Report on practice report on financial practice at the plant of the State Research and Production Center named after M. Khrunichev. Problems of the State Scientific and Practical Center named after m. in. khrunicheva: defective managers finish off russia

PO "Polet" (Omsk) is one of the largest industrial enterprises in Russia, which has been specializing in the production of rocket-space and aviation equipment for more than 65 years.

Production capacities, high qualifications of specialists, great scientific and technical potential, the use of advanced technologies of its time allowed PO "Polet" to make a significant contribution to the military-industrial complex of the country, and to become the only plant of the former Soviet Union, and then Russia, which produced and launch vehicles, and spacecraft, and super-powerful RD-170 engines, and aircraft of both military and civil aviation.

Today the enterprise has entered a new stage of development. On February 3, 2007, the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin signed a decree on the creation of a vertically integrated structure for the production of rocket-space and aviation equipment on the basis of the FSUE "GKNPTs named after M.V. Khrunichev", according to which the Center named after M.V. Khrunichev was joined by 4 enterprises of the rocket and space industry of Russia, including the Omsk Production Association "Polet".

As a result, the largest federal enterprise in Russia was formed, which also entered the top five world leaders in the field of space technologies.

At the end of 2007, the Polet production association became part of the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center (FSUE) as a branch.

In connection with the above, FSUE PO Polet was renamed into PO Polet, a branch of FSUE GKNPTs named after MV Khrunichev.

In connection with the reorganization at the enterprise, technical re-equipment began, high-tech types of production began to develop, new jobs were created, the financial and economic condition was stabilized and improved, the size of wages increased.

On the basis of the newly created structure, an exemplary center for the production of rocket-space and aviation equipment will appear, which has no analogues in Russia in terms of technological equipment and level of automation.

This will enable the enterprise to start producing a new generation of equipment: universal rocket modules of the Angara launch vehicle family, small spacecraft based on the Yakhta unified space platform, components and structures for Proton-M and Rokot launch vehicles. , as well as small aircraft. Also PA Polet will continue to provide spacecraft launches using the stock of Kosmos-3M launch vehicles. Production of PO "Polet" - a branch of FSUE "GKNPTs named after M.V. Khrunichev":

Space:

Launch vehicle "KOSMOS-3M". Designed for launching unmanned spacecraft for various purposes weighing up to 1500 kg into circular, elliptical and sun-synchronous orbits up to 1700 km high. Spacecraft are launched by the Kosmos-3M launch vehicle from the Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk test ranges (orbits with inclinations of 66.74.83.87.3 degrees and sun-synchronous orbits).

Spacecraft "HOPE". It is the main element of the international space search and rescue system "COSPAS-SARSAT", designed to determine the location of ships and aircraft in distress.

Spacecraft STERKH. Small spacecraft Sterkh of the Nadezhda-M space system. The device of the new generation ensures the development and more efficient use of the COSPAS-SARSAT system.

Spacecraft "UNIVERSITY". Explores near-earth space and participates in the implementation of applied and educational programs.

ANGARA launch vehicle. The Angara launch vehicle family is a new generation of launch vehicles based on a universal rocket module with oxygen-kerosene engines.

Aviation:

Aircraft range. Yak-9 fighter, IL-28 jet bomber, Tu-104 passenger jet aircraft, AN-3T light multipurpose aircraft, AN-70 transport aircraft, AN-74 multipurpose aircraft

Light multipurpose aircraft AN-3T. AN-3T is a light multipurpose aircraft developed by ANTK im. OK. Antonov (Kiev) and produced by FGUP PO Polet. Short take-off and landing (from 90 meters) allow the use of the aircraft.

An-3T on unequipped sites. This is one of the few aircraft of this class in the world that is allowed to fly with the selection of landing sites from the air in flat and hilly terrain.

An-3T is the only single-engine aircraft in the world that made a non-stop flight from the South Pole to the coast of Antarctica, covering a distance of 1800 km.

An-70 transport aircraft. Medium transport aircraft An-70-100 is designed for transportation on civil aviation air lines of various cargoes, including in containers and on pallets, self-propelled and non-self-propelled wheeled and tracked vehicles.

Multipurpose aircraft AN-74. Multipurpose aircraft for short take-off and landing for operation in any climatic conditions and geographic zones with the possibility of basing on unequipped sites.

Promising developments:

Light multipurpose five-seater short take-off and landing aircraft T-411 "AIST" is designed to transport passengers and cargo over a distance of 1200 km. The design of the aircraft allows you to quickly convert it for use as an ambulance, hydrometeorological reconnaissance and environmental monitoring aircraft, air taxi.

This interview with the employees of the Khrunichev State Scientific and Practical Center could be published in one media outlet, but did not succeed, since the director, Andrei Kalinovsky, hastily left the enterprise, having received a position in Roscosmos. The launches of the Proton-M carrier rockets have been successfully resumed after a one-year break. A new stage of financial recovery has begun.
But you need to know the history and essence, so I publish it here.

***
- When exactly (year) and from what event did the problems in the Khrunichev State Scientific and Practical Research Center begin? What preceded this? What was the reason for the need for these changes?

Financial problems began after the merger of several related enterprises as branches in 2007. They were aggravated by the accidents of 2013 and 2014, as a result of which it was decided to change the management and "improve" the enterprise ( I agree that the interview did not reveal the full causes and volumes of problems at the enterprise that had developed by 2014, including due to the mistakes of the previous management - approx. ).

