The content of the article

CIVIL WAR IN RUSSIA(1918–1922). Almost immediately after the October Revolution of 1917, armed uprisings by its political opponents began against the new government. At the end of October and November 1917, Red Guard detachments loyal to the Soviet government suppressed anti-Bolshevik protests in Petrograd, Moscow and other places. The protests were local in nature, scattered and quickly suppressed, but they were the first flashpoints of the civil war, which soon engulfed the entire country.

The ground for discontent among a large part of the population was also fueled by the government signed in March 1918 by V.I. Lenin’s predatory Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, which deprived the country of vast territories and required the payment of a huge indemnity to Germany. This agreement hit hard on the sentiments of people who were traditionally brought up in the spirit of Russian patriotism: first of all, the officers who came from the nobility and the common ranks, and the intelligentsia associated with the old state system. Millions of Russian people reacted negatively to the Bolsheviks' dissolution of the new Constituent Assembly in January 1918, considering it a departure from promised democratic changes. On the foundation of this discontent, the anti-Bolshevik “white movement” developed, which set itself the task of overthrowing the Bolsheviks. Although the white movement was ideologically and organizationally fragmented, did not have a single leader and a single strategy, its core consisted of military generals and officers, patriots of Russia, and participants in the First World War. They relied on dictatorship in each individual territory where the armies of the white movement were based. In the spring of 1918 it began to concentrate in the Don region.

The initial stage of the Civil War.

Already at the end of 1917, active opponents of the new government began to make their way into the Don region - officers, generals L.G. Kornilov, A.I. Denikin, A.S. Lukomsky, cadet leaders.

Japan unsuccessfully tried to liquidate the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with the help of the White Guards, but in June 1920 it concluded a truce with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and withdrew its troops from Transbaikalia. The remnants of the White Army units in Transbaikalia were defeated in 1921. The strongholds of the white units near Volochaevsk and in Primorye were completely destroyed by the end of 1922, which forced Japan to completely evacuate its troops from the Far East. On October 25, 1922, the last stronghold of Japanese troops, Vladivostok, was captured.

Reasons for the defeat of the white armies. Results of the Civil War.

During the Civil War, military fronts moved from south to north, from west to east. Cities and villages were destroyed, the productive forces of the people were undermined. The Civil War was the greatest tragedy of the peoples of Russia and brought them enormous disasters. The damage to the national economy amounted to more than 50 million gold rubles. Agricultural production was halved, industrial production fell to 16% of the 1913 level, more than 8 million people died in battles, from hunger and disease. The Red Army suffered defeats at the fronts, but ultimately won, despite the help of the Whites from their foreign allies. This question has been repeatedly discussed in historiography, but the answers available to it are not always based on taking into account the objective political and military factors that determined the victory of the Reds and the defeat of the Whites.

The ruling circles of the Entente, when making decisions on military assistance to the opponents of the Bolsheviks, hoped to provide them with superiority over the Red troops. In fact, their participation in the Russian Civil War ultimately turned against the whites under their care; it allowed the Bolshevik authorities, under the slogan of fighting the occupiers, to direct the anger of the patriotic masses against the white armies receiving foreign assistance. This greatly facilitated the Soviet government's rapid creation of a powerful Red Army constantly replenished with reserves, based on universal conscription, military discipline and coercion. From 100 thousand people in April 1918, the army grew to 1 million in October 1918, to 1.5 million in May 1919 and 5 million people in 1920. To command such a multimillion-dollar army, numerous qualified military personnel were required, and the Soviet government used officers of the tsarist army. Agitation, calls to fight foreign occupiers and material incentives prompted 48 thousand former officers and 415 thousand non-commissioned officers to return to duty in June 1918 - August 1920. Without them, Lenin later admitted, it would have been impossible to create the Red Army and win. Experienced major tsarist military specialists and military leaders from the worker-peasant environment were appointed to many senior military posts. Some of them turned out to be talented commanders: M.V. Frunze, M.N. Tukhachevsky, who won victories over Kolchak, Wrangel, and the commander of the “red cavalry” S.M. Budyonny. Everyone was led by L.D. Trotsky, the People's Commissar of Defense of the Soviet government. On an armored train, equipped with all the weapons and ammunition necessary in the emergency circumstances of war, even a printing press for printing the People's Commissar's orders, he moved across the country from one front to another, appeared at the hottest moments of battles, did not hesitate to take cruel measures, often ordering the shooting of officers and soldiers who did not follow orders.

The victories of the Red Army were also facilitated by the peculiarities of the geographical environment and the structure of the population of Central Russia, which was a stronghold of the Bolsheviks. Moscow, Petrograd and other industrial cities, densely populated areas around them supplied the Red troops with reinforcements, weapons, and uniforms. Transport routes converged here. The White armies and regimes, especially after the fall of Samara, were located on the periphery of the country, in the sparsely populated Don, Kuban and Ural steppes, in Siberia. By controlling the center of the country, the Soviet government could, if necessary, transfer troops from one front to another, making optimal use of reserves, which its opponents located on the periphery could not do.

One of the reasons for the defeat of the whites was also the policies pursued by their governments. The Cadets who determined this policy did nothing to win the recognition of the majority of the population. They annulled all the positive innovations of the Bolsheviks, although at the same time they created orders that were in many ways similar to those on Soviet territory; in essence, white governments ruled using the same violent methods as the Bolsheviks. The White government alienated the population, failed to create a unified command and a unified strategy in the fight against the common enemy, and did not use the opportunities that were given to them by the negative attitude of a significant part of the population towards the policies of the Bolsheviks.

The available historiography of the Civil War in Russia reflects the main tendencies of the authors who studied this problem. Soviet historians, under strict ideological control, adhered to assessments aimed at discrediting the white movement. The works of historians published in the West, based on the memories of Russian emigrants who lived there, participants in the events and their archives, also turned out to be tendentious. The authors were looking mainly for evidence of the correctness of the anti-Bolshevik movement. That is why historiography does not yet sufficiently reveal the objective political and military factors that determined the victory of the Reds and the collapse of the White armies.

Efim Gimpelson

APPLICATION

Declaration of the Volunteer Army

1. The volunteer army fights for the salvation of Russia by:

a) creating a strong, disciplined and patriotic army;

b) a merciless fight against the Bolsheviks;

c) establishing unity and legal order in the country.

2. Striving to work together with all state-minded Russian people, the Volunteer Army cannot accept party overtones.

3. Questions about the forms of the political system are subsequent stages; they will become a reflection of the will of the Russian people after liberation from slavery and spontaneous insanity.

4. No relations with the Germans or the Bolsheviks. The only acceptable provisions: withdrawal from Russia of the former and disarmament and surrender of the latter.

5. It is desirable to attract the armed forces of the Slavs on the basis of historical aspirations, but without violating the unity and integrity of the Russian state and on the principles indicated in 1914 by the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Order of General A.I. Denikin to the Special Meeting

In connection with my order of this year No. 175, I order the Special Meeting to adopt the following provisions as the basis for its activities:

1. United, Great, Indivisible Russia. Defense of faith. Establishing order. Restoration of the productive forces of the country and the national economy. Raising labor productivity.

2. Fight against Bolshevism to the end.

3. Military dictatorship... All pressure from political parties should be swept aside, all opposition to the authorities - both from the right and from the left - should be punished.

The question of the form of government is a matter for the future. The Russian people will create the Supreme Power without pressure and imposition.

Unity with the people. The fastest possible union with the Cossacks by creating a South Russian government, without at all wasting the rights of national government.

4. Domestic policy – ​​only national. Russian.

Despite the occasional hesitations on the Russian issue, the Allies should go with them. Because another combination is morally unacceptable and realistically impossible.

Slavic unity. For help - not an inch of Russian land.

5. All forces and means are for the army, struggle and victory. Comprehensive provision for the families of fighters. Supply authorities should finally take the path of independent activity, using the country’s still rich resources, and, without relying solely on outside help, to strengthen their own production.

Extract uniforms and supplies for troops from the wealthy population.

Give the army a sufficient amount of banknotes, especially in front of everyone.

At the same time, mercilessly punish free requisitions and theft of “war booty.”

6. Domestic policy.

Showing concern for the entire population without distinction.

Undertake the development of an agrarian and labor law in the spirit of my declaration, as well as the law on Zemstvo.

To promote public organizations aimed at developing the national economy and improving economic conditions (cooperatives, trade unions, etc.).

The anti-state activities of some of them must be stopped without stopping at extreme measures.

The press - to help the accompanying, the dissenting - to endure, the destructive - to destroy. No class privileges, no preferential support - administrative, financial or moral.

Severe measures for rebellion, leadership of anarchist movements, profiteering, robbery, bribery, desertion and other mortal sins are not only frightening, but carried out with the direct intervention of the Department of Justice, the Chief Military Prosecutor, the Department of Internal Affairs and Control. The death penalty is the most appropriate punishment.

To speed up and simplify the procedure for the rehabilitation of those who were not entirely successful under Bolshevism, Petliurism, etc. If there was only a mistake, but they are fit for purpose - leniency.

Appointment to service is solely on business grounds, sweeping away fanatics both on the right and on the left.

The local service element for evading the policies of the central government, for violence, arbitrariness, settling scores with the population, as well as for inactivity, is not only dismissed, but also punished.

Involve the local population in self-defense.

7. Improve the health of the front and military rear - the work of specially appointed generals with great powers, the composition of the field court and the use of extreme repression.

Strongly clean up counterintelligence and criminal investigation by introducing a judicial (refugee) element into them.

8. Raising the ruble, transport and production of mainly state defense. The tax press is mainly for the wealthy, as well as for those not performing military service.

Trade exclusively for military equipment and items necessary for the country.

Temporary militarization of water transport with the aim of using it for war, without, however, destroying the commodity-industrial apparatus.

To alleviate the situation of the service element and the families of ranks located at the front by private transfer to in-kind allowances (through the efforts of the Food Department and departments, military supplies). The content should not be below the subsistence level.

9. Propaganda serves exclusively its intended purpose - popularization of ideas pursued by the authorities, exposing the essence of Bolshevism, raising people's consciousness and fighting anarchy

Order of General Wrangel N 3226 of May 20, 1920

The Russian army is going to liberate the Motherland from the red evil spirits.

I call on the Russian People to help me. I have signed the laws on volost zemstvos, and zemstvo institutions are being restored in the areas occupied by the Army.

State-owned and privately owned agricultural land will be transferred by order of the volost zemstvos themselves to the owners who cultivate it.

I order the defense of the Motherland and the peaceful work of the Russian people and promise forgiveness to those who have gone astray and return to us.

To the people - land and freedom in the structure of the state!

The Earth is a Master appointed by the will of the people!

God bless us!

General Wrangel.

__________________

Listen, Russian people, what we are fighting for:

For the desecrated faith and insulted shrines.

For the liberation of the Russian people from the yoke of communists, vagabonds and convicts who ultimately ruined Holy Rus'.

For stopping internecine warfare.

For the peasant, upon acquiring ownership of the land he cultivates, to engage in peaceful labor.

For true freedom and law to reign in Rus'.

For the Russian people to choose their own OWNER.

Help me, Russian people, save our Motherland.

General Wrangel.

The last White Guard order on Russian Land

ORDER of the Ruler of the South of Russia and the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army Sevastopol October 29, 1920

Russian people. Left alone in the fight against the rapists, the Russian army is waging an unequal battle, defending the last piece of Russian land where law and truth exist.

Conscious of the responsibility that lies with me, I am obliged to anticipate all contingencies in advance.

By my order, we have already begun evacuating and boarding ships in the ports of Crimea of ​​all those who shared the way of the cross with the army, the families of military personnel, officials of the civil department, with their families, and individuals who might be in danger if the enemy came.

The army will cover the landing, remembering that the ships necessary for its evacuation are also in full readiness in the ports, according to the established schedule. To fulfill the duty to the army and the population, everything within the limits of human power has been done.

Our further paths are full of uncertainty.

We have no other land except Crimea. There is no state treasury either. Frankly, as always, I warn everyone about what awaits them.

May the Lord grant everyone strength and intelligence to overcome and survive the Russian hard times.

General Wrangel.

