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Factors behind Japan's economic miracle. Japanese "economic miracle". Russian-Japanese relations in the field of economics

Japan's prosperity was due to many reasons. First of all reduction in military spending . Their share in the country's budget turned out to be the lowest in the world. According to the constitution, Japan was prohibited from creating an army beyond the needs of self-defense.
Another reason for economic growth was the enormous Japan's income from fulfilling American military orders . During the Korean War (1950-1953) and Vietnam (1964-1973), of all the US allies, Japan was closest to the theater of war. It became the main supply base for American troops. The Japanese authorities carried out a successful economic policy. They skillfully overcame factors unfavorable for the country. Japan has almost no raw materials of its own; to this day, 98% of it is purchased abroad. Therefore, the state carried out very strict control over foreign trade . The import of any products that were or could be produced in the country was excluded. Only in 1971, when Japan was firmly established in world markets, was state control over foreign trade weakened.

Japanese people around the world bought advanced technologies , which made it possible to save on their own scientific research. High technologies were often introduced earlier than in the countries that developed them, especially in leading industries. The state provided active support for this. Enterprises producing export products were considered leading. Automotive companies such as "Toyota", "Nissan", "Honda", "Mitsubishi", "Isuzu" , robot manufacturers "Hitachi" And "Fuji-tsu" , computers and consumer electronics - "Toshiba", "Sony", "GVC" gained worldwide fame. Their competitiveness was initially ensured by government subsidies and low wages for highly skilled labor. The high quality and relatively low cost of Japanese goods allowed them to quickly and successfully conquer world markets.

The transformation of Japan into one of the most developed countries in the world was greatly facilitated by national traditions. Played a big role in this clan-professional solidarity of owners firms Most companies do not compete, but cooperate with each other. In Japanese enterprises, employees do not separate their personal interests from the interests of the corporation. The country has a lifetime employment system, which guarantees employees employment for the entire period of their working life. The longer they work, the higher their salary. It is also paid in case of temporary stoppage of production. At the expense of the corporation, advanced training and educational levels are ensured. This is how Japanese companies achieve maximum labor productivity by voluntarily performing overtime work. Strikes and labor strikes are very rare in Japan.


Over time, the income and average wages of Japanese workers have reached levels that exceed those of most developed countries. In terms of infant mortality and life expectancy, Japan is among the most prosperous countries in the world.

An important source of economic success is political stability post-war Japan. Despite the presence of opposition parties, the political arena is dominated by Liberal Democratic Party(LDP). Repeated revelations of corruption and abuse of power led to changes in its leaders, but did not affect voter support.

In foreign policy Japan is an ally of the United States. This ensures the successful promotion of Japanese goods on the American market. Japan's role as an ally of the United States required it to send its troops to conflict zones in the 1990s. and to Iraq in 2003. In the last decade, trade and economic ties between Russia and Japan have been successfully developing.

In the 1990s. Japan's economic growth rates fell, and the country found itself in a state of protracted crisis. Its share of global industrial production has declined. Many previously successful companies went bankrupt, and unemployment began to rise. Japan has strong competitors in the world market in the form of newly industrialized countries and China. A big blow to the Japanese economy was the rapid rise in prices for oil, which the country imports.

At the beginning of the 21st century. Japan has not yet decided on the future direction of socio-economic development. According to experts, in the coming decades the rate of development of the Japanese economy may be half that of Western Europe and three times lower than that of the United States. The question is raised about the transition to neoconservative methods for solving emerging problems, mass privatizations, creating incentives to attract foreign capital to the economy. Ideas are being put forward to revise labor relations in the direction of increasing attention to the individual contribution of each employee. However, these proposals do not meet with support in Japanese society.

In the first half of the 20th century, Japan pursued a policy of militarism and expansion. The Japanese tried to compensate for the lack of natural resources by seizing the territories of a number of East Asian countries.

But as a result of World War II, the Land of the Rising Sun suffered a crushing defeat and, after nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on September 2, 1945, was forced to sign the Act of Unconditional Surrender. The country was occupied by “allied forces.”

During the war, a significant part of the Japanese economic potential was destroyed, the housing stock was significantly destroyed, and supplies of foreign raw materials ceased. Industrial production fell to 1926 levels, and total damage was estimated at 1.3 trillion. Ian. The country's development was delayed for a good ten years.

American recovery

The US victory was perceived by the Japanese elite as proof of the effectiveness of the American model of society and the economy. Yesterday's warlike samurai in the blink of an eye changed his “sword to a plowshare.” The emperor publicly renounced his divine origin, women received suffrage, trade unions were revived, a directive on political and religious freedoms appeared, and the activities of opposition parties, including socialists and communists, were allowed.

In 1947, one of the most militant countries in history adopted a new constitution, in which it set a course for pacifism and liberal democracy. At the same time, in 1946-1949, according to the plan of the economist Wolf Ladejinsky, land reform was carried out. Large landownership was destroyed, peasants stopped renting land - they became its owners.

Following this, in 1949-1950, an American banker developed a plan to stabilize the Japanese economy (the so-called "Dodge Line") through "shock therapy". To overcome inflation, a tough tax reform was carried out, based on the principle of a progressive income tax. Instead of subsidizing industrialists, the government sent assistance to banks, which began to issue loans to companies on their own responsibility.

Many large enterprises froze the payment of already meager wages, there was a wave of mass layoffs, and the Japanese tightened their belts. A rigid exchange rate of the yen to the dollar was established (360 to 1). The result of reforms along the “Dodge Line” was the adoption of a deficit-free state budget, stabilization of the yen and the gradual establishment of foreign trade.

Free swimming

At the end of the occupation (April 1952), the state's economy was almost completely restored. Japan has become a moderately developed country. Transferring experience to Japan Marshall plan American organizations and firms, along with Europeans, invited Japanese delegations to business courses, where they shared practical knowledge about their production technologies.

The Japanese turned out to be as amazingly teachable as the ancient Romans once were. American experience has made it possible to effectively reconstruct outdated areas of industry. Industry switched from labor-intensive industries (light industry, textiles) to capital-intensive ones (heavy industry), and then to knowledge-intensive ones. The driving force of the country's economic development was the manufacturing industry.

At the same time, the Japanese took the path of actively importing foreign equipment and technology. Between 1950 and 1971, over 15 thousand patents and licenses were acquired (mostly in the USA). Instead of enormous financial and time expenditures on research, the Japanese bought up the rights to the developed product and often improved it. By the end of the 60s, Japan had created an almost universal industrial production structure using the latest production technologies.

A striking example: the American concern Du Pont spent 11 years developing a nylon production process, spending $25 million on it, the Japanese company Toyo Rayon bought a patent for its production for $7.5 million. At the same time, the Japanese paid this amount during 1951-1959, receiving over these years an income of $90 million from nylon exports.

Orientalist Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: “After the war, the Japanese convinced the Americans that they themselves would rebuild their extremely militarized economy. However, in essence it remained state capitalist. The essence of the Japanese miracle is the amazing mutual trust of the supreme power and big business. In Japan, the state, together with big business, developed an economic strategy. They clearly defined the country's development priorities. At the first stage, the emphasis was placed on the development of metallurgy, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. They created the most advanced metallurgy in the world and began to smelt 100 million tons of steel. Japan became the first shipbuilding power in the world, building tankers with a displacement of 200-300 thousand tons. In order to process oil locally, they began to develop petrochemicals. At the second stage, priorities were given to household electrical appliances and the automotive industry. It was necessary to break the existing stereotype - before the Second World War, Japanese goods were cheap, but of poor quality. At the cost of enormous efforts, with their transistors, with their televisions, and then with their cars, they convinced the world that Japanese means quality.”