"Recovered". No starts - no accidents. The new management was able to achieve the biggest break in launches (almost a year!) In the entire history of Proton flights.

Why did the employees of the center write in their appeal that, unlike the scientific community, employees of space enterprises cannot openly fight for the salvation of their enterprises? Why can't they openly?

Employees of enterprises in the rocket and space industry are bound by various regime restrictions concerning the non-disclosure of information constituting state or commercial secrets. The management also prohibited employees from criticizing his actions in the open press or official coverage of them by journalists. Thus, it became completely closed from criticism both from the inside and from the outside, presenting the situation only in a favorable light for itself.

LV "Proton-M"

- The Proton-M launch vehicle has not been flying for a year. Why?

The problems associated with the launch of the EchoStar-XXI spacecraft are mainly associated with two factors. Firstly, it is the suspension of production due to the ongoing process of reorganization of the plant in Moscow. The workshop is in the process of moving, the production of a number of components has been transferred to Omsk and Ust-Katav, where there were difficulties with its development. All this led to significant delays in the manufacturing process of the launch vehicle. Secondly, there are problems with engines for Proton, produced at VSW in Voronezh. They arose due to measures to optimize production, similar to those taking place in Moscow. As a result, as A. V. Kalinovskiy mentioned in his recent interview, in order to accelerate the launch, it was necessary to replace the rocket with a previously launched one that was not affected by the problem with the engines.

- The number of orders for launching satellites has decreased. Why? What can this lead to?

The number of orders dropped due to the reduction in missile production. Due to delays caused by problems with accidents and reorganization of production initiated by effective managers, the enterprise is now unable to produce 10-12 Protons annually. And if there is no product, then there is no demand for it. In 2016, we made only three launches. But earlier their number reached 12-14, of which commerce accounted for up to 8. Now, there are officially contracts for only 15 launches until 2023 (Kalinovsky's last interview), earlier this would have been enough only for 2 years of work.
(Note that the interview also did not disclose the detailed reasons for the decline in orders for launches of commercial spacecraft on the Proton-M, namely, a decrease in competitiveness due to poor statistics on accidents and an increase in insurance premiums (this is partly what led to a decrease in the cost of commercial launches on the LV “ Proton-M "in dollars, in an attempt to attract customers) - approx. )

The aggressive pricing policy of SpaceX had some influence on the number of orders, but only this year they will be able to break the launch records of the State Research and Production Space Center (12-14 launches). So far, they have had a fairly low rate of execution of orders, of which they have a lot. Therefore, our company had a good chance of luring some of the customers from the end of the queue to Musk, but they were missed due to the reorganization of production. If we kept the same pace of work, we could have made about 15 more commercial launches over the past three years, but the reforms prevented this.

If there are no orders, and accordingly, the volume of production decreases, then its cost begins to grow and prices will then have to either increase or work at a loss, including for government orders.

Three years have passed since the first launch of the new Angara rocket, and its flight tests will not be resumed in any way. Why?

This is due to the reorganization of the Angara production cycle initiated by the reformers. Previously, it was divided between Moscow and Omsk. In Omsk, the blocks of the first and second stage - URM-1 were to be produced, in Moscow - the block of the upper stage - URM-2, and the general assembly and testing of the rocket was to be carried out before being sent to the cosmodrome. Kalinovsky moved the entire production to Omsk, at the same time still producing its "concentration" there. The current plans provide for a 50% reduction in the area of ​​the production site in Omsk. Part of the equipment from Moscow was sent to Omsk, and new equipment was purchased, including imported ones. As a result of these relocations, the manufacture of "Angara" was suspended, which caused delays in testing. A big problem in Omsk is also the fact that there was a big break in the production of missiles before work on the "Angara" began there. Previously, light missiles of the Cosmos-3M class were produced there, but their production was curtailed in the early 90s and their launches were carried out from the remaining stocks. The continuity in personnel and experience was broken, local workers had to learn this anew, since the 90s greatly undermined the personnel and production potential of Polyot. For the full production cycle of "Angara" there is simply not a sufficient number of qualified specialists.

We have almost lost the ability to launch heavy satellites on the GSO, which poses a direct threat to Russia's defense capability. Please explain how?

The conduct of modern military operations is impossible without the provision of operational and reliable communications on a global scale, which is provided with the help of low-orbit communication systems and relay satellites in geostationary orbit. To ensure the required bandwidth of communication lines, they have to install powerful repeaters and antennas, so that their weight currently reaches several tons. The main means of launching them into the target orbit in the USSR was the "Proton-K" booster rocket with the "DM" upper stage, which was operated from the Baikonur cosmodrome. After the collapse of the USSR, he ended up on the territory of another state - Kazakhstan. Currently, Russia leases its territory, which costs more than $ 100 million annually. If relations with Kazakhstan deteriorate sharply, then Russia’s early withdrawal from Baikonur and the loss of the ability to quickly update its satellite constellation, both civil and military, in geostationary orbit, is extremely likely. Therefore, in the early 90s, the development of the "Angara" began, which was supposed to replace the "Proton", starting from the domestic territory and using non-toxic fuel components. Quite often I criticize it for the too northerly location of the cosmodrome, which is less profitable for launches to the GSO than the same Baikonur. But in the early 90s, the country simply did not have the money to build a new cosmodrome, and therefore had to use Plesetsk, which at that time was the most intensively used in the world - more satellites were launched from it than from Baikonur. True, later it turned out that there was no money not only for the creation of a new cosmodrome, but also for the revision of the existing one for the Angara, as well as for the development of the Angara itself, which is why it dragged on for many years. At present, due to prolonged flight tests and problems with the development of mass production in Omsk, it is far from replacing the Proton. And its launches, in turn, depend on the goodwill of Kazakhstan, which at one fine moment may end, for example, due to a change of power, which will jeopardize our space program. At the Vostochny cosmodrome, the construction of a launch complex for Angara should only begin, and given how much it was built for Soyuz, it is unlikely to be completed by 2021, as planned.

