Border posts are not important for Old Man, Russian gas is more important to him

Relations between Belarus and Russia have become noticeably tense - the Russian Federation has started, they even started talking about the fact that Belarus is -. The Belarusians increased the tariff for the transit of Russian oil, despite the fact that they owed Russia a lot of money for gas, the Russian Federation reduced oil supplies, and Lukashenko decided not to come to the CSTO summit in St. Petersburg.

Yuri Shevtsov, director of the Belarusian Center for European Integration Problems, told us what kind of cat ran between the Russians and Belarusians.

In the 1990s, the possibility of uniting Belarus and Russia into a single state was discussed - do you think this discussion can still be relevant today?

Today Belarus and Russia are very different states. If at the end of the 1990s Belarus was already consolidated under the rule of one person and was a controlled state, then Russia was not one then. Before Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia was a very weak state. Today both states are strong and well governed. Therefore, it is simply impossible to raise the question of some kind of quick unification.

If we dig even deeper, the two states are developing on the basis of completely different legacies of the 1990s. In Russia at that time, a radical reform was carried out, which formed the local business elite in such a way that they were based on oligarchs. In Belarus, the formation of such a business class was stopped. The Belarusian business environment was formed under state control. It is almost impossible to combine these two economic models.

- That is, in the late 1990s - early 2000s there were fewer of these contradictions?

The situation in Russia was different then. In the late 1990s, it lost the Chechen war, lay in ruins after the 1998 default, and famine began in many regions of the country. Therefore, in the late 1990s, Belarus, led by Lukashenko, looked very attractive to many Russians. It seemed to them that it was possible to stop Russia’s slide into even greater chaos if they followed the path of Belarus. Today, Minsk is not a spiritual or any other leader for the people of Russia. Today Moscow has its own strong leader.

Do you think that after the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the war in Donbass, the relationship between Minsk and Moscow has changed?

Yes. Russia is at the stage of its next imperial cycle. It is consolidating and raising on the world stage the question of respect for its interests, which go very far beyond the borders of Russia. In turn, Belarus is a small state that increasingly feels itself to be part of Eastern Europe, part of a conglomerate of small states like itself. This is where the different attitudes to foreign policy problems that exist between Russia and Belarus originate. For example, for Minsk, involvement in the war in Syria or Donbass looks like something distant and unrealistic. Minsk has very low foreign policy ambitions. This can be called pacifism or a sense of common sense, but the fact is that for Belarus such a scale of thinking is now the norm.

The other day, President Alexander Lukashenko said that Ukraine is fighting for its independence, and Belarus is defending it in the economic field. If I understood correctly, he meant relations with Russia. Do you think his words may indicate that there is no longer any need to talk about the brotherhood of Belarusians and Russians?

I wouldn't use such harsh language. For now, this is nothing more than another statement by Lukashenko at a time when Belarus and Russia have very strained relations over oil and gas supplies. We have already experienced similar trade wars several times, and then the rhetoric was no less belligerent. In fact, we still have a Union State with a huge complex of concluded agreements and functioning institutions. Also, the countries are in a military alliance, which no one is going to break up, but quite the opposite, and so on.

- Why Lukashenko to the meeting of the CSTO and the Eurasian Union at the end of last year? Now there are rumors in the media that Minsk may even announce its withdrawal from these organizations.

Officially, Lukashenko simply decided to send the prime minister in his place, and he did not explain his decision in any way. If you wish, you can see a certain political signal from Russia behind this, but I don’t want to speculate. In general, this is an element of the anxiety that has arisen in relations between Russia and Belarus recently. Another trade war is taking place between countries over gas prices, but there have already been a lot of these wars over the past 20 years.

Why does this trade war even arise if Russia and Belarus are long-time strategic partners and allies?

They are based on economic contradictions. For example, Belarus is one of the top ten global exporters of dairy products. Of course, the main dairy export goes to Russia. There this causes resistance from competitors, both Russian and foreign. The same story with Belarusian tractors. Thus, the trade wars between Moscow and Minsk are primarily based on the interests of lobbying groups. Exactly the same contradictions can be observed within Russia between various economic entities, but in the case of Minsk, these disputes very quickly begin to move to the interstate level.

While the trade confrontation was unfolding, three people writing for the Russian agency Regnum were detained in Belarus. According to the security forces, they worked to split the Russian-Belarusian friendship, and their editorial office claims that, on the contrary, their goal was to bring the peoples closer together. Each of the arrested journalists published for about a year. Do you think their detention was a mere coincidence, or was it part of the confrontation with Moscow?

Now any episode in which Russia and Belarus are involved is considered in the context of an undeclared trade war. Imagine, Belarus pays for gas as much as it sees fit, that is, approximately half the price that Gazprom insists on. In response to this dispute, where Minsk has its own arguments and the Russian company has its own, Moscow has sharply reduced oil supplies to Belarus. According to some estimates, it was for this reason that the country's GDP decreased by 2%. This is a very deep dispute that has been going on for more than a year.