Literature:

Lenin V.I. . Report at the VII All-Russian Congress of Soviets, December 5–9, 1919. Full collection op., t 39
Sokolov K.N. The reign of General Denikin: from memories. Sofia, 1921
Boldyrev V.G. Kolchak Directory. Interventionists. Novonikolaevsk, 1925
Pilsudski Yu. 1920 . M., 1926
Spirin L.M. Classes and parties in the Civil War. M., 1968
Ioffe G.Z. The collapse of the Russian monarchical counter-revolution. M., 1977
Ioffe G.Z. Kolchakism and its collapse. M., 1986
The Great October Revolution and the defense of its conquests. Defense of the socialist Fatherland. M., 1987
Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. M., 1991
Lekhovich D. Whites against reds. The fate of General Anton Denikin. M., 1992
Civil war in Russia. Crossroads of opinions. M., 1994
Anti-Bolshevik Russia: from the White Guard emigrant archives. M., 1995
Trukan G.A. Anti-Bolshevik government of Russia. M., 2000



The revolutionary events of 1917 and the subsequent Civil War are among the most complex and controversial events in Russian history. But it doesn’t matter which side you take today - in that era you can find many “dark” pages and unconditional achievements on both sides. Among the latter is the defeat of Baron P.N. Wrangel in Crimea in the fall of 1920. A unique military operation effectively ended intrastate clashes.

Black Baron of the White Guard

In 1920, the white movement in Russia noticeably weakened. His international support has almost ceased: in the West they were convinced of the reluctance of their soldiers to fight the Red Army and the popularity of Bolshevik ideas and decided that it would be easier to distance themselves from the Russian state.

The Red Army won one convincing victory after another: the failure in the war with Poland in the spring and summer months of 1920 did not fundamentally change anything. General Denikin's volunteer detachment, which previously controlled the entire south of the country, was retreating. At the beginning of 1920, its territory was actually limited to the Crimean Peninsula. In April, Denikin resigned and General P.N. took his place as leader of the White Guards. Wrangel (1878-1928).

This was a representative of an ancient noble family. Among the general’s relatives were A.S. Pushkin and the famous polar explorer F.P. Wrangel. Pyotr Nikolaevich himself had an engineering education, he participated in the Russian-Japanese and the First World Wars, and received well-deserved awards, including the St. George Cross. His candidacy as Denikin's successor was unanimously approved by the political leaders of the white movement. Wrangel owes his nickname “black baron” to his favorite clothes – a dark Cossack Circassian coat.

In the spring and summer of 1920, Baron Wrangel made several attempts to withdraw troops from and expand his influence in southern Ukraine. But the fearless defense of the Kakhovka bridgehead by the Reds (later in the USSR they sang about Kakhovka as a “stage of the long journey”) thwarted these plans. He tried to conclude an alliance with S. Petlyura, but this year he no longer represented a real force.

Who led the operation and participants: impenetrable Perekop

On the other hand, the Red Army command experienced significant difficulties when trying to resolve the issue of the final defeat of the White Guard direction. An entire Southern Front was formed for this purpose, but it was limited in its capabilities. The Wrangelites built the strongest defensive system on.

There literally was not an inch of land that was not covered by cannons or machine guns. Although Wrangel’s army had significant supply problems, it had enough ammunition to hold on for a long time and with heavy losses for the attackers. The Bolsheviks were unable to storm Crimea from the south - they did not have a fleet on the Black Sea.

The autumn of 1920 demonstrated an almost hopeless situation: Wrangel could not leave the Crimea, and the Red Army, despite its numerical superiority (almost 100 thousand against 28 thousand combat-ready White Guards), was not able to enter.

General Baron Wrangel was a good commander; experienced ideological fighters served under him. But even against him stood people who were not simple, talented nuggets with vast combat experience. Who led the operation to defeat Wrangel? In general, the invincible Soviet Marshal M.V. Frunze. But such well-known figures as

• K.E. Voroshilov,
• S.M. Budyonny,
• V.K.Blyukher,
• Bela Kun,
• N.I. Makhno.

The Red Army commanders had at their disposal aerial reconnaissance data, which clearly demonstrated to them the defense of Perekop. Among the units assigned to take Crimea was a kind of “revolutionary special forces” - the Latvian division. One can guess that such commanders with such fighters were able to cope with any task.

Perekop operation: defeat of Wrangel’s army

Hero V.S. Vysotsky in the film “Two Comrades Served,” a Wrangel officer, describing the plan for this operation, put it this way: “Okay, I’m crazy, what if the Bolsheviks are too?” The plan to seize Crimea was indeed unthinkable from the point of view of classical military science, but convinced people carried it out without hesitation.

November 8 V.K. Blucher launched an attack on the Perekop fortifications. His actions completely captured the attention of the defenders. At night of the same day, two red divisions - about 6 thousand people - forded across the bay. It is shallow; a person of average height can cross it without diving headlong. There were guides among the locals. But the bottom in Sivash is muddy and marshy - this made movement significantly difficult.

All found watercraft - fishing boats, rafts, even gates - were used exclusively for transporting ammunition. November, even in Crimea, is not the best time for swimming. People walked up to their chests and throats in water along the muddy bottom of the “Rotten Sea.” If anyone fell through, they drowned silently, without splashes or cries for help. The soldiers' clothes were frozen.

But they passed, and on the morning of November 9, 1920, Wrangel’s troops were faced with the need to fight on two fronts. Two days later, Blucher broke through the defenses of Perekop, and the maneuverable detachments of Father Makhno arrived in time to break through. The Red Army quickly occupied new territories, and Wrangel could only take care of the evacuation of the maximum number of his supporters.

To his credit, he did everything he could, but the few ships did not take everyone. Overcrowded transports left under the French flag for Constantinople. Wrangel himself then went there. A significant part of the remaining Wrangelites were shot after the capture of Crimea. Everything was completed before the end of the month.

Results and consequences

The defeat of Baron Wrangel in the fall of 1920, which took place on the territory of Crimea, actually put an end to the massive Civil War; then only the Basmachi in Central Asia and the atamans in the Far East resisted. You can feel sorry for the victims of the Red Terror as much as you like, but Wrangel’s counterintelligence did not stand on ceremony with the revolutionaries either - that was the time. The last major operation of that time became a significant milestone in the development of military art. And the transition to a peaceful life, even at a high cost, can only be welcomed.

The civil war was one of the most terrible for Russia. The number of those killed in battle, executed, and died of hunger and epidemics exceeded ten million people. In that terrible war, the whites were defeated. We decided to find out why.

Inconsistency. Failure of the Moscow campaign

In January 1919, Denikin's army won a major victory over an army of almost one hundred thousand Bolsheviks and occupied the North Caucasus. Next, the white troops advanced to the Donbass and Don, where, united, they were able to repel the Red Army, exhausted by Cossack uprisings and peasant riots. Tsaritsyn, Kharkov, Crimea, Ekaterinoslav, Aleksandrovsk were taken.

At this time, French and Greek troops landed in southern Ukraine, and the Entente was planning a massive offensive. The White Army advanced north, trying to approach Moscow, capturing Kursk, Orel and Voronezh along the way. At this time, the party committee had already begun to be evacuated to Vologda.

On February 20, the white army defeated the red cavalry corps and captured Rostov and Novocherkassk. The totality of these victories inspired the troops, and it would seem that victory was imminent for Denikin and Kolchak.

However, the Whites lost the battle for Kuban, and after the Reds took Novorossiysk and Yekaterinodar, the main White forces in the south were broken. They left Kharkov, Kyiv and Donbass. The Whites' successes on the northern front also ended: despite financial support from Great Britain, Yudenich's autumn offensive against Petrograd failed, and the Baltic republics rushed to sign a peace treaty with the Soviet government. Thus, Denikin’s Moscow campaign was doomed.

Personnel shortage

One of the most obvious reasons for the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces is the insufficient number of well-trained officers. For example, despite the fact that there were as many as 25,000 people in the Northern Army, there were only 600 officers among them. In addition, captured Red Army soldiers were recruited into the army, which did not contribute to morale.

White officers were trained thoroughly: British and Russian schools trained them. However, desertion, mutinies and the murder of allies remained frequent occurrences: “3 thousand infantrymen (in the 5th Northern Rifle Regiment) and 1 thousand military personnel of other branches of the army with four 75-mm guns went over to the side of the Bolsheviks.” After Great Britain stopped supporting the Whites at the end of 1919, the White army, despite a short-term advantage, was defeated and capitulated to the Bolsheviks.

Wrangel also described the shortage of soldiers: “The poorly supplied army fed exclusively from the population, placing an unbearable burden on them. Despite the large influx of volunteers from places newly occupied by the army, its numbers hardly increased.”

At first, there was also a shortage of officers in the Red army, and commissars were recruited in their place, even without military experience. It was for these reasons that the Bolsheviks suffered many defeats on all fronts at the beginning of the war. However, by decision of Trotsky, experienced people from the former tsarist army, who knew what war was first-hand, began to be hired as officers. Many of them went to fight for the Reds voluntarily.

Mass desertion

In addition to individual cases of voluntary departure from the White Army, there were more widespread cases of desertion.

Firstly, Denikin’s army, despite the fact that it controlled quite large territories, was never able to significantly increase its numbers at the expense of the inhabitants living on them.

Secondly, gangs of “greens” or “blacks” often operated in the rear of the whites, who fought against both the whites and the reds. Many whites, especially from among the former prisoners of the Red Army, deserted and joined foreign troops.

However, one should not exaggerate about desertion from the anti-Bolshevik ranks: at least 2.6 million people deserted from the Red Army in just one year (from 1919 to 1920), which exceeded the total number of white troops.

Fragmentation of forces

Another important factor that ensured the Bolsheviks’ victory was the solidity of their armies. White forces were widely scattered throughout Russia, which made it impossible to competently command the troops.

The disunity of the whites also manifested itself on a more abstract level - the ideologists of the anti-Bolshevik movement were unable to win over all the opponents of the Bolsheviks, showing excessive persistence in many political issues.

Lack of ideology

Whites were often accused of trying to restore the monarchy, separatism, and transferring power to a foreign government. However, in reality their ideology did not consist of such radical but clear guidelines.

The program of the white movement included the restoration of the state integrity of Russia, “the unity of all forces in the fight against the Bolsheviks” and the equality of all citizens of the country.
A huge mistake of the white command is the lack of clear ideological positions, ideas for which people would be willing to fight and die. The Bolsheviks proposed a very specific plan - their idea was to build a utopian communist state in which there would be no poor and oppressed, and for this it was possible to sacrifice all moral principles. The global idea of ​​uniting the whole world under the red flag of the Revolution defeated the amorphous white resistance.

This is how the white General Slashchev characterized his psychological state: “Then I didn’t believe in anything. If they ask me what I fought for and what my mood was, I will sincerely answer that I don’t know... I won’t hide the fact that sometimes thoughts flashed in my mind about whether the majority of the Russian people were on the side of the Bolsheviks - after all, it’s impossible, that they are still triumphant thanks only to the Germans.”

The failure of open intervention and the first big campaign against Soviet Russia did not stop the Entente. The last thing she wanted was to stop fighting the socialist state. That is why it was the Entente that organized the first campaign as a combined one, that is, as an offensive from all sides, so that in case of failure in one direction, success could be achieved in the other. Kolchak's defeat forced the Entente to switch its main attention to other generals - Denikin and Yudenich. During the first campaign of the Entente, Denikin's armed forces grew significantly due to volunteers from the kulaks, bourgeois sons and officers, as well as through forcibly mobilized peasants. By the end of June, Denikin managed to send about 100 thousand soldiers to the front.

Strengthening and arming the white armies in every possible way, but still not relying entirely on their combat effectiveness, the Entente begins to look for other ways to organize an attack on the Soviet country. According to the leaders of the Entente, the weapons of such an attack were to be states located along the borders of the Soviet republics, mainly along the western border.

