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Submarine Leninist. Marine section. underwater minelayer II series

The first military shipbuilding program, approved in 1926, along with torpedo submarines, provided for the construction of underwater minelayers (3 units each for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets). Our country had priority in the creation of such submarines.

The world's first underwater minelayer "Crab" (displacement 533 t / 736 t), developed by M.P. Naletov and participated in the First World War as part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, had 2 bow torpedo tubes and took on board 60 mines. Despite the fact that the placement of mines in the superstructure was not entirely successful (in the event of an attack with depth charges, they could “detonate”), in tactical and technical terms, the submarine minelayer “Crab” surpassed the underwater minelayers that appeared later in other countries of the world.

For the submarine "Crab" an anchor mine of the "PL - 100" type with an impact-inertial fuse was designed, installed on a given depression from the ground using a hydrostatic device, the principle of which was proposed by Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov. They were located in two parallel corridors of a permeable superstructure equipped with rail tracks. The preparation of mines was carried out at the base, since access to them at sea was impossible ("wet" storage of mines). The mines were moved along the rail tracks to the stern section using a worm shaft rotated by an electric motor, and through the embrasure they were dropped into the water one by one. At the first moment, the mine fell along with the anchor, and then, using a special device, it was disconnected from the anchor and floated to a given depth.

In 1915 - 1916 in three military campaigns, the submarine-layer "Crab" deployed 150 mines off the coast of Turkey and Bulgaria. The experience gained in the Black Sea was an incentive to convert two Bars-class submarines (Ruff and Forel) then being built for the Baltic Fleet into minelayers. They were left with 2 bow TAs, and in the aft superstructure they set up mine corridors similar to the submarine "Crab" (21 mines on each side).
According to the project of an underwater minelayer developed in 1929 by A.N. Shcheglov, both rows of mines (40 in total) were transferred from the superstructure to a special mine tube of elliptical cross-section, half embedded in a durable hull. This, in contrast to the submarine "Crab", ensured "dry" storage of mines from the moment they were loaded until the start of deployment.
Between the rows of mines there was a passage sufficient to monitor their condition and access to depth setting devices. However, before planting the first mine, the pipe had to be filled with water from a special annular gap tank and further access to it became impossible.

A serious drawback of the option proposed by A.N. Shcheglov was also the large cross-section of the mine pipe and its non-circular shape. Therefore, to fill the mine pipe with water, a special large-volume tank was required, and the non-circular shape necessitated the need for powerful reinforcements of both the pipe itself and the adjacent part of the durable hull.
Such a minelayer was unsuitable for submarines, because filling the annular gap in it in a submerged position would have been impossible due to the pouring of water along the mine pipe and tank, and surfacing for this purpose or swimming with a constantly filled pipe would have deprived it of its main advantages - stealth and “dry” storage of mines.
A wide range of Baltic and Black Sea submariners and miners were involved in the development of more rational technical specifications for the Series II submarines. Such leading mine experts as A.E. Brykin and P.P. Kitkin took part in it. Twice (in December 1928 and September 1929) meetings were held on this issue in a separate division of the Black Sea Fleet submarine. They were attended by B.M. Malinin, the flagship miner of the Black Sea Fleet B.A. Denisov, naval engineer P.I. Serdyuk, and the chairman of the NTMK diving section A.N. Garsoev. The use of the collective experience of submariners and mine specialists of the domestic fleet made it possible to successfully cope with the task.

The improved version of the underwater minelayer proposed by B.M. Malinin differed from A.N. Shcheglov’s version mainly in that it provided for the placement of each of the two rows of mines (10 in each) with a separate round pipe with a diameter of 912 mm. They were located for most of their length inside the durable hull and exited it only through the aft end bulkhead. This achieved a multiple reduction in the annular gap in the pipes and the volume of the corresponding replacement tank.
Longitudinal stability when filling the annular gap underwater remained sufficient. Thus, the mines could remain dry until they were laid. A new version of the underwater minelayer was transferred to the Baltic Plant for implementation.

Based on the name of the lead submarine of the II series, minelayers of this type began to be called “Leninists”.
Architecturally, the Leninets submarine was in many ways reminiscent of the Decembrist type submarine and was its logical development, taking into account the experience already gained. At the same time, for the first time, a simplified form of a durable hull was used in the form of a combination of a cylinder in the middle part with cones at the ends instead of the spindle-shaped shape transferred to the Dekabrist type submarine from the single-hull submarines of the Bars and AG types.
This hull design made it possible to produce skin sheets using a cold method in rollers, whereas in previous submarines they had double curvature. Therefore, they had to be bent under pressure, and only in a heated state.
The durable hull of the Leninets type submarine (hereinafter referred to simply as the "L" type) was divided by bulkheads into 6 compartments. Of the 5 intercompartment bulkheads, 4 were spherical, designed for a pressure of 6 atm, and one was flat, designed for a pressure of 1 atm. All bulkheads had oval-shaped doors (on D-type submarines they were round).
The end bulkheads, which closed the ends of the shell of the durable hull, were made cast, 40 mm thick, spherical in shape. They were turned with the convex side outward.
The submarine had 3 shelter compartments, in which there were emergency blowing posts for the main ballast and means of rescuing personnel.

The distribution of durable hull volumes between compartments and rooms has changed significantly. The dimensions of the bow compartment (it became the largest), the central post (third compartment) and the fourth compartment were increased. This made it easier to recharge the nasal TAs. In the aft (sixth compartment) torpedo tubes were replaced with mine tubes. The special radio compartment (the second on the D-type submarine) was eliminated.
The commander of the submarine “L-3” P.D. Grishchenko describes the second compartment as follows: “Here on the left side, immediately behind the bulkhead, there is a navigation station and a navigator’s cabin, behind it is a wardroom and 7 berths - like in a soft carriage. On the starboard side there are 2 cabins - the commander and the political officer. Then there is the ship's galley, the radio room and, right next to the partition of the first compartment, a hydroacoustic post."
And this is what the submarine commander’s cabin looked like: “A tiny closet - 2 m along the side and 1.5 m from it. In the cabin there was a small table with a lowering board, several drawers for linen and personal belongings, a small safe for secret documents, a tiny closet for clothes... Along the side there is a bunk on oxygen cylinders with a bookshelf attached above the head, and a telephone on the shelf.”

The "L" type submarines belonged to the one-and-a-half-hull submarines. Their lightweight body was located along the entire length of the durable hull, but not along its entire perimeter - the lower part of the durable hull remained open. This hull shape significantly improved the stability of the submarine on the surface. The vertical keel was replaced by a box-like structure, separate from the light hull. It contained solid ballast.
The superstructure in the bow of the hull was significantly expanded. At first glance, this achieved better survivability of the submarine on the wave, but at the same time, control in a submerged position became significantly more difficult, and when on the surface, the pitching motion became more choppy.

To eliminate these shortcomings, they tried to increase the area of ​​the bow horizontal rudders, but this had an insignificant effect. On subsequent series of L-type submarines, the superstructure was again narrowed. As a result, it was possible to achieve a smoother pitching motion and reduce its scope.
The natural end of the light minelayer hull in the stern would be a vertical transom (a flat section of the stern). But for submarines this form turned out to be unacceptable for reasons of speed. Therefore, in the first version of the Leninets-class submarine, a permeable fairing of a pointed (flattened) shape was provided. However, the design of such a fairing, with large niches in it for the exit of mines, turned out to be very complex. Later it became clear that the fairing was not practical and was abandoned.