And the situation with, whom Minsk wants to expel to Azerbaijan for visiting Nagorno-Karabakh, can be placed in the same chain of events?

I would not mix everything together, because if in the case of the Regnum journalists the Russian Foreign Ministry supported the actions of the Belarusian authorities, then in the second situation, on the contrary, they are asking to release the person. In diplomatic terms, these are completely different stories.

Every year, Lukashenko is accused several times by the Russian media of betraying Moscow, including turning to the West. At the same time, liberal politicians in Belarus itself fuel these sentiments with their expert opinion. Why do you think this happens?

Belarus has opponents in Russia. These are mainly lobbyists for those companies that are forced to compete with it in the domestic market of their country. They need a certain ideology so that they can defend their interests at the political level. For example, in the last 10 years it has been proven that Belarus is trying to betray the interests of Russia. And earlier, when the Russian Federation was still weak, the same essentially anti-Belarusian ideology was based on the fact that there was a “scoop” in Minsk, a collective farmer in power, red-browns, and so on.

The economic interests of Belarus' competitors must always find some kind of ideological embodiment. Perhaps they will come up with something else in the future. But in fact, relations between Belarus and Russia are not determined by information wars and clichés that the parties bestow on each other. There is a strong contractual basis for relations between the countries. This, for example, is evidenced by official statements of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in relation to Belarus, as a rule, are very complimentary.

Recently it has become known about the establishment of camps for Syrian refugees in Belarus and the abolition of visas for residents of 80 countries. Why do you think Minsk decided to take these two steps, and how could they affect the existence of an open border with Russia within the Union State?

After the start of the war in Ukraine, the geopolitical position of Belarus changed greatly. Minsk became a donor to regional security, for which it received its diplomatic bonuses. In particular, the normalization of relations with the West began. Before that, Belarus was under Western sanctions for about 20 years. Russia has never gotten to this point yet. Firstly, anti-Russian sanctions are not as painful as for Minsk, and secondly, Moscow has been living under them for less than three years.

To make it clearer what we are talking about: there are almost no American diplomats in Belarus now. There was a moment when out of 45 diplomats at the embassy, ​​40 were expelled, and even the US ambassador left the country. Also, almost all Belarusian diplomats, including the ambassador, were recalled from America. Until now, the interests of both countries are represented not by ambassadors, but by chargés ad interim. Russia has never had and does not have such a serious conflict with the West.

After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, reconciliation began between Minsk, the European Union and the United States, during which a significant part of the sanctions were lifted. This circumstance has not brought the relationship between Belarus and the West to the level of trust that exists between Russia and the West, but it is already better than it was before. That is, Lukashenko still does not travel to the West, as Putin does, but still this is something.

In parallel with this, a slight liberalization in the political sphere took place in Belarus. In particular, a decision was made on refugee accommodation centers and the abolition of visas. For Russia, this is a problem that must be solved as quickly as possible.

Will the FSB's decision to place border control points on the border with Belarus hit Russian-Belarusian relations?

In itself, it is not some kind of blow to Minsk, simply because Belarus introduced exactly the same regime back in 2014, and this did not cause any indignation then. But there are additional complications created by Russia. First of all, this is Moscow’s refusal to allow third-country citizens who enter Belarus on a Belarusian visa into its territory. In order for these people to enter Russia from Belarus by car, they must go through a passport control point on the Russian-Belarusian border, which should be located on the highway, but they simply are not. Due to the latest decision of the FSB, Moscow and Minsk must agree on a solution to this problem.

Do you think Minsk is ready to sacrifice an open border with Russia if one day its cooperation with the West leads to this?

If a serious crisis breaks out that threatens Russian-Belarusian relations, Belarus will choose Russia. Relations between Minsk and Moscow are too deep to be crossed out in any foreseeable future. They are based on such a deep commonality that Belarus does not have with any other neighboring state or people. The entire value system is focused on an alliance with Russia.

Belarus has some leeway in this relationship, but it will never cross the red line. In particular, we are talking about maintaining the union with Russia, preserving the Russian language as one of the state languages ​​of the republic, and preserving that version of the state ideology that refers to the Soviet version of the interpretation of World War II. If at least one of these boundaries is passed, Belarus will explode.

How difficult will it be for Minsk to maintain its independence in the future, given the next Russian imperial cycle that you spoke about? Will trade wars become too difficult for Belarus to continue to defend its interests, and will it become a hostage to relations with Russia, which may find itself in a long-term conflict with the West?

Of course, there is such a threat. And the current trade war, although it has not been officially declared, is one of the most acute of all time since the collapse of the USSR. This trade war is developing against the backdrop of an open war in Ukraine and simply a total outbreak of anti-Russian hysteria in the Eastern European countries neighboring Belarus. Many forces have emerged in these countries that are trying to deepen the contradictions between Russia and Belarus and pull Belarus into their camp. Such sentiments exist in Belarus as well. There are supporters of destroying the union of the two countries in Russia, and they have recently become more active under a variety of slogans. But still, the influence of those who do not want Ukrainian instability to spread to Belarus, the influence of those who do not want Russia to be cut off from the rest of Europe by a warring strip between two seas, is stronger. The current trade war must still end, like all previous trade wars between Belarus and Russia, with the next round of mutual integration.

