knowledge of the world abstracts from some of its parties will be obviously inaccurate and coat. As a person cannot know the world, without fixing his attention on his sides and without being distracted by others, the approach is inherently inherently inherent in the cognitive process.

On the other hand, the search for absolute truth is being made in the framework of cash. As shown by F. Engels. in " Anti-Drug", the status of eternal truth can only be attributed to a very small number, as a rule, banal statements. As examples of eternal truths, suggestions usually appear, which are a statement of fact, for example:" Napoleon died on May 5, 1821. "Or the speed of light in vacuum is 300,000 KM / s. However, attempts to apply the concept of absolute truth to the more significant provisions of science, for example, to the laws are unsuccessful.

Thus, a peculiar dilemma arises: if the absolute truth is considered as absolutely complete and accurate knowledge, it lies beyond the limits of real scientific knowledge; If it is considered as a totality of eternal truths, the concept of absolute truth is not applicable to the most fundamental types of scientific knowledge. This dilemma is the result of a one-sided approach to the problem that is expressed in the fact that the absolute truth is identified with the type of knowledge separate from relative truth. The Referrant of the concept of "Absolute Truth" is revealed only in the process of developing scientific knowledge. It is that in the transition of scientific knowledge from stage to a step, for example, from one theory to another, the old knowledge is not completely discarded, and in one or another form is included in the system of new knowledge. It is this inclusion, continuity characterizing the truth as a process, and constitutes the content of the concept of absolute truth. Absolute true - This is not an eternal truth, moving from one level of knowledge to another, and the property of objective and true knowledge, which is what knowledge is never discarded. This kind of knowledge always performs the prerequisite of deeper and fundamental truths. Absolute truth manifests itself in growing knowledge.

I will try to explain all this on the example. For the first time a hypothesis that matter consists of atoms, expressed Democritus. He assumed that atoms are something like indivisible elastic balls. Even in this, the elements of absolute truth were very relative for its truth. This statement: "Matter atoms really exist." All subsequent development of physics did not cancel and will not cancel this element of absolute truth. But in this relative truth there were elements of delusion, such as the idea of \u200b\u200bthe indivisibility of an atom, an idea of \u200b\u200bit as an elastic solid, etc.

The new picture of the building of the atom was created D. ThomsonAccording to which it consists of positive and negatively charged electrons. In this also relative to the true picture of the structure of the atom, it is impossible not to notice the new elements of the absolute truth, which the subsequent discoveries were not shakeped or canceled. This statement: "Atom consists of positive and negatively charged particles." But in the Thomson model there were many elements of delusion that were not confirmed by the subsequent development of science. Such, for example, the assumption of the existence in the atom of positive electrons.

Third stage of development of ideas about atom - model Rezneford-BoraAccording to which an atom consists of an atomic nucleus and electrons rotating around it. In this model, it is generally more accurate than previous, there were new elements of absolute truth. These moments were: the representations of small sizes of the nucleus and electrons relatively to the size of an atom, about the radiation of the light as a result of the electron transition from one energy level to another, etc. To cancel these statements, the subsequent development of science cannot, since they absolutely displayed certain parties Atom structure. But in the theory of boron contained elements of error. For example, borrowed from classical mechanics an idea of \u200b\u200belectrons as soon as particles are very inaccurate and therefore in a certain sense is also incorrect. The Bohr himself from this presentation willingly refused, as soon as quantum mechanics were created.

The picture of the atom in today's physics is incomparably more accurate and full than in the theory of boron, and therefore it contains more elements of absolute truth. But there is no doubt that the modern picture of the atom will change, refer to, specifying that it will be found in subsequent inaccuracies and elements of delusion, which we do not know today.

I want to summarize the said. The relative and absolute moments in truth are inextricably interrelated: on the one hand, in the relative truth there are always elements of the truth of the absolute (private), on the other hand, in the process of the development of human knowledge from the truths of relative, the absolute (general) truth is formed.

Scientific true.

Scientific truth is knowledge that meets the requirements of a twofold order: first, it corresponds to reality; Secondly, it satisfies a number of criteria for scientific relations. From all the criteria, I would allocate: logical harmony, empirical verifiability, including time check, the ability to predict on the basis of these knowledge new facts, consistency of the knowledge, whose truth is established, etc.

These criteria, of course, should not be considered as something unchanged and once the forever. They are a product of the historical development of science and in the future they may change.

And finally, the most important criterion for the truth of knowledge is practice.

Practice as criterion truth.

One of the main reasons for the failures of modern philosophy to solve the problem of the criterion of truth is their initial installation that focuses on the possibility of solving this problem within the knowledge system. This setting can be formulated as follows. If we have a knowledge system applying to the objective world, then we can learn about its compliance with our subject, studying only the properties of the system itself. In contrast, Diamat claims that the specified problem cannot be solved in such a way, that is, without going beyond knowledge. This brilliant thought, throwing a new light on the problem of the criterion of truth, was first formulated by K. Marx in his "Theses about Feyerbach". K. Marx stressed that the question of whether human thinking is subject to substantive truth, cannot be resolved within the framework of the thinking itself. In science of this kind, prohibitions play an extremely important role. As examples, it is possible to indicate the impossibility of evoking the fifth postulate of the Euclide established by Lobachevsky; The impossibility of evidence of the consistency of the formal system of type of arithmetic in the framework of this system itself (Gedel's theorem), etc.