- Why did employees begin to leave the enterprise en masse?

This is mainly due to the activities to improve performance by effective managers. Because of them, the level of bureaucracy has sharply increased, the number of meetings held has increased significantly, and the higher the bosses, the more often they sit on them, only they still do not help the work.

The new wage system has led to the fact that it has become almost impossible to achieve the start of work before the release of official orders or to urgently correct the issued documentation - since the amount of the bonus depends precisely on the officially issued work. In fact, the activity comes down precisely to the official closure of the so-called. "Cards", and not to the actual work on the development of new technology or maintenance of the existing one. The opinion of specialists has practically ceased to be taken into account, they just do what they order, even if it goes against their many years of experience. A striking example of this is the new line of carriers based on Proton. Such developments are bad both in terms of technology and economic indicators, which is obvious for KB employees, but not for the Center's top managers. People began to feel a sense of shame for the results of their work, which does not contribute to an improvement in the psychological climate in the organization. Management acts as an irresistible spontaneous force in relation to employees, with which there is no way to fight by systemic means. The trade union organization defends their interests, but only up to certain limits - everyone remembers the dismissal of the director of the RKZ V.A. The court ruled this dismissal unlawful, but he did not succeed in returning to the enterprise and recovering in office. There is a similar example in KB. Its chief, Yu. O. Bakhvalov, was also dismissed due to disagreement with the position of the top management regarding the Angara-A5V missile. He expressed reasonable doubts about the possibility of its rapid creation. If even such high-ranking bosses are being fired, then what can we say about ordinary workers of the design bureau and the plant? In the created atmosphere of despondency of despair, people are either already looking for new jobs, or they are simply waiting to be offered to leave, since when they are reduced, they are offered three salaries, which is at least some, but money. Many experienced professionals who could still continue to work have retired, just not to engage in all this violence against the technology they created.

MLM "Science"

- Why are other employees being fired? How massive are these layoffs?

Dismissals in the language of managers is called “headcount optimization”. This is partly due to the abandonment of further work on the creation of modules for orbital stations and satellites, which led to the re-profiling and reduction of the corresponding units, in part with a reduction in the volume of activities carried out at the Moscow production site. For example, a course was taken to eliminate the test base located there, since the corps occupied by it are located on the territory intended for release. To build it on the remaining territory from scratch, taking into account the extremely specific requirements for the premises where the stands for testing launch vehicles, booster blocks and fairings should be located, is extremely expensive. As a result, that part of the tests that were carried out at the enterprise during the development and operation of rocket technology will need to be ordered from other organizations, which will have to pay a lot of money for this.

Often the volume of staff reductions is associated with the uncritical transfer of Western production methods to our realities. The organizational structure of aerospace enterprises in Russia and the United States has certain differences that do not allow direct comparisons of their labor productivity. However, there are no such barriers for graduates of foreign business schools, and therefore they are ready to cut just for the sake of layoffs. Of course, there is an obstacle in their way in the form of a labor code and collective agreements, which limit the number of redundant employees. Therefore, at the enterprises of the Center such conditions are created that employees are encouraged to leave at their own request. Only because of the crisis there are not very many such people. There are fewer and fewer jobs in the field of work for employees of space enterprises, since "optimization" takes place not only in TsiKh, but also in RSC Energia im. SP Korolev and NPO them. SA Lavochkin, and therefore they have to look for work mainly in related industries.

The total number of employees of the Center decreased from 2014 to 2016 by 6 thousand people, from 33 to 27 thousand, that is, by about 20%. A significant part of their redundancies falls on the Moscow plant, moreover, a significant part of the workers there are taken out of the "idle" state, that is, they receive 2/3 of their salary by being present at the workplace and not doing any work, since there is no work. - for reducing the number of launches and transferring part of the production facilities to Omsk and Ust-Katav. They are not yet eager to quit, although they are already being offered 5 salaries for leaving "by agreement of the parties". The situation with industrial enterprises in Moscow is getting worse and worse, greedy developers continue to survive, and therefore it is extremely difficult to find a new job. All this leads to a loss of qualifications and demotivation of employees, which, as a result, can have a sad effect on the accident rate of the Center's products.

Please tell us about the financial recovery program? What is it, what are its weaknesses? Are there strong ones?