- Has the warming of relations with the West led to the liberalization of Belarus?

One element of the warming of relations was the cessation of repression against the opposition. Partly thanks to this, the election of two opposition candidates became possible. But they can have little effect. Firstly, their votes are not enough for anything. Secondly, in the Belarusian system of government, parliament is a very weak state institution.

In addition, the war in Donbass led to society recoiling from the Ukrainian example of political struggle. Nobody wants Belarus to follow the same path. The disputes that are developing in Belarus today are not due to the fact that some nationalist forces are strengthening here, as some in Russia believe, but on the contrary - more pacifist sentiments are growing here.

Does Belarusian society want liberal reforms, or is it satisfied with the government course that Lukashenko is now setting?

From a policy analysis perspective, we have to pay attention to what we can touch. Such markers are the two national election campaigns that took place over these two years. These are parliamentary and presidential elections. Nothing unexpected happened in the elections. Society has once again demonstrated support for those candidates who support Lukashenko’s course. There is no socio-political turmoil in the country even close. Lukashenko also won the presidential campaign with such an advantage that he even eclipsed his first election victory. Society's sympathy for him, as a guarantor of stability, especially against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, turned out to be very high.

Carrying out liberal reforms, including increasing housing and communal services tariffs, raising the retirement age, etc., which the IMF talks about during negotiations with Minsk, can be implemented. But all this may concern exclusively the economic sphere, and not the political one.

That is, there is a red line here too. In the post-Soviet understanding, liberals are those who advocate weakening the role of the state in the economy, social sphere, and so on. This is such an orientation towards wild capitalism. It is difficult to even imagine that Lukashenko would allow such a movement while he is in power.

Recently, a constitutional reform was announced in Kazakhstan; even earlier, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan announced their transformation into parliamentary republics. Will there be nothing like this in Belarus?

The latest Belarusian elections showed that the country does not need any changes similar to its president, and society is consolidated around Alexander Lukashenko. But still, such a need may arise, for example, for the sake of successful negotiations with the IMF. To achieve this, Minsk can strengthen the importance of parliament, but this will not lead to a change in the system of power in principle.

In this case, in Belarus there is an analogue of “United Russia”, which is called “Belaya Rus”. This association consists of approximately 150-160 thousand people. This is a completely ready-made structure that, even tomorrow, can be declared a party, and it will become the ruling party in parliament. That is, even if the country’s leadership decides to turn Belarus into a parliamentary republic, Lukashenko’s importance will still not decrease, since “Belaya Rus” is a completely pro-presidential organization.

- Does anyone think about what will happen after Lukashenko?

This issue has existed as long as Lukashenko has been in power. However, for this issue to become truly acute, society must stop trusting it or begin to doubt its chosen course of development. Then new opposition leaders and parties will appear in Belarus. We don't see anything like this today. Moreover, even the West, which previously constantly interfered in the internal politics of Belarus, supporting the opposition and looking for an alternative to Lukashenko, today has actually abandoned this idea.

Separately, it should be emphasized that predicting the future of any personalized regime is a thankless task, because the prospect always depends on many factors: the leader himself, his physical condition and unforeseen events. Therefore, experts, as a rule, highlight the development paths of Belarus after Lukashenko with a certain degree of convention. Thus, the Carnegie Center talks about three general medium- and long-term scenarios.

The first is a chaotic and unforeseen transfer of power. In this situation, experts are confident that the political forces supported by the Kremlin will likely be recognized by society as legitimate, and the West will have neither the political will nor the resources that could significantly influence the situation in the country.

“A sudden and unexpected transfer of power in the near future will most likely lead to the formation of another constitutional “super-presidential” regime, but it will be led by someone with less charisma than Lukashenko,” the Carnegie Center believes, explaining that in Currently, the nomenklatura is completely cleared of people with charisma, and in the event of an unexpected transit of power, they simply will have nowhere to come from.

The second scenario, highlighted by the center’s researchers, is a gradual transition to “softer authoritarianism.” “The basis for such a gradual transition will likely be economics. 

Nervousness about the chronic economic crisis in the country is already leading to the president’s mistakes,” experts emphasize.

In parallel with this, changes in policy will occur. Within five to fifteen years, according to experts, more officials with market views will come to power, and in the end Belarus will become more oligarchic - similar to today's Armenia or Moldova under the presidency of Vladimir Voronin.

Finally, the third option is to submit the issue of changing the constitution to a referendum. At the beginning of 2017, Lukashenko discussed with the head of the Central Election Commission of Belarus Lydia Ermoshina the possibility of switching to a mixed electoral system, which would mean an increase in the role of political parties.