Neglecting such prohibitions leads not only to the useless search for evidence, but also to various pararalogism. Thus, attempts to proof the fifth postulate Evklid were associated with the fact that along with axioms, from which this postulate allegedly followed, assumptions equivalent to the fifth postulate itself were taken. But diamatic not only indicates how it is impossible to solve the problem of the truth criterion. At the same time he tells us how it can be solved. To do this, you need to go beyond the limits of knowledge and compare it with the original. The form of such an exit and comparison of knowledge with the object is the practice - the material activity of people.

If you try to give a brief characteristic function of practice as the criterion of truth, then I would do something like that. In practice, there is a material embodiment of knowledge that is subject to verification. At the same time, practice is an objective phenomenon belonging to the material world and functioning in accordance with its laws. This dual (Dual) nature of practice provides it with the role of the truth criterion: knowledge of the real world, embodied in practice, is controlled by the laws of this world.

Here you should highlight two points:

1. To establish the compliance of knowledge to the objective world, it is necessary match knowledge from samim objective mir. How to do it? In the gnoseological terms, the thought is opposite to its subject. It is an ideal design, an informational model of the object being studied. To compare the idea with the object, you need to make them one-order. This is achieved in the process of material incarnation of thinking in human practice. It is the practice that removes the gnoseological opposite of material and perfect. Human thinking is not a special ideal substance, cut off from matter. It is the property of matter (as, for example, the speed is the property of a rapid flying aircraft), which has the material forms of its expression. Such forms are language and practical activity. But between them there is a fundamental difference.

Knowledge in language form is not reduced to the material embodiment. It only acts as the material code of the ideal content - mental objects that will be represented by the objects of the material world. Completely different is the material embodiment of knowledge in practice. Here, the material acts no longer as a code that fixes the perfect content, but as the implementation of this content. Essentially, knowledge here loses the status of an ideal phenomenon. It becomes the phenomenon of the material world. Technical and technological procedures of human activity are becoming the main form that realizes knowledge.

2. Practiceincluded in the system in the system of interaction with the objective world, itself turns out subordinate law of this interaction. This circumstance determines the possibility of practicing the criterion of truth. Being, on the one hand, the incarnation of knowledge about the material world, and on the other, part of this world, subordinate to his laws, the practice of its functioning itself carries out the truth of knowledge. If a person in his knowledge correctly expressed the essence of the laws of the real world and built its activities in accordance with these laws, the practice as an objective process controlled by these laws turns out to be effective.

Its effectiveness manifests itself in the fact that it is carried out in accordance with the perfect plan and implements this plan. On the contrary, if human representations do not comply with the laws of the objective world and if practical activities are built in accordance with these ideas, the laws of the objective world will make the practice of ineffective - ineffective in the sense that it will not be able to implement the perfect plan. Roughly speaking, if the plane built in accordance with the theory of aerodynamics and the conversion - flies, then we can make a conclusion about the truth of these knowledge.

And one more thing. Agnostica They argue that a person will never be able to know the actual structure of the world, for he (man) is only a matter of sensory experience, but not with an objective world itself. B. Russell wrote in his book "Human knowledge, his sphere and borders": "I do not know the tables and chairs directly, but only certain actions that they produce in me." He repeated almost literally Yumawho reasoned something like that. All that I have is sensual perceptions, and where these sensual perceptions appeared, I do not know and I can not know. Perhaps, things are hiding behind sensual perceptions, as materialists assure. But the other is possible: these perceptions excites God in me, as idealists assure. This argument may seem invulnerable. Indeed, a person is doomed to deal only with the world given to him in sensations. Therefore, his knowledge, it would seem, can relate not to the objective world, but only to sensory experience. However, a person does not just contemplates the outside world. With its activities in which his knowledge of the world is embodied, he "enters" the objective world becomes part of the latter. And the laws of this world control the correctness of his ideas about the world, on the basis of which its activities are built. It is the fact that for all his long history, a person managed to adapt to the outside world, to survive in the struggle for existence, to survive biologically, indicates the correctness of the ideas made by him. This assessment was made by the laws of the outside world and to get it a person could only through his material activity - practice.