"Golden Sixties"

A period of rapid economic growth between 1955 and 1961 paved the way for the so-called "Golden Sixties", the second decade of which is usually associated with "Japanese economic miracle". In 1965, Japan's nominal GDP was valued at slightly more than $91 billion. Fifteen years later, in 1980, nominal GDP soared to a record $1.065 trillion.

The volume of Japanese exports increased almost tenfold between 1957 and 1973. Japan literally bombarded the world with cars, ships, optics, electrical equipment, sewing machines, radios, cameras and televisions. For a number of important types of products, Japan has taken second place after the United States. At the same time, Japan, dependent on the export of raw materials and fuel, imported unprocessed raw materials and carried out a full cycle of its processing.

During the same period, road and sea transport actively developed. Each of them accounted for 40% of domestic cargo transportation. By 1971, Japan had become one of the largest automobile countries in the world, with over 12 million cars, and the total tonnage of the maritime fleet (including giant tankers) exceeded 30 million tons. In both industries, this was the second highest figure in the world after the United States.

As a result, during the period from 1950 to 1973, the average annual growth rate of the Japanese economy was about 10-11%. This was the highest rate among developed countries. The record economic growth that began in the mid-1950s continued until the oil crisis of 1973, during which time Japan's GDP increased 6.5 times, and industrial production more than 10 times.

This historical phenomenon will be further characterized as Japanese economic miracle.

Rapid growth rates in the shortest possible time allowed Japan not only to fully recover after defeat in the war, but also to take second place in economic power, consistently surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, the USSR and second only to the United States.

The distinctive features of the “Japanese Economic Miracle” were:

  • the unification of manufacturers, resource suppliers, product distributors and banks into closely related groups called keiretsu - large corporate conglomerates and holdings;
  • mutually beneficial relations between entrepreneurs and the government;
  • guarantee of lifetime employment in large corporations;
  • active trade union movement.

Reasons for record performance

Among the reasons for the “miracle” are low taxes and the intensive development of new technologies by Japanese science, information about which almost did not reach Japan before the Second World War due to the isolationist policy of the authorities.

The Japanese did not find a simple secret. The key to success was a number of different factors:

  • American occupation reforms
  • US loans
  • political stability
  • competent technical restructuring
  • development of new technologies by Japanese science
  • export orientation
  • national manufacturer support
  • Japanese mentality
  • cheap labor
  • trust in the banking system
  • control over foreign trade

The Americans, who caused the greatest harm to the Japanese, actually brought the greatest benefit. The result of American reforms was the stabilization of the political situation in the country and the gradual establishment of foreign trade. At an early stage, the absence of an army played an important role, which made it possible to significantly reduce taxes. According to the Japanese constitution, military spending cannot exceed 1% of the gross national product.

Subsequently, the peculiarities of the Japanese economic model, in particular the “keiretsu,” did not allow foreigners (including the United States) to occupy a niche in the country’s domestic markets. Keiretsu is a large association of various holdings and corporations around a powerful bank, which finances all the companies of the group and virtually excludes the possibility of their absorption by other market participants. In addition, this system is a successful model of protection against the expansion of foreign companies.

Particular attention should be paid to the Japanese mentality. The Japanese have always been an isolated nation with a centuries-old practice of building society according to a strict hierarchy. This has also affected modern business relationships within the country. Thus, Japan was characterized by lifelong assignment of an employee to an enterprise.

This was achieved both by the generally accepted way of life and by economic factors. The newcomer always had the lowest possible salary, which increased over the years as he worked. At its core, the company is a second family. The Japanese receive a pension from the enterprise itself in one single payment, on the principle of 1 month's salary for each year worked.

And of course, it is necessary to note the peculiarity of state regulation of the economy. The state directly owns approximately a third of all fixed production assets, forming ~30% of GDP. At the same time, economic planning is carried out by management consisting of representatives of financial groups and corporations, and not by politicians from parliament. Therefore, the plans are carried out strictly: sanctions for violations will come not from the state, but from fellow craftsmen, which is much worse.

Japanese financial bubble

The end of the “miracle” dates back to 1985, when Japan signed the famous Plaza Agreements (named after the hotel in which they were signed), as a result of which the yen increased by 1.5 times, and the rate of economic growth in Japan fell from 8% to 2 %.

In the second half of the 1980s, financial deregulation, euphoria about economic prospects, and monetary easing by the Bank of Japan, coupled with large savings, led to aggressive speculation in the stock and real estate markets. The Nikkei 225 stock index reached its all-time high on December 29, 1989, closing at 38,915.87. Plus, banks began to issue riskier loans.

At the end of 1989, the Treasury Department, taking into account the instability of the financial bubble, sharply raised interest rates. The bubble burst, followed by a massive stock market crash, followed by a debt crisis, which in turn led to a crisis in the banking sector.

In the early 1990s, high land values ​​and exceptionally low interest rates led to a short-term improvement when credit was very cheap and available. This led to massive borrowing, the proceeds of which were invested in domestic and foreign stocks and securities.

Eventually a wave of consolidation began, leaving Japan with only four national banks. The situation was critical for the long-term economic outlook, since Japanese firms were saddled with huge debts, which affected both their attractiveness for investment and their ability to obtain credit. Even now the official interest rate is 0.1%. Many borrowers turn to moneylenders to obtain loans.

Unemployment began to rise at a significant rate:

  • during the 1970-1980s, its level fluctuated between 2-2.8%;
  • in the 1990s the figure was slightly above 3%;
  • by 2011 it was 4.9%.

The economic bubble in Japan from 1986 to 1991 was characterized by a complete stop in economic growth and multiple increases in prices in the real estate and stock markets. The bubble's burst lasted over a decade, with the stock market bottoming in 2003 but subsequently hitting a new low in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis. The collapse of the bubble resulted in a long period of economic stagnation, called "lost decade".

The Lost Decade

The period of "stagnation" in the Japanese economy following the collapse of the Japanese financial bubble originally included the period from 1991 to 2000, but more recently the period from 2001 to 2010 has also been included, so the entire period of the 1990s and 2000s is called the "lost decades" or "lost years".

“The Nikkei Index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which reflects the securities of Japan's 225 leading companies, is still less than half what it was then,” Xinhua pointed out in January 2013, noting that currently “the Japanese economy is characterized by a large amount of debt, low savings rate and a negative trade balance, and is therefore facing a third decade of recession.”

2000s

In the Ginza quarter real estate prices peaked in 1989 at 100 million yen (about $1 million) per square meter. In other business districts, prices were only slightly lower, but by 2004, class A commercial real estate in Tokyo cost less than 1% of its peak price, residential real estate prices fell more than 10 times, but still remained the highest in the world until the second half of the 2000s, when Tokyo gave way to Moscow and other cities as the most expensive city. Trillions of dollars in Japanese wealth were lost as a result of the bursting of the bubble. It was only in 2007 that real estate prices began to rise, but fell again as a result of the global economic crisis.