The last time the president promised to think about redistributing his power was in April, delivering his annual address to parliament. And this happened the day after Armenian Prime Minister Serzh Sarksyan resigned after almost two weeks of street protests. Lukashenko assured that recommendations for amendments are already being developed by the constitutional court.

The public also has its own proposals. So, about a year ago, a team of authors led by the ideological leader of the country’s national and cultural revival, Zenon Poznyak, prepared the “Free Belarus” program. Among her proposals: return the 1994 constitution, which limited the power of the president, move to a parliamentary-presidential form of government, introduce local self-government and a mixed electoral system, carry out a new administrative-territorial division of the country, leave the EAEU, not seek membership in the EU and NATO, leave Belarusian language will be the state language, and Russian will be given the status of a language of interethnic communication.

The Western coalition's missile attack on Syria, United States sanctions against Russia - the confrontation between the West and the Kremlin is becoming increasingly acute. The consequences do not bypass Belarus either. What position do the Belarusian authorities take and what to prepare for in the near future.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus in its official statement condemned the strike by coalition troops on Syria. What is this – the beginning of a confrontation with the West or another attempt to get preferences from Russia for loyal rhetoric?

Attempts to convert pro-Russian statements into financial gain are not new for the Belarusian authorities. Only the eastern neighbor has recently completely stopped appreciating this approach and is demanding concrete steps for political and military rapprochement.

“Belarus will behave more carefully and will try not to completely fit into this conflict. Pay attention to this statement from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry. It says that, of course, the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, that it must be punished, but first we need to figure out who, how and what. This is very different from the Russian position, which believes that there was no chemical attack at all,” says the political scientist Valery Karbalevich.

However, it seems that Belarus was in a hurry even with such a statement, because none of Russia’s allies from the CSTO made more similar statements. On the other hand, the Belarusian authorities have always demonstratively opposed foreign armed interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

“Belarus has put forward a new concept for its foreign policy: the image of Belarus as a peacemaker, as a place where international conflicts are resolved, like a new Geneva or Helsinki-2. And against this background, Belarus’ actions in support of Russia greatly spoil this concept,” notes political scientist Valery Karbalevich.

But it is not only the political concept that is deteriorating. According to experts, at the moment almost all Belarusian exports, excluding fertilizers and petroleum products, go to Russia. Accordingly, any deterioration in the economy of our eastern neighbors instantly affects us. So, last week the introduction of American sanctions shook up the Russian ruble, followed by the Belarusian ruble.

“Belarus is affected not so much by the situation with the Russian foreign exchange market, but by the general economic situation. In other words, a recession in Russia, a slowdown in growth or a transition to a decline in the Russian economy would be more dangerous for us than the fall of the Russian ruble,” notes senior analyst at ALPARI. Vadim Iosub.

Experts note that the United States is highly likely to introduce new sanctions against Moscow, but it is still impossible to predict against whom exactly the restrictions will be directed.

“The fate of the Belarusian ruble depends quite heavily on American sanctions directed against Russia - the Belarusian government and the National Bank cannot do anything about this, we can only be observers. On the other hand, the prospects for other American sanctions against Russia are vague and incomprehensible,” says financial analyst Vadim Iosub.

It is also unclear how the Belarusian authorities will react to further escalation in relations between Russia and the West. But in any case, as experts note, there is little optimism in this development of events.

Dmitry Mitskevich, Belsat

Cover photo - president.gov.by

https://www.site/2018-10-11/sobiraetsya_li_rossiya_prisoedinyat_belorussiyu

“Falsehoods that the country may lose its independence are beneficial to the Kremlin”

Is Russia going to annex Belarus?

Dmitry Azarov/Kommersant

The Forum of Regions of Belarus* and Russia started in Mogilev on October 11, within the framework of which a meeting of the presidents of the two states will take place. The negotiations will take place on October 12 and will be the fourth personal meeting between Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko since the end of August. Pro-government media present the increasingly frequent Belarusian-Russian summits as “positive dynamics in bilateral relations.” However, there are also opposing opinions, documenting the protracted trade and economic disputes between Russia and Belarus.

It is alleged that under these conditions, Moscow is reviewing its policy towards Minsk, intending to put the Belarusian economy “on a diet” in order to make Lukashenko more accommodating. And there, perhaps, the question of Belarus joining Russia will arise. Experts, however, call talk about integration “informational stuffing” that benefits exclusively the Kremlin.

"We are at the front"

Problems in Belarusian-Russian relations have been accumulating for a long time. 2018 was a continuation of the trend. First, there was a “milk war” due to restrictions on the supply of Belarusian dairy products to Russia, then friction arose over transit and visa issues. A series of conflict episodes led to Lukashenko losing his temper on June 22.

Speaking to farmers in the Mogilev region, he said: “We are at the front. We won’t survive these years, we’ll fail, which means we’ll either have to join some state, or they’ll just wipe their feet on us. And, God forbid, they start a war like in Ukraine.”