On the "L" type submarine, as well as on the "D" type submarine, the main command post was located in the central control room, and the control room had the shape of a vertical cylinder and served only as a support for the periscope stands and an airlock chamber. BUT, during tests of the “D” type submarine, and then the “Leninets” submarine, it was noticed that even with slight sea conditions, the upper guides of the periscopes and parts of the radio masts were often exposed during underwater travel, forming clearly visible breakers. The decision to transfer the control center from the control room, as was the case on the Bars-class submarine, to the central control center turned out to be erroneous. The fact is that the immersion depth of the periscope stands, as well as the upper part of the radio masts, does not depend on the length of the periscope, but only on its stroke during lifting, i.e. on the distance between the lower roller of the guy rope in the hold and the upper position of the eyepiece in the command post. The combination of the GKP and the CPU reduced this distance by almost 2 m. The periscope immersion depth of the submarine decreased by the same amount. Meanwhile, during rough seas, an additional lifting force of a dynamic nature arose, the greater the smaller the submersion depth of the submarine. For an "L" type submarine it could reach 1.5 - 2% of the displacement, i.e. 15 - 20 t! It is clear that it is almost impossible to combat such positive buoyancy with horizontal rudders during a dive at a speed of 5 - 10 knots.

A second version of the cabin was developed, which had the shape of a horizontal cylinder, in which the main control unit was located. Despite the fact that this caused a decrease in the rigidity of the periscope stands and even the appearance of vibration of the periscopes, the task of increasing the stealth of the submarine was considered more important.

Shortly before the war, L-type submarines underwent modernization. New periscopes were installed - anti-aircraft and commander. The commander's seat was raised from the central control room to the conning tower by more than 2 m. This innovation freed the commander from the noise and cramped conditions of the central compartment, where reports were received in a stream from all the submarine combat posts, and there were more than 20 of them.
The disadvantages of these submarines include clutter in the interior spaces, especially residential ones, which was facilitated by the transition in the general ship and battery ventilation systems from rectangular and trapezoidal pipes to round ones. However, round pipes fit worse into the contours of the interior, and technologically their production required significantly more labor, especially if there were many bends and bends. Nevertheless, round pipelines were also used on submarines of subsequent types and series.

During the construction of the submarine "Decembrist", sealing the deck tanks turned out to be difficult due to the presence of a large number of pipes and drives in them. Therefore, on the submarine "Leninets" they abandoned the use of deck tanks, and to compensate for the surface position, the upper stringer (roof) of the double-hull tanks was raised almost to the level of the upper edge of the pressure hull. This reduced the average water pressure when filling the tanks during a dive and required a slight increase in the cross-sectional area of ​​the seawalls. The transition of the submarine from the surface to the submerged position while simultaneously receiving all the ballast water took about three minutes.
An increase in the supply of compressed air compared to the Dekabrist submarine made it possible to increase the use of pneumatics. In particular, on “L” type submarines, not only the ventilation valves of the main ballast tanks, but also the kingstons were equipped with remote pneumatic control.

This, in turn, made it possible to increase the number of double-hull tanks, which improved unsinkability, reduced the cross-section and simplified the design of their kingstons. At the same time, there was a manual drive on the kingston of the aft ballast tank. Kingston remained always open and closed only when necessary by order. The ventilation valve of the rapid submersion tank had one pneumatic actuator.

The "L" type submarines received modernized domestically produced non-reversible diesel engines "42-BM-6", installed in the fifth compartment. They were compressorless, which eliminated the main cause of failure of all diesel engines with air atomization of fuel and provided a surface speed of up to 14.5 knots. At an economical speed of 9 knots, L-type submarines of Series II could travel 7,400 miles.
Instead of four groups of batteries, like the “D” type submarine (240 elements), the “Leninets” type submarine was equipped with only three groups of 112 “LS” type elements each. The total number of elements (336) has increased, but the size and capacity of each of them has decreased. This provided them with more intensive cooling and made it possible to count on the possibility of forcing discharge modes (for example, with a sharp increase in underwater speed). The advantage of the new batteries was the permissibility of discharge with a high current (1.3 hours instead of two hours on type “D” submarines).

Reducing the number of battery groups made it possible to reduce the number of battery compartments, i.e. reduce the number of bulkheads, which saved weight without compromising the unsinkability of the submarine. But due to the transition to an odd number of groups, it was necessary to abandon the possibility of switching them to a serial connection and fixing a constant voltage of 220 V.
In order not to lose the efficiency of the main underwater electric motors (sixth compartment) at economic and low speed, they were made with two anchors of equal power (325 hp each at 340 rpm), while ensuring the possibility switching them from parallel to serial connection. At full speed the armatures were switched on in parallel, at low speeds - in series. The economic propulsion engine anchors, which were located on the "D" type submarine on the main shaft line in a common housing with a full speed anchor, were replaced by separate economic propulsion engines with a power of 30 hp. at 800 rpm. with a textropic (i.e. elastic) transmission to the propeller shaft.

The bow torpedo compartment of the Leninets submarine has not undergone any changes compared to the D-type submarine, with the exception of steel TA pipes used for the first time in domestic submarine shipbuilding instead of cast bronze ones.

The artillery armament of the Leninets submarine, like that of the Dekabrist submarine, consisted of one 100-mm gun and one 45-mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic machine. But the 100 mm gun was installed not on the bridge, where it interfered with visibility, but in front of the wheelhouse on a special platform (parapet) of reduced height. The gun was protected from the oncoming wave by a forward-sloping bulwark.

The main weapon of the Leninets submarine was mines. In 1924, the PL-150 mine was put into service, which was a modernization of the PL-100 mine, which was used on the Krab submarine. It was used in combat training by the crew of the submarine "Rabochiy" (former minelayer "Ruff") in the Baltic Sea. But she no longer met the requirements. Therefore, for the L-type submarine, an anchor shock-mechanical mine PLT (submarine tube mine) with a warhead mass of 300 kg was created. It had the shape of a cylindrical cylinder with a length of 2100 mm and a diameter of 850 mm and consisted of a body and an anchor. Inside the case there was a charging chamber, a shock-mechanical device, an ignition device and a hydrostatic box. Dropping mines into the stern (like the submarine "Crab") eliminated the possibility of the submarine exploding on them during deployment. After exiting the pipe, the mine was immersed and, using a hydrostatic box, installed at the required depth.
For mechanical movement of mines in pipes during their loading and placement, a collet system was used, similar to those used in elevator devices for naval artillery installations. It consisted of longitudinal rods with ratchet heads (collets). During the longitudinal forward-reciprocating movement of the rods, the persistent teeth of the collets rested on the teeth of the ratchet bars attached to the mines and moved them in the desired direction.

Unlike the "D" type submarines, which had a system for tilting the bow horizontal rudders to reduce water resistance, on the "Leninets" series II submarines they were made stationary. The fact is that the system of folding bow horizontal rudders on the D-type submarine turned out to be very complex and turned out to be unnecessary - in the process of collapsing them, the submarine uncontrollably floated to the surface.

The completion of the development of many instruments and devices, which began during the creation of the Decembrist submarine, made it possible to use them on the Leninets submarine.
During the construction of the submarine "Leninets" in Technical Bureau No. 4, EPRON raised the British submarine "L-55" on August 14, 1928, sunk on June 4, 1919 in Koporye Bay. A thorough study of it made it possible to make an objective comparison with the "D" type submarine The displacement of the "L-55" turned out to be 14% less, and the buoyancy reserve as a percentage of the displacement and the number of compartments were the same.