Even during the first campaign of the Entente, there emerged, as Comrade Stalin wrote, “a new combination, a new covert form of armed intervention, admittedly more complex than open intervention, but more “convenient” for the “civilized” and “humane” Entente. We we mean the alliance of bourgeois governments hastily put together by imperialism - Romania, Galicia, Poland, Germany, Finland - against Soviet Russia... Why open intervention, “dangerous” for imperialism, which also requires great sacrifices, since it is possible to organize covered with a national flag and “ a completely safe" intervention at someone else's expense, at the expense of "small" nationalities: the war of Romania and Galicia, Poland and Germany with Russia. But this is a war for "national existence", for the "protection of the eastern border" against Bolshevik "imperialism", a war led by the Romanians and Galicians, the Poles and the Germans “themselves” - what does the Entente have to do with it? True, the latter supplies them with money and weapons, but this is a simple financial transaction, sanctified by the international law of the “civilized” world. Isn’t it clear that the Entente is as pure as a dove, that it is “against” intervention...

Thus, imperialism is forced from a policy of saber-rattling, a policy of open intervention, to a policy of disguised intervention, to a policy of drawing small and large dependent nationalities into the fight against socialism." (Stalin, article “Reserves of Imperialism”, see “Life of Nationalities” No. 9 (17) for 1919).

But in the spring of 1919, the bourgeoisie of Poland, Romania, Estonia and other countries was busy fighting the revolutionary movement in their countries. In addition, Romania was soon entrusted with the fight against Soviet Hungary, and the German bourgeoisie was faced with the task of fighting the growing influence of the communists, with Soviet Bavaria. Therefore, the bourgeoisie of all these states could not at that time allocate large forces to fight Soviet Russia.

By the autumn of 1919, the situation in Western Europe had changed. With the direct support of the Entente, Soviet power in Bavaria and Hungary was strangled. Even before this, Soviet power was overthrown in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The most brutal terror suppressed the slightest attempts by workers and peasants to defend their class interests. Now the Entente could already try to mobilize all these countries to fight the proletarian state.

A “campaign of fourteen states” against the Land of Soviets was planned for the fall of 1919. The initiator and organizer of this new, disguised intervention was the British Minister of War Churchill. As the foreign press reported, Churchill informed the Conservative Party Congress “about the deadly blow being prepared by the Entente against the Russian revolution. After concentrating all kinds of military supplies along all the borders of Soviet Russia, the armies of fourteen states will begin an offensive on Moscow. This offensive should begin in late August or early September. According to Churchill's calculations, Petrograd should fall in September, and Moscow by Christmas. From now on, until the end of the pacification work in the country, Russia will be governed by a mixed commission under a military dictatorship.”

Churchill tried to refute these press reports, but, as Lenin pointed out, “even if this source turned out to be incorrect, we know very well that the affairs of Churchill and the British imperialists were exactly like that... Finland, Estland and other small countries were subject to all measures of influence in order to so that they fight against Soviet Russia" (Lenin, vol. XXIV, p. 596).

The bourgeois press shouted in advance in every possible way about the upcoming success of the “campaign of fourteen states,” hoping for a quick defeat of the Bolsheviks. But nothing came of this campaign. It was thwarted by the active policies of the Soviet government.

Which countries were among these fourteen states? Lenin compiled a list of them on one of the documents. It included: England, USA, France, Japan, Italy, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia - a total of fourteen states. And on the side of the list in brackets, Vladimir Ilyich added: “Kolchakia”, “Denikia”.

Already from the list it is clear what a significant place the small states formed after the October Revolution occupied in this proposed campaign. It was clear that the last thing England, France and other Entente countries intended to do was repeat the experience using their own troops. The flashes of revolutionary uprisings in the French and British troops and navy in 1917, 1918 and 1919 were still too fresh in the memory of the imperialists. It was the armies of small states that had to supply the cannon fodder for the campaign. But the Entente could not dispose of these armies as their own armies. “The fact,” Comrade Stalin noted back in 1920, “that these armies act on the directives of the Entente does not at all refute the existence of the friction that exists and will exist between the Entente and the national interests of the states whose troops the Entente uses.” (Stalin, About the October Revolution, p. 23).

The Entente demanded that small states help the Russian counter-revolution, while the victories of Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich threatened, first of all, with the elimination of the independence of these countries. The white generals did not even bother to hide the fact that they were fighting for the old “united and indivisible” Russia. Kolchak categorically rebelled against Finnish independence. The White Guards viewed Estonia and Latvia as components of old Russia. They did not agree to recognize the independence of Poland and the Caucasian republics. That is why, despite pressure from the Entente, most small states, under all sorts of pretexts, either completely refused to act together with the White armies against Soviet Russia, or limited themselves to sending small units to the front to help the White Guards against the Red Army.

The bourgeoisie of all the newly formed republics were afraid of the Bolsheviks, were ready to fight with them themselves, and more than once came out with armed force against Soviet Russia. But at the same time, she did not at all want to help the struggle of the tsarist generals against the Bolsheviks, especially since the national and peaceful policy of the Soviet government provided the outlying republics with full opportunity for independent existence.

When small states, Lenin said on this occasion, “the question arose of whether to go head-on with the Entente, whether to help it strangle the Bolsheviks, or help the Bolsheviks with our neutrality, it turned out that we won the lawsuit and received neutrality, although we did not have any agreements.” , and England, France and America had all sorts of bills, all sorts of agreements - after all, the small countries did what we wanted, not because the Polish, Finnish, Lithuanian, Latvian bourgeoisie took pleasure in pursuing their policies for the sake of the beautiful eyes of the Bolsheviks, - this, of course, is nonsense - but because we were right in our definition of world-historical forces: that either brutal capital will win and, be it any democratic republic, it will strangle all the small nations of the world, or the dictatorship of the proletariat - and only in this is hope all working people and all small, downtrodden, weak peoples" (Lenin, vol. XXIV, p. 598).

Just as at the beginning of 1919, Soviet Russia took its own soldiers from the Entente, so now, in the fall of 1919, Soviet Russia wrested these small nations from the Entente. Vladimir Ilyich regarded this victory as a victory of world-historical significance, repeatedly analyzing and explaining its reasons in detail.

§ 2. The beginning of the second campaign of the Entente and Denikin’s offensive

The “campaign of fourteen states” against the Soviet Republic was to be accompanied by a simultaneous offensive of the White armies. The failure of the campaign forced the Entente to turn all its attention to the White Guard armed forces. Using these armed forces, the Entente carried out its second campaign in the fall of 1919.

“This campaign was also a combined one, for it assumed a joint attack by Denikin, Poland and Yudenich (Kolchak was dropped from the count). The center of gravity of the campaign lies this time in the south in the Denikin area." (Stalin). Yudenich, as in the spring, was supposed to launch an auxiliary attack on Petrograd. White Poland was still supposed to pin Soviet troops on the western front.

On June 30, the Whites managed to capture Tsaritsyn and thereby consolidate their dominance throughout the Don region. This was a serious loss, although it now posed less of a danger than at the end of 1918 or the spring of 1919, when on the eastern front the Whites were approaching the Volga and the threat of a unification of the armed forces of the eastern and southern counter-revolution was real. By this time, White troops had captured Left Bank Ukraine (including Kharkov) and Crimea. Intoxicated by his successes and urged on by the Entente, on July 3, Denikin, still a good 700 kilometers from Moscow, issued an order to all his armies to launch a decisive offensive, “with the ultimate goal of capturing the heart of Russia - Moscow.”

The right-flank Caucasian army under the command of General Wrangel was supposed to advance on Saratov - Penza - Nizhny Novgorod, in order from here to turn sharply west towards Moscow. The Don army, located in the center, was marching straight towards Moscow. The left-flank volunteer army had to first secure itself from the west by capturing Kyiv, and then advance on Moscow through Kursk - Orel - Tula. The White Guards were so confident of the final victory that one of the White generals, Mai-Maevsky, in a speech given on October 14, the day after the capture of Orel, directly stated that he would “occupy Moscow” no later than the end of December, by Christmas 1919. And the Donetsk capitalists directly promised a million-dollar reward to whichever regiment would be the first to break into Moscow.

§ 3. “Everyone to fight Denikin!”

Meanwhile, the Soviet country, under the leadership of the party, strained all its forces to counterattack Denikin.

At the beginning of July, when the decisive successes of the Red Army on the Kolchak front had already become apparent, the Party Central Committee, at the suggestion of Lenin, addressed all party organizations with a letter under the slogan: “Everyone to fight Denikin!” The letter was written by Lenin himself.

“One of the most critical, in all likelihood, even the most critical moment of the socialist revolution has arrived. Defenders of the exploiters - landowners and capitalists - Russian and foreign (primarily English and French) are making a desperate attempt to restore the power of the robbers of people's labor in Russia in order to strengthen their declining power throughout the world,” Lenin wrote in this letter.

To organize a rebuff to Denikin, “the Soviet republic must be single military camp not in words, but in deeds." Explaining to all the people the truth about Kolchak and Denikin, working among the mobilized and strengthening the fight against desertion, direct assistance to the army - clothes, shoes, weapons, shells, reducing all non-military work, deploying extensive work in the front line , carrying out the correct party line in relation to military specialists, strengthening the fight against counter-revolution in the rear, the total mobilization of the entire population for war - Lenin and the Central Committee of the Party mobilized all communists, the working class, all the working people of the Soviet country to accomplish these tasks.

“From all communists, from all conscious workers and peasants, from everyone who does not want to allow the victory of Kolchak and Denikin, an extraordinary rise in energy is required immediately and over the next few months, work in a revolutionary way is required” - this is how the letter ended.

The party and the working class responded to the call of the Leninist Central Committee with enormous enthusiasm and a truly revolutionary response. In the most dangerous moments, thousands and thousands of the best workers and Red Army soldiers firmly connect themselves with the party, join its ranks, so that, as many wrote in their statements, “if you have to die, then as a Bolshevik.” The “Party Week,” successfully carried out at the height of the offensive of Denikin and Yudenich, produced tens of thousands of new communists.

Thousands of communists from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and other proletarian centers are sent to the southern front, where they join the front ranks of the Red Army units. Many Komsomol organizations also went to the front in their entirety. The Second Congress of the Komsomol (in October 1919) adopted a resolution on the mobilization of Komsomol members throughout the country to the front. On the doors of Komsomol committees one could often find a notice: “The committee is closed. Everyone went to the front."

Within four months (June - September 1919), the working class and peasantry, mostly middle peasants, gave the Red Army over half a million new fighters. By October 1, the number of the Red Army had already reached 2.5 million people, and by January 1, 1920 - 3 million people.

This was a fact of the greatest political significance, a clear indication of the strengthening of the military-political alliance of the working class with the bulk of the peasantry - the middle peasants. Lenin’s party policy towards the middle peasants, which found its expression in the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress on work in the countryside, already known to us, was of decisive importance in consolidating the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry. On the other hand, the short stay of the peasants under the rule of Denikin contributed to no small extent to the elimination of the vacillations of the middle peasants.

The offensive of Denikin’s army, like Kolchak’s offensive in its time, was accompanied by the restoration of bourgeois-landowner power and the destruction of all the rights and gains that the October Revolution gave to the workers and peasants. On the heels of the white army were landowners, police officers and village elders - yesterday's owners of the village. If Denikin in the rear still covered up his landowner policy with talk that in the future, supposedly, the peasants would receive land (of course, for money), then in the localities, especially in the front line, they knew one thing for sure: the establishment of the power of the white generals meant, first of all, the return landowners of the land and all their estates with buildings, living and dead equipment, and compensation by the peasants to the landowner to the penny of all losses caused by the revolution.

All White Guard commanders were primarily concerned with one thing - restoring the landowners in their rights. General May-Mayevsky, the executioner of hundreds and thousands of workers and peasants, issued an order to the volunteer army on August 15, 1919, in which he proposed to “hurriedly send kerosene and salt to the occupied areas. Distribute these products to the population at reduced prices. We must remember,” the general wrote, “that we cannot snatch victory with ramrods alone; after all, the Bolsheviks gave the land, and this means a lot to the dark peasant. Kerosene and salt will serve us well: they will help us defeat Bolshevism and painlessly return their lands to the landowners.”