He did not specify where the threat comes from and which state Belarus could join in the worst-case scenario. But the fact that Lukashenko admitted the possibility of losing independence made many think. It is noteworthy that the president made this statement after a meeting in Minsk with Vladimir Putin. On June 19, the leaders of the two countries participated in a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State, where, as Lukashenko put it, “controversial issues” were discussed.

Soon Putin invited the Belarusian president to Sochi. Lukashenko delayed the visit for a long time. At this time, there was a wave of repression against independent Belarusian media. And on August 10, Russia sharply limited subsidies to the Belarusian economy. Reuters reported that Moscow froze $1.2 billion in lending and wants to reconsider the terms of oil supplies and customs clearance.

“Russians are behaving barbarically”

The next time Lukashenko and Putin met was on August 22. As the media wrote, after this the Belarusian president did not appear in public for a long time. Belarusian political scientist Anton Platov, in a conversation with Rosbalt, said that Lukashenko wanted to bargain once again, but Moscow showed that it was lowering the level of relations with Minsk to other EAEU countries. In particular, gas and oil were promised to be supplied to Belarus on general, not exclusive, terms.

Probably, Lukashenko’s behavior was also explained by the fact that Minsk had to agree to the appointment of a new Russian ambassador who was part of Putin’s personnel pool - Mikhail Babich. The Belarusian side, following Ukraine, did not want to give him an ambassadorial agrement.

But on August 24, Putin signed a decree appointing Mikhail Babich as the new ambassador to Belarus and at the same time as the special representative of the Russian President in this country for trade and economic cooperation. Before this, Babich was the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Volga Federal District. His father served in the German KGB station and was Vladimir Putin’s boss. Experts call Babich Jr. a tough manager. Having become an ambassador, he retained his post in the Russian Security Council, the president’s inner circle.

Kremlin.ru

This was followed by clarifying messages that Russia, in order to avoid “gray” re-exports, would supply hydrocarbons to Belarus only for its domestic consumption. In addition, Moscow will demand compensation for gas transit, which will affect the Belarusian budget (we are talking about $2.5 billion, or 4-5% of GDP).

Soon Lukashenko changed the leadership of the Council of Ministers and the entire economic bloc, declaring that the country had entered a difficult period. “The Russians behave barbarously towards us, I speak about this publicly. They demand something from us, as if we are their vassals, and within the framework of the EAEU, where they invited us, they do not want to fulfill their obligations. So they create a non-competitive situation,” he complained.

Autumn negotiations

Issues of tariffs and supplies of Russian oil products and gas to the Republic of Belarus were discussed again by Putin and Lukashenko in Sochi on September 21. The President of Belarus later said that the negotiations were difficult. According to official Minsk, the heads of the two states agreed to refinance the Belarusian debt to Moscow in the amount of $1 billion. In addition, Lukashenko said that Belarus would be provided with the sixth tranche of a loan through the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) in the amount of $200 million. On other issues , as Lukashenko noted, “all key contradictions have been resolved,” but neither he nor the Russian side provided any specifics.

A discussion of the results of the negotiations in Sochi was scheduled for September 28, as part of the CIS summit in Dushanbe. But journalists were not able to see the personal meeting of the presidents. Only later did the Belarusian leader say that he had “confidentially” discussed security issues with Putin.

Internet portal of the President of the Republic of Belarus

And now a meeting between Putin and Lukashenko is planned in Mogilev on October 12. The presidents are expected to continue discussing problematic topics that began in the summer. In addition to the transit of oil and gas and their prices, these are also issues of the supply of Belarusian products to the Russian market, subsidies, refinancing of Russian loans, etc. Another possible topic of dialogue is Warsaw’s plans to place an American military base on its territory, for which the Polish President Andrzej Duda even chose the name “Fort Trump.” In response, Russia wants to place its military base in Belarus.

In addition, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus' is flying to Belarus. On October 14, the day of the Intercession of the Most Holy Theotokos, the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church will serve the rite of great consecration of the memorial church in honor of All Saints. And on October 15, a meeting of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is scheduled “for the first time on Belarusian soil.”

“Belarus is a huge burden”

On the eve of the next meeting between Putin and Lukashenko, as well as the visit of Patriarch Kirill, there was a wave of speculation in the media that, through economic and other pressure, Moscow is trying to make Minsk more accommodating and ready to follow Russia’s lead. It is even suggested that Moscow wants to replace Lukashenko with a manager more loyal to the Kremlin and even begin the process of integrating Belarus into Russia. Supporters of this theory note that now is the most opportune moment - there is about a year left before the presidential elections in Belarus, and there is time to calculate all the moves. In addition, a spectacular foreign policy move could distract Russians from internal problems; with the help of the “annexation” (in one form or another) of Belarus, the Kremlin could try to return society to the state of the “Crimean consensus”.

However, Andrei Suzdaltsev, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Politics at the Higher School of Economics, believes that there can be no talk of any integration.

Hanna Zelenko/Wikimedia

“It's simply impossible. This would be a repeat of the political focus in the Baltics and partly in Ukraine. But who today would want to take over an entire country into which they will have to invest tens of billions? Moreover, on some, probably not entirely favorable terms, for example in the case of Belarusian claims to our oil fields. This is a huge burden. We have already invested about $160 billion in Belarus over the past 20 years. Enormous money,” the expert noted.