The most famous definition of truth was expressed by Aristotle and later accepted by the Foma Akvinsky. Conformitas Seu Adaequatio Intentionalis Intellectus Cum Re is the intentional consent of intelligence with a real thing or compliance with it. In other words, the thought is called true (or truth), if it matches its subject. Such an interpretation is called the "classical concept of truth" (or the "theory of correspondence", from the English correSpondence state).
In the course of the development of philosophy and science, this understanding caused a number of issues and disagreements. In the philosophy of Marxism, they allocate absolute and relative truth, while the first is familiar with the sum of the second. At the end of the 19th century, Ch. Pierce and J. Duuri identified the truth with the utility (philosophy of pragmatism). In their opinion, truly what is useful and brings success.
During the classic science, scientists tried to find universal foundations of knowledge that do not cause any doubts. The dominant system was a mechanistic picture of the world. The ideal of science was understood as a mathematically built model, and the geometry of Euclid was served as a real model.
The principles of mechanics were used not only in natural, but also in socio-humanitarian sciences. The work of Benedict Spinoza "Ethics" devoted to the problems of human freedom is built on a mathematical model. Using the geometric system of evidence (theorems, lemmas), the author postulates the idea that everything that happens in the world has the cause in God.
As data accumulates, it became clear that there are patterns inherent in specific science (biology, chemistry, etc.). Mechanism explains not all. There is a transition to disciplinary-organized science. Moreover, the emergence of a new empirical material gradually discredits existing ideas about certain phenomena, the question arises to create a new theory, which is questioning the idea of \u200b\u200bthe only possible description of the truth.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, as part of the philosophy of logical positivism, the question arose about finding a reliable basis for scientific knowledge. According to the concept of philosophers of this direction, "... reality is a set of states in the world around the world. Such states (properties) can be empirically detected and expressed in elementary atomic proposals that were called "protocol offers" "[philosophy: textbook / ed. A.F. Zotov, V.V. Mironova, A.B. Rasin .- 2nd ed., Pererab. and additional - M.: Academic Project; Tricst, 2004. -s. 629]. The combination of such proposals, according to positivists, is a reliable basis for scientific knowledge. Get it can be based on observation and experiment.
Positivists also highlighted the theoretical level of knowledge formed by induction and hypotheses. Both of these levels (theoretical and empirical) are scientific theory. The investigations, logically derived from general theoretical provisions, were checked by experience. The more the theoretical explanation has received empirical confirmations, the more reasonable and scientific it was considered. This method was called the principle of verification and turned into a criterion for the demarcation of science and non-science in logical positivism.
His failure was that verification is not possible in all areas of scientific knowledge (mathematics, socio-humanitarian sciences). It has become not always available with the advent of complex equipment. For example, to check the data obtained from the collision of the particles on the administrative collider, it is necessary to build its own icon collider, etc. Moreover, the question arose about how much evidence is necessary in order to conclude that the theory is true. According to the principle of verification, the statement "All metals - electrically conductive" will be true if each of the metals possesses this property. However, in this case, the amount of metals is the final and verification is possible. An example of an inverse situation can serve as a famous white swan theory. For a long time, there was an opinion that all swans are white, while in 1697, the expedition of Villem de Velmman did not find a black population in Western Australia.
This problem was tried to solve the philosopher and sociologist Karl Popper. Since often scientific theories relate to an infinite or low-investment in the subject area, to establish a common statement that can be much easier than to look for the entire set of confirmation facts. To do this, you need to find only one example, contrary to the general theory. According to the popper, scientific knowledge is a description of nature, strive to become true, but this goal cannot be achieved, from its point of view the criterion of scientific truth does not exist.
Popper offers to replace the verification principle by the principle of falsification. The theory requires no rationale for empirical facts, but checks and refutations with their help. According to this principle, each scientific generalization is potentially falsified. At the same time, the more attempts to refute it, all the more stable is the theory, the more it retains the status of the temporary scientific truth. If the approval has not regained checks, it should be resolutely discarding. Actions on its salvation lead to dogmatism and rehabilitation of false theories, the philosopher believes.
The principle nominated by K. Popper is rather normative in nature, in reality, the scientist, faced with empirical refutations, will not refuse his theory, and will rather look for the cause of the conflict of empirical and theoretical levels. Will look for the possibility of changing some parameters, save theory.
Thomas Kun is an American historian and a philosopher - creates the concept of philosophy of science, not cut off from scientific and social reality in a historical and modern context. The key concept in his philosophy is the concept of "paradigm". The carrier and developer of the scientific paradigm is the scientific community. "Paradigm is something that unites the members of the scientific community, and, on the contrary, the scientific community consists of people recognizing the paradigm" [Kun T. Structure of scientific revolutions. - 2 ed. - M., 1977.- P. 229].
Anyway, in the process of accumulating a new knowledge, data appear contrary to existing ideas. When too much accumulates, the need to create a new theory arises. Such a process Thomas Kun called the scientific revolution. If it is necessary to revise the fundamental foundations of scientific knowledge, a global scientific revolution occurs or a change in scientific paradigms.
At the same time, the old theory never ceases to exist. It can be used to explain some phenomena in those spheres of reality in which it is acceptable. Newtonian mechanics are still studying at school, although the most reliable is the theory of the relativity of Enstein. The fact is that Newton's mechanics still works, but only at low speeds.
From this point of view, scientific truth is conventional. Physics Aristotle argued that heavy items are striving down, and it was the truth. 300 years ago, it was replaced by the Newtonian world of world gravity; And at the beginning of the twentieth century Einstein found out that the bodies slide on the geodesic lines of space-time. And it also became a new truth.

Thus, the scientific truth is an explanation of reality, the most suggestive scientific community in a particular time interval. Member of the Commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences to combat Lzhenauku and the falsification of scientific research Alexander Sergeyev in his work "The problem of practical demarcation of science and lzhenayuki on the Russian scientific field" uses the term "scientific minstream". Scientific postulates may be questioned. In the event of new data, scientific theories are revised, and sometimes the foundation of the whole science is revised.

There is a lawsager question, if there is no absolute truth, and there is a total agreement of a certain group of people, why should we have a credibility of science?
According to the Polish sociologist Peter Tomptov, confidence is always associated with the uncertainty about the future. If our forecasts were always performed, it would lose meaning. "Trust is a pledge made for future unsure of other people" [Tychka P. Trust - the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 80].
"Trust is confidence plus-based actions based on it, and not just confidence itself. Trust is a concept of an active discourse. Trust is a special, human platform into an unknown future world, in which other people play a central role. "[Uzmka P. Trust - the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 82].