It consists in the reorganization of serial production and the transfer of design to new principles. The main reason for the enterprise's losses is the ineffective organization of production and surplus territories of the Center's enterprises. As a means of solving this problem, their radical reorganization was proposed. The experts immediately raised doubts about the volume and timing of the reorganization: such large-scale changes could stop the existing production, which ultimately happened. The work did not work out on the new principles - the program was drawn up in a hurry and without reference to the specifics of the enterprise. Well, what else could you expect from a plan drawn up in two months by people who had not previously been involved in the production of missiles? By the way, A. V. Kalinovskiy also did not show himself in the old place - the plant for the production of "Superdets" did not reach the planned figure of 60 aircraft per year. Its maximum was reached in the year of Kalinovsky's departure and amounted to only 37 cars, which, moreover, later required a long-term refinement for delivery to the customer. We received volumes only at the expense of quality. Then the output immediately dropped to about 20 cars, with a slight increase in quality. For rockets, such a drop in quality is unacceptable - they are disposable and cannot make an emergency landing for repair, the consequences of quality problems are fatal for them.

Please, tell us how and why (as explained by the management) production in Moscow and Omsk is being rebuilt? What are their official and informal goals?

A common feature of the restructuring of production in Moscow and Omsk is territorial concentration. And there, and there, the area occupied by production premises is minimized. The official goal of this minimization is production optimization (reducing the paths traveled by parts between workshops, increasing equipment utilization, etc.), reducing the cost of maintaining the territory (utilities) and the tax burden. There are big problems with the justification of these cuts - the technologists have raised a lot of questions about such cuts in areas, but nobody listened to their opinion, that's why we have the current state of production.

Moreover, plans to reduce the territory in Moscow were revised and the share of the released territory was increased to from 63 to 80%, that is, the remaining share was almost halved. On this stub it is difficult to talk about any production in general, there is simply not enough space, the equipment simply will not fit.

The team has long had an established opinion about the true goals of this restructuring, namely, to increase the amount of territory suitable for development, even if this is detrimental to national security and the current activities of the enterprise. Reformers are associated with developers, and for them construction on the territory of the enterprise is an end in itself. After all, they are even ready to build up areas in Omsk, which will bring less money than Moscow ones. But they are ready to put everything under the knife for this penny.

- Please, tell us about the situation with "Proton": what has changed in the scheme of its production?

At the time of moving the workshops, the manufacture of some of its components was transferred to the branches - Omsk and Ust-Katav. Moreover, in Ust-Katava, the production of certain types of components was also concentrated for all enterprises belonging to the State Research and Production Center. Moreover, they were not previously produced there, and the transfer of production itself leads to an increase in transport costs for moving between enterprises.

As a result of the changes, the production of "Proton" practically stopped, and instead of the growth of labor productivity promised by the new management, it fell, if we measure it in the products actually manufactured and delivered to the customer.

- Cancellation of allowances and recalculation of salaries: how exactly did this happen, who did it affect and what did it lead to?

The new management decided to measure labor productivity in the way it was accustomed to in the old place. A. V. Kalinovsky did not have to lead the development of technology, and therefore he applies the same approach to them as to the workers of mass production. This approach does not take into account the specifics of design work and actually leads to demotivation of employees.

At first they were divided into two categories: some received a weakly variable premium, others a strong one. This division took place depending on the functions performed by the departments. The second category now received an award, varying greatly depending on the percentage of formally completed work. Earlier, when the Center was still functioning normally, the bonus practically did not depend on how the activity was going - there were launches, there were no - they received on average 20 to 30% of the salary. Now it, too, has little to do with reality, unless, of course, the unit is directly related to servicing launches. The reduction in travel allowances also affected the incomes of employees working at the cosmodrome. Officially, the reason for this is the formation of the Customs Union, which served as the basis for reducing travel allowances in Kazakhstan (calculated in US dollars, for travel abroad) to the level allocated for travel in Russia (of course, in rubles). Taking into account the growth of the dollar, this gave them a tangible decline. As a result, many of those who were employed at the cosmodrome quit.

The work performed, for calculating the bonus, is measured in conventional units - standard hours, which have long since broken away from physical ones. Their number, received by a particular department, depends both on the general fund allocated for the work, and on the penetrating abilities of the department's management, the ability to prove the necessity of their work. As a result, before the introduction of the new wage system, there was a large imbalance in the distribution of these standard hours: on average, everything was fine in the hospital, but there were also those who had too many or too few of them. As a result, when these standard hours became money, it led to a significant stratification in wages. This motivated some to quit due to insufficient pay for their work.

MLM "Science"

Removal of the "Proton-M" LV from the "AsiaSat-9" spacecraft:

- Tell us about the Proton-light project. His weaknesses? The state of affairs today?

The official reason for the creation of "Proton-Light" was the desire to reduce costs when launching satellites with a lower mass. For this, it was proposed to reduce the number of steps and thereby obtain some savings. Only this alteration of the rocket requires additional tests and restructuring of production, which also requires certain costs. The whole question is, will they not be more than the resulting savings? After all, this will ultimately lead to a decrease in the production volumes of each modification, which means an increase in unit costs.

The first version of the "Proton-Light" required significant improvements: the second stage was excluded, and fuel was added to the first and third stages by increasing their tanks. In the case of the current third stage, this increase in fuel reserve was significant - by about 50%, which required a corresponding increase in the operating time of its engines. This required testing them for a new term of operation, and, if necessary, modernization in order for them to withstand it. It is also worth noting that the last two accidents were associated precisely with the third stage engine - in 2014 and 2015. So the cost of this modernization option was eventually assessed as too high and was abandoned.

But they did not give up the idea of ​​throwing out at least some step! Now it has been decided to exclude not the second, but the third stage. The second stage, like the first, will in fact remain without major changes, which will reduce the cost of revision. There are some doubts that, given the current state of production described above, the new rocket will be ready on time. Competitors won't wait.