According to him, it would be possible to talk about Belarus joining Russia if there was a plan of intent. But nothing is known about such documents. “I believe that this (talk about integration. - Ed.) is an element of information war. Most likely, Belarus will continue to bargain with Russia. The only question here is why does this country think that Russia should, simply because of some “uniqueness of Belarus,” meekly subsidize and subsidize this republic? Subsidies reach up to $10 billion a year,” Suzdaltsev added. — In return, in theory, we should seek some kind of allied decisions. For example, on the world stage this could be the recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. But this is not the case. Lukashenko remains a man who bargains. And for now he is not ready to give up leading the country.”

“Kremlin information dumps”

The head of Russian studies, co-founder of the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies (Belarus), Yuri Tsarik, also speaks about the groundlessness of the idea of ​​Belarus joining Russia. He recalled that on October 10, Lukashenko met with Mikhail Babich. The president said that he expects relations between Russia and Belarus to flourish under Babich and that the issue of sovereignty is not discussed.

“We are a sovereign and independent country. In the 21st century, talking (as they write there) about incorporation, the inclusion of Belarus into Russia is simply ridiculous. And I have never heard this from the current president of Russia, or from the past, the first president of Russia [Boris Yeltsin],” Lukashenko said.

Yuri Tsarik noted that there were numerous fakes in Telegram channels about Putin’s supposed ultimatum to Lukashenko, but, the expert believes, they have nothing to do with reality.

Belarus is a significant trading partner of Russia, where it supplies a lot of food products Embassy of Belarus in Moscow

“The liquidation of Belarus as an independent state is clearly not included in the plans of the Belarusian leadership. Moreover, the Belarusian authorities are now busy with another problem - the transit of power. This will happen either during the upcoming elections in 2019 or after them. The country’s leadership wants to create conditions that could facilitate a calm, conflict-free transfer of power,” Tsarik said.

As for concessions in favor of Russia, no real actions are being taken. “The same issue regarding the military base of the Russian Federation remains unresolved, because its placement on the territory of Belarus will completely eliminate the country’s strategic autonomy and deprive the authorities of signs of independence,” Tsarik noted. — There are no signs that the Belarusian authorities want to give up their positions. Falsifications that the country may lose its independence are beneficial only to the Kremlin. This undermines trust in Belarus as an independent partner within the country and in the international arena. This meets the interests of the Russian side, which wants to gain strategic control over the territory of Belarus unilaterally.”

Signs of a “bad script”

However, recent events make some observers believe that everything is heading towards the “bad scenario” that Lukashenko spoke about. One of the leaders of the Belarusian National Congress, Yevgeny Afnagel, notes that there are too many signals that indicate that Putin has decided to take Belarus seriously. “Almost every day, articles appear in the Russian media that it is time to end the independence of our country, about the infringement of the rights of the Russian-speaking population here,” Afnagel writes in his blog. — For the first time, the Kremlin is sending former security official Mikhail Babich, who is also known for his tough position, to Minsk as an ambassador. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church publicly speaks of a “united Russian people,” which includes Belarusians. All this is happening against the backdrop of economic pressure. Belarus has not received the next tranches from the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development in the amount of $400 million. And there are also constantly meat and milk wars, and ahead is a tax maneuver that will further undermine Lukashenko’s already precarious position.”

* With great respect for the people of the Republic of Belarus, the editors of the site adhere to the norms of the Russian language, that is, the spelling “Belarus”.

Moscow, 09/05/2018

Evgeniy Treshchenkov, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Relations in the Post-Soviet Space, St. Petersburg State University

A relatively small number of countries can be called allies of Russia. The Ukrainian crisis and open confrontation with the West have become a serious test for such relations and make each of Moscow's partners especially valuable. One of them is Belarus. This former Soviet republic participates in all Russian integration projects in the post-Soviet space, ranks third among the trading partners of the Russian Federation (after the EU and China), and its armed forces, together with their Russian counterparts, form the Regional Group of Forces and the Unified Regional Air Defense System. According to public opinion polls, citizens of Russia and Belarus regularly rank each other's states as the friendliest. The article is published as part of a partnership with the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin

Mikhail Metzel/TASS

Summer crisis of 2018

Despite such diverse interaction, regular crises are an integral part of it. They have long been taken for granted by experts. The summer of 2018 became another difficult period in the relations between the two countries. This time, several claims were brought against the Russian partners - from accusations of attempts by Russia to privatize the victory in the Great Patriotic War to “unfair competition” in trade and economic relations. As a rule, the initiator of conflicts is the Belarusian leadership, and the result is a solution to a particular problem through bilateral bargaining. It is precisely this tactic that allows the Belarusian president to win back the shrinking space for maneuver in relations with Russia year after year. At the present stage, Minsk is concerned about the establishment of border controls by Russia on the Russian-Belarusian border, the price of gas, the conditions for oil supplies to Belarus after the completion of the “tax maneuver” in the Russian oil industry, as well as the future of the loan planned for 2019.

