Seelow Heights. Battle for Seelow Heights B Seelow Heights were taken

My interest in the assault of the Seelow Heights by the Red Army is caused by only one circumstance - this assault brightly highlighted the all-Soviet slogan “we will not stand up for the price”, showing how Stalin and “Marshal of Victory” Zhukov valued their soldiers, with what generosity they threw hundreds of thousands of lives into the muzzle of war winners a few days before the victory.
In April 1945, the Seelow Heights became the last obstacle on the way of the Red Army to Berlin - the passage through the Oder through the Seelow Heights was the shortest route to the eastern border of Berlin. Zhukov had the opportunity to bypass the Seelow Heights, encircling the 9th German army defending them, but, having a huge military advantage, he wanted to be the first to break into Berlin, and the marshal never stood behind the price of victory. Later, zealous Soviet historians will find excuses for the terrible massacre that claimed countless lives of Russian soldiers shortly before the surrender: they say that it was impossible to allow the 9th German army into Berlin and thereby complicate its assault - an explanation that does not stand up to criticism, since the defeat of the Germans during a frontal assault on the heights required an order of magnitude more victims than taking them into the cauldron.
However, the task of hitting the forehead was given to all three fronts storming Berlin - to go ahead, and not bypass Berlin in a wide arc. All Western military historians are unanimous that the enormous loss of life on the Soviet side during the storming of Berlin is not due to military reasons, but solely to Stalin's political pressure and Zhukov's ambitions.
It was clear to everyone that victory did not depend on overcoming the German fortifications on the Seelow Heights. The operation to encircle the enemy promised much greater success. But neither the Moscow dictator nor Marshal Zhukov thought so. For their goal was to take Berlin before the second most important Soviet holiday - May 1st. To achieve this goal, Stalin and Zhukov were ready to sacrifice their soldiers without any restrictions. According to historian Sven Kellerhof, egomania led to the battle for the Seelow Heights. And in order to protect his reputation as a winner, Zhukov easily sacrificed entire divisions.
The ratio of forces. From the German side, the Seelow Heights were defended by the 9th Army, which included 14 rifle units (about 112 thousand people), 587 tanks (512 on the move, 55 under repair, 20 on the way), 2625 artillery barrels, including 695 anti-aircraft guns. German troops began fortifying the heights two years before the battle, "charging" the hills with thousands of mines, traps, and various military installations.
From the side of the Red Army, which concentrated on the Kustrinsky bridgehead along the Oder, there were 11 armies (about 1 million people), 3059 tanks and self-propelled guns, 18934 artillery pieces and mortars, that is, the superiority of the attackers in manpower and equipment ranged from 5: 1 to 9: 1. 83 rifle divisions, 1155 tanks and self-propelled guns, 14628 guns and mortars and 1531 rocket artillery installations directly stormed the Seelow Heights. In the area of the main attack of the troops, the artillery density reached 270 guns with a caliber of 76 mm and more per kilometer of the breakthrough front, and the density of the advancing infantry formations reached 1,300 people per kilometer of the front. Never in world history has there been a greater concentration of artillery than during the assault on the Seelow Heights: one gun of medium and large caliber for every three meters of the front line. The assault on the German fortifications on the Seelow Heights lasted 4 days from 16 to 19 April 1945.
Since about 50 km remained from the heights to Berlin, the ridge of high hills, passing along the left bank of the old channel of the Oder River, was turned by the Germans into the most powerful center of resistance in the 2nd defense line of Berlin: the swampy bank of the Oder, rows of trenches, a large number of Wehrmacht Pillboxes, bunkers, machine-gun platforms, trenches for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In front of the heights, the Germans dug an anti-tank ditch up to 3 m deep and 3.5 m wide, all approaches to which were mined, and the open space in front of the heights was shot through by cross artillery and machine-gun fire.
Due to the steepness of the stormed slopes, tank columns and vehicles of the Red Army could overcome them exclusively along the highways laid here, which were mined and completely shot through by the Germans.
Despite the huge superiority of forces, the first day of the assault on the heights turned into a real disaster: it was possible to break through the first line of defense at the cost of incredible losses, which led to the fact that Zhukov was forced to additionally bring into battle the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, which, according to the original plan it was supposed to enter the battle later, after breaking through the enemy’s battle formations, and according to the original plan, the tanks were supposed to bypass the heights and advance on Berlin from the north and northeast.