Based on the hull type, the L-55 submarine should be classified as a single-hull submarine with round-shaped external main ballast tanks (“Bulls”). Compared to the double-hull submarine "Decembrist", this form seemed irrational, since it led to an increase in the width of the ship and its wetted surface, which could have an unfavorable effect on its performance both on the surface and in the submerged position.
More understandable was the use of a vertical stem shape by British designers. About. It has long been known that this helps to increase the performance of surface ships compared to the yacht form adopted for the Dekabrist class submarine. An even more advantageous form of stem (ram-type) was used on the Bars-class submarine. But on the submarine "Dekabrist" B.M. Malinin deliberately went for some deterioration in propulsion, believing that the applied shape of the stem would provide the submarine with better maneuverability through positional anti-submarine barriers: nets, booms connected by horizontal cables, etc. This was confirmed during the Great Patriotic War.
The superstructure of the L-55 submarine was significantly narrower than that of the Dekabrist submarine, which could be considered rational for a single-hull submarine, but would be difficult to apply for the Dekabrist double-hull submarine. On the other hand, the rather sharp change in the height of the superstructure in the area of ​​the wheelhouse and behind the mufflers, as well as its breakage at the end bulkhead of the pressure hull in the stern, could hardly be considered a successful design solution. The high height of the fencing, characteristic of all ocean-going submarines, especially British and American, attracted attention. However, the high deckhouse, which caused great water resistance when moving in a submerged position, required an increase in the power of the electric motors. This led to increased energy consumption, but the British were unable to significantly increase the battery capacity. Therefore, the underwater cruising range of the L-55 submarine turned out to be 1.5 times less than that of the Dekabrist submarine.
On the submarine "" the compartments were connected to each other by doors, which were secured using 17 wings (screw latches). In the event of an accident, there might not be enough time for this. On the watertight bulkheads of Soviet submarines, the necks were tightly closed within a few seconds.
There was no technical connection between the compartments on the L-55 submarine. There were no escape hatches for emergency exit of personnel and no air regeneration system.

The battery pits on the L-55 submarine were not sealed. They were simply covered with wooden shields covered with a rubber carpet on top. This carpet could prevent water from entering the pit, but did not protect the living quarters from the penetration of detonating gas and electrolyte fumes. However, with this design of the jar, the British managed to increase the height of the living quarters. Ventilation of the batteries was common. Many other critical remarks were made towards British designers. At the same time, as often happens, an opposite point of view appeared. For example, the chairman of the radiocommunication and radionavigation section of NTKM, A.I. Berg, argued in his memorandum that “for the designers of the L-55 submarine, it is of enormous value and it is advisable to somewhat delay the readiness of new submarines in order to make some improvements to them.”
The battery pits on the Leninets series II submarine were supposed to be made according to the model of the L-55 submarine, because this made it possible to slightly increase the height of the living compartments located above them. Meanwhile, A.N. Garsoev argued that on Soviet submarines “the personnel are located well and in no way worse (if not better) than on the L-55 submarine.” Nevertheless, such design changes were approved by the then Navy leadership.

The only borrowing was the “Boolean” contours of the hull of the Leninets submarine, but they were proposed by Soviet designers. This was a natural result of a critical reflection on the experience of building a D-type submarine.

The first 3 Soviet underwater minelayers were laid on September 6, 1929. The builder of the Leninets submarine was S.L. Kirichenko, the commissioning commander was A.G. Shishkin, and the commissioning mechanic was G.M. Trusov.
The other two submarines of series II were given the names "Marxist" and "Bolshevik". During the construction process they were renamed “Stalinets” and “Frunzovets”.

On March 15, 1930, 2 underwater minelayers were laid in Nikolaev - "Garibaldiets" and "Chartist" for the Black Sea Naval Forces. The third submarine of the "L" type - "Carbonari" was laid down on April 15, 1930.

In October - November 1933, the state commission chaired by Y.K. Zubarev adopted the first underwater minelayers of the Leninets type. During one of the submarine's dives, a strong blow was heard on the hull. During the inspection of the compartments, the cause was not discovered. But the subsequent blowing of the main ballast turned out to be longer than usual for some reason. The reason was discovered only after opening the necks of the onboard tanks in the database. It was refused that the line, located in the double-hull space and consisting of separate pipes with flanges installed on the watertight bulkheads of the side tanks, was crushed by outboard water pressure. A miscalculation was made in choosing the wall thickness of the pipes. After this, the pipes of the low-pressure air system for purging the main ballast were transferred from the onboard tanks inside the pressure hull.
On October 22, 1933, the lead submarine "Leninets" entered service with the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. Its commander was A.G. Bulavinets, mechanical engineer Yu.M. Serebryakov.
Following this, the fleet received underwater minelayers of the "L" type:
October 24, 1933 - submarine "Stalinets" (commander G.A. Ivanov, mechanical engineer A.P. Medvedev);
November 9, 1933 - Submarine "Frunzovets" (commander A.A. Pyshnov, mechanical engineer V.V. Matveev).

In the same year, the Black Sea Naval Forces entered service:
October 14, 1933 - submarine "Garibaldiets";
November 2, 1933 - submarine "Chartist".
On May 11, 1935, the sixth L-type submarine of series II, Carbonari, entered service with the Black Sea Fleet.

TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL ELEMENTS OF THE "LENINETS" TYPE PLUS

Displacement 1025 t/1312 t
Length 78 m
Maximum width 7.2 m
Surface draft 3.96 m
Buoyancy reserve 28.3%
Diesel engine power 2 x 1100 hp.
Electric motor power 2 x 600 hp.
Full surface speed 14.5 knots
Full underwater speed 8.3 knots
Cruising range at full surface speed 3,600 miles (10.8 kts)
Cruising range economic speed over water 7400 miles (9 knots)
Cruising range at economic speed underwater 154 miles (2.5 kts)
Autonomy 28 days
Operating immersion depth 75 m
Maximum immersion depth 90 m
Armament: 6 bow TA, stock of 12 torpedoes,
One 100 mm gun (122 rounds),
One 45 mm zen. gun (250 shells)

The submariners who mastered the first minelayers were particularly concerned about the operation of batteries, which was associated with a design flaw in its ventilation.
The Black Sea Navy Command reported on April 9, 1934 to the Chief of the Red Army Navy that “there was a case of a spark striking while charging a battery, which, with a significant release of hydrogen, could lead to an explosion.”
On August 14, 1934, a fire occurred in the third group of the battery on the submarine "Frunzovets". Vigorous actions under the leadership of submarine commander A.A. Pyshnov and mechanical engineer V.V. Matveev managed to eliminate it. This was followed by explosions of batteries on submarines of the II series, built by different factories: on August 28, 1934, an explosion occurred on the submarine "Garibaldiets", on September 5, 1934, an explosion occurred on the submarine "Stalinets". Both underwater minelayers were underwater at the time of the explosions that led to casualties. Commander P.I. Boltunov and commander of the electromechanical unit F.V. Bukach skillfully supervised the actions of the personnel of the submarine "Garibaldiets". Composure and technical competence were demonstrated by the commander of the submarine "Stalinets" G.A. Ivanov and mechanical engineer K.L. Grigaitis.
In both cases, the explosions occurred due to an improper ventilation system for the battery pits.
As a result, after two to three hours under water, the concentration of hydrogen released by the batteries reached the maximum permissible level (4%), an explosive mixture was formed and the slightest spark was enough to cause an explosion and fire.

We had to pay too high a price for our unjustified passion for foreign technical “novelties.” It took a lot of effort to achieve the necessary structural improvements to the “L” type submarines under construction and to eliminate the detected defects on those that were already in service. The battery pits were again made insulated, with a permanent metal flooring, and a special “K-5” device was used to burn hydrogen.
Among the unjustified “innovations” there was one more. The injection muffler system for exhaust gases, borrowed from the submarine "L-55", turned out to be not entirely successful: in conditions of low outside air temperatures, the injected water condensed, which unmasked the submarine.
To eliminate this phenomenon, the gas outlet from the muffler was diverted below the waterline (approximately 1 m). This did not have a noticeable effect on the operation of the diesel engines, but sufficient secrecy of the submarine was ensured even with a mirror-like sea surface.