The Japanese economy, driven by high levels of investment, was particularly hard hit by the bursting of the bubble. Investments began to be directed outside the country, manufacturers began to lose their technological advantage. Japanese goods became less competitive abroad, and low consumption caused deflation. The Japanese Central Bank has lowered interest rates to almost zero. After this failed, some economists suggested using inflation targeting- a set of measures taken by government authorities in order to control the level of inflation in the country, i.e. setting a target inflation rate for a certain period (for example, one year).

Affordable credit, which triggered the bubble, remained a problem for the next few years; in 1997, banks were still making loans with a low probability of repayment. Loan and investment managers struggled to find assets that could generate profits. Sometimes they even resorted to investing money in the deposits of rival banks, causing complaints from their managers. Correcting the situation in the banking system became even more difficult when the government began to subsidize problem banks and enterprises, creating so-called “zombie companies.” This eventually led to the emergence of the carry trade, where money is borrowed in Japan at low rates, invested in more profitable assets abroad, and then the loan is repaid at a significant profit.

Despite economic recovery in the 2000s, the conspicuous consumption of the 1980s, such as spending on whiskey and cars, has yet to fully return. This was due to the traditional Japanese emphasis on thrift and economy, as well as the fierce competition that the dominant Japanese firms experienced in the 1980s from companies in South Korea and Taiwan. Most Japanese companies began to replace permanent labor with temporary workers who had no job security; these employees now make up more than a third of Japan's workforce.

Economic growth during the period of the economic miracle was almost 10% annually, this was the highest growth rate among developed countries at that time. One of the reasons for the “miracle” is low taxes and the intensive development of new technologies by Japanese science, information about which almost did not reach Japan before the Second World War due to the isolationist policy of the authorities.

Rapid growth rates in the shortest possible time allowed Japan not only to fully recover after defeat in the war, but also to take second place in economic power, consistently surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, the USSR and second only to the United States. Japan has been the second largest economy in the world since 1968, losing to China in 2010.

The distinctive features of the Japanese economy during the period of the “economic miracle” were:

  • the association of manufacturers, input suppliers, product distributors and banks into closely related groups called keiretsu;
  • mutually beneficial relations between entrepreneurs and the government;
  • guarantee of lifetime employment in large corporations;
  • active trade union movement.

"Golden Sixties"

The period of rapid economic growth between 1955 and 1961 paved the way for the so-called. The “Golden Sixties”, the second decade of which is usually associated with the “Japanese economic miracle”. By 1964, Japan was experiencing steady economic growth. But in 1964 everything changed, and GDP growth rates began to decline rapidly. In 1964 it went bankrupt "Sanuebu", and in 1965 "Sanyo Ltd" suffered huge losses. In response to the current situation, the government began to prevent a recession. In 1965, Japan's nominal GDP was valued at slightly more than $91 billion. Fifteen years later, in 1980, nominal GDP soared to a record $1.065 trillion.

Causes

  • American occupation reforms
  • cheap labor
  • trust in the banking system
  • control over foreign trade
  • export orientation
  • national manufacturer support
  • US loans
  • political stability
  • development of new technologies by Japanese science
  • Japanese mentality

Notes

Links

  • ECONOMIC MIRACLE // Japan from A to Z. Popular illustrated encyclopedia. (CD-ROM). - M.: Directmedia Publishing, “Japan Today”, 2008. - ISBN 978-5-94865-190-3

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

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Books

  • Gaijin in the service of Mitsubishi: Japanese management through European eyes: the shocking truth, Murtagh Niall. The author of this book worked for several years in one of the most conservative companies in Japan and knows well what price the Japanese are actually paying for the so-called Japanese economic miracle.…

The Japanese economic miracle is a historical fact of record growth of the Japanese economy. The economy grew at 10% annually, the highest growth rate among countries at that time. Rapid growth rates in the shortest possible time allowed Japan not only to fully recover after defeat in the war, but also to take second place in economic power, consistently surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, and the USSR.

So, on September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered. The country was under the rule of the American military, the economy was in a state of ruin. “Industrial output fell to 20% of the pre-war level.

The economy was revived slowly: the pre-war level of production was not restored in 1949, as in Western Europe, but only by 1953.” Being in such a situation, Japan needed to transition to a new development strategy, and the essence of this strategy was a fundamental departure from the past. It was necessary to create a new economic structure, new incentives for work, democratization of society, development of market relations and entrepreneurship. Thus, it was decided to invite American entrepreneurs and managers who developed a program affecting all aspects of Japanese life.

The Japanese economic miracle arose in the 50-60s. 20th century

This phenomenon seems incredible, because having suffered a severe defeat in the war, Japan suffered significant damage, both morally and materially, and, despite this, was able to become an economic leader.

The main problem in Japan at that time was the lack of its own raw material resources, limiting the possibilities for extensive growth and predetermining the need for an intensive development path. Japan was forced to import 99% of the necessary natural resources (100% of bauxite and nickel, cotton, natural rubber, more than 90% of oil, iron ore, non-ferrous metals). Limited natural resources have forced Japan not only to constantly modernize production, develop and implement material and energy-saving technologies, but also to develop an export-oriented economy. The export of national products was supposed to provide financial means for the import of raw materials, energy and food resources. The focus on exports in conditions of fierce competition required the Japanese industry to produce products to the highest international standards and ensure their competitiveness in terms of such parameters as price, quality, service, etc.

A number of factors contributed to the rapid growth of the Japanese economy:

1. Total control was taken over export-import processes, the import of foreign finished products that could drown out Japanese industry was prohibited, but the import of modern Western-made technologies was encouraged, which ultimately was aimed at the development of Japan's technological industry.

2. Manufacturers of new products were supported at the state level, while resellers were in a less enviable position; pressure in their direction made this type of activity unprofitable. As a result, the number of primary producers increased and thus national wealth increased faster.

3.Effective use of scientific and technological advances. Japan skillfully applied the achievements of world scientific thought, acquiring patents, licenses, know-how and putting them into practice. This made it possible to save money and make a colossal breakthrough in science and technology based on the scientific and technical level already achieved by other countries.

4. The active economic role of the state, which was a major owner and buyer, was of great importance for Japan's economic recovery. The state also influenced economic development through planning, but the plans were developed by representatives of financial groups and corporations. Two types of plans were developed - national, the implementation of which was ensured by private investment, and sectoral, implemented with state financial resources.

However, first of all, this merit is directly due to the Japanese workers who performed the most complex tasks, therefore the “Japanese Economic Miracle” is primarily based on the system of labor relations.

The main features of such a system can be highlighted:

lifetime employment system, which is based not on the formal legal “fixation” of a person, but on the real ensuring the interest of workers to work for a given enterprise for the maximum possible time and link their fate with it for life. An increase in work experience affects the level of wages and future pensions, the length of vacation, and the receipt of some additional privileges;

socio-psychological factors, which are of great importance in modern conditions for increasing production efficiency. The company's administration is taking measures to create a good psychological climate and unite the workforce. An understanding of the company and its employees as a single family is formed, all members of which help and support each other;

wage system. The amount of wages for company employees consists of many elements. The formation of an employee’s total earnings is influenced by age, length of service, education, position and responsibilities, working conditions, work results, family support benefits, housing, and transportation. A feature of production in Japan is the relatively low share of wages in the cost of the final product compared to other countries. Thus, the share of wages in the finished product in the USA is 32%, in the UK - 27%, in Japan - 11%. This is due to the fact that in Japan, labor productivity growth significantly outpaces wage growth, and the rate of labor productivity growth is higher than in many other countries.

personnel rotation system, which involves moving workers horizontally and vertically every 2-3 years. The main goal of rotation is to determine the place that most contributes to the realization of the employee’s potential abilities and, ultimately, to the performance of the company as a whole;

on-the-job training system is associated with a clear division of functions between secondary and higher education, which provides fundamental knowledge, and in-house training, which provides professional training;

reputation system, which involves drawing up annual characteristics for each employee at the place of work by his colleagues. Such characteristics help employees objectively evaluate themselves both in the work process and in relationships within the team.