On debts: why and how much have they grown? Where does the company get funding from? What does huge debts threaten him with?

For the sake of saving factories on the periphery, almost killed by the dashing 90s (salary delays, the departure of most of the employees, a small number of young people, etc.), they were included as branches in the State Research and Production Center. Their rehabilitation required large financial costs on the part of the Center, which were only partially compensated by the Government of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Center ended up with debts to suppliers, had to take loans and its activities became unprofitable.

The reformers took out loans secured by the territory, which the enterprise is unlikely to be able to repay on time because of the production problems they organized themselves.

Funding for the enterprise is carried out largely through loans received with the guarantee of the state corporation "Roscosmos" - in 2016 alone, it received them for 40 billion rubles. The total debt to banks is already 52.5 billion rubles. There is still a little more and it will owe approximately at the level of the "Superjet", which has repeatedly received funds to cover its debts from the state.

Read more about the implementation of land rights in the Filevskaya floodplain. Has the territory already been given for construction? How does this threaten the enterprise?

The territory has not yet been transferred for construction, and for several reasons. Firstly, it is the form of ownership of the enterprise. While GKNPTs them. MV Khrunicheva is a Federal State Unitary Enterprise, that is, a Federal State Unitary Enterprise, his land cannot be re-profiled. It will be possible to dispose of the territories only after its transformation into a joint-stock company as part of the state corporation Roscosmos, which will own 100% of the shares. This is hindered by the presence of unsettled claims with customers, the total volume of which is estimated at 10.5 billion rubles.

Secondly, the liberation of the territory itself is proceeding at a rate lower than originally planned. KB Salyut was to be one of the first to leave its old buildings, and initially it was generally about moving to a new location, outside the territory of the existing site. The work of some of the design bureau divisions requires constant visits to the workshops of the plant, the relocation would lead to unproductive losses of working time for travel between the two territories. Also, due to the restrictions associated with the secrecy regime, the new building must be owned by the enterprise and be equipped in a certain way for this. Such an office building costs billions of rubles, and therefore the move, which was once opposed by the director of RKZ V.A.Petrik, and for which he was fired, eventually moved into the future.

It was also not possible to completely transport the equipment to Omsk and Ust-Katav, which in some cases led to trips of blanks from Omsk to Moscow and back, since Omsk does not have the necessary equipment for a number of technological operations. The reduction in shop floor movement has resulted in thousands of kilometers of travel for parts. The buildings are still intact, many of them have already been disconnected from communications and mothballed, and the process of dismantling the equipment is underway.

- The case of Mikhail Ostroushenko: if possible, tell us what it is about.

Mikhail Ostroushenko previously worked with A. V. Kalinovsky in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and then, as a well-tested person, he was assigned to manage the Omsk PO Polet, where the entire production of Angara was transferred. The delays in the release of Angara as a result of the restructuring of production attracted the attention of the prosecutor's office and the FSB. The results of their inspections of economic activities at the enterprise served as a pretext for legal proceedings.

This entry was originally posted at

The official history of the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center is usually counted from April 30, 1916 (over 100 years), when the construction of a large plant of the Russo-Balt automobile company began in Moscow Fili

The Khrunichev State Space Research and Production Center was established in 1993 by merging two of the oldest Moscow enterprises in the space industry - the M.V. MV Khrunichev and the Salyut Design Bureau, located on a common territory in the bend of the Moskva River. At the same time, the fate of the enterprise, which received a new sign after the collapse of the USSR, turned out to be much more successful than that of many scientific and industrial centers during this turbulent time.

"Khrunichev" successfully survived the dashing 90s and, unlike many other enterprises in the aerospace industry, managed not only to survive, but to fit into the new conditions of market relations. There were too many people willing and the Soviet space heritage turned out to be too valuable for our new "friends" to let it sink into oblivion. At the first stage, the enterprise survived due to orders for the space program of friendly India (cryogenic upper stage 12KRB). Then came the contracts for the construction of modules for the ISS (International Space Station). And most importantly, the center was allowed to enter the international commercial services market with its products, namely, to launch spacecraft for foreign customers using the most reliable domestic launch vehicle "Proton-K"

Rocket Proton in a mounting case 92A-50
alexpgp

As a result, by the end of the 90s, the volume of orders received and the profit received was enough not only to preserve a unique team and capacities (from 8 to 12 launches were carried out per year), but also to develop some of the most necessary infrastructure. In particular, the complexes for the preparation of products at the Baikonur cosmodrome (the so-called 81st site and MIK 92A-50) were restored and refurbished. Upgraded conversion ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) for commercial launches ("Rokot"). A new upper stage "Briz-M" has been designed and manufactured. The old "workhorse" of the "Proton-K" LV enterprise was modernized into the "Proton-M" version with a new digital control system.

In addition, the center began to gradually enter markets previously uncharacteristic for the manufacture of small spacecraft for communication and remote sensing of the earth for the needs of domestic business and corporations. At the same time, the project of a launch vehicle to replace the aging Proton was developing slowly and difficult (due to scarce and episodic government funding). This was started back in 1995, the development of a new promising launch vehicle "Angara" of a modular type.