On August 13, 1933, the Soviet government decided to build underwater minelayers of the "L" type for the Pacific Fleet. On February 2, 1934, the STO decided to begin construction of 6 submarines of series II-bis (then series XI). The need to transport them to the Far East by rail required the sectional assembly of these submarines.
The number of compartments of the "L" type submarine of the XI series increased to 7 (the previous aft compartment was divided into two. The layout of instruments and devices in the interior was changed, which improved the habitability of the submarine.
Their length increased by 2 m (in particular, due to the lengthening of the nasal tip).
The battery pits were made hermetically sealed (modeled on the Decembrist submarine type).
All submarines of the "L" type, series XI, were laid down from April 10 to June 10, 1934. The lead submarine was named "Voroshilovets" ("L-7").
In 1935, construction began for the Pacific Fleet of 7 underwater minelayers of the XIII series ("L-13" - "L-19").
On April 25, 2 submarines were laid down - "L-13" (lead), on December 31 - the last submarine of this series ("L-17").

The XIII series submarines had a mixed design - a strong hull was riveted, and a lightweight hull was welded. They differed significantly from the previous series in the perfection of technology, combined with great simplicity of design. This was primarily the merit of design engineers B.M. Malinin, V.I. Vasiliev, A.V. Samarin. The submariners who served on these submarines half-jokingly and half-seriously claimed that only the mine tubes remained on them from their predecessors. However, the mine device has also undergone changes.
Practice has shown that the collet system for advancing mines in pipes used on submarine minelayers of the first series had flaws (jamming of the drive due to misalignment of the collets). But in order to place a cable drum and a pusher in the aft part of each mine tube, ensuring equal tension on both branches of the cable, it was necessary to reduce the number of mines on board to 18. The mechanical indicator of the number of mines laid, previously located at the bow end of the mine tube, was replaced by a remote one that received signals from an electrical sensor installed at its aft end.
The "L" type submarines of the XIII series had an inclined stem and retractable bow horizontal rudders. On these submarines, 2 TA were additionally installed in the aft part of the superstructure. There were also 2 spare torpedoes in the pencil cases. The total supply of torpedoes increased from 12 to 18, 100 mm artillery shells from 122 to 150, 45 mm shells from 250 to 500. The habitability of the submarine was improved.
The cruising range at surface economic speed reached 10,000 miles instead of 7,400-7,500 miles for submarines of series II and XI. The maximum diving depth has increased to 100 m. The emergency dive time has been reduced to 60 seconds.

Submarines of the "L" type, series XIII-bis (according to the technical documentation, series XIII -38), were laid down in 1938. Their development was led by B.M. Malinin (he was released from prison in 1932 .), V.F. Kritsky, V.I. Vasiliev, P.Z. Golosovsky, V.P. Goryachev, V.P. Funikov.
The bow end of the XIII-bis series submarine was shortened by 2 m to eliminate the contact of fired torpedoes with the breakwater shields. A significant part of the mechanisms inside the durable casing had rubber shock absorbers, which significantly reduced the noise of the submarine.
The number of mines initially specified by the project (20) was restored due to a slight extension of the mine pipes.
Diesels of the "42 - BM - 6" brand were replaced with diesel engines of the "1 - D" brand with a power of 2000 hp. with some reduction in fuel consumption - 200 g/hp. at one o'clock. Thanks to this, the surface speed increased to 18 knots instead of 14.5 - 15.0 knots for submarines of series II, XI, XIII bis.
The lead submarine of the "L" type of the XIII-bis series - "L-20" was laid down on June 10, 1938. The entire series consisted of 6 units.
In total, the domestic industry built 25 Leninets-class submarines, of which 24 submarines were put into operation. The last submarine, the L-25, died in 1944 from a mine explosion while being towed.
Before June 22, 1941, 19 L-type submarines entered service in the USSR Navy
.

The high potential capabilities of this type of submarine were clearly demonstrated during pre-war combat training.
In the Black Sea, the submarine "L-6" ("Carbonarius" series II under the command of Lieutenant Commander V.L. Shatsky in October 1936, using an air regeneration system, was continuously under water for 2 weeks, only once surfacing to periscope depth for performing a training torpedo attack.
The submarine "L-13" of series XIII Pacific Fleet, commanded by Lieutenant Commander N.F. Shkolenko, in January 1940 made a difficult exit from the base under the ice, covering a distance of 46.8 miles in 19 hours 43 minutes.
Minelayers of the "L" type proved themselves to be excellent during the Great Patriotic War, effectively using not only mines, but also torpedo weapons.
For example, the submarine "L-3" ("Frunzovets") of series II has 22 transport ships and 5 enemy warships. Not a single submarine of the USSR Navy destroyed such a number of ships and vessels. The crew under the command of Captain 2nd Rank P.D. Grishchenko destroyed 17 transport ships with a total displacement of 35,506 GRT and one enemy submarine. The submarine "L-3" was repeatedly blown up by mines during combat campaigns, but remained in service.
Under the command of Captain 3rd Rank V.K. Konovalov, the submarine "L-3" further increased its combat score. For the achievements, the submarine "L-3" became one of the first at the KBFPL to be awarded the Guards rank. The cabin of the submarine "L-3" is installed on the territory of the KBF underwater connection.
The lead submarine of the "L" type of the Black Sea Fleet, the "L-4" ("Garibaldiets"), operated exceptionally successfully under the command of captain 3rd rank E.P. Polyakov. She became the first Red Banner submarine on the Black Sea.
On mines laid by the submarine "L-5" ("Chartist"), commanded by Lieutenant Commander A.S. Zhdanov, the Romanian minelayer "Regele Carol I" was blown up and sank.
Torpedoes from the submarine "L-6" under the command of Lieutenant Commander B.V. Gremyako sank a small coaster and damaged a tanker.

The submarines "L-15" and "L-16" of the Pacific Fleet made the transition from Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka (left on September 25, 1942) through the Pacific Ocean, the Panama Canal, the Atlantic Ocean, to the Barents Sea (May 19, 1943, the submarine "L" -15" arrived at the port of Polyarny). The submarine "L-16" was lost near San Francisco after a torpedo attack by an unknown submarine (Japanese or American).
During the war with Japan, the submarine "L-12" (series XIII), under the command of Lieutenant Commander P.Z. Shchelganov, was sunk by torpedoes off the island. Hokkaido frigate No. 75 (displacement 745 tons). The submarine "L-19" (series XIII), under the command of captain 3rd rank A.S. Kanonenko, disabled two transports with torpedoes, one of which sank.

In total, the Leninets-class submarine had 40 dead transport ships with a total displacement of 93,900 gross tons, as well as 18 enemy combat and auxiliary ships.

At the beginning of June 2009, the first stage of the search expedition “Bow to the ships of the Great Victory 2009” ended, which consisted of exploring the remains of a submarine lying at a depth of 59 meters off the coast of Bulgaria. After clearing the bow 100-mm gun of the sunken submarine, we read the markings “B-24” and “06-9”, which corresponded to the submarine L-24, the hull of which was discovered at the bottom of the Black Sea in 1988 by an expedition of the Institute of Oceanology of Bulgaria using a towed uninhabited submarine device "Relef - 4000". According to the Bulgarians themselves, in 1988 and 1991 they “partially explored” the remains of the submarine, which, according to them, lie at a depth of about 60 meters at a course of 290 degrees and rise 9.2 meters above the bottom.