By the 80-90s. Japan has managed to firmly establish itself in second place in the world, second only to the United States.

Thus, within just one generation, the country's economy grew more than such economic giants (at that time) as the USA, France, Canada, Germany and Italy. This is where the concept of the Japanese economic miracle arose, characterizing the dizzying rise of a country with mediocre territorial and human resources. However, in the 90s. This phenomenon gave way to the disease known as the Lost Decade, which occurred after the collapse of the country's financial industry.

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Introduction

Interest in Japan around the world is enormous. The impressive achievements of the Land of the Rising Sun, especially in the economy, are well known and attract close attention, causing mixed feelings: from surprise and admiration to envy and fear. Indeed, how did Japan, which suffered a severe defeat in the war and suffered enormous material and moral damage, manage to not only rise from ruins and devastation within almost one generation, but also turn into a first-class economic power, leading in many areas of industry and trade, science and technology.

The unprecedented rate of industrial development that the Japanese economy achieved annually for three decades is still studied by economists around the world, cited as an example and showing the way for developing countries. The industrial development and economic growth of Japan are interesting as a unique phenomenon of our time, but the results achieved by Japan are especially impressive if we take into account the obvious unsuitability of the geographical and climatic conditions in which this country had to develop.

It is not surprising that a vast literature is growing in the world (from travel accounts to fundamental studies devoted to the “Japanese phenomenon” and the “Japanese challenge”). They contain prophecies foreshadowing the emergence of Japan as a global economic power that will lead the whole world, and gloomy predictions about the inevitable collapse of the “Japanese miracle.”

Today, Japan's achievements will not surprise anyone. It is much more important to understand and explain the reasons for the “Japanese economic miracle,” or, rather, the phenomenal post-war breakthrough of Japan, which brought it into the category of an “economic superpower.”

1 . "Japanese economic miracle"

Japanese economic miracle - this term refers to the breakthrough in the economic development of Japan that occurred during 1955-1973, when the average annual rate of its economic growth was 9.5%.

Until the middle of the 20th century, the Japanese economy was practically isolated from the main world centers of industrial development due to colossal distances, which made transporting raw materials and finished products to the islands unprofitable and even impractical, due to the aggressive foreign policy of the country’s imperialist leadership in the interwar period, due to centuries-old self-isolation of the islands until 1868, which left a deep psychological boundary that still sometimes separates the so-called. Japanese and European civilizations.

Industrial production by the end of the war had decreased by 10 times compared to pre-war levels. Therefore, it is natural that the restoration here lasted longer than in other countries: the pre-war level of production was restored only in 1952. But something else is more significant: the restoration took place on the old technical basis, i.e. the technical renewal that took place during restoration in other countries was not here. Japanese industrialists hoped to continue to benefit from the cheapness of labor and restored industries that did not require large capital and high technology, but a lot of human labor. But by the end of the recovery period, it became clear that in the new conditions the old methods of social dumping were ineffective: Japan was increasingly losing its previous position in the world economy.

It would seem that in such unfavorable conditions, forcing the use of more expensive construction and transport technologies, covering enormous distances when delivering products to the main markets, and besides, producing and transporting almost all products using imported raw materials and fuel, it was impossible for Japanese corporations to achieve competitiveness in world markets and become one of the global economic leaders. However, the history of Japan's industrial expansion has proven the opposite, using growth factors that had not previously received sufficient attention in other countries. It can be said that Japan taught the whole world an excellent economic lesson, the assimilation of which and the repetition of the success achieved on the islands is today becoming a priority task for the governments and business executives of many countries.

In this situation, the discussion about the dilemma that arose in Japan immediately after the end of the war, where to begin to emerge from the post-war devastation - with the development of production (the concept of recovery through production) or the suppression of inflation (the concept of monetary reform), ended in favor of the first option. Japanese economic miracle economy

When Japan's economic leaders sharply changed their priorities, a sharp increase in economic indicators began, the pace of which Japan was ahead of the whole world.

Such superiority in pace over a number of years gave rise to the first wave of publications about the Japanese “economic miracle”, which occurred in the late 60s and early 70s. These works analyzed the reasons, compared existing rates, extrapolated, and on this basis made stunning forecasts of Japan's transformation into a world leader.

1.1 Economic implicationsWorld War IIwars

The economic situation in post-war Japan was extremely difficult. Although its industrial and technical base suffered relatively little during the war, Japan's economy was on the verge of collapse. Japan lost all the captured territories and thereby lost colonial supplies of raw materials, fuel, and food. Japanese goods were forced out of world markets. Inflation and unemployment were high in the country. The industry found itself in a difficult situation. In 1945 its production volumes were only 28.5% of the level of 1935-1937. even two years after the end of the war - in 1947. industrial output was 3.5 times less than in 1938.

The greatest reduction in production capacity occurred in the light industry - textile and food industry, which meet the consumer demand of the population.

Since Japan was prohibited from maintaining direct ties with other countries, the import of raw materials, fuel and food into the country was practically stopped. As a result of this, as well as the general economic devastation, production capacities, slightly damaged by military operations, could not be fully used for several years.

The economic situation in the country was complicated by the fact that at first the Japanese monopolies resorted to tactics of sabotaging the restoration of the national economy. Firstly, the former military-industrial corporations refused to expand production until the government compensated them for losses incurred during the war, citing unprofitability, lack of raw materials and financing. Secondly, the reluctance to restore production by large capital was motivated by fears of reparation seizures, i.e. compensation by Japan for material damage caused by it during the war to other countries through the transfer of technological equipment. However, it soon became clear that equipment for these purposes would not be exported from the country.

A significant feature of Japan's recovery period was that, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, it was occupied by American troops, acting on behalf of the Allied powers and adopting a number of directives for the democratization and demilitarization of the country. Until the beginning of the 50s. The supreme power in the country was in the hands of the American occupation army. However, the United States did not exercise this power directly, but through the Japanese government.

To cover the significant state budget deficit and pay off obligations to monopolies, the national government took the path of mass issue of paper money. From 1945 to 1947 the total money supply quadrupled. Inflation increased sharply and the population's standard of living decreased. By 1946 workers' real wages were about 13% of pre-war levels.

Restoring the country's economy required the development of a fundamentally new development strategy. It was necessary not to restore the destroyed structure of the economy, but to move from total state control to the free market. The most significant economically were the following reforms.

Firstly, in 1945 A law was passed to eliminate the zaibatsu, which prohibited the formation of industrial cartels. Control over mergers of firms was introduced, freedom of trade transactions was established, and private sources of financing became available to all entrepreneurs. The liquidation of the zaibatsu was viewed in the country as fair retribution against those magnates who were the instigators of the aggression.