But neither kerosene nor salt helped the White Guards. The peasantry held tightly to the land they received in October. The middle peasant, who had recently hesitated, voluntarily joined the Red Army when the White Guards approached. This found particularly clear expression in the voluntary turnout into the Red Army of a significant number of peasant deserters who had previously evaded joining the army and hid in the forests. On the territory of the whites, the middle peasant took up arms against them. Thousands of forcibly mobilized peasants came over to our side, after mercilessly dealing with their oppressors. Numerous uprisings broke out in the deeper rear of the whites. The working people of the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus took up arms against Denikin, whom Denikin’s national policy returned to the same powerless state in which they were under the tsar. The Kuban Cossacks also became worried, from whom Denikin’s rulers forcibly took away grain for export abroad and to whom they denied self-government. Among the Cossacks, stratification intensified. The poorest part of the Cossacks began to actively oppose the White Guards.

Despite the difficult economic situation of the country, by the autumn of 1919 the party, which strictly implemented Lenin’s instructions, managed to provide the Red Army with everything necessary to go on the offensive and defeat Denikin.

§ 4. Deployment of the second campaign of the Entente

But while the turning point came, Denikin continued to develop his offensive. On August 10, he sent General Mamontov’s cavalry corps into the rear of the Red armies (XIII and VIII) directly defending the route to Moscow. The white cavalry relatively easily broke through the red front at Novokhopersk and moved deep into the rear of the Red Army. Taking advantage of his superiority in mobility and maneuverability (the Red command in the area of ​​​​the White breakthrough had almost no cavalry), Mamontov successively captured a number of cities for a short period of time - Tambov, Kozlov, Usman, Yelets. Mamontov's advancement was accompanied by unheard of violence against the peaceful working population - floggings, beatings, pogroms, and executions. A forest of gallows, mountains of corpses of communists, Soviet workers, workers, flames of fires - this is how the Mammoth bandits marked their path. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and its chairman Trotsky failed to properly organize a rebuff to Mamontov. After several weeks of operations in our rear, Mamontov, with a huge convoy of looted property, turned south and on September 19 united with Denikin’s main forces.

The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic failed to organize properly the counteroffensive of the central (XIII and VIII) and left-flank groups (IX and X armies) of the southern front, which began on August 15. After short-term success, both of these groups, under the attacks of the white armies, had to pause their offensive and then retreat. On October 6, the Whites occupied Voronezh, and on October 14, Oryol. The advanced units of Denikin's army broke into the Tula province. An immediate threat looms over the red capital of the Land of Soviets, Moscow.

At this very moment, according to the plan of the Entente (the English General March dictated his demands to the whites on its behalf), it launched (from September 28) a new offensive against Petrograd and Yudenich’s army, reinforced by the English fleet and some Estonian units. Back in August-September, the British, in order to weaken the Baltic Fleet at the time of the decisive offensive, disabled several ships with planes and torpedo boats. Despite heavy losses, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet selflessly participated from the sea and on land in the defense of the city. After a preliminary attack on Pskov, in order to attract the attention of the red command, Yudenich on October 10–11 broke through the front of the VII Army defending Petrograd near Yamburg and in just ten days approached the outskirts of the city. The traitors who penetrated the headquarters of the army and the Baltic Fleet made it easier for the Whites to advance. The iron hand of the organs of the proletarian dictatorship severely punished the traitors to their homeland: they were shot. The bourgeois press hastened to notify the whole world about the alleged fall of the first city of the revolution. By the beginning of October, Kolchak, having gathered his last forces, pushed the Red Army beyond the Tobol River.

Never before had the position of the Soviet state been as dangerous as at the moment described - in mid-October 1919. But the Red Army, relying on its powerful rear, was already preparing to launch a decisive offensive.

The Central Committee of the Party and, first of all, Lenin and Stalin clearly saw all the shortcomings of the work of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and its head, Trotsky, who - according to the successful definition, Comrade Voroshilov - led the Red Army from two trains, shifting the entire burden of work to secondary workers.

This poor leadership of the Red Army on the part of the RVS of the Republic and Trotsky was very clearly indicated by a letter full of anger from Vladimir Ilyich to the then member of the RVSR, the now deceased S.I. Gusev. It was written on September 16, 1919, i.e. at the very height of Denikin’s attack on Moscow. Comrade Voroshilov announced it for the first time in his report dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the Red Army, omitting only one name.

Vladimir Ilyich wrote:

“Comrade Gusev! Delving into Sklyansky’s letter (about the state of affairs on September 15) and the results of the reports, I am convinced that our RVSR is not working well.

Calming and reassuring is a bad tactic. It turns out to be a “game of calm.”

But in reality, we have stagnation - almost collapse.

They installed some bastard Olderoga and a woman on the Siberian front... and “calmed down.” It's a shame! And they started beating us. We will make the RVSR responsible for this if vigorous measures are not taken. Letting go of victory is a shame.

There is stagnation with Mamontov. Apparently, there were delays after delays. The troops marching from the north to Voronezh were late. We were late in transferring the 21st Division to the south. We were late with the auto-machine guns. We were late with communication. Was it only the commander-in-chief who went to Oryol or did they not do anything with you? No connection was established with Selivachev, no supervision was established over him, contrary to the long-standing and direct demand of the Central Committee.

As a result, both with Mamontov there was stagnation, and with Selivachev there was stagnation (instead of the “victories” promised by childish drawings from day to day - remember, you showed me these drawings? And I said: they forgot about the enemy!).

If Selivachev escapes or his division commanders betray him, the RVSR will be to blame, because he was sleeping and calming down, but nothing was done. We need to send the best, most energetic commissars to the south, not sleepy grouse.

We are also late with the formation. We skip autumn, and Denikin will triple his strength, receive tanks, and so on. and so on. You can not do it this way. We need to change the sleepy pace of work into a lively one.

Answer me (via L.A. Fotieva).

16. IX. 1919. Lenin.

Apparently, our RVSR “commands” without being interested or willing to monitor execution. If this is our common sin, then in military affairs it is downright ruinous.”

§ 5. The Central Committee entrusts Comrade Stalin with organizing the defeat of Denikin

It is clear that with such work by the top army leadership, the Central Committee of the Party and Lenin had to directly resolve all issues of defense of the Soviet state, entrusting leadership in the most important areas of the struggle to the best Bolsheviks, and above all to J.V. Stalin. This was the case in the fall of 1919, when enemy forces approached both capitals of the Soviet country - Moscow and Petrograd.

The Party Central Committee timely and completely correctly assessed the relationship between the Petrograd and southern fronts. The Petrograd Front was very important. Petrograd could not be surrendered, but still the southern front was the most important, the most important. On October 15, the Politburo of the Party Central Committee once again emphasized this, deciding “... the issue of the Northern and Western fronts should be considered only from the point of view of the security of the Moscow-Tula region in the first place...” It was here, on the southern front, that the final victory was decided. That is why the party sent Comrade Stalin here, to the south, entrusting him with organizing the defeat of Denikin.

Comrade Voroshilov, in his work “Stalin and the Red Army,” vividly outlined the gigantic work done by Comrade Stalin on the southern front.

“Before his appointment,” says Comrade Voroshilov, “Comrade Stalin set three main conditions for the Central Committee: 1) Trotsky should not interfere in the affairs of the southern front and should not cross its demarcation lines, 2) he should be immediately recalled from the southern front a whole number of workers whom Comrade Stalin considered unfit to restore the situation in the troops, and 3) new workers of Comrade Stalin’s choice who could carry out this task should be immediately sent to the southern front. These conditions were fully accepted.

But in order to cover this huge colossus (from the Volga to the Polish-Ukrainian border), called the southern front, numbering several hundred thousand troops, the front needed a clearly formulated task. Then this goal could be set before the troops and, by regrouping and concentrating the best forces in the main directions, strike the enemy.

Comrade Stalin finds a very uncertain and difficult situation at the front. On the main direction Kursk - Orel - Tula we are being beaten, the eastern flank is helplessly marking time. As for operational directives, he is offered the old plan (September) of delivering the main attack on the left flank, from Tsaritsyn to Novorossiysk, across the Don steppes...

Having familiarized himself with the situation, Comrade Stalin immediately makes a decision. He categorically rejects the old plan, puts forward new proposals and proposes them to Lenin in the following note, which speaks for itself. It is so interesting, it so vividly depicts the strategic talent of Comrade Stalin, it is so characteristic in the very decisiveness of the question that we pose it, that we consider it useful to present it in full.

“Two months ago, the Commander-in-Chief did not fundamentally object to a strike from west to east through the Donetsk basin as the main one. If he still did not take such a blow, it was because he referred to the “inheritance” received as a result of the retreat of the southern troops in the summer, i.e., to the spontaneously created grouping of troops of the south-eastern front, the restructuring of which (the grouping) would lead to a big waste of time, to Denikin’s benefit... But now the situation and the associated grouping of forces have changed fundamentally: the VIII Army (the main one on the former southern front) has moved in the southern front area and looks directly at the Donetsk basin, Budyonny’s concorps (another main force) has also moved to area of ​​the southern front, a new force has been added - the Latvian division, which in a month, having been renewed, will again represent a formidable force for Denikin... What makes the Commander-in-Chief (headquarters) defend the old plan? Obviously only stubbornness, if you like, factionalism, the stupidest and most dangerous for the republic, cultivated in the Commander-in-Chief by the “strategic” cockerel attached to him... The other day the Commander-in-Chief gave Shorin a directive to attack Novorossiysk through the Don steppes along a line along which there could be It’s convenient for our aviators to fly, but it will be completely impossible for our infantry and artillery to roam. There is no need to prove that this extravagant (alleged) campaign in an environment hostile to us, in conditions of absolute roadlessness, threatens us with complete collapse. It is not difficult to understand that this campaign against the Cossack villages, as recent practice has shown, can only rally the Cossacks against us around Denikin to protect their villages, can only present Denikin as the savior of the Don, can only create an army of Cossacks for Denikin, that is, it can only strengthen Denikin. That is why it is necessary now, without wasting time, to change the old plan, which has already been canceled by practice, replacing it with a plan for the main attack through Kharkov - the Donetsk basin to Rostov: firstly, here we will have an environment that is not hostile, on the contrary, sympathetic to us, which will facilitate our promotion; secondly, we get the most important railway network (Donetsk) and the main artery feeding Denikin’s army - the Voronezh - Rostov line ..; thirdly, with this advance we cut Denikin’s army into two parts, of which we leave the volunteer part to be devoured by Makhno, and we put the Cossack armies in danger of going behind their rear; fourthly, we get the opportunity to quarrel the Cossacks with Denikin, who (Denikin), in the event of our successful advance, will try to move the Cossack units to the west, which most Cossacks will not do...; fifthly, we get coal, but Denikin is left without coal. The adoption of this plan cannot be delayed... In short: the old plan, already canceled by life, should under no circumstances be galvanized - this is dangerous for the republic, this will certainly ease Denikin’s situation. It needs to be replaced with another plan. Circumstances and conditions are not only ripe for this, but also imperatively dictate such a replacement... Without this, my work on the southern front becomes meaningless, criminal, unnecessary, which gives me the right, or rather, obliges me to go anywhere, even to hell, just not stay on the southern front. Your Stalin."

No comments are needed on this document. It is noteworthy how Comrade Stalin measures the shortest operational direction.

In civil war, simple arithmetic is insufficient and often erroneous. The path from Tsaritsyn to Novorossiysk may turn out to be much longer, because it passes through a hostile class environment. And, on the contrary, the path from Tula to Novorossiysk may turn out to be much shorter, because it goes through working-class Kharkov, through the mining Donbass. This assessment of the trends reflected the main qualities of Comrade Stalin as a proletarian revolutionary, as a real strategist of the civil war.

Comrade Stalin's plan was adopted by the Central Committee. Lenin himself wrote with his own hand an order to the field headquarters to immediately change the outdated directive. The main blow was delivered by the southern front in the direction of Kharkov - Donbass - Rostov." (Voroshilov, Stalin and the Red Army).