Conversion launch vehicle Rokot at the Plesetsk cosmodrome
mil.ru

If we are talking about the general vector, then the policy of the old leadership of the center was aimed at maximizing the preservation and loading of existing capacities. At the same time, this was often done by pulling resources and orders from other enterprises in the industry (the Briz-M upper stage competed with a similar product from NPO Energia - a series of DM blocks). Many may call this state of the enterprise quite successful, but from the point of view of the industry, it was rather a slow stagnation. Naturally, all the typical problems of the domestic industry of the post-Soviet period were present. This is a gradual aging and outflow of personnel, degradation of the production infrastructure (as mentioned above - with rare exceptions), the disappearance of suppliers of critical materials and components.

In this mode, the research and production center gradually turned into a "space cab", the entire scientific and engineering potential of which was used exclusively for solving current problems and "plugging holes." At the same time, competitors were already breathing in the back, namely European and Asian providers of launch services. The United States retained a separate market share, but the direction of commercial private astronautics developed by them was still in its infancy.

However, the potential of the enterprise, which remained since the times of the USSR, was generally preserved, and, if used intelligently enough, allowed, if necessary, to resume truly breakthrough projects in the space industry. These could be new (including reusable) carriers, space stations, interorbital tugs, heavy geostationary platforms. These and many similar projects were periodically worked out by the specialists of the center, but everything died at the level of draft designs and layouts (reusable stage "Baikal"). Such things did not arouse interest on the part of the country's new leadership. Until the second half of the 2000s.

Reusable stage Baikal
Quote "Morning of Russia" 2001. russia.tv

The appearance at this time of additional income from the increased oil prices (the peak fell in 2008) led to the fact that science-intensive industries and, in particular, space were again remembered. And this, unfortunately, played a cruel joke on the State Scientific and Practical Research Center. Under the upcoming epic tasks of the domestic cosmonautics, strikingly coinciding with the populist statements of the American presidents, other enterprises of the space and related industries began to join the center (as branches) for many years. This process started in 2007 and continued until 2011. In total, 10 branches were connected. It is clear that as a result, all their debts were paid by the State Committee for Scientific and Practical Research with the expectation of future state investments. Until some time, the financial viability of such a conglomerate was not in doubt. However, some problems began almost immediately. In addition to financial recovery, all new branches had to be loaded with work. Attempts were made to transfer to them from the Moscow site the manufacture of parts of the components and assemblies. As a result, the accident rate has sharply increased (since 2007, on average, every tenth launch has been unsuccessful).

Experts believe that the reason for the frequent accidents is not only a general degradation and a drop in discipline in the process of reorganization, but also the low quality of components produced "on the side". Branches, not accustomed to the tough requirements of the space industry, often drove outright substandard, which sometimes surpassed the incoming control already accustomed to a certain level of quality. At the same time, in the resulting confusion and in the process of the flow of funds, the possibility of financial violations appeared. Currently, several heads of branches and former heads of the center, as well as their deputies, are under investigation.

However, the problems did not end there. By 2014, it became clear that there would be no more money, as oil prices finally collapsed. And here, in conditions of a budget deficit, the center was asked to deal with the accumulated problems on its own. By this time, the company's operating debt amounted to more than 11.9 billion rubles, and debts to suppliers - 14.7 billion. For the minimum financial stabilization, the center already needed about 56.4 billion. ) was repaid by the state, the rest was allocated as a commercial loan by Vnesheconombank, Sberbank and Roskosmos. And not at all on the previously promised preferential terms.

Thus, the enterprise had to get out of the current situation at the expense of its own resources, including through the so-called "optimization of production activities."

As a result of the rash actions of the reformers and in connection with a sharp reduction in state funding by the end of 2014, a catastrophic situation arose in the Khrunichev State Research and Production Center.

As described at the end of the previous part of our article, the Khrunichev center had to get out of the financial and orgasmic crisis at the end of 2014 on its own. Instead of replenishing the resulting shortage of funds from Roscosmos, a new acting general director, Andrei Kalinovsky, who had previously been involved in the production of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 aircraft in Novosibirsk and in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, was appointed.

Within a short time, they were presented with a corresponding program of financial recovery.

The main source of the missing funds was the sale of more than 60% of the enterprise's territory (more than 100 hectares) in Moscow and the transfer of most of the technological operations to the Omsk Production Association Polet. First of all, this concerned the production of the promising "Angara" launch vehicle. In addition, it was planned to get rid of most of the "non-core" tasks (for example, small satellites and space station modules). Again, it was supposed to use the resources of existing branches and "outsourcing" to the maximum, having already purposefully given most of the technological chains there. In words, all this was done solely to reduce costs and increase labor productivity, as well as optimize the use of production areas and traffic flows. But the main thing is that in the end, again, expensive Moscow land was freed up, which was needed to pay off the accumulated loans.

A. Kalinovsky. Change is needed
Barbel Timofey © IA Krasnaya Vesna

It is clear that the "financial recovery" put at the forefront by a specialist who was not previously related to astronautics, very soon brought its sad results. "Effective management" was expressed in the final collapse of the Moscow site and a massive outflow of personnel from the center. At the same time, the transfer of production of the "Agara" launch vehicle to Omsk actually failed. The Angara-5 that departed at the end of 2014 was manufactured mainly by the efforts of Moscow specialists; attempts to manufacture the Angara on the basis of the Polet plant led to a failure. Due to the inability to provide the same quality. As a result, at the end of 2016, the prosecutor's office sent materials to the court on bringing the head of the Polet enterprise, Mikhail Ostroushenko, to administrative responsibility for disrupting the state defense order.