Who do we believe, speaking of confidence in science?
Trust always belongs to human, humanitarian, and not a natural discourse. In other words, it can be rendered to a person or a group of people, and not an impersonal subject. Relying on the technique, for example, in fact, we have confidence in those people who invented it, checked experimentally, and also observed all security measures when assembling and installation.
"Trusting knowledge, we ultimately believe the actions of scientists who have committed some discoveries (we believe that they were seriously true, conscientious, self-critical, had evidence confirming their allegations, and reasoned in accordance with the principles logic). We also provide confidence in the scientific methodology: a certain procedure, a method for creating knowledge, which is considered the best among others (such as revelation, intuition and faith). But here again, what we eventually believe is the actions of the researchers (which they conducted research professionally, scrupulously, in accordance with the evidence adopted standards, using the most modern methodologies) "- the umbrellas - the basis of society . - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 392].
"Confidence in science can be reduced to trust in the actions of scientists: researchers and organizers of scientific life, which together create a scientific environment" [Uzmka P. Trust is the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 393].
Let's call several reasons why we can trust the scientific community.

1. Practical effectiveness.
It is difficult to argue with the fact that scientific achievements significantly changed our world over the past century. It is thanks to science that the average life expectancy has increased, high-tech means of transport appeared, the speed of communications has increased significantly, etc. Science works, and the evidence of this can be seen everywhere.
At the same time, the main goal of science has always been the knowledge of reality, and not an applied application of knowledge. As the umbrellas notes, the trust is always referred to not only "to a specific person (and trusts c), but also to a certain action (and believes that in will do x)" [Uzkodka P. Trust is the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 393]. In the event of science, X is the desire for the truth. It is logical to conclude that something that truly can have practical application, while there will be no such application that is false. And, despite the fact that the absolute truth in science does not exist, the laws that help to explain the reality (albeit temporarily) and make predictions, have widespread practical application and convert our world. Consequently, if science does not know the absolute truth, then at least she strives for her and successfully proves it.

2. Scientific ethics.
Until the twentieth century, scientific ethics remained at height. To a large extent, it is the heiress of the British Gentelmen Society (XVII-XIX centuries). At that time, a number of wealthy and educated people were interested in this or that scientific area. It was still possible to achieve serious success on the scientific field at this time alone. "The motifs of gentleman's honor were transformed into a special kind of scrupulousness, which became the foundation of scientific ethics" [Sergeev A. The problem of the practical demarcation of science and lzhenayuki on the Russian scientific field. URL: http://klnran.ru/2015/10/demarcation/.]. The pledge of adherence to ethical norms was the social position of the scientist, from which his well-being directly depended.
R. Motton allocates 4 main norms of scientific ethics. The rate of versatility requires that science be objective. The approval of the scientist should not depend on personal or public attributes (racial, nationality, religion, class, etc.) The norm of community postulates the idea that scientific knowledge is public domain, and not the personal property of the author. The rate of unconscious requires a refusal to personal satisfaction from the opening of the "Truth" in favor of the external interests of the whole society. The fourth norm (organized skepticism) requires an impartial analysis from the standpoint of empirical and logical criteria. Each work is subject to critical analysis by other scientists.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, big money came to science, and the former mechanisms of ethical regulation stopped working. This served as one of the reasons for the appearance of Lzhenayuki. Gradually, ethical regulation began to move into a legal plane. In Russia, such a transition is noticeably discharged, which is probably due to the fact that we have long been not subject to commercial pressure.
The above-mentioned norms of scientific ethics relate to more extent, by the period of the so-called "academic" science (XVII - 2nd half of the twentieth century). "In the period of" Packageded Science ", we are witnessing erosion of confidence. The question arises: why? We see the reason that the norms of the scientific ethics of Merton cost or subjected to weakening, and the recognition of achievements from other scientists is no longer for the researcher the main award. Five changes that have recently occurred in science as institutions and as a scientific community "[Utrate P. Trust - the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 404].

1. Fiscalization of science. The search for funds on expensive research leads to the dependence of science from external authorities, which harms the norm of universalism.
2. Privatization of science. The exceptional rights of using the results of scientific knowledge contradicts the norm of Mrthon's generality.
3. Commercialization of science. "Changes taking place in this direction undermine the conditions of unattended and organized skepticism of MERTON" [Uzmka P. Trust - the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 405].
4. Bureaucratism of science. Researchers dedicate a mass of time to classes that are not related to scientific and creative activities (cost planning, reporting, writing projects, etc.).
5. Reducing the exclusivity and autonomy of the scientific community. "The gate of the" Elephant Tower "opens, the flow of people begins in both directions. Politicians, administrators, marketing experts, lobbyists penetrate the scientific community, and all of them are guided by interest and values \u200b\u200bthat differ from the disinterested aspiration for the truth. Conversely, scientists leave the scientific community and take the role of politicians, administrators and managers. They use their academic qualifications in political struggle or marketing, thus undermining the prestige of science and their authority as scientists. The rate of unmaturity and universalism of Merton is suspended "[Uzkodka P. Trust - the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 405, 406].
However, despite the indicated changes, the ideals of academic science did not lose their relevance and still serve as a moral landmark for scientists. The bases of classical science are more utopic, but no one denies the need for aspiration to ideal. In some countries, ethical regulation gradually began to move into a legal plane.