§ 6. Implementation of Stalin's plan

Comrade Stalin did not limit himself to developing a strategic plan for the defeat of Denikin’s army and approving it at the center. Together with the commander of the southern front, A.I. Egorov (now the chief of staff of the Red Army), Comrade Stalin, as a member of the front's Revolutionary Military Council, directly supervised the implementation of this plan. The main idea of ​​the plan, as can be seen from Stalin’s letter to Lenin, was to strike at the White armies from Orel through Kharkov-Donbass to Rostov, in order to cut off the volunteer army from the Don army. But for this it was necessary: ​​1) first of all, to stop the movement of the Whites north to Tula and go on a counter-offensive, 2) to carry out the division of Denikin’s army into two parts and defeat them, and 3) to ensure the continuous pursuit of the defeated White troops until the occupation of Rostov.

As we already know, in the first half of October White successfully advanced. The best officer divisions acted here against our broken and tired units. The primary task of the command of the southern front was to defeat the presumptuous White Guards, create a turning point at the front and consolidate it. The resolution of this task was entrusted to the strike group created southeast of Bryansk at the junction of the XIV and XIII Red armies. The strike group included the following units transferred from the rear front: the Latvian division (headed by Comrade Martuzevich, later replaced by Comrade Kalnin), a separate rifle brigade of Pavlov and a brigade of red Cossacks by Comrade Primakov, which later expanded into a division - about 10 in total thousand fighters. Comrade Lenin personally monitored the timely concentration of the strike group. On October 11, the group went on the offensive with the task of reaching the Fatezh-Maloarkhangelsk line. The enemy, who quickly discovered the presence of the strike group, made every effort to knock it off the given direction with a series of blows, disperse its forces, scatter the group into parts in order to hit them one by one. To a certain extent, White achieved this. By pushing back the units adjacent to the strike group and capturing Orel on October 13, the enemy ultimately ensured that the strike group changed the direction and system of delivering its main attack. Over the course of several days, the main attack was twice inclined to the north, so that in fact the group operated in the Kromy-Oryol area. At the same time, several units of the strike group took part in the attack from Krom to Orel, and the 1st brigade of the Latvian division and the brigade of red Cossacks under the overall command of Comrade Primakov acted in the opposite direction - from Krom to Dmitrovsk. The splitting efforts of the strike group naturally weakened the force of the strike itself. On October 20, the 3rd brigade of the Latvian division, simultaneously with the advanced units of the 9th and Estonian divisions, occupied Orel. This marked the beginning of a turning point on the southern front: the White offensive in the main direction was suspended. But here and there the enemy went on the offensive. On October 23, he occupied Kromy. From Orel he withdrew his units in advance in the direction of Kursk. Where the Red Army went on the offensive, he stubbornly defended himself. It was necessary to defeat the Whites in order to consolidate the turning point at the front. This was precisely the task of the strike group and this was precisely what had not yet been accomplished.

I. V. Stalin and A. I. Egorov.

Comrade Stalin, who continuously monitored how the strike group carried out the first part of his plan, promptly noticed all the shortcomings in its actions. On the night of October 24-25, having heard a report via direct wire from Comrade Ordzhonikidze (a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the XIV Army, to which the strike group was subordinate) about the military operations of the army, Comrade Stalin gave him the following instructions:

“The situation in recent days has developed at the front in such a way that the enemy managed, through a skillful maneuver, to push the strike group into separate regiments and beat them one by one. The meaning of our last directive is to give you the opportunity to again collect these shelves in one group and destroy Denikin’s best regiments, I repeat, destroy, for we are talking about extermination. The capture of Krom by the enemy is an episode that can always be corrected; the main task is do not let the regiments of the strike group go individually, but hit the enemy as a single and massive group in one direction; the remaining units coming from the south will provide you with all possible assistance."

These instructions, exceptional in their clarity and purposefulness, were accepted by the command of the XIV Army (commander Comrade Uborevich) and immediately transferred to the commander of the strike group for execution.

Concentrating again, the strike group launched a counter-offensive the next day, trying - in accordance with Comrade Stalin's directive - to hit the enemy's manpower and destroy his best regiments. In the battles from October 26 to 28, the strike group, reinforced from the flanks by units of the XIV and XIII Armies, returned Kromy (October 27), defeated the best (1st Army) corps of the volunteer army, forcing the Whites to retreat. The armies of the southern front were faced with the task of fulfilling the most important part of Stalin’s plan - cutting the White army into two halves. The decisive role in the accomplishment of this task, as well as in the subsequent persecution and final defeat of the armed forces of the southern counter-revolution, was played by Comrade Budyonny’s cavalry corps, which was later reorganized into the 1st Cavalry Army.

I. P. Uborevich.

At the end of September, Budyonny’s corps was still in Kazan on the left bank of the Don (at about 240 km southeast of Voronezh). The main command intended to send the corps to the southwest (via the Don). But Comrade Budyonny learns at this time about a new, second, raid of Mamontov’s cavalry units in the rear of the Red armies in the area of ​​​​the southeast of Voronezh.

Comrade Budyonny well remembered the dire consequences of the August breakthrough of the Mamontovites for the Red Army. He understood that the white cavalry could only be dealt with by the cavalry. He knew that besides his corps there were no other equally strong cavalry units in the Red Army. The conclusion suggested itself. And Comrade Budyonny made this only correct, truly revolutionary conclusion. On his own initiative, he moved the corps north, to the VIII Army region - to Voronezh, against the white cavalry. The high command was forced to agree with Comrade Budyonny’s decision: to find and defeat the White cavalry.

L. M. Kaganovich.

On October 13 - for the first time in the entire civil war - large cavalry formations of the revolution and counter-revolution, Budyonny and Shkuro-Mamontov, clashed. For several days, reconnaissance with combat, short blows, the opponents groped for each other’s weak spots. Finally, on October 19, in the fields east of Voronezh, Comrade Budyonny throws units of the military corps eager for battle against the enemy. All the atrocities and violence committed by white robbers against the peaceful working population and against captured Red Army soldiers were imprinted in the memory of the Red fighters. The corps passed through trampled fields, through looted and burned villages and hamlets. Everywhere he met peasant families deprived of breadwinners and orphaned children. The red soldiers burned with anger. Their hatred of the kulak Cossacks and the officers was strong. And that is why their blow on the white cavalry was so crushing and merciless. The best division of the Whites - the Kuban - was cut down with such speed that the generals did not even have time to look back. A few more crushing blows - and the white cavalry was forced to give up the battlefield to the reds. On October 23, the military corps, together with Voronezh workers and communist detachments led by Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, the chairman of the Voronezh Gubernia Revolutionary Committee, approached the city itself. On a frosty night, through snow-covered fields, red cavalry rushed towards the enemy. On the morning of October 24, advanced units broke into the outskirts of Voronezh, and by the end of the day the city was cleared of white bandits. In fact, in these October days, the volunteer army received a severe blow not only along the front, but also on the right and left flanks. The enemy retreated, and Comrade Budyonny was already preparing to carry out the decisive task - to strike at Kastornaya and further to the south in order to finally cut off the volunteer army from the Don.

The news of the successes of the strike group and units of the XIII Army in the Oryol direction, and the concorps in the Voronezh direction quickly spread throughout the army and the whole country. All parts of the southern front, reinforced by communist and Komsomol reinforcements, were preparing for new attacks on the Whites.

The attack on Kastornaya was not chosen by chance. It was in this area that the junction of the volunteer and Don armies took place. In early November, having crossed the Don, the regiments of the cavalry corps moved to Kastornaya. The corps command knew that there were serious battles ahead, that the battle would be bloody, but they were confident of the final victory. And Comrade Budyonny and the division commands were able to instill this confidence in the soldiers of the corps and the attached rifle units.

The White command was well aware of the importance of Kastornaya with its most important railway junction. Two infantry divisions, tanks, armored trains, and armored vehicles were sent to defend Kastornaya. The commanders of the white corps defeated near Voronezh, having received reinforcements and strengthened their units, dreamed of taking revenge on yesterday’s sergeant, non-commissioned officer or ordinary Cossack who dared to raise a hand against “their nobility.”

The sentiments of ordinary soldiers of the White Army were different. The forcibly mobilized peasants did not want to fight for the interests of the landowners; participants in the Voronezh battles remembered the crushing blows of the red cavalrymen. That is why the political and moral state of the whites was reduced.

V. M. Primakov.

Comrade Budyonny carried out the capture of Kastornaya by combining attacks on horseback with a remarkable maneuver. Despite the ice and a severe snowstorm, the 11th Cavalry Division approached Kastornaya from the northeast on November 13–14, the 42nd (attached) Division advanced from the north, the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions under the general leadership of Semyon Mikhailovich struck from the south, to the station. Sukovkino, cutting off White from the main base. Having captured Sukovkino, Comrade Budyonny used the conversation tapes found on the telegraph to understand the situation in the White camp. Then, on behalf of the white command, he gave several orders to the white units by telegraph. Knowing perfectly well the location of the Whites and the route of their movement (by his own order from Sukovkin), Comrade Budyonny scheduled a decisive attack on Kastornaya on November 15. Red regiments rushed at the enemy from all sides. The decisive role was played by the attack from the south: under the cover of four armored trains captured from the Whites, our units burst into the station. The blow was unexpected. The enemy - whoever was able - fled in panic, leaving huge trophies for the winners. The victory was huge. The whole country repeated Budyonny's name with love.

Arrival of Comrade Stalin to the First Cavalry Army. From a painting by the artist Avilov.

During these same days, on the left flank of the volunteer army, Comrade Primakov’s Red Cossacks, together with the Latvian and Kuban cavalry regiments, also dealt a strong blow to the Whites. Having dressed in the White Guard uniform, posing as Shkurovites, the Red Cossacks from November 3 to 5, and then from November 14 to 15, carried out two deep raids (on Ponyri-Fatezh and Lgov) behind enemy lines, causing panic, defeating the best officer units, capturing over three thousand prisoners, dozens of guns, and destroying his bases. And most importantly, these raids greatly facilitated the advancement of the XIV Army.

After the November victories, the Red Army no longer encountered serious obstacles on its path.

§ 7. Creation of the 1st Cavalry Army

In the pursuit of Denikin's troops and in their final defeat, the decisive role was played, as already noted, by the First Cavalry Army, which acted as a strike group of troops on the southern front. A huge role, as will be clear from what follows, was played by the First Cavalry in the struggle in 1920. It should be emphasized all the more that this true brainchild of the revolution was created only and exclusively on the initiative and insistence of Comrade Stalin with the opposition of the main leadership of the Red Army.

Mounted units in the Red Army already existed in 1918. In particular, on the southern front (near Tsaritsyn) with the support of comrade. Stalin and Voroshilov created large cavalry units. But the main command, representatives of the old officers who worked in the central apparatus of the Red Army, considered the cavalry only as an auxiliary type of weapon, auxiliary to the infantry. Based on the experience of the imperialist war, during which mediocre commanders reduced the importance of cavalry to nothing, many military workers believed that in the new conditions its role would be very limited. Trotsky, who was strongly influenced by old military specialists, also opposed the creation of large cavalry formations capable of independently conducting operations. One of the reasons for his attitude towards the cavalry (in addition to arguments from the “experience” of the World War) was his disbelief in the revolutionary capabilities of the poor and middle peasantry, in particular the Cossacks, as well as disbelief in the ability of the working class to organize, discipline and rally the working peasantry around itself under banners of the Leninist party.

In the process of carrying out the Kastorna operation, the Revolutionary Military Council of the southern front, based on the experience of using large cavalry formations and the prospects for further struggle, decided on November 11 to “form a cavalry army.”

A request for approval of this decision was immediately sent to Moscow. On November 15, the Kastorna operation was victoriously completed - another fairly compelling argument for the creation of a cavalry army. Despite this, the RVSR, chaired by Trotsky, having discussed at a meeting on November 17 the request of the RVS of the southern front to create a cavalry army, made a decision that essentially slowed down the organization of the I Cavalry.

The resolution of the RVSR read: “Having encountered no fundamental objections to the renaming of Comrade Budyonny’s cavalry corps into the Cavalry Army, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic postpones the final decision on this issue until the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front presents the RVSR with the combat composition of this army, position and staff.”

The meaning of this resolution, despite the statement that there were no fundamental objections, was absolutely clear: the creation of a cavalry army was postponed until staffing, supply and all other issues were resolved in numerous offices. And this, given the pace of work of the central apparatus, for which Vladimir Ilyich repeatedly scolded its leaders, required months.