Secondly, in 1947-1950. Agrarian reform took place in Japan. The state forcibly bought land from landowners and sold it to peasants in installments. As a result, landownership was destroyed, and the peasants became land owners. These transformations completed the implementation of the tasks of the Meiji revolution and were bourgeois in nature. Although the country was still dominated by small peasant production, the reform contributed to the development of commodity-money relations, the growth of the capacity of the domestic market and agricultural production. Since 1946 to 1970 it has more than doubled.

Third, social relations were reformed. Thus, according to the new labor legislation, an eight-hour working day, paid vacations, and social insurance were established. These measures limited the arbitrariness of entrepreneurs and encouraged them to master new technology.

Fourthly, in 1949 Tax reform was carried out in Japan. Taxes on corporations were reduced and taxes on excess profits were abolished, but taxation of the population increased significantly. This allowed entrepreneurs to accelerate the accumulation of capital, but at the same time the growth of production was hampered by the low purchasing power of the population.

Fifthly, in 1950 budget reform was carried out. From that time on, the country stopped paying compensation to military factories for conversion and gratuitously subsidizing unprofitable enterprises. The emission was brought under control. A single fixed exchange rate was adopted. Inflation was gradually stopped and price controls were lifted. This meant a transition to a market economy.

Sixth, much attention was paid to structural restructuring of the economy. Since Japan did not have its own natural resources, it had to create modern processing industries based on import-substituting technologies.

1.2 The reasons behind"Japanese economicmiracle"

Gradually, Japan increasingly lost its former position in the world economy. Then Japanese economic leaders sharply changed their priorities, and the Japanese “economic miracle” began: in terms of growth rates of key economic indicators, Japan was ahead of the whole world. According to the main economic indicators - gross national product and industrial production - Japan has taken 2nd place in the capitalist world. It took 1st place in the world in the production of ships, steel, cars, a number of electrical and radio products, etc.

The scientific literature usually identifies the following factors for Japan's rapid economic growth.

Firstly, the special nature and special conditions of fixed capital. During post-war reconstruction, industry is equipped with the latest technology, i.e. There is a technical leap. At the same time, the structure of industry is also changing: new industries are coming to the fore. But in Japan the degree of war destruction required a particularly complete renewal of fixed capital.

The speed of technical restructuring was increased by the fact that instead of independent scientific and technical developments, Japan took the path of acquiring scientific and technical experience from other countries, purchasing patents and licenses. It turned out to be cheaper and faster. It wasn't even so much money that was saved as time. Japan was forced to do this by circumstances: according to the calculations of Japanese experts, by the mid-50s. its industry in scientific and technological terms lagged behind advanced countries by 20-25 years, and starting from the very beginning meant consolidating the lag.

Secondly, special forms of labor exploitation and a high share of capital investment in national income. About a third of investment is “individual savings.” In other words, the Japanese spend relatively little on their consumption, save, and put the saved money in the bank or buy shares of industrial enterprises with it. This is due to the peculiarities of labor exploitation in Japan. Wages here have increased significantly, but remain lower than in other countries in relation to the cost of production.

Japan is characterized by lifelong attachment of an employee to an enterprise. This attachment, of course, is ensured not by coercion, but by economic factors. Entry-level wages are relatively low, but they are increased annually by longevity bonuses, so that a worker aged 45 earns 2.5 times more than a entry-level worker. Naturally, when switching to another form, the employee must start from the lowest salary level. In addition, as work experience increases, vacation time also lengthens, some privileges expand, and the pension increases in the future. Under these conditions, the life of the worker becomes connected with the prosperity of the company. Naturally, this increases labor productivity.

In addition, in Japanese industry much attention is paid to socio-psychological factors. The administration is taking measures to unite members of the workforce and organize family vacations. A pension in Japan is a lump sum payment based on one month's salary for each year of work. Since the pensioner will no longer receive anything from enterprises, he tries to invest this money in business, i.e. buys shares with them. Obviously, this is also due to a third of capital investments coming from private savings.

In addition, in Japan there is such a practice: production operations that do not require high technology, but require a lot of human labor, are not carried out by large firms themselves, but are transferred to small, sometimes even semi-handicraft establishments. It costs much less.

Thirdly, the high share of spending on agricultural development was associated with low military spending. According to the Japanese constitution, military spending cannot exceed 1% of GNP. They are growing because the national product itself is growing.

Fourthly, the high growth rates of Japanese industry were associated with the peculiarities of state regulation of the economy. The Japanese economic system, held together by typically Asian informal ties between business circles and business circles and the state, is one of the most stringent in terms of the degree of government influence on the economy. The most important method of solving economic problems is protectionism. The state pursued a policy of preferential loans, high customs tariffs on the import of finished products, restrictions on external investment, authorized the creation of the largest financial and industrial groups, organized centralized planning, etc.

Economic planning is carried out by a body called the “Economic Planning Department”. Representatives of financial groups and corporations actively participate in it. Parliament does not participate in the development or approval of plans. Two types of plans are being developed - national and sectoral. The purpose of national plans is to ensure a certain rate of growth. The purpose of sectoral plans is to eliminate the weak points of the Japanese economy, i.e. to ensure the growth of those parts of the economy that cannot do without government assistance. If national plans are supported by private investment, then sectoral plans are supported by public investment.

Fifthly, it should be noted the features of the Japanese national character that influenced the economic development of the country. The specifics of Japanese culture and philosophy, the preservation of feudal traditions contributed to the establishment of such national character traits as obedience, devotion to the owner, belief in Japanese exclusivity, etc. The point is, therefore, that the Japanese economic model organically included the country’s civilizational features as a systemic element.

The technical re-equipment of Japanese industry and structural changes in it went through a number of stages. From the second half of the 50s of the twentieth century. The development of new technological processes and new industries begins. During this period, Japanese industry transitioned from labor-intensive manufacturing to capital-intensive industries. The share of light industry is decreasing, the automotive industry, electrical engineering, and the production of technical materials are developing rapidly. Great changes have taken place in the agricultural sector. Under the influence of agrarian reform, a steady increase in agricultural production began. In 1961 The Basic Agricultural Law was adopted, aimed at transferring agriculture from small-scale to large-scale production. It was supposed to reduce the share of rice and stimulate the production of livestock products, vegetables, and fruits.

1.3 Japanese sunseteconomic miracle

Somewhere in the mid-70s, the “Japanese economic miracle” came to an end. The seventies were the years of the so-called oil shocks, the end of the era of cheap energy. Throughout the capitalist world, structural restructuring is underway, accompanied by acute crisis phenomena. Structural adjustment is also taking place in Japan. Energy-intensive production turns out to be ineffective, especially in Japan, which does not have any significant energy resources of its own. Industries such as metallurgy and chemistry turn out to be structurally depressed.

The aging of the Japanese labor force is beginning to take its toll, and, at the same time, the depletion of the cheap labor factor. Acute disproportions arise between the development of the country's economic and social infrastructure, and the consequences of long-term neglect of environmental protection problems become clear. The attachment of the Japanese economy to the world market is increasing, primarily its export dependence on the US market.

However, the line of Japanese entrepreneurship, supported by the state, towards continuous technical renewal of production continues to increase productivity, and at the same time the competitiveness of Japanese goods. Japan continues to increase its exports, releasing an increasing number of cutting-edge cars and electronics onto world markets. The country's trade surplus and, at the same time, capital exports are growing.