3. Science self-regulatory
The unity of scientific knowledge is a scientific article, in a scientific journal it is quite difficult to publish unreliable information. Articles applying for publication are a thorough check, while the author is usually not familiar with the reviewers. They, in turn, being experts in a particular area of \u200b\u200bscience, check the correctness of the studies performed by the author. Of course, at this stage it is difficult to take into account all the nuances, and unreliable data can be published. If the study is not very important, most likely, on this everything will end. Otherwise, a much larger number of scientists will pay attention to it than two or three people (reviewers). Having revealing methodological or other errors, they will turn to the editor. If the article recognizes unreliable, it will remain in the magazine marked retracted and reference to the analysis and explanation of errors. The article may also not to withdraw, and add references to critical analysis.
There are situations when in different studies of the same topic turned out not quite the same results. In such cases, a more reliable source of systematic reviews (metaanalyzes) - "work, the authors of which are collected in a bunch of 50 studies of the same problem and formulate general conclusions" [Kazantseva A. On the Internet, someone is wrong! Scientific research of controversial issues. - M: Corpus, 2016. - P. 226].

Trust in science is necessary within the community. A scientist is often a specialist of a narrow orientation, while many significant discoveries are made in adjacent areas. No one is able to check all studies conducted by others, which leads to the need to take the results on faith. Proof of ABC-hypothesis, proposed by the syncycles of Motezuki, takes several volumes and still not verified by anyone. Even if someone takes on this work and establish that the proof is true, there is a chance that this scientist will make a mistake. Pythagore's theorem was checked for thousands of years with different scientists and today no doubt.
The accumulation of knowledge is possible only when scientists trust their predecessors, says Merton. "If we were now starting everything from scratch, we would have to get fire to fire again and to invent the wheel" [Uzkomka P. Trust - the basis of society. - M: Logos, 2012. - P. 395].

Brief conclusions:
1. Scientific truth is an explanation of reality, the most suggestive scientific community in a particular time interval. Scientific postulates may be questioned. In the event of new data, scientific theories are revised, and sometimes the foundation of the whole science is revised.
2. Science has high practical efficiency, which increases the level of confidence in it.
3. The scientific community has developed a strategy for insurance against risks of falsification over many years.
4. The ideals of academic science did not lose their relevance and still serve as a moral guideline for scientists. The bases of classical science are more utopic, but no one denies the need for aspiration to ideal.

• Specialty of the WAK RF09.00.08
• Number of pages 177.

Chapter 1. The concept of scientific truth as a problem in modern philo Sofia.

§ 1. Problems of the classical concept of truth (p. 12 - 48)

§ 2. Comparative analysis of the "non-classical" concepts of scientific trustees (p. 49 - 86)

Chapter 2. The main aspects of scientific truth.

§ 1. Epistemological aspect (p. 87 16)

§ 2. Praxiological aspect (p. 11? -135)

§ 3. Axiology aspect (p. 136 - 153)

The dissertation (part of the author's abstract) on the topic "The concept of scientific truth: philosophical analysis"

The relevance of the topic of research is directly related to the situation in the domestic philosophy of science in the second half of the XX century. This provision can be described as the lag of scientific and philosophical reflection from continuous innovative changes in science. In particular, by about the 90s, the problem of scientific truth was often solved from the position of predetermined ideological presumptions. In the 80s - 90s, based on phallibrism (K. Popper) and relativism (T. Kun, P. Feyerabend, etc.) the criticism of the dogmatized theory of scientific knowledge is deployed. The tendency to eliminating the topic of truth from the problems of studies on the philosophy of science is gradually being developed, to the refusal of the model of progressive development of scientific knowledge, to eliminate the ideological value of the scientific search results. In this situation, a philosophical analysis of the phenomenon of scientific truth is relevant to identify its essential characteristics and finding the actual place of the concept of truth in the structure of scientific knowledge and scientific and philosophical reflection.

The degree of scientific developing the problem of scientific truth is very high, however, in the overwhelming majority of works of domestic and foreign authors, the same flaw is found overcome in this study. It should be noted that overcoming this shortage is of fundamental importance for an adequate understanding of not only the phenomenon of truth, but also the gnoseological and methodological problems as a whole. The disadvantage is that from the field of view of philosophers of science, applied theories were actually eliminated; Truth was understood almost exclusively as the theoretical representation of fragments of objective reality, i.e., was the quality of fundamental theory. In our opinion, the close connection of modern science with production requires a fundamentally different approach to the phenomenon of truth: analyzing the phenomenon of scientific truth, we must be aware of whether the truth of which theories is the object of our analysis.

Analysis of truth criteria should be proceed from this primary separation, and an analysis of the axiological aspect of scientific truth. So, if the test of fundamental theories for truth implies a variable number of dupiric and empirical criteria, then checking applied theories will be to analyze them for compliance with the criterion of pragmatic simplicity, in the verification experiment and production implementation. Also, the high ideological value of fundamental theories is hardly significant for theories of applied. Thus, we specified approach allows us to overcome one-sidedness of classical works on the philosophy of science.

Here it should also be noted that the criticism of the classical concept of truth in foreign literature was often incorrectly carried out: it was criticized in essence, this concept itself, but its weaker options. That is why the basic, i.e., the most developed, option of the classical concept of truth is revealed in this study.

The dissertation object is the phenomenon of scientific truth in the historical being of science and scientific and philosophical reflection. The phenomenon of scientific truth is analyzed, based on the system of its main aspects that make up the subject of the study.

The purpose of this dissertation study is the specification of the phenomenon of scientific truth in accordance with the specifics of the types of scientific theories and identify the nature of the ratio of the main aspects of scientific truth. The following tasks are formed in line with the goal: to analyze the scientific truth in the form of an adequate theoretical representation of the object of the study, i.e., in the form of a true fundamental theory.

Analyze the scientific truth in the form of a plan that anticipates further actions for the production of an object, i.e. in the form of a true applied theory.

To identify the characteristic features of the practice as the criterion of truth, given the specific features of modern science and the environmental situation.