The steep slopes during a frontal assault did not allow the tanks to turn into battle formations. They had to keep to the roads, while becoming convenient targets for enemy artillery. Troop control was completely disrupted, in the heat of battle and with the huge density of advancing regiments, tanks crushed their own infantry. Under enemy fire, all the troops were mixed up, and there was a complete confusion in their management.
Russian journalist Alexander Peresvet wrote in Livejournal that Zhukov squandered two tank armies for taking the heights: “They ran into the German defenses and practically fought in the ranks of the infantry. HOW did you waste it? - Goose. If a tank was knocked out, they pushed it into the swamp and drove on - another two dozen meters, until the next one was knocked out ... My hair was moving in horror at what ours had to experience. Needless to say, all the heights are now covered with graves with the inscriptions "Unknown" ... "
My reader Emma Zharikova, who studied the documentation of the Military Museum and Archives in Kustrin, near the Seelow Heights, wrote: “All the Soviet tanks arriving (attacking on Berlin), which could not overcome the mountain slope of 33 degrees, fell into a fiery dead end, unable to turn around and leave the strip of swampy land near the Oder, already clogged with other tanks, between the Seelow rock and the bridge. Zhukov did not carry out any reconnaissance of the area, nor artillery preparation, because the guns of General Kazakov were not placed close enough, and Russian shells did not reach the three belts of fascist defense. The Polish army also perished in the same fire. When I first visited the monument in 1977, there was a death toll: 75,000 fighters. I was shaking with bitter weeping. However, later it turned out that there were at least four times more dead, but Zhukov hid the truth from Stalin. And at the site of the death of tanks, German volunteer search engines have been cleaning the earth from burnt scrap metal for 20 years and have already collected many tons of it ... In his memoirs, Zhukov mentioned this in five lines, but in such an abstract and veiled manner that an ignorant reader will not even guess what speech".
Aviation - one's own and the enemy's - only added to the chaos. Having no connection with the advancing troops and poorly oriented in the location of the troops due to the clouds of smoke and dust that enveloped the battlefield, she struck indiscriminately, so that both strangers and her own were hit. When their bombs began to fall near the NP of Zhukov himself, the anti-aircraft gunners were ordered ... to open fire on their aircraft.
Losses on the first day of the assault were gigantic - one Red Army soldier died on every meter of the front that day. But, nevertheless, the breakthrough of Stalin's troops failed. Despite the huge losses, Zhukov, who received the nickname "butcher" for this operation, continued to drive the troops forward, demanding from commanders at all levels that they be at the forefront. In order to stun the enemy, a night attack was made using anti-aircraft searchlights, but it did not work, because their rays could not penetrate thick clouds of smoke, dust and burning, which, moreover, were blown away by the wind on the Soviet side.
Even in undefended areas, the offensive was difficult due to the abundance of obstacles and booby traps. The Germans fought not out of courage and patriotism, but out of fear of being shot: the German command resorted to the tried and tested Soviet practice of detachments, the role of which was performed by special teams of the SS troops, who had orders to shoot all those who retreated without an order. The offensive pressure of the Soviet troops weakened both because of the huge losses, and as a result of the completely natural desire of the soldiers to live to see such a close Victory ...
Zhukov was whipped up by two circumstances: fear of the wrath of the Commander-in-Chief and the successes of other Soviet armies rushing to Berlin. He needed to take the Seelow Heights, regardless of any losses. More and more divisions had to be thrown into the furnace of a senseless battle. Zhukov knew that in case of failure, even the halo of the winner of the Battle of Stalingrad would not save him. Three days later, the third and last defensive line was finally breached. It cost the lives of at least 100 thousand people, and 727 wrecked tanks ... Truly, this was a victory that we suffered ... In total, in the last days of the war in the battle for Berlin, the Soviet military command put more than 361 thousand soldiers and officers ... the storming of Berlin (15712 people) are the highest among all offensive operations of the Second World War. For comparison: near Moscow they were equal to 10910 people. per day; near Stalingrad - 6392; on the Kursk Bulge - 11313; in Belarus - 11262.