Repeated attempts by the government to turn the development of the Japanese economy inward end in failure. The “plan for the reconstruction of the Japanese archipelago” put forward in 1972 by Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka failed even before its implementation began. Although the plan itself was quite reasonable and justified, suggesting a significant expansion of living space for the population of Japan, almost 90% of which is concentrated in a narrow coastal strip, constituting about 10% of its entire territory. The plan provided for the widespread development of industrial and social infrastructure, large-scale road construction, and the creation of new industrial centers in the hinterlands of Japan. The same fate befell the “life cycle plan” proposed by another Prime Minister of Japan, T. Miki, aimed at overcoming “social imbalances” (in the areas of social insurance, employment, education, etc.). After the first successes, the proposed in 1982 was soon “forgotten and abandoned.” a plan to switch the Japanese economy to the domestic market.

The implementation of these plans would make it possible to use the huge foreign exchange earnings from Japanese exports to clear up the bottlenecks of the Japanese economy, rooted in the lagging industrial and social infrastructure, primarily land shortage and human factors, and solve environmental problems. This in turn would improve the Japanese economy's investment absorptive capacity and help reinvigorate flagging economic growth.

However, large Japanese corporations and banks got a taste of easy profits - from the transfer of production to other countries, as well as from speculative transactions on the land and stock exchanges. Unresolved bottlenecks reduced the scope of possible profitable investment within Japan. Unraveling these bottlenecks required huge, mainly government, investments and increased government intervention. But this conflicted with the selfish interests of powerful forces within Japan's financial capital. On the other hand, external pressure on Japan was increasing from its foreign trade partners from developed countries, primarily the United States. The latter were particularly concerned about the growing US trade deficit with Japan. This pressure aimed to disrupt Japan's highly structured capitalist economy in order to weaken Japanese competition in its markets. The United States was particularly concerned about reducing its trade deficit with Japan and, failing that, creating a mechanism to refinance it. Under pressure from these forces, Japan began in the late 70s and early 80s to begin the process of liberalizing its economy. Since 1980, the Japanese government began to implement the so-called administrative and financial reform, one of the main directions of which was the policy of privatization of public sector enterprises.

Following this, a series of events shook the stability of financial ties within Japanese financial and industrial groups. The interaction of two factors had an impact - the successful conquest of foreign markets by Japanese corporations (including through the creation of foreign enterprises) and the decline in the ability of the Japanese economy to absorb new investments. At the same time, the Japanese domestic market was oversaturated with consumer goods. In order to dramatically expand effective demand, it was necessary to create a new lifestyle in a new living space. Japan's aging population needed to create a decent standard of living so that a new structure of effective demand could emerge. Working pensioners needed to be provided with work with decent pay.

The country needed an active demographic policy that would allow, instead of a sharp slowdown in demographic growth, to ensure a smooth transition to a more mature age structure. This required an appropriate youth policy, including the creation of new population and production centers. Without this, domestic investment in Japanese production was doomed to stagnation, and left to the mercy of the market, they could not compete with foreign investment opportunities.

Since the second half of the 80s, a speculative wave was added to these negative impacts. The country has entered an era of rampant speculation in land and shares of the most promising companies. The development of the so-called “bubble economy” began.

This time the ruling elite of Japan was not up to the task facing it. Again, looking ahead, we can say that there has been a generational change in the Japanese leadership. The creators of the “Japanese economic miracle”, those who still participated in the creation of the Japanese military-industrial complex in Manchuria and understood the need to combine market flexibility with a planned beginning and strong organization of production, those who selflessly restored the economic ties destroyed by the Americans, figures like Matsushita , Honda, Okita became very old people and gradually passed away. Leaders of the younger generation, such as Morita, also passed away. All of them carried deep traditions of Japanese society into modern times and at the same time looked far ahead, one might say, beyond the horizon. In their place came young people brought up on American textbooks of economics and management, and generally under the strong influence of Americanism. They saw ways of further development of Japan in the internationalization of its economy, i.e. in its inclusion in the general wave of globalization as a junior partner of the United States, and did not notice the dangers that awaited the country along this path.

2. Economy of Japan

2.1 Period of high economic growth (1960-1971)

The period of high growth rates occupies a special place in the economic development of Japan. The successes it achieved in those years were so impressive that the world started talking about the Japanese “economic miracle.” For 15 years - from 1958 to 1973. -- Japan's gross national product increased 6.5 times, and industrial production increased by more than 10 times. Having surpassed France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain and Germany, already at the end of the 60s Japan took second place in the capitalist world in terms of industrial production, and at the beginning of the 70s - in terms of gross national product. The growth rate of the Japanese economy at that time was the highest among developed capitalist countries and amounted to about 11% per year.

Japan's economic successes were associated mainly with the rapid development of the manufacturing industry, due primarily to huge investments in the expansion and renewal of fixed capital. During the period of high growth rates, an average of about 30% of the country's GDP was spent on savings, and about 2/3 of these funds were spent on industrial development.

With the completion of restoration processes in industry in 1957, it became obvious that its further development was impossible without a radical technical reconstruction. Since the second half of the 50s, Japan began an intensive process of renewal of fixed capital in old industries (ferrous metallurgy, oil refining, electrical engineering, shipbuilding, textile and food industries, chemical industries). At the same time, there was a rapid construction of enterprises in new industries and industries, such as radio electronics, petrochemicals, production of plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibers, etc.

Both the reconstruction of old industries and the creation of new ones were largely based on the import of foreign equipment and technology. So, for 1950-1971. Japan acquired over 15 thousand foreign patents and licenses, of which more than 60% were from the United States.

The implementation of the policy of technical reconstruction and the creation of an advanced industrial structure led to the fact that the basis for economic growth was the huge and ever-increasing demand of enterprises for machinery, equipment, construction materials and other investment goods. This was accompanied by an increased concentration of investment and production in heavy industries that served the market for investment goods. At the same time, machine-building production developed at the fastest pace.

As a result, by the late 60s and early 70s, the face of Japanese industry had changed radically. Firstly, the share of heavy industry in its structure increased significantly: from 51.7% to 67.8% in 1956-1973. (including the share of the machine-building complex from 17.9% to 35.3%). Secondly, by the end of the 60s, Japan had created an almost universal sectoral structure of industrial production, in which all types of modern production, including the latest, were represented in one way or another. And thirdly, all the old branches of Japanese industry switched to new production technologies and mastered the production of modern products. Thus, in ferrous metallurgy a decisive turn was made from the open-hearth method of steel smelting and the oxygen-converter method; a new technology for the construction of giant tankers and dry cargo ships was introduced in shipbuilding; more efficient equipment for the production of ammonia, artificial fertilizers, etc. was installed in the chemical industry.

In the late 60s and early 70s, the technical level of Japanese industry was already one of the highest in the world. The share of machinery and equipment under 3 years of age in the early 70s accounted for almost half the cost of fixed assets, and in a number of leading industries in terms of power and equipment productivity, Japan managed to outperform not only European countries, but also the United States (primarily in ferrous metallurgy , petrochemicals, shipbuilding).The place and role of Japan in world production has radically changed. By the end of the 60s, it became the world's largest manufacturer of many important types of heavy industry products, taking first place in the world in terms of production of ships, film and photographic equipment, chemical fibers, and in steel smelting, production of electrical equipment, electronic equipment, cars, sewing machines, etc. - second after the USA, ahead of Great Britain and Germany.