Analyze the phenomenon of scientific truth from the point of view of its incomplete and social significance.

The scientific novelty of the results of the study consists in the peculiarities of the approach to the subject matter. For the first time on a number of essential features, options for the classical concept of truth are detected, although its heterogeneity at different stages of the development of scientific and philosophical knowledge is obvious. For the first time, a systemic analysis of the phenomenon of scientific truth is carried out, based on the three main aspects: epistemological, praxiological and axiological.

The results of the conducted studies are formulated in the following provisions endowered:

Historical and philosophical analysis showed that the basic version of the classical concept of truth is the option of semantic-model, evolutionary, with an indirect nature of the interaction of the subject and the object of knowledge. This option is most developed within the framework of the classical concept of truth and meets the specifics of the genesis and the formation of scientific knowledge.

For a number of applied theories, the definition of "Truth is the compliance of the knowledge of reality" should be replaced by the following: "The truth is the compliance of the implementation of the rational project", where the concept of implementation means the object produced in harmony with the theoretical plan.

The multiplicity of technological solutions of applied problems allows us to talk about the multiplicity of truth. In this case, the effective criterion for the selection of competing theories is not the degree of their approximation to reality, but economic and environmental expediency.

In the conditions of the environmental crisis, a change in the nature of practice as a criterion of truth becomes fundamental: the classical practice of transformation of the object is inferior to the Mrest practice of control over the object.

Truth, however, remains the dominant value of the scientific enterprise, while the value of survival should determine the specifics of the technical and technological implementation of scientific theories. At the same time, the main value of the fundamental theory is the value of the ideological value, and the main value of the applied theory is pragmatic.

It is shown that the interaction of the main aspects is a universal and necessary condition for the possibility of scientific truth in both fundamental and applied theories.

In general, the author of the dissertation research seeks to preserve the realistic interpretation of scientific knowledge, considering, however, the tool-sheet installation on the prediction of a significant scientific enterprise in connection with a change in the nature of practice noted in the fourth situation. The copyright position is thus close to empirical realism, according to which the objects of knowledge, data in the adopted species of empirical scientific research are recognized as real. Refusing to further concretize the nature of the known reality, the author, nevertheless, uses the concept of matter, staging (in Art. 35) that calling the reality of material, we put forward the provision in need of an experienced justification.

Used literature can be divided into three main groups. The first group consists of the abstracts of candidate and doctoral works, in one way or another affecting the problem of scientific truth. Among the candidate works are of interest to the dissertations R. X. Lukmanova "The problem of truth: epistemological and existential aspects" (1995). V.P. P. Pottskova "The potential truth of the scientific problem of as a developing knowledge system" (1992) and E. E. Krylova "The problem of truth in the context of humanization of science" (1992). Related from the doctoral works were the most significant studies of N. V. Ro-Zhina "Problems of objective reliability in Western philosophy" (1992), P. Kornev "The ideal concept of truth" (1997) and M. and; Bilalova "Diversity forms of the existence of truth in the total knowledge" (1991).

The second group consists of articles and monographs, devoted to both the problem of truth and other epistemological issues belonging to domestic authors. Part of the material on the problem of scientific truth was drawn from articles and monographic studies M. I. Bilalova, V. P. Vigina, D. P. Gorsky, S. N. Zharova, I. Tasa-Wine, S. B. Krymsky , E. A. Mamchur, Yu. K. Melville. L. A. Mikashih, N. V. Motroshilova, I. S. Zamsky, A. P. Ogurtsova, T. I. Oh-Zemman, M. N. Rutkevich, E. M. Chudinova and others. Among the research on various aspects of scientific knowledge, it is necessary to note the works of L. B. Bazhenova, A. S. Bogomolov, P. P. Gaydenko, D. P. Gorsky, A. F. Zotov, V. V. Ilina, V. A. Lectorec, S. F. Martynovich, I. P. Merkulova, L. A. Mikushina, I. S. Narh, A. A. Pekhenkina, V. S. Stepin, V. S. Shröreva and others.

The third group includes studies of foreign authors, such as the city of Bashl, J. Khangil, R. Karnap, A. Koire, T. Kun, I. Laka-Tos, E. Makh, X. Patnam, K. Popper, A. Poincare, R. Rorty, R. V. Sel-Lars, A. Tar, Art. Tulmin, P. Feyerabend, M. Heidegger, T. Hill, J. Holton, A. Shaff and others. The dissertations used the works of M. Born, V. Heisenberg, M. Planck and A. Einstein.

The dissertation study has a classic structure and consists of administration, two chapters, conclusion and literature of the used literature. The first chapter is called "The concept of scientific truth as a problem of modern philosophy" and represents a historical and philosophical study of options for the classical concept of truth, as well as a comparative analysis of the non-classical concepts of scientific truth, indicating the main, historically arising problems. The chapter contains two paragraphs.

Conclusion of dissertation on the topic "Philosophy of Science and Technology", Truff, Sergey Igorevich

Conclusion

The analysis carried out in this work shows that the concept of scientific truth, despite the close attention of researchers, does not have the required clarity. Many terms used by philosophers of science need a more thorough definition.

One of these "conceptual atoms" is the concept of "the classical concept of truth." Traditionally researchers, speaking about the classical concept of truth, did not conduct a tough separation between different options for this concept. However, since the latter, throughout the history of philosophy and science, developed (without changing its wording), we revealed, for a number of essential features, historically established options for the classical concept of truth, as well as its basic, i.e. The most developed option.