It is clear that it was impossible to put up with such bureaucratic obstacles. The fight continued, the enemy was not finished off, a cavalry army was needed. And a couple of days later, on November 19, an order was issued signed by comrade. Egorov and Stalin (for No. 1801), which actually legitimized the reorganization of the 1st Concorps into the army. December 6 vol. Stalin and Egorov arrived in the area of ​​​​operations of the corps (in N. Oskol, the village of V. Mikhailovka) to help the command carry out the reorganization as painlessly as possible. The highest command of the cavalry took shape from vol. S. M. Budyonny, K. E. Voroshilov and E. A. Shchadenko (Revolutionary Military Council of the Army), S. A. Zotova (Chief of Staff), division chiefs 4, 6, 11 were approved by vol. Gorodovikov, Timoshenko and Matuzenko (the latter was soon replaced), and military division commanders (respectively) vol. Detistov, Bakhturov and Ozolin. With this leadership team, the young Cavalry continued to carry out the combat missions assigned to the corps.

“From now on,” Comrade Voroshilov later wrote about the significance of this reorganization, “the red cavalry acquired the necessary organizational independence and the ability to solve not only tactical, but also strategic tasks in sectors of its front.” (Voroshilov, Red horse masses, “Red Star” No. 261 for 1924). The enormous political work carried out by the communists of the cavalry army under the leadership of Comrade Voroshilov in educating the cavalry soldiers, among whom there were many partisan-minded fighters, turned the 1st Cavalry Army into a reliable support of the party and Soviet power.

Thus, in the crucible of the civil war, the correctness of the party line was tested and confirmed in practice, Trotsky’s erroneous views and harmful proposals were refuted and defeated.

§ 8. Liberation of Ukraine

The victories of units of the southern front near Orel, Voronezh and Kastornaya, and the non-stop movement of the 1st Cavalry Army towards Rostov allowed the front command to set major tasks for the other armies. The most important of them politically was the task of liberating Ukraine and its main cities - Kharkov and Kyiv. The XIV and XII armies were entrusted with this task.

R. P. Eideman.

Despite the fierce resistance of the white units concentrated on the approaches to Kharkov, the capture of the city was carried out by units of the XIV Army with absolutely amazing precision for the combat situation. December 4th Vol. Uborevich and Ordzhonikidze issued order No. 041 to the army troops, in which they set the task of capturing the Kharkov area no later than December 11, the 41st division (headed by Comrade Sablin) - from the west, 46th division (headed by Comrade R.P. Eideman, military commander of the division T. L. Mehlis) - from the north-west, the Latvian division (chief of the Kalnin division) - from the north and the cavalry group of Comrade Primakov - from the east, had the task of encircling Kharkov. Moreover, Comrade Primakov’s group was supposed to carry out a raid south of Kharkov, cutting off the Whites’ escape route to the south. And so great was the offensive impulse of the Red troops, so strong was the support they met from the local population in the area of ​​​​their movement, that exactly at the scheduled time, by the evening of December 11, the Latvian brigade and the 2nd regiment of red Cossacks under the command of Comrade Potapenko from Art. Merefa, that is, already from the rear, burst into the outskirts of Kharkov, where local workers were already in arms against the white rapists. On December 12, the city was completely cleared of Denikin.

G. I. Kotovsky.

At this time, the command of the XII Army (commander Comrade S.A. Mezheninov, members of the RVS Comrades Zatonsky and Aralov) concentrated the efforts of its units on capturing Kiev.

The Whites, under the command of General Bredov, occupied very advantageous positions on the right, higher bank of the Dnieper, from which it was easy to shoot the red units advancing on the city along the left bank. The Dnieper had just begun to freeze, but it was no longer possible to use boats to cross, and it was still impossible to cross on the thin ice. But the city had to be taken. And on December 14, the command gave the order to the 44th division (chief of division t. I.N. Dubova) from the east (from the left bank) to attack the city, sending one brigade each to bypass the city from the north and south, the 58th division (chief of t . I. F. Fedko) and the 47th division from the west and south to attack the city, helping the 44th division.

Liberation of Donbass. From a painting by artist Zhuravlev.

With great enthusiasm, the units began to carry out the order. The vast majority of the fighters of the 44th division, and partly the rest, consisted of workers and peasants of the Kiev and Chernigov regions. They fought in partisan detachments on the right bank of Ukraine during the German intervention. They fought here both with the Haidamaks of the Rada and with the troops of the hapless Hetman Skoropadsky. It was here that the strong Bolshevik Comrade Nikolai Aleksandrovich Shchors formed the Bogun brigade, and later the 1st Ukrainian division (later renamed the 44th), the first division commander of which he was until his death at the front on August 30, 1919.

Here, in the Tarashchansky district, the old revolutionary, Bolshevik, carpenter of the Kyiv arsenal Vasily Nazarievich Bozhenko created the Tarashchansky brigade, which later also became part of the 44th division. It was here that Bozhenko died at the front, and hundreds of the best sons of Ukraine died. Every fighter in the Kiev region, in Kyiv itself, had relatives and friends. That is why the fighters attacked the whites so persistently. And the division was largely indebted for the capture of the city to a local fisherman from Nikolskaya Sloboda near Kiev - Alekseev, whose entire family was tortured by the whites. Alekseev longed to take revenge on the damned executioners. On December 15, he appeared at the headquarters of the 389th Bohunsky Regiment with a proposal to transfer the regiment south of Kyiv across the ice on the Dnieper along a path known to him. The command agreed. On the night of December 16, the Bogunians began their journey through ice holes and cracks, on thin ice floes covered with cold water.

Before dawn, Alekseev led the entire regiment to the right bank. The enemy did not expect the Reds here. With a swift blow from the south, they burst into Kyiv. At the same time, the remaining units rushed towards the city. By the evening of December 16, Kyiv was captured. The most important points of Ukraine became Soviet again. Liberation of the remaining parts of Ukraine from the whites was no longer difficult. On February 7, 1920, Kotovsky’s cavalry occupied Odessa, the last stronghold of the Whites in Ukraine.

By January 8, 1920, the I Cavalry Army, having liberated Donbass and occupied Rostov, completed the implementation of Stalin’s plan. Not so long ago, Denikin’s hordes (“my army,” the English Minister of War Churchill spoke of them with pride) were defeated. Their remnants went to the North Caucasus. Their elimination was already a matter of time.

§ 9. Insurgency in the rear of Denikin, breakthrough of the southern group

The insurgent movement organized by the party behind Denikin's rear was of exceptionally great importance for the defeat of Denikinism. Denikin, like Kolchak, not only restored the dominance of capitalists and landowners, but persistently pursued a policy of recreating a “united and indivisible” Russia. Ukraine, Kuban, and the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus were considered by him as colonies of Russia. By armed means he suppressed all attempts of the peoples of Ukraine and the North Caucasus to independently organize their lives. The party's consistent Leninist national policy and its call for workers to fight for the restoration of Soviet power and self-determination of all nationalities met with a warm response from the working population of Ukraine, the North Caucasus and Crimea.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, through the Zafrontburo, which it specially created for underground work behind the cordon, organized and led the anti-Denikin movement. Underground party organizations and special commissioners united disparate groups of rebel peasants and coordinated the actions of rebel groups. By the fall of 1919, three brigades of Soviet rebel troops were operating only within the Yekaterinoslav and Poltava regions. Subsequently, two more brigades were organized. The uprising developed especially widely in the Kherson region, Kharkov region and Donbass. Ukrainian Komsomol members and working youth fought heroically against Denikin.

The insurgency and uprisings were organized by party organizations throughout the North Caucasus, especially in the national regions and along the entire Caucasian Black Sea coast. Comrade Kirov from Astrakhan continuously led the partisan struggle in the North Caucasus. After the murder of Comrade Kirov on December 1, 1934, the scum of the counter-revolutionary Zinoviev organization revealed the enormous scope of the work he carried out during the Civil War to revolutionize the white rear. Comrade Gikalo, who led the fight in Chechnya, south of Grozny, received help from Comrade Kirov with reliable commanders, weapons, and money. Betal Kalmykov in 1919 launched a struggle in Greater and Lesser Kabarda on the direct instructions of Comrade Kirov. Kirov envoys also worked directly among the interventionist and white troops. Under the influence of Bolshevik agitation, the Cossacks became agitated in Denikin’s rear. Hiding in the mountains and forests, the rebels launched raids from here on the rear and bases of Denikin’s troops, captured cities and entire regions, destroyed landowners, gendarmes, and officers, wrecked railroads and thereby impeded the movement of Denikin’s troops.

M. I. Vasilenko and S. M. Kirov.

Larger detachments fought with White Guard units, coordinating their actions whenever possible with the actions of the advancing units of the Red Army, in particular with the actions of the XI Red Army (commander Comrade Vasilenko, member of the Revolutionary Military Council Comrade Kirov), advancing from Astrakhan to Stavropol.

The rear of the whites was thus engulfed in continuous uprisings. Because of this, Denikin had to keep large armed forces in the rear, instead of sending them to the front. Moreover, he was forced to remove entire regiments and divisions from the front and send them to suppress the uprisings. But Denikin failed to suppress the rebel movement.

Through the fight against Denikin, the Red Army wrote many glorious pages in its military history. Every regiment, every division that participated in the Civil War on the southern front can proudly recall dozens of examples of heroic, selfless struggle against the White Guards. One of the most remarkable episodes of this struggle was the breakthrough of the southern group of the XII Army, surrounded by counter-revolutionary troops, from near Odessa to the north to Zhitomir.

The southern group consisted of the 45th division (chief of the division Comrade Garkavy), the 58th division (chief of the division Comrade Fedko) and the remnants of the 47th division. Moving with the group were thousands of communists and Soviet workers who evacuated with their families from the cities of Crimea captured by the whites, from Kherson and Odessa. In total, the southern group consisted of up to 30–40 thousand people with a huge convoy. The group was surrounded by the enemy from all sides: from the west and north-west - by Petliurists, from the east - by Makhnovists and Denikinites, from the south - also by Denikinists. There was only one way - to the north, to join the Red Army.

I. E. Yakir.

The southern group was cut off from the nearest units of the Red Army by a distance of 600–700 km. This path had to be taken in order to escape from the encirclement. The task is almost impossible. But the fighters of the southern group carried it out. Having started their campaign in mid-August, they fought their way north for weeks with continuous fighting. And in the end they broke through, captured Zhitomir, united with the main part of the XII Army and went on the offensive against Denikin. The names of the leaders of this truly legendary breakthrough are well known to all working people. The group was commanded by Comrade Yakir (now the commander of the UVO troops), a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the group was Comrade Gamarnik (now the 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the Purkka).

§ 10. The defeat of Yudenich

Simultaneously with the transition to the offensive on the southern front, the Red Army dealt a crushing blow to Yudenich’s army. In the decisive days of the struggle near St. Petersburg (October 17), Lenin addressed the workers and Red Army soldiers of Petrograd with a letter calling on them to selflessly resist the whites. Here is what Vladimir Ilyich wrote:

"Comrades! The decisive moment has come. Tsarist generals

Once again they received supplies and military equipment from the capitalists of England, France, America, and once again they are trying to take Red Peter with gangs of landowners’ sons. The enemy attacked in the midst of peace negotiations with Estonia and attacked our Red Army soldiers who believed in these negotiations. This treacherous nature of the attack partly explains the rapid successes of the enemy. Krasnoye Selo, Gatchina, Vyritsa were taken. Are two cut? railways to St. Petersburg. The enemy seeks to cut off the third, Nikolaevskaya, and the fourth, Vologda, in order to take St. Petersburg by starvation.

Ya. B. Gamarnik.

Comrades! You all know and see what a huge threat hangs over Petrograd. In a few days, the fate of Petrograd is decided, the fate of one of the strongholds of Soviet power in Russia is being decided.

I have no need to tell the Petrograd workers and Red Army soldiers about their duty. The entire history of the two-year, unprecedented in difficulties and unprecedented in victories of the Soviet struggle against the bourgeoisie of the whole world showed us on the part of the St. Petersburg workers not only an example of fulfillment of duty, but also an example of the highest heroism, revolutionary enthusiasm and self-sacrifice unprecedented in the world.