Russia and the “Belarusian economic miracle”

The situation is made especially acute by the difficulties that the Belarusian economy has been facing for many years. They are caused by a combination of internal and external factors and manifest themselves in various forms - from problems with the sale of Belarusian products to a decrease in real incomes of the population. Attempts to form a “new” economy in parallel with the old one, loaded with social obligations, despite local successes (for example, the experience of the High-Tech Park), do not fundamentally change the situation. The key reasons are the planned nature of the Belarusian economy, its technological lag, as well as its high dependence on one key market. The country's economy is clearly export-oriented, with more than half of all Belarusian foreign trade going to Russia.

Trade and economic relations with Russia are an integral element of the “Belarusian economic miracle”. Since the second half of the 1990s. A socio-economic model developed in the republic that guaranteed Belarusians a modest but stable income and other social benefits. The state retained control over the largest industrial enterprises, providing employment to the population. The products of these enterprises went mainly to the Russian market. We should pay tribute to the leadership of the republic - its special attention has always been focused on promoting Belarusian products in foreign markets. We can talk about a kind of “economization” of the country’s foreign policy. Thus, the key task of the ambassadors, according to President Alexander Lukashenko, is to promote Belarusian exports.

Here we can also note the impressive activity of the Belarusian leadership in promoting products to Russian regions. The Republic of Belarus has joint working groups for cooperation with more than 40 constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Since the 1990s There are cooperation agreements not only between individual regions of the two countries, but also between Russian regions and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus. In all major cities of Russia you can see Belarusian retail chains and branded stores. In addition to trade, Belarus is also promoting industrial cooperation with Russian regions. However, this cooperation has its own specifics. In the overwhelming majority of cases, we are talking about the assembly of Belarusian products on the territory of one or another constituent entity of the Russian Federation (elevators in St. Petersburg, tractors in Cherepovets, etc.). That is, in fact, such cooperation is aimed at promoting Belarusian exports.

Made in Belarus

In Russia, Belarusian goods have developed a special image. Food products are still considered natural and of high quality, equipment is easy to use and inexpensive. The popularity of Belarusian goods even led to the opening of corresponding “fake” stores in a number of Russian cities. Thus, in St. Petersburg, after the opening of a chain of stores of Belarusian products “Belorussky Gostinets” within the framework of an agreement between the Government of the Republic of Belarus and the Administration of St. Petersburg, “fake” stores under a similar brand appeared. Despite the fact that the popularity of the slogan “made in Belarus” among Russian consumers has gradually declined, Belarusian goods still occupy their niche here. At the same time, it would be incorrect to say that Russian goods are more competitive than Belarusian ones, or vice versa. In both cases, the products are characterized by low technology in comparison with Western analogues. The products of joint ventures with large foreign companies (Belarusian version) or branches of transnational companies that have localized their production on the territory of the corresponding republic (Russian version) are distinguished by higher quality and complexity. Thus, Belarusian manufacturers often point out that in Russia they compete with large global manufacturers (for example, the Belarusian Atlant and the Italian Indesit).

One of the complaints expressed by the Belarusian leadership to the Russian side in August 2018 was the accusation of “unfair competition.” The statement was made during Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to Gomselmash OJSC, which is one of the largest suppliers of agricultural machinery to the Russian market. In a number of cases, Belarusian equipment, thanks to government subsidies and an export support system, turns out to be cheaper than Russian equipment. At the same time, it is also included in the Russian federal leasing programs. On the contrary, access of Russian equipment to the Belarusian market is difficult. Naturally, this situation leads to conflicts and attempts by Russian manufacturers to win back market share.

In general, there are barriers to market access for each other’s products in both Russia and Belarus. The rhetoric of the political leadership varies. The image of President A. Lukashenko as a strong business executive suggests his personal participation in solving the problems of the republic’s largest export enterprises. The Russian leadership prefers to refrain from making harsh statements on technical issues, leaving the responsibility for solving them to the bureaucracy and business. At the same time, restrictions on the access of goods to the Belarusian market are quite real. Thus, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development provides a list of more than a dozen such barriers. Among them are restrictions on the access of Russian manufacturers of buses and agricultural machinery when participating in purchases under leasing agreements, the existence of assortment lists of goods for various types of food and non-food retail facilities and public catering establishments. Another example is the preferential VAT rate in force in the Republic of Belarus for agricultural products produced in the country (10% instead of the standard 20%).

The social contract is under threat

Despite all the activity in promoting exports, the existing economic model in the Republic of Belarus, due to its own structural features, is failing. It does not come as a surprise when the country's largest industrial enterprises end the reporting year with losses and large credit debt, and warehouses accumulate products for several months in advance. At the same time, stopping any large enterprise and laying off workers will mean aggravation of social tension. The state, as the main owner of the country's largest industrial enterprises, guarantees employment, wages and basic social guarantees. This is the social contract between the government and the population.