On the initiative of the Russian Underwater Federation and the Bulgarian Dive Center, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of Bulgaria S. Stanishev, this year it was possible to prepare an expedition led by K. Bogdanov, which included not only Russian, but also Bulgarian divers On June 2 (the first day of the dive), scuba divers examined the boat and found that it lay at a depth of 59.5 meters on an even keel, all the hatches were battened down, and the guns were secured in the stowed position. A hole was discovered on the left side under the bow 100 mm gun. Having cleared the place under the gun of the submarine, which had lain at the bottom for 67 years, the submarine was identified, thereby fulfilling the goal of the first stage of the expedition.

The Leninets-type underwater minelayer of the XIII-bis series was built at plant No. 198 NKSP (Black Sea Shipyard named after Andre Marty) in Nikolaev. Laid down on October 20 (according to other sources, 23) October 1940.

The acceptance certificate was signed on April 29, 1942, the submarine officially entered service on May 6, 1942, and was officially included in the Black Sea Fleet on May 12, 1942. For the creation of submarines of the XIII-1938 series in 1943, the honorary title of laureates of the State Prize of the 1st degree was awarded to N.V. Alekseev, V.I. Vasiliev, P.Z. Golosovsky, V.P. Goryachev, V.F. Kritsky, B M. Malinin, V. P. Funikov. The L-24 met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War at the factory wall, where the construction of the submarine continued. As of July 1, 1941, the degree of technical readiness of the submarine was estimated at 75%.

Tactical and technical data of the project:

Displacement: surface/underwater - 1108/1099 t

Speed: surface/underwater - 18/9(8.5?) knots

Cruising range:

on the surface - 950 (18 knots) miles

5500(10kt) miles

with increased fuel reserve 3400 (17 knots) miles

10000(10kt) miles

Submerged - 150 (2.5 knots) miles

13.5(9kt) miles

Crew: -52(54-56?) people

Dimensions: -85.3(83.3?)x7.0x4.1 m

Armament: 533mm NTA-6 pcs.

533mm KTA-2 pcs.

gun B-24-PL 100mm - 1 pc.

gun 21-K 45mm - 1 pc.

Mines: -20 pcs.

Autonomy: -30(45) days

Immersion depth: - up to 100 meters

In mid-August 1941, German troops approached Nikolaev. On August 12, L-24 urgently began leaving the factory. It was missing a battery and some auxiliary mechanisms and devices; The submarine could not dive. Together with the crew, the delivery team headed by builder M.I. Bychkov and mechanic A.A. Zmeytsyn left for the submarine. The senior officer on board the submarine was Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain II Rank I.A. Burmistrov. At the exit, the submarine was fired upon by German artillery, and in the area of ​​Cape Tarkhankut it was caught in a strong storm and sea water began to flow into the hull through the rivet holes of the removable sheets, disrupting the operation of a number of mechanisms. Along the route, the L-24 withstood an attack by a German plane, but was still able to complete the difficult single passage to Sevastopol.

On August 17, 1941, Lieutenant Commander Andrei Antonovich Kosenko was appointed commander of the L-24. On November 9, L-24 moved to Poti, where it continued completion and commissioning of the ship. The state of discipline on the submarine was not up to par, and on January 12, 1942, the submarine commander was arrested and tried by a military tribunal for systematic drunkenness. Having considered his case, the court sent the former L-24 commander to a penal company.

On February 9, 1942, captain III rank Georgy Petrovich Apostolov was appointed commander of the L-24. On April 7, the submarine completed the sea trials program. At the beginning of June 1942, the L-24 moved to Novorossiysk, from where it took part in supplying the besieged Sevastopol. Over four transport flights to Sevastopol, the L-24 delivered 217.3 tons of ammunition, 95 tons of food, 98 tons (according to other sources 82 tons) of gasoline to the city’s defenders, and evacuated 54 people to the Caucasus.

After the fourth transport voyage, when the submarine returned to Novorossiysk, it survived three long pursuits by Kriegsmarine boats with a total duration of 36 hours. The total number of depth charges dropped on the submarine during this period was about three hundred. A number of electrical measuring instruments on the submarine were disabled, and the seals of the high pressure cylinders were damaged. Arriving in Novorossiysk, the L-24 came under the infamous air raid on July 2, 1942, when 64 German Ju-88 bombers, accompanied by a dozen fighters, dropped about 170 bombs on the ships standing in the harbor. In a quarter of an hour, the leader "Tashkent", the destroyer "Bditelny", the ambulance transport "Ukraine" and several small ships were killed. L-24 was also damaged. Four bombs exploded at a distance of 5-15 meters from the submarine’s hull. The submarine began to move away from the pier and at that moment a 500-kg bomb hit the first engine room of the destroyer Bditelny, causing the explosion of its two torpedoes in torpedo tube No. 1. As a result of the bombing and detonation of the Vigilant torpedoes, the submarine suffered numerous damage to the light hull and tank plating, and the breakwater flaps of the torpedo tubes were jammed. Seven L-24 crew members were injured and burned. On the same day, the submarine left for Poti, where it remained under repair until August 12, and two days after entering service, the L-24 headed to the Bosphorus, where it patrolled the area to no avail until the evening of August 31. When the submarine returned to the Samsun area, several enemy aircraft dropped 48 bombs on the L-24 without much success.

On October 1, 1942, the L-24 went to sea. Having deployed twenty mines near Yalta on October 4, the submarine moved to the designated area to the Bosphorus, where it arrived on October 6. The next day, L-24 discovered an enemy convoy and attacked a tanker from it with three torpedoes. The minesweepers "R-165" and "R-166" guarding the convoy dropped 9 depth charges on the submarine, from the explosions of which the submarine received minor damage. A minute and a half after the launch of the torpedoes, an explosion of one of them was recorded on the submarine. The target of the L-24 attack was the Italian tanker Arca (1883, 2.238 GRT). It is unknown whether the ship was damaged. Arca was sunk by the British submarine Taku on October 26, 1942, off Chios. L-24 remained in position until the evening of October 17, but did not encounter anyone else except the Turkish schooners.

On November 15, L-24 went to sea with the task of laying mines southeast of Cape Kaliakra (Bulgaria). On November 19, having deployed 20 mines, the submarine successfully completed its combat campaign on November 23, 1942, arriving in Poti.

The next trip to sea was the last for the L-24. On December 12, 1942, the submarine went to lay mines in the area of ​​​​Cape Kaliakra, after which it was supposed to conduct patrols in this area and return to base on the morning of January 1, 1943. Before the start of patrolling at the position assigned to him, the L-24 commander, Captain III Rank G.P. Apostolov, after appropriate additional reconnaissance of the enemy’s coastal communications, was supposed to place on them 8 miles east of Cape Kaliakra the entire mine reserve of his ship - 20 boat anti-ship anchor contact mines of the PLT type .

On December 12, 1942, at 22.47, the “Combat Log of the Headquarters of the 1st Submarine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet” recorded a radiogram given by G.P. Apostolov at 22.30 to the operational duty officer of the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet: “For the period from 00 o’clock until 05 o’clock, please turn on the radio beacons of Poti, Batumi and Sukhumi.” This was the only radiogram received from the L-24. On December 31, 1942, in the “work log of the operational duty officer of the Flagship Command Post of the Black Sea Fleet” there appeared a record of a radiogram sent by the command of the Black Sea Fleet submarine brigade at 09.40: “At dawn on January 1, the arrival from Westa to Poti according to the plan of submarine L-24 is expected. The submarine is returning without radio communication.”