Battle for the Seelow Heights

By April 1945, the fate of the Third Reich was already decided. The armies of the USSR and Western allies squeezed the ring. The whole question now was in what configuration and at what cost the war would end. The Allies blocked the main forces of the German Western Front in the Ruhr with a series of maneuvers. The Red Army, on the other hand, stood on the bridgeheads beyond the Oder, a few tens of kilometers from Berlin, and was preparing for the final push.

At the beginning of April it was not clear who exactly would enter the German capital. The collapse of the German front awakened Churchill's ambitions. The British leader wrote to Roosevelt about the need for an early breakthrough to the depth and the capture of Berlin. However, this plan met with opposition from the commander of the Allied forces. Dwight David Eisenhower.

He noted that a breakthrough to Berlin with bare flanks would lead to a supply crisis, and in a military sense, it was necessary to break up the group surrounded in the Ruhr and prevent the Wehrmacht from retreating to the so-called Alpine fortress in Bavaria and western Austria.

Interestingly, no one even mentioned earlier agreements with the Soviet Union. Military considerations prevailed. Therefore, a headlong dash to Berlin from the west did not take place.

Meanwhile, Stalin was well aware that Berlin was giving serious political preferences to the one who occupied it, so he was not going to lose such valuable booty from his hands. There were also purely military reasons to defeat the Nazis as soon as possible. The Wehrmacht was not at all incompetent. The German army still numbered several million soldiers, and the stocks of weapons allowed them to conduct active battles for several more months.

A little-known fact is that the Germans tried to impose their will on the Allies until the very end, and the last cauldron of the war dates back to April 1945, when several Polish divisions were surrounded near Bautzen, from where they were rescued with difficulty. In a word, to stop and complacently wait for the allies to pull up from the west was in any case a bad idea.

Georgy Zhukov presented two plans for the conquest of Berlin to the headquarters. The "long" plan assumed the consolidation of bridgeheads beyond the Oder and the encirclement of the Germans in Frankfurt an der Oder. According to this plan, two Soviet fronts bypassed Berlin from the south with combined forces, inflicting only auxiliary blows from Kustrin. The ramming of two fronts immediately south of Berlin, no doubt, would have demolished everything in its path: in reality, much fewer forces managed there. However, it took at least a few more weeks to implement it.

According to Stalin, the Red Army did not have a few weeks. Therefore, it was necessary to implement a "short program": Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front was operating south of Berlin, and Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front was advancing directly on the German capital. He left for the 1st Belorussian Front to prepare an attack on the German capital.

Thus began the battle for the Seelow Heights.

ZELOVSKIE (Zeelovskie) HEIGHTS, a ridge of heights in the North German Plain, 50-60 km east of Berlin, passing along the left bank of the old riverbed. Oder.

The length is up to 20 km, the width is 4-10 km, the excess of heights above the valley of the river. Oder 40-50 m, slope steepness up to 30-40°. The fascist German command created a second line of defense on the Elovsky heights, which had solid trenches, a large number of bunkers, machine-gun sites, trenches for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In front of the heights, an anti-tank ditch was dug up to a depth of 3 m, a width of 3.5 m, and the approaches to the heights were mined and shot through with multi-layered cross artillery and rifle-machine gun fire. The enemy turned individual buildings into strongholds. The German fascist troops (mainly the 9th Field Army) defending the Zelov heights were reinforced with artillery from the Berlin air defense zone.

Armored vehicles and motor vehicles could overcome the slopes of the 3elovsky heights, mainly along highways, which were mined and shot through by anti-tank and anti-aircraft (88-mm) guns. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having gone over to the offensive on April 16 and successfully overcoming the first line of defense, by the end of the day met fierce enemy resistance at the 3elovsky heights, where the enemy withdrew from the first line and his divisions from the reserve approached. The density of enemy artillery on both sides of the highway running from Zelov to the west was increased to 200 guns per 1 km of the front. An attempt by the front commander to speed up the advance of the troops by bringing two tank armies into battle on the very first day of the offensive did not lead to the desired result. Mobile formations could not break away from the infantry and got involved in grueling battles. Only by the end of April 17, after a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, did the enemy defenses in the main directions of the Elovsky heights. was broken through by the troops of the 8th Guards Army in cooperation with the 1st Guards Tank Army.