Reduction of areas, "optimization" of subcontractors and suppliers of components for the Proton-M rocket led to an almost complete stop of its production. So in 2016 only 3 launches were carried out, in 2017 only 4. As a result, in 2016, for the first time since 1999, Russia carried out fewer launches than the United States, and for the first time in history, fewer than China! Let's remind that earlier from 8 to 12 "Protons" were launched annually. At the same time, Kalinovsky's "aviation" approaches to the production of missiles caused only bewilderment among specialists. Requirements for massive design perfection, tightness and reliability for astronautics have always differed from those adopted in aviation. Not to mention the other serial production and the inevitable uneven production load. In addition, there was no understanding that very often a specialist in this field (worker or engineer) is a piece "product". For years, workers have been developing a peculiar attitude to the quality of the operations performed, constantly interacting with the engineering staff and controllers, and it is simply impossible to replace them with the first local “guest worker” they come across. And the transfer of knowledge from the older generation of engineers to young people in the context of reorganization and massive layoffs is also fraught with unexpected "failures."

Removal of "Angara-A5" to the launch site
mil.ru

The result of this relationship is not only the inability to produce high-quality components and products in the conditions of the newly-formed branches, but also the continuing sad story with the next module for the ISS "Nauka" (a former backup of the Zarya module launched in 1998). The timing of its preparation is annually disrupted due to contamination brought in during the finalization process. Why did the chips get into the fuel system, despite the fact that the technology of such operations has been worked out for years? Why weren't the appropriate specialists involved in the work by the new management? This can only be explained by the destruction of technological continuity and ties already within the enterprise itself. And although this happened even before the appointment of Andrei Kalinovsky as a leader, the "lesson" learned was not learned!

The second part of the GKNPTs, the Salyut Design Bureau, was also looted. The industrial part of the KB (pilot plant) was closed even before the start of the "rehabilitation" program. But under Andrei Kalinovsky, the laboratory and testing base in Moscow was finally liquidated, and the former territory of the design bureau has already been completely vacated for construction. At the same time, unique equipment was abandoned or decommissioned in empty rooms. Buildings with special foundations (for vibration testing) await their sad fate, and the few employees left after redundancies have been relocated to the territory of the serial plant. A plan was announced to create a so-called "Competence Center" from the remaining engineers. Questions on the development and implementation of new technologies, development work, control and testing of products from this "competence" have now definitely dropped out. The question of how long its remnants (competence) will last at least to carry out designer supervision of already manufactured products in conditions of mass reductions remains open.

Science Module (MLM)
nasa.gov

However, some of Andrei Kalinovsky's innovations can be called conditionally reasonable. This is the introduction of electronic accounting and planning of work performed and piecework payment for engineering and technical personnel. However, such automation often does not lead to an increase in labor productivity, but only complicates bureaucratic procedures. But "piecework" on the one hand made it possible to increase the salaries of some of the demanded specialists, but on the other hand, it increased the conflict between employees and departments. Some of the old specialists and departments performing routine work were put on starvation rations. In addition, constant reorganizations and relocations have significantly increased the outflow of experienced personnel. Additionally, most of the top and middle managers were dismissed, mainly due to disagreement with the ongoing "reforms", and instead of them, Kalinovsky's former associates in their previous jobs were appointed.

In connection with the new policy of the management, the number of contracts for the launch of Protons began to rapidly decrease. The stake was placed on the promising Angara, which was successfully tested in 2014.

However, already in 2016, it became clear to everyone that we would not see a new launch of this rocket (in the heavy modification "Angara-5") in the near future. Immediately, the center's management began to voice ideas about the uselessness, hopelessness and high cost of the ill-fated "Angara" and the creation of incomprehensible stubs from the old "Proton" named "Proton Light". And this is almost immediately after the previous statements about the earliest possible curtailment of the production of the "old" missile and the emasculation of the missile design bureau.

On June 27, 2017, Andrei Kalinovsky unexpectedly leaves his post and leaves for Roscosmos as the Executive Director for Quality Assurance and Reliability. Officially, there are reports about the high results achieved by the former director of the center in his previous post. The talk is about raising wages, reducing debt and the previously promised increase in labor productivity. Alexei Varochko, the former director and chief designer of the Motor Design Bureau (Motor specializes in ground equipment for rocket and space complexes), was appointed to the vacated position. Which almost immediately canceled all the innovations of the previous management in terms of reorganizing production at the Moscow site.

The arrival in June 2017 of the new General Director of the State Space Research and Production Center only led to a change in the management style, but did not change the general vector aimed at the gradual liquidation of the oldest enterprise in the space industry.

The new head of the Khrunichev center, Aleksey Varochko, as a whole, continues the policy of the previous leadership.