Hope for her safe return to base was given by an aerial reconnaissance report, which at 10.35 on January 1 reported that a submarine had been detected in square No. 2992, heading 80 degrees, speed 10 knots. Presumably this is submarine L-24,” but this report turned out to be erroneous. On the same day, at 13.15, patrol boat No. 039 left Poti to meet L-24, waited at sea for 6.5 hours to no avail and returned to base alone at 19.40. At 18.00, for independent entry into Poti, the lighthouse and port lights were turned on for an hour (in wartime this is an exceptional case), then their work was extended until 20.25, but the L-24 did not return to base at the appointed time.

The next day, January 2, an entry appeared in the “Historical Journal of the Black Sea Fleet No. 20” that “the submarine L-24 is one day late in returning from position No. 50. There is no connection with the submarine." 9 days later, on January 11, the following final entry was made in the same document: “ The submarine L-24 did not return from position No. 50. The planned return date for the submarine expired on 01/01/43. From 01/11/43 The submarine L-24 is considered lost while performing a combat mission. The cause, time and place of death of the submarine have not been established. Contacts with the submarine since leaving the base on 12/12/42. did not have».

None of the researchers were able to establish any details of the last combat campaign of the underwater minelayer L-24, and therefore most of them agreed that the L-24 died between December 15 and 29, 1942 in the area of ​​​​Cape Shabla (Shabler) on a mine Romanian barrier S-15. Detection of the L-24 hull at the point 43°19.4min N/28°41.5min E. suggests that the boat did not die on the S-15 barrier itself (Sperre 15), set up on December 7, 1941 by the Romanian minelayer “Admiral Murgescu” under the command of Captain III Rank Ovidiu Margineanu, but on one of the 100 German anti-submarine mines of the type that constituted it UMA, torn from it by December storms and carried 12 miles south of it, where L-24 is located today. According to Soviet official sources, the command of the Black Sea Fleet did not know about this barrier and therefore could not inform A.G. Apostolov, who was entering the position, about it, who “apparently considered this area safe from mines.”

The analysis of the first part of the submarine’s combat mission in its last combat campaign - the planned laying of a minefield at Cape Kaliakra - allows us to find the day of the death of L-24. This task could presumably be completed in full (20 minutes) 8 miles east of Cape Kaliakra between 17 and 26 December. Available enemy data suggests that not only no mine explosions were recorded in this area, but also no Soviet boat mines themselves, which clearly indicates that the L-24 never laid any mines. L-24 did not have time to do this before her death, which, obviously, followed immediately after the submarine arrived at the position, in the process of reconnaissance of the enemy’s coastal communications before the actual laying of mines on the night of December 15-16, that is, the boat died on December 15, 1942 of the year.

Thus, it is possible to assume that the underwater minelayer L-24 died on December 15, 1942 in the area of ​​​​Cape Kaliakra (Bulgaria), at a point with coordinates 43gr26.72min N/28gr56.14min E. on a drifting mine torn from an S-15 mine laid by the Romanian minelayer Admiral Murgescu.

While participating in the Great Patriotic War, the L-24 made 8 combat campaigns:
06/05/1942-06/09/1942 Transport flight to Sevastopol
06/11/1942-06/15/1942 Transport flight to Sevastopol
06/16/1942-06/20/1942 Transport flight to Sevastopol
06/22/1942-06/29/1942 Transport flight to Sevastopol
08/14/1942-09/03/1942 Combat campaign
01.10.1942-21.10.1942 Mine laying
11/15/1942-11/23/1942 Mine laying
12.12.1942- +

The number of personnel on the L-24 staff was 50 people, but in the last combat campaign, 57 Black Sea submariners were on board the submarine and died along with it:

1. Apostolov Georgy Petrovich (1910-1942) - captain of the 3rd rank, submarine commander.
2. Mamutov Abidin (1903-1942) - lieutenant captain, deputy commander of the ship for political affairs.
3. Nikolai Danilovich Ivanov (1913-1942) - lieutenant captain, assistant submarine commander.
4. Katkov Alexey Matveevich (1912-1942) - engineer-captain-lieutenant, commander of warhead-5.
5. Kuznetsov Nikolai Mikhailovich (1916-1942) - senior lieutenant, commander of warhead-1.
6. Voronov Lev Semenovich (1916-1942) - senior lieutenant, commander of the steering group.
7. Potemkin Viktor Panteleimonovich (1919-1942) - senior lieutenant, commander of warhead-3.
8. Marchenko Pyotr Sevastyanovich (1918-1942) - senior lieutenant, commander of a mine and torpedo group.
9. Borzov Nikolai Abramovich (1918-1942) - lieutenant, backup commander of the warhead-3.
10. Chaplygin Evgeniy Yakovlevich (1919-1942) - lieutenant engineer, commander of the movement group (motor group).
11. Litvinenko Mikhail Nazarovich (1920-1942) - senior military paramedic, head of the sanitary service.
12. Levkovich Petr Vasilievich (1911-1942) - midshipman, boatswain.
13. Verbenko Gavriil Ivanovich (1911-1942) - midshipman, foreman of a group of electricians.
14. Ermakov Mikhail Fedorovich (1908-1942) - midshipman, foreman of the bilge group.
15. Karpov Ivan Andreevich (1908-1942) - midshipman, foreman of a group of motorists.
16. Lyubimov Valentin Porfirievich (1912-1942) - chief foreman, foreman of the torpedo group.
17. Podolsky Nikolai Nikolaevich (1917-1942) - foreman of the 1st article, foreman of radio operators.
18. Zarubin Dmitry Fedorovich (1919-1942) - sergeant major of the first class, commander of the gunners’ squad.
19. Shishkin Tikhon Petrovich (1914-1942) - senior sergeant of the 1st class, commander of the bilge department.
20. Vasilenko Ivan Panteleevich (1916-1942) - foreman of the II class, commander of the radio operator squad.
21. Glazunov Nikolai Vasilievich (1921-1942) - foreman of the II class, commander of the helmsman squad.
22. Gorban Andrey Moiseevich (1919-1942) - foreman of the II class, commander of the department of electronic navigation devices (navigation electricians).
23. Tkachenko Viktor Fedorovich (1921-1942) - sergeant-major II class, commander of the covert communications department.
24. Khabarov Alexander Semenovich (1915-1942) - foreman of the II class, commander of the torpedo squad.
25. Chukurna Alexander Lazarevich (1915-1942) - foreman of the II class, commander of the torpedo squad.
26. Shcherbakov Vasily Grigorievich (1917-1942) - foreman of the II class, commander of the electricians department.
27. Kononets Pavel Romanovich (1913-1942) - senior Red Navy man, commander of the motorists squad.
28. Volkov Grigory Kirillovich (1919-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior engine mechanic.
29. Domovodov Nikolai Pavlovich (1920-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior engine mechanic.
30. Taran Ivan Vasilyevich (1921-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior engine mechanic.
31. Shakirov Zufar Shakirovich (1919-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior engine mechanic.
32. Belyaev Evgeniy Georgievich (1921-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior electrician.
33. Korobkin Ivan Grigorievich (1921-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior electrician.
34. Gusev Andrey Sergeevich (1920-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior helmsman.
35. Muzhikovsky David Zusimovich (1918-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior helmsman.
36. Lapkin Nikolai Tarasovich (1920-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior bilge officer.
37. Svetlichny Ilya Stepanovich (1921-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior bilge officer.
38. Litvin Pyotr Stepanovich (1920-1942) - senior Red Navy man, senior gunner.
39. Petrov Vladimir Georgievich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, senior motorman.
40. Glukhov Vasily Nikolaevich (1920-1942) - Red Navy man, engine mechanic.
41. Sharnikov Mikhail Mikhailovich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, engine mechanic.
42. Shkuratov Nikolai Vlasovich (1920-1942) - Red Navy man, engine mechanic.
43. Balandin Viktor Ivanovich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, torpedo operator.
44. Gaivoronsky Nikolai Maksimovich (1920-1942) - Red Navy man, torpedo operator.
45. Bozhko Ivan Ivanovich (1921-1942) - Red Navy, bilge.
46. ​​Suprin Ivan Kirillovich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, bilge officer.
47. Vasiliev Gavriil Alekseevich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, helmsman.
48. Koptsov Viktor Dementievich (1922-1942) - Red Navy man, helmsman.
49. Kabitsky Valentin Vasilievich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, miner.
50. Kutsirin Sergey Alekseevich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, miner.
51. Kovalenko Pavel Spiridonovich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, electrician.
52. Komarovsky Ivan Lavrentievich (1920-1942) - Red Navy, cook.
53. Kudryavtsev Ivan Mikhailovich (1924-1942) - Red Navy man, electrician.
54. Popov Mikhail Ivanovich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, electrician.
55. Savoev Anatoly Fedorovich (1921-1942) - Red Navy man, radio operator.
56. Tinyakov Nikolai Alexandrovich (1922-1942) - Red Navy man, senior hydroacoustic.
57. Usenko Ivan Dmitrievich (1923-1942) - Red Navy man, combatant.