This option (semantic-model, evolutionary, with an indirect nature of the interaction of the subject and the object of knowledge), in our opinion, has not yet exhausted its capabilities and, in principle, remains the most significant for the theoretical science. At least, if we are talking about fundamental studies, the subject of which is objective, not changed by human activity, reality.

However, the error of researchers is just that the story of the truth, they rarely clarify, the truth of which theories they mean. So, the concept of "theory", in our opinion, should also be subjected to separation on the theory of fundamental and theory of applied. The fact that fundamental studies are aimed at representing (in semantic-model form) of natural objects, causes the preservation of the classical formulation of truth as a compliance of the knowledge of reality. There is, however, a number of studies that are applied. Some of them have purely pragmatic significance, since it is aimed at the work of unbelievable objects.

Think on: on the one hand, we have playback, and on the other - the work. Accordingly, the formulation of truth changes. If in the first case we set the correspondence of our knowledge of reality, then in the second case, we establish the compliance with our knowledge. The wording of truth changes: the truth is the compliance of the implementation of the rational project. Here you need several reservations. First, if the implementation will continue to interact with a natural organism or substance, then its (implementation) effectiveness will directly depend on the truth of our knowledge about this body or substance. In this case, as mentioned above, the classical formulation of truth is preserved. If the implementation will function within the "artificial" reality (for example, as a component of any mechanism, instrument, etc.), the modified wording is applied. Secondly, a rational project that anticipates the implementation may be based on the identified patterns of the natural world. In this case, the classical formulation is also saved. Hence, the modified wording of truth will be applicable to a rather narrow spectrum of technological solutions of an applied problem. In general, the classical formulation of truth as compliance of the knowledge of reality does not lose its dominant position.

Another thing is that in the process of our study it was found that we did not have a single absolute criterion of the truth of our conclusions about the world. That is why it is necessary to consider separately every specific case. So, when checking the theory for truth, we are talking about fundamental theories) We must take into account the following factors. First, we must consider the theory from the point of view of its simplicity (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic) and falsifier. Secondly, to identify its relationship with well-known facts and already proven theories. Thirdly, it is necessary to identify and experimentally check the consequences of the theory (i.e. its ability to predict new facts). And finally, fourthly, it is necessary to consider the possibility of an approximate to the experiment (with accuracy) of technical implementation. Conducting the requirements of the fourth point can be significantly stretched in time, and it must be considered. In addition, when choosing one of several alternative fundamental theories, the phenomenon of "moral aging" of theories becomes valid criterion.

Applied theories suggest a much less complex method of checking. First, they must have simplicity and, especially, pragmatic simplicity, i.e. Easily experimental verification. The latter must be held in the shortest possible time. Secondly, the test experiment should be initial to assume technical or technological implementation. At the same time, the accuracy of the test experiment should close as much as possible to the accuracy of the implementation. Further, since technological solutions of one or another problem may be somewhat, the selection criterion, which we called by ecological and economic feasibility, enter into force. Environmental feasibility means that: 1) the implementation of the theory is possible with minimal energy and raw materials costs; 2) Implementation is not able to disrupt the ecological balance. Economic feasibility, in turn, means that the implementation of the theory will not require significant investments. Here it is necessary to take into account that at present, environmental and economic feasibility can intervene in contradictions: what is economically appropriate, can simultaneously be environmentally unacceptable and vice versa. That is why in the conditions of the ecological crisis, the priority is environmental expediency. In principle, any implementation should be environmentally justified.

Based on the last remark, it is necessary to point out the importance of changing the value grounds of practice. If the inner goal of science is the achievement of truth, and the purpose of scientific (ie, experimental) practice is, in particular, the model reproduction of theoretical provisions, the goal of production practice should be not only the satisfaction of the needs of society through the implementation of theoretical provisions, but also ensuring human safety Life. Hence, the nature of the practice is also partially changing:

1) production and development fall under control environmental norms;

2) The practice of changing the object is supplanted by the practice of control over it.

Since the practice of control with the need is based on a comprehensive knowledge of the facility and includes the foresight of the changes in complex organized systems of objects, especially attention, in our opinion, should be given to the development of a general scientific picture of the world, which would combine knowledge about various levels of reality. This kind of picture of the world, of course, is needed not as true (and therefore mandatory for all) worldview, but as a mandatory determinant of further scientific search. That is, the general scientific picture of the world should be used inside the scientific enterprise, but not within society as a whole.

To organize everyday practice, in turn, it is enough to introduce a clear religious and ecological picture of the world. In principle, attempts to build this kind of painting of the world are already available, even if they do not take into account the extensive heritage of the Russian Sosmists.

Of course, one thing: at this time, the scientific enterprise has become extremely efficient and, therefore, it should not be imposed on him from the alien to him religious and philosophical and environmental norms. The goal of science is to find truth, which, due to its invariance, can be implemented in various ways. Therefore, strict control is necessary only in the area directly related to practice, applied research. Or even in the production area. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that a scientist, like everyone else (at the fair opinion of L. B. Bazhenova), a normal person is hardly inclined to destructive actions: no need to make additional measures to explain to him, which is good and that bad.

The synthesis of a general scientific picture of the world, in turn, is possible only if we clearly imagine the process of accumulating true knowledge. In this sense, neither relativistic nor phallibist positions are satisfied with us.