Relying on its ever-increasing industrial power, Japan gradually became one of the world's largest exporters of industrial products. The volume of Japanese exports in 1957-1973. increased almost 10 times, with a sharp change in its internal structure. The export of textiles, which accounted for 20-25% of the value of exports back in the late 50s, faded into the background, giving way to a wide range of heavy industrial products, such as steel, ships, cars, radios, optical instruments, electrical equipment, sewing machines, cameras, televisions, etc. In 1973, textile products accounted for only 9% of the value of exports, machinery and equipment - 55%, metals and metal products - 8.5%, chemical products - about 6%. Moreover, if previously the Japanese niche in world markets was filled mainly with goods of relatively low quality and low degree of complexity, then by the end of the 60s Japan already had a reputation as a supplier of high-quality, technically complex products. Being deprived of any significant reserves of basic types of natural resources, Japan, in order to maintain the rapid development of industry, was forced to increase the import of raw materials and fuel from year to year. Taking advantage of the fact that prices for these goods on world markets have been stable for a long time and even decreased, Japan preferred to import unprocessed raw materials, organizing a full cycle of its processing on its own territory. For 1957-1973 the volume of imports increased almost 7 times, while at the end of the period raw materials accounted for about a third of its value, and mineral fuels accounted for about 22% (including 16% for oil). As before, food products accounted for a fairly high share of imports - over 15%. Although since the late 50s Japan has been able to satisfy the population's needs for the main food product - rice - through domestic production, the growth in the standard of living of the population required the expansion of imports of various types of food (primarily livestock products and fruits). As for machinery and equipment, Japan’s dependence on their supplies from Western countries has decreased significantly (with the exception of a small group of the most complex high-tech equipment, which it itself could not yet produce), and the share of these goods in imports in the early 70s was less than 10%.

The onslaught of Japanese goods on world markets was so powerful that, despite the manifold increase in import volumes, from the second half of the 60s, Japan's trade balance began to almost constantly turn into a positive balance, which allowed it to accumulate significant gold and foreign exchange reserves and begin active exports of capital . Total for 1951-1970 Japanese investments abroad amounted to about $2.7 billion, of which $1.88 billion, or about 70%, were invested in the second half of the 60s.

The manufacturing industry at that time undoubtedly acted as the engine of the country's economic growth. As for other areas of the economy, their fates turned out differently. The abundance of cheap and high-quality raw materials on world markets predetermined the beginning of the actual curtailment of our own mining industry. In 1957-1970 The volume of production in the extractive industries increased by only 11%, and their share in total industrial production decreased from 5.1 to 2.1%. At the end of the 60s, only about 500 thousand people were employed in the mining industry, or approximately 1% of the total number of people employed in industry. The curtailment of production in the largest sub-industry - coal mining - was of decisive importance for such dynamics. The maximum level of coal production - 54.5 million tons - was reached in 1961, then it began to decline quite quickly and in the early 70s amounted to only about 33 million tons. At the same time, Japan's dependence on imports coal over the years increased from 36 to 56%.

The extraction of all other types of raw materials and fuel was carried out in extremely small (often symbolic) volumes. Transport developed quite quickly during a period of high growth rates: in 1960-1973. the volume of freight and passenger transportation almost tripled. Road transport has developed significantly - in the early 70s it accounted for almost half of passenger transportation and about 40% of cargo transportation. Maritime transport carried over 40% of domestic cargo and the entire volume of external cargo, while railway transport accounted for about 20% of cargo and about half of passenger traffic.

The length of Japan's railways has practically not increased since the mid-30s and in the early 70s was about 27 thousand km (of which 21.3 thousand km were state railways), but in the 60s this The industry has undergone a number of important technical innovations. One by one, sections of the Shinkansen high-speed railway, which was supposed to connect all the main cities of Japan, began to be put into operation. The average speed of trains on this route was more than 160 km/h. At the end of the 60s, construction of a railway tunnel between the islands of Honshu and Hokkaido (with a total length of 36.4 km and an underwater length of 22 km) also began, and a little later - the construction of two largest railway bridges that were supposed to connect the Osaka-Osaka region. Kobe with Shikoku Island. Finally, in the second half of the 60s, a complete transition to thermal and electric traction was carried out, and steam locomotives continued to be produced only for export.

By the early 70s, Japan had become one of the largest automotive powers in the world. In 1971, the country already had more than 12 million cars (including over 5 million cars), and according to this indicator it ranked 2nd (after the USA) in the world. The 60s became a period of intensive road construction. In particular, in 1969 the Tokyo-Nagoya-Kobe high-speed highway with a length of 536 km was put into operation. The construction of roads absorbed a huge amount of money, and to ease the tense situation with its financing, a law was passed in 1968, according to which, when purchasing a new car, each buyer had to pay a tax of 3% of its cost for the purpose of road construction. Although Japan ranked third in the world in terms of the length of highways by the early 70s (after the USA and France), in terms of the road network it still lagged significantly behind many advanced countries: for example, out of 150 thousand km of roads, only about 45% had a hard surface.

The period of high growth rates was decisive in the development of the Japanese navy. Only by the end of the 50s did it manage to restore the maximum pre-war level of naval tonnage (6.1 million tons), which suffered colossal damage as a result of the war. However, in subsequent years, the fleet was replenished at such a rapid pace that already in 1971, in terms of its total tonnage - over 30 million tons - Japan took second place in the world. In terms of technical level, the Japanese fleet was one of the most advanced in the world: it included giant tankers, powerful bulk carriers, and container ships.

Important changes occurred during this period in the Japanese countryside. Around the mid-50s, a fairly rapid outflow of the rural population to the cities began. In 1955-1973. More than 11.5 million people left the village, and by 1973 the rural population had dropped to 24.7 million people. (23% of the total population). The total number of peasant farms also decreased by about 900 thousand and amounted to about 5160 thousand by 1973. Although the reduction in the number of farms occurred mainly due to the category of small and tiny ones (with plots of up to 1 hectare), the latter still formed the basis of Japanese agriculture : in 1973 there were more than 3.5 million, or two-thirds of the total number of households.

There has been a significant reduction in the scale of land leasing. By the beginning of the 70s, there were almost no landless peasant tenants left in the village, and the number of farms resorting to renting had decreased to approximately 1 million (in 1950 there were more than 2 million).

The total volume of agricultural production increased by 1.5 times during the period under review. In the 60s, agricultural machinery (mini-tractors, combines) became relatively widespread in the village, but most agricultural operations were still carried out manually or using draft power. In general, in terms of the level of mechanization of agricultural production, Japan in these years was much inferior to Western countries. At the same time, by the end of the 60s, it became one of the first places in the world in terms of consumption of chemical fertilizers. Thanks to the intensive use of fertilizers, pesticides, as well as improved agricultural production methods, Japanese peasants managed to significantly increase their productivity, and in the late 60s the average yield of rice, sweet potatoes, onions, etc. Japan occupied one of the first places in the world.

The financial situation of the peasants also improved. Average total income of a peasant family in 1957-1973. increased almost 7 times, but at the same time the share in it from agriculture decreased from 56.6% in 1957 to 32.1% in 1973, and the share of side income accordingly increased from 43.4% to 67, 9%. By the beginning of the 70s, only 15% of farms made do with income received from agriculture, and 85%, to one degree or another, resorted to side earnings (from hired work to starting their own business).