The death of the minelayer L-24 was accompanied by the largest number of dead submariners in the history of the Black Sea Podplav.

Everlasting memory!

Vladimir Boyko
reserve captain 1st rank
Navy submariner veteran
Marine Assembly of Sevastopol

Submarine L-21

On March 14, 1945, two German destroyers were heading west. They were transporting representatives of the East Prussian administration from Pillau who were fleeing the advancing Soviet troops. The calculation of the German bureaucrats seemed to be correct; high-speed warships with good anti-aircraft weapons could fend for themselves during a Soviet air raid. But this time another danger awaited the destroyers. A large column of water rose up at the side of the destroyer T-5 and within a few minutes the destroyer began to rapidly plunge under the water. Let's give credit to the commander of the second ship, the destroyer T-3, he did not abandon his comrade and tried to organize the rescue of the crew and passengers. But this time this decision was wrong and a few minutes later the destroyer T-3 was blown up by a mine. The destroyer's emergency party kept the doomed ship afloat for a long time; it lasted for almost two hours, but eventually sank. The mines that blew up the German ships were laid by the Soviet submarine L-21.
From the time of their creation, submarines were intended to covertly strike the enemy. Stealth gave them the opportunity to suddenly launch an attack and deliver a crushing blow. Naturally, torpedoes were best suited for this, and the first attacks by submarines on warships immediately yielded serious results. A small midget could drown a giant many times larger than itself. But one designer in Russia believed that covert mine laying could cause just as much damage to the enemy. One of the talented Russian engineers, Naletov, proposed building an underwater minelayer and designed it himself. This submarine, named "Crab", was built at a shipyard in Nikolaev and was delivered to the fleet in 1915. The submarine took part in the First World War, laid mines and even achieved success. The Turkish gunboat Isa-Reis was blown up by mines. Apparently influenced by the appearance of this submarine, German engineers designed their underwater minelayers.
Years passed, after the revolution and civil war, the USSR government tried to evaluate the submarines remaining from tsarist times. Alas, the picture was bleak. Most of the submarines were in poor condition. All this was aggravated by the fact that the existing Bars-class submarines had many design flaws. They did not have waterproof bulkheads, and most of the torpedoes were in external lattice tubes, which had to be abandoned due to the experience of the First World War. In practice, this meant that in case of any damage to the pressure hull, the Bars-class submarine quickly flooded and died.