Comrades! The fate of Petrograd is being decided. The enemy is trying to take us by surprise. He has weak, even insignificant forces, he is strong in the speed, arrogance of his officers, supply technology and weapons. Help for Peter is close, we have moved it. We are much stronger than the enemy. Fight to the last drop of blood, comrades, hold on to every inch of the ground, be steadfast to the end, victory is not far away! Victory will be ours" (Lenin, vol. XXIV, p. 488).

As in the spring of 1919, the workers of Petrograd, under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, stood up like a solid wall to defend the first city of the revolution. In a few days the city was turned into an impregnable fortress. Tens of thousands of men and women workers, the entire party organization, about one and a half thousand Komsomol members joined the ranks of the defenders of Petrograd. Reinforcements arrived from the Sestroretsk and Shlisselburg factories, from the areas closest to Petrograd. A significant part of the workers fought at the front. Of the nearly 14 thousand mobilized women workers, about three thousand participated in the fight at the front as signalmen, machine gunners, sappers and nurses. Everyone else worked to strengthen the defense of Red Peter from the inside. The Cheka, with the support of the workers, suppressed the counter-revolutionaries and traitors lurking in the city with an iron fist.

The plan for the defense of Petrograd planned to defeat Yudenich with a joint blow of the VII and XV Red Armies (the latter was supposed to strike the White flank from the south) in front of Petrograd or, in the event of a White breakthrough, to destroy them in the city itself. It didn't come to that. At the very walls of Petrograd, on the Pulkovo Heights, during October 21–22, Yudenich was dealt a crushing blow.

Thanks to the reinforcements received, the VII Army quickly recovered from its defeats and became stronger. The communists carried out enormous political work among the Red Army soldiers. The fighters knew that the eyes of all the working people of the Soviet state were turned to them. The call of their beloved leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin inspired them. In the decisive days of the struggle, all units competed with each other in dedication and heroism.

The cadets especially stood out, these future Red commanders, “Lenin’s cadets,” as they were called during the Civil War.

Moscow, Petrograd, Novgorod, Cherkassy cadets fought in the front ranks of units of the VII Army, the 7th regiment of Moscow cadets in the battle near the village of Koporskoye, having retained only 300 bayonets (out of a thousand) after previous battles, despite the lack of ammunition, destroyed one of the best regiments Yudenich - Livensky Regiment. The wounded and shell-shocked cadets remained in service until the end of the battle. Cadets of the Petrograd Military Engineering School (then still a technical school) selflessly fought in the Krasnoselsky and Detskoselsky directions. In the battles near Detskoye Selo, one company of this school lost two-thirds of its strength. Cherkassy cadets were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for their heroism.

Finnish cadets showed unprecedented resilience - the best representatives of the Finnish Red Guards, who came to us after the defeat of the revolution in Finland. When the Whites near Petrograd first used British tanks and caused panic among the young Red Army soldiers, the Finnish cadets rushed into a bayonet attack on the tanks. Near the village of Koshelevo, a platoon of cadets captured one tank, but before they had time to withdraw it, they were destroyed. There was a case when cadets managed to snatch a machine gun from a tank. The command, by special order, was forced to prohibit the cadets from engaging in combat with tanks. Even the whites were forced to acknowledge the unprecedented feats of the cadets in their newspapers.

Already on November 7, the Red Army occupied Gdov, on November 14, Yamburg (now Kingisepp - in honor of the deceased Estonian communist), and a few days later the remnants of the White Army were thrown out to Estonia.

Kolchak’s last convulsive efforts to delay the advance of our army at the turn of the Tobol River led to nothing. On November 14, the 27th Division (headed by Comrade Putna) of the V Army (commander M.N. Tukhachevsky, now 2nd Deputy People's Commissar of Defense) broke into the capital of Kolchak's kingdom - Omsk. The Eastern Front had by this time been so reduced that the further offensive, mainly along the Siberian Railway, was carried out by the V Army alone. Coordinating their rapid advance with partisan detachments, the divisions of the V Army, as if competing with each other, occupied one city after another. On December 13, the 3rd brigade (under the command of Khakhanyan) of the 27th division captured Novonikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk), on December 22–23, the 30th division (under the command of T. A. Lapin) occupied Tomsk, south of Tomsk at the station. Taiga The 27th Division smashed the Polish division to smithereens, capturing more than 6 thousand people. By the beginning of January, Krasnoyarsk was occupied. On January 4, in the rear of the retreating Kolchakites, the rebel Irkutsk workers, together with partisan detachments, captured the city, arrested Kolchak, and took away from the whites the country's gold reserves, which they had taken from Kazan back in 1918. On March 7, they approached Irkutsk and parts of the V Army. Kolchak had already been shot by the verdict of a revolutionary court.

In February 1920, decisive victories were also won on the northern front. With the departure of foreign troops, the northern counter-revolution lost its main armed support. Fermentation began among the White Guard troops, especially among the forcibly mobilized peasants, under the influence of Bolshevik agitation. In several units, the soldiers rebelled, several units went over to our side. Taking into account the favorable situation created, the VI Red Army went on the offensive on February 8. Our units moved forward in exceptionally difficult climatic conditions. On February 21, the 54th Division occupied Arkhangelsk, on February 26 Onega was occupied, and finally on March 13, Murmansk. The North became Soviet again.

§ 11. The defeat of Denikin’s troops in the North Caucasus

Having captured Rostov, the I Cavalry Army, in cooperation with units of the XIII and VIII Armies (commander Comrade Sokolnikov), completed Stalin’s plan for the defeat of Denikin.

“The main task given to the troops of the southern front - the defeat of the enemy volunteer army, the capture of the Donetsk basin and the main center of the southern counter-revolution - Rostov - has been completed. Advancing in winter through deep snow and bad weather, enduring hardships, the valiant troops of the front marched over seven hundred miles in two and a half months with stubborn battles from the Eagle line to the shores of the Sea of ​​Azov. The enemy's volunteer army, reinforced by the cavalry of Mamontov, Shkuro, and Ulagai, was defeated, and its remnants fled in different directions. The front armies captured over 40 thousand prisoners, 750 guns, 1,130 machine guns, 23 armored trains, 11 tanks, 400 steam locomotives, 2,200 carriages and a huge amount of all kinds of military equipment. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, proud of the consciousness of the combat power and strength of the Red armies of the Southern Front, sends its fraternal greetings to all the valiant Red Army heroes, commanders, and commissars and congratulates them on their brilliant victory over the worst enemy of the workers and peasants - the army of the Tsarist generals and landowners. Long live the invincible Red Army!

The white units that retreated across the Don River tried, under the cover of this natural line, to organize serious resistance to the Red Army. Our units operating against the whites were united into the Caucasian front. The front commander, Comrade Shorin, not understanding the conditions in which the Cavalry Army could and should operate, made a mistake in using it, namely, he ordered a frontal attack on the enemy across the Don in open terrain. Erroneous orders from the front commander caused a hitch in the actions of the red units. There was a change of commanders. Comrade Tukhachevsky's new commandery radically changed the plan for defeating the enemy. I Horse, as Comrade insisted on this all the time. Voroshilov and Budyonny, was sent into a deep bypass of the White right flank - across the Sal River to Manych in the general direction of Tikhoretskaya. On the fields of the North Caucasus in the battles near Torgovaya, near the station. Shablievskaya, Belaya Glina and Yegorlykskaya (from February 25 to March 1) the main forces of the Whites were defeated. The enemy fled to the Black Sea. Off the coast, its white units received their final blows. And only thanks to the help of the Entente, which provided the white command with its ships, about 20 thousand White Guards were transported to Crimea, where the remnants of the units that retreated here from Ukraine also took refuge. Crimea thus became the last stronghold of the Russian White Guard.

While the I Cavalry, IX, and X armies liquidated the whites in the Kuban, pushing them back to the Black Sea coast, where rebel detachments were operating behind the white lines, the XI army, led by Comrade Kirov, began its movement to help the working mountain peoples of the North Caucasus. Previously, in order to secure its rear from the east and west, the XI Army completely liquidated the white Astrakhan Cossacks by the end of 1919. On January 3, the right-flank division of the XI Army - the 50th (headed by Comrade Kovtyukh) together with the 37th division (headed by Comrade Dybenko) of the X Army returned Tsaritsyn to Soviet Russia. Now both armies had a direct path to the south. The troops of the XI Army moved through Stavropol, Pyatigorsk, Vladikavkaz, Grozny, Petrovsk, and Derbent to Baku. Everywhere they met numerous partisan detachments, organized under the leadership and on the instructions of Comrade Kirov by local Bolsheviks. It was thanks to the help of these detachments, who knew their area of ​​​​operation very well, that the Red troops were able to make their victorious march, defeating Denikin’s troops and the detachments of local White Guards who supported them.

Simultaneously with the liquidation of the Whites on the Black Sea coast and along the western shore of the Caspian Sea, detachments of White Guards were also liquidated on the Trans-Caspian Front. In January 1920, the Red troops, inspired by V.V. Kuibyshev, a member of the RVS of the Turkestan Front, carried out a heroic four-day raid through the Kara-Kum desert to the Aidyn station and defeated the enemy. On February 6, their last stronghold in the Transcaspian region, Krasnovodsk, was liberated from the Whites.

When the advanced units of the XI Army approached Baku, the communists who were underground raised the Baku proletariat in arms against the counter-revolutionary Mussavat government. On April 27, 1920, Baku workers, with the support of red armored trains that broke into the city, consolidated their Soviet power. On November 29, 1920, the working people of Armenia established Soviet power. Only in Georgia did the Mensheviks use all sorts of maneuvers to prolong their stay in power. Soviet power in Georgia finally won only in March 1921.

The overall result of the struggle in 1919 was disappointing for world imperialism.

The second campaign of the Entente, like the first, ended in the defeat of its main forces - the armies of Denikin and Yudenich.

§ 12 Lenin on the lessons of the fight against Kolchak and Denikin

After the defeat of Kolchak, and then after the defeat of Denikin, Lenin addressed all the workers and peasants of the Soviet republics with letters regarding the victory over Kolchak and Denikin. In these letters, Vladimir Ilyich illuminated with exceptional clarity the main lessons that workers and peasants were to learn from the experience of the Kolchak and Denikin eras. What were these lessons?

1. To protect the power of workers and peasants from landowners and capitalists, a powerful Red Army is needed. “Not out of fear, but out of conscience, to carry out all the laws regarding the Red Army, all orders, to maintain discipline in it, to help the Red Army in every possible way in every way that everyone can help - this is the first, fundamental and most important duty of every class-conscious worker and peasant, not desiring Kolchakism. “We must fear partisanship, the willfulness of individual detachments, and disobedience to the central government like fire, because this leads to death: the Urals, Siberia, and Ukraine have proven this,” Lenin wrote.

2. “The Red Army cannot be strong without large state reserves of grain, because without this it is impossible to move the army freely or prepare it properly. Without this, it is impossible to support the workers working for the army.”

3. Revolutionary order and legality must be sacredly observed throughout the country.

4. The Kolchak movement was helped to be born and was directly supported by the social compromisers, who are accomplices of the whites.

5. “All peasants must, without hesitation, make a choice in favor of a workers’ state. Either the dictatorship (i.e., iron power) of the landowners and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class.”

6. Unity and close union of working people of all nationalities are necessary.

The working people of the Soviet republics have learned these lessons well. And this contributed to an even greater strengthening of the alliance of the working class with the middle peasantry under the leadership of the working class, to an even greater strengthening of the fraternal union of workers of all nationalities of the Soviet republics and their unity around Lenin’s party.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE WRANGEL GOVERNMENT OF THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA

Believing that A.V. Kolchak and A.I. Denikin’s hands were “tied” by the governments - the Provisional Russian and the Special Conference - Wrangel was a convinced supporter of the fact that in conditions of war and devastation, only a military dictatorship can be an effective form of government.