In recent years, it has become increasingly difficult for the authorities to comply with its conditions. This inevitably affects the president's ratings and the stability of the political regime. At the same time, the measures taken by the country's leadership do not always achieve their goals, causing even greater tension in society. This is, in particular, the situation with Presidential Decree No. 3 “On the Prevention of Social Dependency.” The decree provides for the introduction of a so-called “parasitism fee” levied on unemployed citizens to finance government spending. The initiative caused serious public resistance, leading to protests in certain cities in February 2017.

In this context, it is worth considering the recent indicative resignation of the leadership of the Belarusian government and a number of senior officials. It is obvious that the President not only demonstrates to the electorate his intention to fight corruption, but is also making attempts to improve the efficiency of the management system. The example of Armenia, where the opposition came to power during popular unrest in the spring of 2018, also obviously causes certain concerns in Minsk.

New Russian policy towards Belarus?

In these conditions, support from Russia is of fundamental importance for the Belarusian leadership. It is no coincidence that President A. Lukashenko, appealing to Moscow, says that Russia needs a stable Belarus. At the same time, Minsk is actively establishing relations with Western countries, supporting the negotiation platform on the Ukrainian crisis, and more broadly on the dialogue between the West and Russia. As is known, the European Union, under the influence of the confrontation with Moscow and the growing crises along the perimeter of its borders, lifted the crisis in 2015-2016. sanctions against the vast majority of individuals and companies in the Republic of Belarus. At the same time, the emphasis on establishing constructive relations has not led to a significant improvement in the investment, trade and economic prospects of the Republic of Belarus in the western direction. In 2017, it was unable to obtain a loan from the International Monetary Fund, which required structural reforms in the form of reducing the share of the public sector in the economy and increasing housing and communal services tariffs. China has been actively investing in the Belarusian economy (car production, creation of the Great Stone Industrial Park) in recent years, but these funds are allocated for specific projects and cannot be used to stabilize the macro-financial situation or pay off the republic’s external debt.

Russia remains a key potential lender. With the change of Russian leadership in 2000, the policy towards the Republic of Belarus gradually acquired an increasingly offensive character. Moscow has increasingly begun to make certain demands in exchange for preferential energy prices and loans. Speaking about the next crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations in the spring of 2017, experts even pointed to a new stage in these relations, calling it the transition “from advances to prepayment.” In this light, one can also view Moscow’s delay in the decision to provide the Republic of Belarus with a loan of up to $1 billion, which is planned to be spent on repaying the Belarusian external debt in 2019. For Minsk, the situation is especially painful given Russia’s intention to stop duty-free supplies of petroleum products to the Republic of Belarus. At the same time, the difficult economic and financial situation in Russia itself does not contribute to the softness of the Russian leadership.

Based on this, the appointment of a new Russian ambassador (Mikhail Babich) in Minsk, who is also the special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the development of trade and economic relations with the Republic of Belarus, should be considered as a desire to carefully monitor all the details and complexities of the agenda of Russian-Belarusian relations directly on the spot . After the events in Armenia, Moscow’s attention will be focused, among other things, on preventing destabilization of the political situation in Belarus, provided that the country continues to move in the wake of existing integration structures under the auspices of Russia. It is obvious that Belarus will receive the required financial support; there is hardly any need to worry about the prospects for continued Belarusian participation in the EAEU.

The future of the Eurasian Economic Union

Almost all mutual trade of Belarus within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union is accounted for by one state - Russia (97-98%). The Belarusian leadership regularly criticizes the Eurasian Union. At the same time, criticism almost always concerns the issues of Russian-Belarusian trade and economic cooperation within the framework of this association. The claims made against the EAEU in the summer of 2018 are fully consistent with established practice. The “four freedoms” are indeed not fully implemented in the Union; various barriers to free trade remain, the customs space is fragmented, and there is virtually no unified trade and industrial policy. However, all members of the EAEU, including the Republic of Belarus, contribute to this situation. At the same time, if we proceed not from some ideal picture, but from the existing political and economic reality in the participating countries, the Eurasian Union quite fully uses the existing limited opportunities.

In the coming year, one should not expect the Republic of Belarus to abruptly abandon its obligations within the Eurasian Economic Union. Such a refusal, being directly related to trade and economic interaction with Russia, is tantamount to suicide. At the same time, the stories that were heard during the aggravation of bilateral relations in the summer of 2018 remain relevant. We are talking about the conditions for the supply of Russian oil to the Republic of Belarus in 2019, the price of gas, border control on the Russian-Belarusian border, as well as the prospects for lending both bilaterally and through the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. The difficult economic and financial situation in Russia itself will continue to have a serious impact on the prospects of the Belarusian economy. Russia, in turn, despite its rather tough position towards Belarus, also cannot afford to risk one of its few allies. Looking back at the recent events in Armenia and the series of previously occurring “color revolutions” in other post-Soviet republics, Russia will continue to rely on maintaining the stability of the Belarusian regime.