In November 2017, the corporatization of the former federal state unitary enterprise into a joint stock company was completed. And already in January 2018, Varochko announced that the center urgently needed additional financial support from the government in the amount of at least 30 billion rubles. Including for servicing the previous loan in the amount of 4.5 billion annually! This is the kind of "financial stabilization". At the same time, all plans for the sale of Khrunichev's land in Moscow and the complete transfer of production to Omsk are still in force. Additionally, the company is introducing strict measures to save on bonuses and salaries of employees. It was ordered to forget about the former "piecework". New reductions and reorganizations are planned with very vague prospects. It is too early to talk about them in detail, since the plans of the new leadership are constantly changing. However, it has already been announced that some of the branches (the Voronezh Mechanical Plant and the A. M. Isaev Design Bureau of Chemical Engineering) are to be separated from the center and transferred to NPO Energomash in May-June 2018. As for the ill-fated "Angara" - the date of the second launch of its heavy modification was named. Not earlier than 2022! After the first successful launch (in 2014), 8 years will have passed by that time. This is the price of transferring production from the Moscow site.

The first test launch of "Angara-A5"
mil.ru

It should be noted that almost immediately after the departure of Kalinovsky (July 2017), the leadership of Roscosmos also announced a sharp change in plans for Angara. The stake is now being placed on the supposedly cheaper and more promising Phoenix project (Soyuz-5 carrier). It is for him that all flight plans of the new manned spacecraft "Federation" are now being typeset. There is really one "but"! Soyuz-5 is in fact a deep modification of the good old Russian-Ukrainian Zenit, and all the savings come down to using the existing Zenit ground infrastructure at the Baikonur and Plesetsk cosmodromes. The Sea Launch, recently bought out by the Russian company S7, is also designed for it. At the same time, there is still no new manned rocket, and despite the existing groundwork, it still has to go through a full cycle from design to flight tests. Moreover, the use of the Zenit successor for manned launches will require not only a revision of many parameters of the rocket, but also the retrofitting of the existing SC for the respective purposes. So the declared cheapness (in comparison with the "Angara") in the final version may be very different from the one announced earlier. In addition, acquaintance with modern realities raises doubts that by 2022 (the estimated date of the start of the Federation's tests), the full readiness of the new rocket will be ensured. At the same time, as it was said, Angara is blamed not only for its high cost, but also for its “hopelessness”. Because the main assembly unit of the URM rocket (universal rocket module) was originally designed for small payloads (about two tons for "Angara-1.1"). Accordingly, even with a promising hydrogen booster, the maximum combination of such units in the Angara-5V configuration is limited to a payload within the range of 30-35 tons. Another thing is not yet created "Phoenix", very similar in size to "Falcon 9" and pulling according to the project up to 17 tons in a single-block version. It is stated that from its blocks it is possible to assemble a super-heavy carrier by analogy with the recently flown "Falcon Heavy" and even more. True, it is modestly silent that the "Zenith" start for such a modification was not originally designed. And in this case, savings on ground infrastructure for the future heavy carrier will obviously not work. At the same time, under the future foggy prospects of the Phoenix, they have already abandoned both the manned version of the Angara and the construction of a second launch complex for it at the Vostochny cosmodrome.

"Angara-A5" in the assembly and testing complex
Anrey Morgunov. mil.ru

A natural question arises related to such sharp turns in the policy of Roscosmos. What is the real reason for the sudden need to save money on one launch complex and to embark on less costly (only at the first stage!) Development of a new space project from scratch? Is the reason for the temporary financial difficulties of the state or the understanding that in the near future we will not see a new flying "Angara" anyway? In our opinion, it was solely due to the irresponsible actions of the previous management, who first brought a self-sufficient and quite successful enterprise to a financial hole, and then carried out rash "reforms" in order to compensate for their own mistakes and miscalculations. How else to explain why for the sake of a hypothetical "Phoenix" in the sky it was urgently necessary to strangle the titmouse "Angara" already in hand?

Or is it just an ordinary attempt to hide their own failures behind a smokescreen of new loud statements?

So, what do we have in the end.

At the beginning of the reforms - a stable and moderately developing company with a very good position in the international market of start-up services.

In the end - the destroyed production and scientific base, the almost lost ability to produce the old "Proton" and the disrupted production of the promising "Angara". In addition to this, huge debts and hopelessly lost positions in the global market for commercial launches.

Reusable Falcon Heavy steps for landing
SpaseX

The near term, when it will be possible to try to return to the world market in the field of heavy carriers (with the "Angara" or the already new "Phoenix") is smoothly leaving for 2022. It is clear that all this time our competitors will frolic in the formed niche, first of all the proactive and impudent Elon Musk with his Falcon of various modifications. And again, there will be few people willing to let us into this market. For the time being, one can forget about the lost technologies, experienced specialists, scientific and industrial school, these concepts are difficult to measure in monetary terms. The question of who will now manufacture modules for the new Russian orbital station, plans for which are being built after 2024 (completion of the ISS operation), is also modestly silent. Khrunichev made most of the modules for her, but this is clearly in the past. There were no plans to continue operating the Moscow site even in the form of the remaining stump after 2025. According to the latest information from employees, mass layoffs are being prepared again by the summer of 2018

In the "pluses" we have a hundred hectares of expensive Moscow land freed up for commercial development, around the upcoming sale of which strange games have already begun, including with the participation of the Moscow prosecutor's office.

If you do not know the background, then the result obtained strongly resembles an ordinary raider takeover. This is how some media interpret the events around Khrunichev. We are dealing with the elementary stupidity and incompetence of modern Russian officials, in whose hands the fate of the national cosmonautics is, or political intrigues and subtle and selfish calculations are behind it - time will tell. But in any case, the actual destruction of one of the leading enterprises in the industry can greatly affect not only the prestige and development of astronautics, but also the defense capability of our country in difficult modern conditions.

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