The main obstacle, as Denikin’s experience showed, on the path to establishing sole dictatorial power was the sovereignty of the Cossack regions. However, the military atamans and chairmen of the governments of the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan, who found themselves in the Crimea “without peoples and territories,” became completely dependent on the new commander-in-chief: only the departments of his headquarters and the central institutions subordinate to him could finance the Cossack units and supply them with everything necessary. On March 29, Wrangel, by order No. 2925, announced a new “Regulation on the management of areas occupied by the Armed Forces in the South of Russia”: “The ruler and commander in chief ... embraces the fullness of military and civil power without any restrictions.” The Cossack troops were subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the AFSR, and the “lands of the Cossack troops” were declared “independent in terms of self-government.” His assistant, his chief of staff and the heads of departments - Military, Naval, Civil, Economic, Foreign Relations - and also the State Comptroller, who were directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief, constituted the Council under the commander-in-chief, “having the character of an advisory body.”

On August 6, at the moment of the greatest success of the landing operation on Kuban, Wrangel issued order No. 3504, by which “in view of the expansion of the occupied territory and in connection with the agreement with the Cossack atamans and governments,” he renamed himself “ruler of the South of Russia” and commander-in-chief of the Russian army, and The council was in the “government of the South of Russia,” which included the heads of central departments and representatives of Cossack state entities and was headed by the chairman of the government.

The efficiency of officials in 1920 was much lower than before the revolution. The sense of duty, partly fueled by calculations for ranks, awards and promotion, like other factors, came to naught. The main motive was the use of official position for personal gain. This was facilitated by both the feeling of the precarious position of the Russian army in Tavria and the catastrophic deterioration of the financial situation.

Periodically issued orders from Wrangel threatened bribe-takers and embezzlers who “undermine the foundations of the destroyed Russian statehood” with hard labor and the death penalty, introduced in October. However, they did not have any deterrent effect. Equally ineffective were the campaigns of the official press, which appealed to the patriotic feelings of officials (under the slogan “Taking a bribe now means trading Russia!”) and arguing that “poor salaries, high costs, families - all this is not an excuse” for bribery.

Finally, the official discipline of officials fell sharply. Lateness to work and loafing became so widespread that even formal document flow was destroyed, if it was not deliberately confused in order to hide traces of malfeasance. The officials mostly “drank tea and smoked,” the usual arrogance and indifference to petitioners and complainants from the common people turned into contempt and rudeness

Such a military-civil apparatus was unable to regulate the economic life of the occupied territory, including stabilizing the financial system.

Due to a lack of cash, the State Bank branches could not provide field treasuries with banknotes on time, as a result of which advances and salaries were paid irregularly, and the commissariat did not have sufficient funds to purchase everything necessary to supply the troops. Therefore, as in 1919, commissaries took food from the population for receipts, which in itself already caused discontent among the peasants, and many officers, soldiers and especially Cossacks simply took away everything they needed by force, which already caused sharp hostility and sometimes led to spontaneous outbreaks of resistance. As a result, it was not least the robberies, which resumed with renewed vigor in Northern Tavria and the occupied areas of the Ekaterinoslav province, that led in August-September to a turn in the sentiments of the peasants against the power of Wrangel.

C.B. Karpenko. Wrangel in Crimea: statehood and finance

“WHITE ARMY, BLACK BARON” - HISTORY OF THE SONG

For a long time, when the song was published, its authors were not indicated, and it was considered folk. Only in the 50s did musicologist A.V. Shilov establish that the “Red Army” was composed by the poet Pavel Grigorievich Grigoriev (1895-1961) and the composer Samuil Yakovlevich Pokrass (1897-1939).

The song was a response to the events that took place in the summer of 1920. Wrangel's troops began attacking the Republic of Soviets, surrounded by a ring of fronts, from the Crimea. In this regard, on July 10, Pravda published an appeal from the Central Committee of the RCP (b) to communists and Komsomol members, to all workers.

“On the Crimean Front,” it said, “we are now paying only for the fact that in the winter we did not finish off the remnants of Denikin’s White Guards... The Central Committee calls on all party organizations and all party members, all trade unions and all workers’ organizations to put on the order of the day and immediately take measures to intensify the fight against Wrangel... The last stronghold of the generals' counter-revolution must be destroyed! The red flag of the workers' revolution must fly over Crimea! To arms, comrades!”

Several thousand communists and Komsomol members mobilized by the party joined the ranks of the Red Army fighting in the south.

It was at that time that the song was written, which was then called “White Army, Black Baron.”

Many years later, recalling the details of the creation of the song, P. Grigoriev wrote: “My main work from 1919 to 1923 was the creation of propaganda works on the instructions of the Political Education of the Kiev National Education Department, the Kyiv Military District, the Agitprop Provincial Party Committee and other organizations.

Having met first with Dmitry and then with Samuil Pokrass, from time to time I gave them lyrics for songs. During 1920, I wrote several texts of battle songs (including “White Army”) for Samuel Pokrass, who set them to music and handed them over to the troops of the Kyiv Military District.

As far as I remember, it originally had four or even five verses. The chorus I wrote went like this:

Let the warrior be red

Squeezes imperiously

Your bayonet with a stubborn hand.

After all, we all have to

Unstoppable

Go to the last, mortal battle..."

Subsequently, the text of the song was “edited” by its main performer - the people, who more clearly highlighted the class affiliation of the Red Army soldiers.

The music of the song with its elastic rhythm, the sound of fanfare, emphasizing the logical emphasis of the text, instills cheerfulness in the hearts of the fighters, gives them faith in their strength, unites and inspires the singers.

White Army, Black Baron

The royal throne is being prepared for us again.

But from the taiga to the British seas

The Red Army is the strongest.

So let Red

Squeezes imperiously

Your bayonet with a calloused hand,

And we all have to

Unstoppable

Go to the last, mortal battle!

Red Army, march forward!

The Revolutionary Military Council is calling us into battle.

After all, from the taiga to the British seas

The Red Army is the strongest.

Yu.E. Biryukov. The history of the creation of the song “The Red Army is Stronger than All”

http://muzruk.info/?p=828

CONQUEST OF THE CRIMEA BY THE REDS

On August 28, 1920, the Southern Front, having a significant superiority of forces over the enemy, went on the offensive and by October 31 defeated Wrangel’s forces in Northern Tavria. “Our units,” Wrangel recalled, “suffered severe losses in killed, wounded and frostbitten. A significant number were left behind as prisoners...” (White Case. The Last Commander-in-Chief. M.: Golos, 1995. P. 292.)

Soviet troops captured up to 20 thousand prisoners, more than 100 guns, many machine guns, tens of thousands of shells, up to 100 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages and other property. (Kuzmin T.V. The defeat of the interventionists and the White Guards in 1917-1920. M., 1977. P. 368.) However, the most combat-ready units of the Whites managed to escape to the Crimea, where they settled behind the Perekop and Chongar fortifications, which, in the opinion of Wrangel command and foreign authorities, were impregnable positions...

The greatest difficulty was the assault on the Wrangel defense in the Perekop direction. The command of the Southern Front decided to attack them simultaneously from two sides: with one part of the forces - from the front, in the forehead of the Perekop positions, and the other, after crossing Sivash from the side of the Lithuanian Peninsula, - in their flank and rear. The latter was critical to the success of the operation.

On the night of November 7-8, the 15th, 52nd rifle divisions, 153rd rifle and cavalry brigade of the 51st division began crossing the Sivash. The first was the assault group of the 15th division. The movement through the “Rotten Sea” lasted about three hours and took place in the most difficult conditions. Impassable mud sucked in people and horses. Frost (up to 12-15 degrees below zero) froze wet clothes. The wheels of the guns and carts cut deep into the muddy bottom. The horses were exhausted, and often the soldiers themselves had to pull out guns and wagons with ammunition stuck in the mud.

Having completed an eight-kilometer march, Soviet units reached the northern tip of the Lithuanian Peninsula, broke through barbed wire barriers, and defeated the Kuban brigade of General M.A. Fostikova and cleared almost the entire Lithuanian Peninsula of the enemy. Units of the 15th and 52nd divisions reached the Perekop Isthmus and moved towards the Ishun positions. The counterattack launched on the morning of November 8 by the 2nd and 3rd infantry regiments of the Drozdov division was repulsed...

The command of the Southern Front is taking decisive measures to ensure the success of the operation, the 7th Cavalry Division and the group of rebel troops N.I. Makhno under the command of S. Karetnikov (ibid., p. 482) (about 7 thousand people) are transported across Sivash to reinforce the 15th and 52nd divisions. The 16th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Cavalry Army was moved to help the Soviet troops on the Lithuanian Proluisland. On the night of November 9, units of the 51st Infantry Division launched the fourth assault on the Turkish Wall, broke the resistance of the Wrangelites and captured it...

By the evening of November 11, Soviet troops broke through all the Wrangel fortifications. “The situation was becoming dire,” Wrangel recalled, “the hours remaining at our disposal to complete preparations for evacuation were numbered.” (White Case, p. 301.) On the night of November 12, Wrangel’s troops began to retreat everywhere to the ports of Crimea.

On November 11, 1920, Frunze, trying to avoid further bloodshed, turned on the radio to Wrangel with a proposal to stop resistance and promised amnesty to those who laid down their arms. Wrangel did not answer him.

The red cavalry rushed through the open gates into the Crimea, pursuing the Wrangelites, who managed to break away by 1-2 marches. On November 13, units of the 1st Cavalry and 6th armies liberated Simferopol, and on the 15th - Sevastopol. The troops of the 4th Army entered Feodosia on this day. On November 16, the Red Army liberated Kerch, and on the 17th, Yalta. Within 10 days of the operation, the entire Crimea was liberated.

THE LAST LEADER OF WHITE RUSSIA

Wrangel Peter Nikolaevich (15.8.1878, Novo-Alexandrovsk, Kovno province - 22.4.1928, Brussels, Belgium), baron, lieutenant general (22.11.1918). He received his education at the Mining Institute, after which in 1901 he volunteered in the Life Guards Horse Regiment. Passed the officer exams to become a guard officer at the Nikolaev Cavalry. College (1902), graduated from the Nikolaev Military Academy (1910). Participant in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-05, during which he commanded a hundred of the 2nd Argun Kaz. Regiment of Transbaikal Kaz. divisions. In Jan. 1906 transferred to the 55th Finnish Dragoon Regiment. In Aug. 1906 returned to the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment. From 22.5.1912 temporarily commander, then commander of His Majesty's squadron, at the head of which he entered the world war. From September 12, 1914 he was chief of staff of the Consolidated Cossack Division, and from September 23. assistant commander of the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment for combat units. For the battles in 1914, one of the first Russians. officers was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree (10/13/1914), and on 4/13/1915 he was awarded the St. George's Arms. From October 8, 1915, commander of the 1st Nerchinsky Regiment of the Transbaikal Kazakh. troops. From 12/24/1916 commander of the 2nd, 19/1/1917 - 1st brigade of the Ussuri Cavalry Division. 23 Jan V. was appointed temporary commander of the Ussuri Cavalry Division, and from July 9 - commander of the 7th Cavalry. division, from July 10 - consolidated cavalry. body. On July 24, by resolution of the Corps Duma, he was awarded the soldier's St. George's Cross of the 4th degree for distinction in covering the infantry's retreat to the Sbruga line on July 10-20. 9 Sep. V. was appointed commander of the III Cavalry Corps, but because former commander gen. P.V. Krasnov was not removed and did not take command. After the October Revolution, V. went to the Don, where Gen. joined the ataman. A.M. Kaledin, whom he helped in the formation of the Don Army. After Kaledin’s suicide, V. joined the Volunteer Army on August 28, 1918. From 31 Aug. Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, from November 15. - 1 cavalry corps, from December 27. - Volunteer Army. 10.1.1919 V. was appointed commander of the Caucasian Volunteer Army. Since November 26, 1919, commander of the Volunteer Army and commander-in-chief of the Kharkov region. 20 Dec due to the disbandment of the army, he was placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the AFSR. 8.2.1920 due to disagreements with the gene. A.I. Denikin dismissed.

After the resignation of Denikin, by decision of the majority of the senior command staff of the AFSR. On March 22, 1920, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the All-Soviet Union of Socialist Republics on May 2 - Russian Army. Concentrating it in the Crimea, he launched an offensive to the north, but failed on November 14. was forced to evacuate with the army to Turkey. In 1924 he created the EMRO, which united white military emigration.