All this led to the decision of the Soviet government to begin the design and construction of new submarines. Having our own experience of the successful use of underwater minelayers and evaluating the experience of German submariners, it was decided to build one of the series of submarines as underwater minelayers.
The first submarines built in the USSR were series I submarines (Decembrist type). Despite some shortcomings, it turned out to be a good submarine for operations on the seas and oceans.
On the basis of this project, underwater minelayers of the II series (Lenenets type) were created. The shape of the hull was changed to simplify construction, and two pipes with 10 mines each were added. According to this project, submarines L-1-L-6 were built, three each for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, respectively.
Next, twelve underwater minelayers were built for the Pacific Fleet. They were a modified design, mainly in the direction of increasing manufacturability during construction.
The last underwater minelayers of the Lenenets type were the submarines of the XIII series - bis. These ships were already very different from the Series II submarines. The length was reduced by two meters, and the noise of submarines was reduced through the use of special shock absorbers. The armament was supplemented by two stern torpedo tubes. The ammunition capacity of artillery guns has been increased. New, more powerful diesel engines made it possible to develop higher speeds on the surface.
The L-21 submarine belonged to precisely such submarines. It was laid down on September 30, 1938 at plant No. 189 in Leningrad. Construction went according to plan and the submarine was launched on July 30, 1940.
The displacement of the submarine on the surface was 1125 tons, while underwater it was 1416 tons. The length of the submarine was 83 meters, width 7 meters, draft 4.43 meters. The torpedo armament consisted of six bow and two stern 533 mm torpedo tubes. The supply of torpedoes reached 18 pieces. The mine armament consisted of 20 mines. The artillery armament consisted of one 100 mm and one 45 mm cannon. Two diesel engines of 2,000 horsepower each provided a maximum surface speed of 18 knots. When submerged, the boat was powered by two electric motors with a power of 650 horsepower each and could reach a maximum speed of 8 knots. The electric motors were powered by batteries, which were charged by diesel engines on the surface. Cruising range on the surface is 11,000 miles at a speed of 9 knots, underwater 130 miles at a speed of 2 knots. Maximum diving depth is 100 meters. Autonomy 30 days. The crew consisted of 57 people.
The submarine L-21 met the war at the factory wall of the Baltic Shipyard. Its readiness was estimated at 74 percent. However, the plant's management, busy with more pressing concerns with the completion and repair of ships, paid virtually no attention to the boat. Despite the difficult blockade winter of 41/42, work was still carried out on the submarine and by May 1942 its readiness was estimated at 85 percent.
On May 24, 1942, the L-21 submarine standing at the outfitting wall of the plant was hit by a heavy German shell. Severe damage led to the sinking of the submarine and it lay on the ground.
However, the factory workers and sailors of the Baltic Fleet managed to seal the holes and apply a plaster to the submarine’s hull. The efforts of the rescuers were crowned with success and on June 8, 1942, the submarine surfaced and was towed for completion.
In November 1942, the submarine underwent dry docking, during which the holes were sealed and the necessary repair work was carried out.
In the spring of 1943, the L-21 submarine finally began completion at the Baltic Shipyard. The workers had to repair a number of components and assemblies of the ship in difficult conditions of the blockaded city. As construction progressed, it became clear that a number of parts for mine pipes were missing in Leningrad. With great effort, the workers were able to produce them and the L-21 mines became one of the deadliest in the Soviet fleet.
The ship was delivered on August 31, 1943. The ship was accepted by the Navy and became a valuable addition to the 1944 company. In the winter of 43/44, the Dragon hydroacoustic station was installed on the ship.
The combat training course for the submarine crew lasted only a month, from September 30 to October 28. Already on the evening of October 28, the submarine set off along the skerry fairway to Helsinki for the war...
The most serious argument for the new submarine turned out to be its commander - captain 3rd rank Mogilevsky Sergei Sergeevich. He was born on September 16, 1909. Served in the Navy since 1931. After being drafted into the navy, he served on the battleship Marat and the destroyer Volodarsky. In 1933, after completing special courses for the command staff of the Red Army Navy, he was appointed commander of the warhead-3 on the L-1 submarine. In 1936, he was a student of the underwater diving training squad named after. Kirov. In the same year, Mogilevsky was appointed assistant commander, and from November 1938 commander of the L-1. Participant of the Soviet-Finnish war. Since February 1941, he was an officer in the submarine department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet headquarters, and in November of the same year he took command of the L-21 under construction. Having extensive experience serving on submarines, he managed to force the crew and the ship to do almost the impossible. This is what became the key to success.
The command of the Baltic Fleet did not allow the submarine to remain in the Finnish bases for a long time. There was a war going on, German ships and transports carried cargo and troops along the entire southern coast of the Baltic Sea. Under these conditions, on November 10, 1944, L-21 left on its first trip to the Pommeranian coast.
On the afternoon of November 14, arriving at a position 45 miles northwest of the Stilo lighthouse, the submarine discovered a German cruiser with an escort. But this time luck turned away from the submariners. The target's too long distance and high speed did not give it a chance to reach salvo range.
On the morning of November 17, the submarine attacked a fishing trawler with torpedoes, but missed.
On the night of November 21, the ship moved to the Stolpe Bank area. Mogilevsky was in no hurry to lay mines. Having carefully studied the movement of German ships during the day, Mogilevsky was able to understand the location of the German fairway. To the observation of the Soviet commander we must add German carelessness. The Germans left a glowing buoy, which greatly helped the Soviet commander when laying mines.
However, the production itself, carried out on the night of November 23, was not an easy task. The mines had to be placed at a distance of 25 cables from the shore (4 kilometers). The depth at the location was 16 meters and if the submarine was detected by German ships, it would not be able to dive. It was possible to lay 16 mines, the 17th mine got stuck in a mine tube during placement and the submarine was forced to return to the Finnish skerries for repairs.
But fortune favors the brave. On the morning of November 23, the German transport Eichberg (1923 GRT) walking along the fairway came across a submarine mine and was forced to run ashore. The Germans managed to save him, but the patrol ship VS-302, which came to the rescue, was itself blown up by a mine and went for repairs.
On the morning of November 24, the Danish steamer Elie (1873 GRT) sailing along the fairway with a German cargo was blown up by an L-21 mine and quickly sank. She became the first ship to die from an underwater mine.
Only the incompleteness of German documents at the end of the war does not allow the German transport Eberhard (761 GRT), which died in the area of ​​a mine-laying submarine on December 22, 1944, to be counted as a submarine.
Meanwhile, despite the breakdown, Mogilevsky continued to look for enemy ships and vessels on the way to the base. On the morning of November 24, he discovered a steamer 18 miles from Visby and fired three torpedoes at it. Two of them hit the target and the Swedish steamer Hansa (493 brt). The Swedes came under attack because there was a German patrol ship next to their ship.
Meanwhile, the submarine reached the Finnish skerries, where it attempted to independently get rid of the stuck mine. This failed and the boat arrived in Turku on November 26.
At the base, the mine was returned to its place and the submarine set off to search for German ships and vessels. Bad weather prevented the commander from achieving new successes.
On December 22, Kozalo almost managed to reach a position for a torpedo salvo on a German convoy coming from Libau to the Bay of Danzig, but the German patrol ship V-1604 managed to detect the submarine going out to attack and bombard it with artillery fire. The attack was foiled and the submarine retreated.
From its first voyage, the submarine L-21 arrived in Hanko on December 25, 1944. Already on December 26, the boat moved to Turku and stood for repairs.
In January and February 1945, the boat's batteries were replaced and the necessary repairs were made. At the same time, an unpleasant incident occurred with the crew of the submarine. Taking advantage of the absence of the commander, the senior assistant and the team began to “rest”, fortunately, there were plenty of reasons for this. Unauthorized absences and drunkenness led to the replacement of the first mate and mechanical engineer on the submarine. Mogilevsky himself received a reprimand from the command and threats that if he did not impose discipline on the boat, he would be removed from his post.
With such a cargo, the L-21 submarine set out on March 5, 1945 for its second voyage. Already on March 8, it became clear that the stern horizontal rudders were not working. It was impossible to continue the campaign without them. Despite the complex breakdown, the crew decided to repair them without returning to base. Repairs continued on the high seas for thirteen hours and the sailors managed to repair the damage to the rudders.
On the night of March 13, the submarine arrived in the area of ​​the Hel Peninsula. Having managed to understand the location of the German fairway, Captain 3rd Rank Mogilevsky once again demonstrated his skill as a ship commander. Taking advantage of the fog, he was able to avoid meeting with German patrol ships and on the morning of March 13 he managed to place all 20 mines 2 miles east of the Hel lighthouse.
The victims of the mine laying were the destroyers T-3 and T-5, the death of which was described above. It should be noted that the destroyer T-3 managed to sink the Soviet submarine S-4. Mogilevsky managed to avenge his fallen comrades. The exact number of sailors killed on German destroyers is unknown to this day.
Another victim of the L-21 mines was the German submarine U-367. The last message from her, which came on March 15, 1945, reported the explosion of a submarine on a mine in a square coinciding in coordinates with the mine laying of a Soviet underwater mine.
Twice on the evening of March 18, 1945, the submarine launched attacks on German convoys northwest of Cape Riksgaft. In both cases, according to the commander's observations, the torpedoes missed the target.
On the evening of March 22, aerial reconnaissance aircraft transmitted information to the submarine about the movement of a German convoy from Sveniamunde to Libau. On the morning of March 23, Mogilevsky overtook the convoy and fired a three-torpedo salvo at it. As a result, two torpedoes hit the patrol ship V2022 "Emil Colsman", with a displacement of about a thousand tons. 76 German sailors died on board the patrol ship.
Early in the morning of March 24, the submarine attacked another German convoy. Having fired three torpedoes, the sailors heard two explosions. What happened is unknown, but the F8 patrol ship reported that it saw the passage of three torpedoes near the convoy. None of them hit the target.
The last success was an attack on the afternoon of March 25, 1945 on a German convoy. As a result of a three-torpedo salvo, one torpedo hit the Gretel light floating battery. The German floating battery quickly sank, becoming Mogilevsky's last success. For a long time it was believed that this attack was unsuccessful, but German documents that have appeared in scientific circulation in recent years clearly prove the success of the L-21 commander.
Having successfully completed the combat campaign, the submarine returned to Turku on March 29, 1945.
As a result of the campaign, the commander of the submarine L-21 was awarded the Order of Ushakov, 2nd degree, for the campaign.
The submarine L-21 served in the Soviet fleet until 1955, when it was decommissioned and dismantled for metal.
Captain 3rd Rank Mogilevsky after the end of the war commanded a number of submarines ("K-54" from November 1946, "P-3" from August 1947), then served as chief of staff, commander of a separate division of experienced submarines. On July 15, 1950, Mogilevsky was awarded the rank of captain 1st rank. Since 1953, Mogilev member of the state commission for the acceptance of ships from industry. In 1966 he retired. He was awarded two Orders of the Red Star, the Order of Ushakov II degree, the Order of the Patriotic War I degree and medals.
It should be noted that, having completed only two military campaigns, Mogilevsky managed to send two destroyers, a submarine, a floating battery, a patrol ship and two transports to the bottom. The transport and patrol ship were damaged. It is possible (impossible to confirm with currently available German documents) that the transport was sunk.
This long list of successes allows us to raise the question of awarding Captain 1st Rank Mogilevsky with the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. He deserved it with his successes during the war. After all, at that time the Soviet headquarters did not have German documents that would allow them to evaluate the success of mine laying.