In general, the appearance of the Japanese village has changed greatly. Refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, not to mention televisions and radios, became part of the everyday life of peasants; many families were even able to purchase cars. At the end of the 60s, there was no longer such a sharp contrast between the city and the countryside as existed before the war and even at the end of the 50s.

The state continued to play an extremely important role in the development of industry, agriculture and other spheres of the Japanese economy during that period. Although the size of the public sector was significantly reduced, the government played a leading role in determining the strategy for economic development.

During the period of high growth rates in Japan, government programming received significant development. The most famous of the plans prepared during these years was the “Plan for Doubling National Income,” which provided for achieving this goal in 1961-1970. and closing the economic and technological gap between Japan and leading Western countries. Although government plans and programs were indicative, they served as an important guide for private business, as they indicated areas and industries that would receive government attention and support. In addition, the state used a wide range of credit and financial levers to encourage the private sector to develop in given directions, and when this was not enough, it resorted to coercion using administrative methods.

In the 60s, the government's primary concern was ferrous metallurgy, oil refining, petrochemicals, and a number of engineering industries.

2.2 Weaknesses of the Japanese Economy

Despite obvious successes, the Japanese economy also has its weaknesses. We are talking, first of all, about the products of labor-intensive manufacturing industries, especially in terms of assembly, and high-tech production. Other industries and sectors of the Japanese economy, both in terms of labor productivity and the technical level of production, as a rule, lag significantly behind the United States and Western European countries. This primarily applies to agriculture, food, paper, cement, chemical, aluminum, mining, pharmaceutical, and aviation industries. The same can be said for most service industries.

In addition to the above, Japan is characterized by so-called congenital weaknesses: first of all, certain distortions in the structure of the economy, the comparative threat of the domestic market, the development of which chronically lags behind the growth of production. As a result, the country's dependence on the foreign market is increasing, which is further aggravated by the lack of its own raw material and energy base, insufficient development of agriculture and growing food imports. The Japanese economy is negatively impacted by the underdevelopment of the housing stock and social infrastructure, weak social support from the state in the field of pensions, benefits, healthcare, and long working hours.

Due to the lack of complexity of the economic structure and growing dependence on the foreign market, Japan has low indicators of social well-being. There is a low level of old-age pensions, the number of divorces and calls to the police is growing, and there is a high level of crime, especially among children.

The housing problem is not being solved. The living space per person is extremely small. The quality of the buildings themselves and the internal layout, as well as the equipment of Japanese homes, is significantly inferior to the level typical of the USA and Western European countries.

Compared to other developed countries, Japan has very short paid vacations and high work intensity.

Thus, the Japanese economy has both strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, the previously backward country managed in a short historical period to occupy one of the leading places in the world in terms of economic power.

3. Results of the “Japanese Economic Miracle”

From 1950 to 1970, the average annual growth rate of industrial production was about 15%. By 1990, Japan's industrial production had increased by 21.1 times compared to the level of 1938 (or 1952).

Bok Zee Kou provides data on the volume of national income of the leading economic powers as early as 1978.

A.N. Izotov publishes information on the rates of economic growth of the most developed capitalist countries in the period 1973-1983.

Against the general background of the very sluggish economic development of other capitalist countries, even the relatively modest figures for Japanese growth observed in the 80s look very impressive.

Conclusion

The Japanese Economic Miracle is a historical phenomenon of record growth of the Japanese economy that began in the mid-1950s and continued until the oil crisis of 1973. Economic growth during the period of the economic miracle was almost 10% annually, these were the highest growth rates among the developed capitalist countries of that time. One of the reasons for the “miracle” was low taxes (the army did not exist, and no public funds were spent on its maintenance) and the intensive development of new technologies by Japanese science, information about which almost did not reach Japan before the Second World War due to the isolationist policy of the authorities. Rapid growth rates in the shortest possible time allowed Japan not only to fully recover after defeat in the war, but also to take second place in economic power, consistently surpassing France, Italy, Canada, Great Britain, Germany and second only to the United States.

The distinctive features of the Japanese economy during the period of the “economic miracle” were: the unification of manufacturers, resource suppliers, product marketers, and banks into closely related groups called keiretsu; mutually beneficial relations between entrepreneurs and the government; guarantee of lifetime employment in large corporations; active trade union movement.

WITHlist of literature

1. Alekseev, V.V. Economy of Japan / V.V. Alekseev. - 2nd ed., revised. - Moscow: MGIMO - University, 2006. - 241 p.

2. Bock, Z.K. Economy of Japan. What is she like? / Bok Zee Kou. - M.: Economics, 2002. - 349 p.

3. Volgin, N.A. Japanese experience: Solutions to economic, social and labor problems. - M.: Economics, 1998. - 255 p.

4. Druzhinin, N.L. Japan. Economic miracle / N.L. Druzhinin. - St. Petersburg: Peter: Leader, 2003. - 265 p.

5. Izotov, A.N. Japan: the concept of becoming a leader. - M.: Economics, 1991. - 113 s.

6. History of Japan / Ross. Academician Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, etc. T.” 1868-1998/ [V.N. Eremin, A.E., Zhukov, I.P. Lebedeva and others]. - 703 p.

7. Osamu, N. Modern Japanese economy / Osamu Nariai. - Baku: Elm ve Hayat, 2003. - 146 p. - (From the series “About Japan”).

8. http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_economic_miracle.

9. http://yandex.ru

10. Volgin N.A. Japanese experience: Solutions to economic, social and labor problems. - M.: Economics, 1998.

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    Prerequisites for super-accelerated economic development like an “economic miracle” in some countries of the world and socio-economic problems of the “economic miracle”. The main ways to introduce the “economic miracle” mechanism into the economy of the Russian Federation.

    thesis, added 06/17/2017

    Mixed economy models: American, German, Japanese and Swedish. The experience of democratization of South Korea and the “Korean economic miracle” during the reign of Park Chung-hee. Stages and features of the formation of a mixed economy of the Russian Federation.

    course work, added 08/05/2013

    Background to the emergence of economic integration in Western Europe. Free trade zone in the EEC. Customs Union of a group of Western European countries. Economic Union of Western European Countries. The essence of Japan's "economic miracle". "Paradox" by V. Leontyev.

    test, added 07/27/2011

    History of post-war economic development of Japan. Factors of the "economic miracle". Main features, strategies of scientific and technological development. Features of structural policy. The country's place in the world economy. Foreign economic strategy of Japan.

    course work, added 10/12/2009

    Familiarization with the trends and contradictions in the development of Japan in the last quarter of the 20th century. Study of the position of the political elite in the context of the global financial crisis. Consideration and analysis of social reflection in Japan on economic challenges.

    thesis, added 06/03/2017

    Japan as a center of economic growth: reasons, successes and growth factors. Development of the Japanese economy by periods. Indicators of the country's economic growth dynamics. The role of Japan in the world economy. The current level of economic development of the state.

    abstract, added 12/05/2010

    Analysis of the causes of the economic crisis in Japan in the 90s and 2008-2010, its impact on the country's economy. Features of the Japanese debt economy. The impact of the consequences of a natural disaster (earthquake, tsunami, radiation) on the economic state of the country.