Thus, phallyabism suggests that true (and even plausible, i.e. relatively true) are only the last, the most common theories. Consequently, all previous theories are false and must be discarded. However, how to deal with theories that are final for a certain level of reality and can not be changed in the future? It is obvious that this kind of theory is absolutely true in relation to a strictly limited level of reality, while those descriptions that will be more common will have already been to another level of reality. Thus, absolutely true theories become special cases of relatively true, but more general theories. Of course, when moving from one level of reality to another, we get some jump, and when moving from one theory to another, more general, we also get some races, gap, gap. What, in fact, it was necessary to prove: the process of incrementing scientific knowledge turns out to be a dialectical process in which the gap is overcome by coverage. However, phallyabism, in our opinion, is more accurate represents the specified process, rather than relativism absoluting the gap.

The absolutization of the gap between the previous and new theories is divided into the progressive development of scientific knowledge on the aggregate of unrelated paradigms, each of which presents a special look at the nature of reality. Obviously, with a similar approach to the history of science, the progressive development of scientific knowledge is denied, since paradigm images of the world are equivalent, and we cannot say that at the current stage of development of science we know more about the world than you knew, for example, in the XVIII century. Using the argument X. Patnam, we pointed to the fallacy of this position.

Meanwhile, we do not deny the determination of the paradigm to choose from a researcher of the problem, research fields, etc. In the process of our analysis, we concluded that the fundamental problems are usually asked by the logic of the development of theories, in contrast to the problems of an applied nature defined by the practical activity of the person (more precisely, production and daily practice).

Further, since the progress of scientific knowledge exists, there is a final point of this progress - the absolute truth. We are forced to allow the notion of absolute truth, at least as a value that gives the meaningful of the work of the researcher. At the same time, the absolute truth in this case has nothing, as an absolutely true picture of the world. This definition is necessary to distinguish it from absolutely true results of local research. The absolute truth of the latter is guaranteed a strictly limited area of \u200b\u200btheir application, as well as the practical inappropriateness of further clarification of the values \u200b\u200bin them. Hence, cash, i.e. The specifically historical picture of the world will have only relative truth.

Since the final criterion for the truth of local research, according to many specialists, is the practice, our analysis stopped on this concept. Here, the concept of "social and historical practice" is subject to the "conceptual atom". For a start, we divided it into scientific and, conventionally speaking, production and daily. In the process of analyzing the selected types, we concluded that the truth of fundamental theories can be established only through accurate scientific practice, since the technical implementation, in the overwhelming number of cases, it turns out to be significantly rougher experimental model. The truth of the applied research, on the contrary, is usually established not only by the experiment: as mentioned above, the experiment is closest here to implementation. However, provided that scientific accuracy will continue to be implemented in everyday human experience, the technical implementation can be considered a valid criterion of truth. Thus, the concept of social and historical practice as the criterion of truth turns out to be too broad: 1) the technical implementation is effective only under the specified conditions (i.e., with the approximation of its accuracy to the accuracy of the experiment and according to the general level of development of production of experimental equipment), and 2 ) Casual practice at all can not be considered the criterion of truth.

We revealed several reasons why everyday practice cannot be considered a criterion of truth. First, everyday life is content with "approximate" knowledge. Secondly, everyday actions can be successful in the event that their base is a false theory.

The last remark is an effective argument against the Prag-Matist understanding of scientific theory. Having considered the scientific enterprise through the prism of an ordinary consciousness, pragmatism presented the theory as a regulator of everyday action. However, as it turned out, false theories not belonging to science can be not worse regulators. Not being "intra-scientific" philosophy, pragmatism, after all, rightly appreciated the significance of the scientific enterprise for society. For a mass person, scientific truth has, above all, pragmatic value, i.e. The ability to serve as a guide for action. In addition, for society as a whole, scientific truth is significant due to the fact that it is necessary, assimilated in the process of socialization, the standard.

For scientist, truth has not only regulatory value, i.e. The ability to serve as a benchmark for solving problems, but also ideological value. At the same time, the ideological value of scientific truth will be much more significant for realist, rather than for the instrumentalist. In our opinion, there is no confrontation between realism and instrumentalism: Rather, two of these images of science are complementary by each other. Thus, in the realism of the most valuable, it turns out to install on the production of a true picture of the world, and in instrumentalism - an installation on the prediction carried out, taking into account the data recorded in the picture of the world, and, at the same time, expanding the latter.

Finally, the consistent conclusion from the foregoing will be the statement that the concept of "truth" applied in relation to the relevant reality of scientific knowledge is necessary for the successful functioning of the scientific enterprise. First, the concept of "truth" is necessary as a methodological category, which records the special quality of our knowledge of some aspects of reality. Secondly, this concept is significantly as a value that makes sense not only activities, but, in some cases, the life of the researcher. Thirdly, "scientific truth" is a concept that does not allow the consciousness of the researcher to become an object of ideological and religious manipulations. Refusal to the concept of "truth", without being a threat to the everyday consciousness completely immersed in the "bellevation", can lead to the destruction of a clearly dividing the truth and a lie of the scientific spirit.

The foregoing proves that the interaction of three main aspects is a universal and necessary condition for the possibility of scientific truth in both fundamental and applied theories. Of course, due to the specificity of the type of County theory, the content of these aspects will vary.

The concept of analyzing the phenomenon of scientific truth, proposed in the dissertation study, as well as put forward provisions can be used as practical recommendations for the transformation of the scientific enterprise and human practical activity and as the methodological principles of further study of the phenomenon of scientific truth. Historical and philosophical and analytical components of this work can be used to develop training courses on the history of philosophy and philosophy of science.

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