German defense

He was considered one of the best specialists in defensive tactics. He knew in advance that the Soviet Army would direct its main attack along the motorway, not far from which the Seelow Heights were located.

Hendrici did not strengthen the river bank. Instead, he took advantage of the favorable location of the heights through which the Oder flowed. The river floodplain was always full of floods in the spring, so the German engineers first destroyed part of the dam and then released the water upstream. Thus, the plain turned into a swamp. Behind it there were three lines of defense: the first - a system of various fortifications, barriers and trenches; the second - the Seelow Heights, the battle for which will last from 16 to 19 April; the third is the "Wotan" line, located 17-20 km behind the front line itself.

By the beginning of the battle, the 56th German Panzer Corps numbered about 50 thousand people. After the battle, only 13-15 thousand fighters were able to break through to Berlin, who later became the defenders of the fascist capital.

Operation plan of the 1st Belorussian Front

The general plan of the operation of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov was to deliver a crushing blow to the Wehrmacht grouping covering Berlin from the east, to develop an offensive against the German capital, bypassing it from the north and south, followed by an assault on the city and the exit of our troops to the river Elbe.
The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front occupied a section of the front 172 km wide, from Nipperwiese to Gross-Gastrose. The main strike force of the front deployed on the 44-kilometer sector Gustebize, Podelzig. The right flank of the front was deployed in the Nipperwiese, Gustebize sector. The left flank of the front deployed on the 82-kilometer section Podelzig, Gross-Gastrose.
The main blow was delivered by the forces of 4 combined arms and two tank armies from the Kustrin area. The troops of the 3rd shock army under the command of Vasily Ivanovich Kuznetsov, the 5th shock army of Nikolai Erastovich Berzarin and the 8th guards army of Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, deployed in the center of the Kyustrinsky bridgehead, were supposed to break through the German defenses, ensure the introduction of tank formations into the breakthrough and attack the German capital.

IN AND. Kuznetsov N.E. Berzarin

IN AND. Chuikov

On the sixth day of the operation, they were supposed to be on the eastern shore of Lake Havel (Havel) in the Hennigsdorf, Gatow section. The 47th army of Franz Perkhorovich received the task of bypassing Berlin from the northwest, advancing in the general direction on Nauen, Rathenov and on the 11th day of the operation to reach the Elbe. In addition, the 3rd Army of Alexander Gorbatov was located in the second echelon of the front in the main direction.
The tank armies were in the second echelon of the strike force and were supposed to develop an offensive around Berlin from the north and south. 1st Guards Tank Army commanded by Mikhail Efimovich Katukov was supposed to advance not from the north, together with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, as previously planned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, but from the south, in order to take the southern part of Berlin.

The offensive of Katukov's army was also supported by Ivan Yushchuk's 11th Panzer Corps. This change in the task of Katukov's army was proposed by Zhukov, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved. The northern part of the bypass grouping was already very powerful, it included: the 61st Army of Pavel Belov, the 1st Army of the Polish Army Stanislav Gilyarovich Poplavsky, 47th Army of Perkhorovich, 2nd Guards Tank Army of Semyon Bogdanov, 9th Tank Corps of Ivan Kirichenko and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov.

S.G. Poplavsky

In order to ensure the offensive of the main strike force of the front in the center on the flanks, two auxiliary strikes were delivered from the north and south. In the north, the 61st Army of Belov and the 1st Army of the Polish Poplavsky Army were advancing. They struck in the general direction of Liebenwalde, Wulkau, and on the 11th day of the offensive were to reach the Elbe in the areas of Vilsnack and Zandau.
In the south, the second blow, which ensured the offensive of the main strike force, was delivered by the 69th army of Vladimir Kolpakchi, the 33rd army of Vyacheslav Tsvetaev and the 2nd guards cavalry corps. The Soviet armies advanced on the Podelzig, Briskov sector in the general direction of Fürstenwalde, Potsdam and Brandenburg. The armies of Kolpakchi and Tsvetaev were supposed to break through the German defenses in the Frankfurt direction and, advancing to the west, with access to the southern and southwestern parts of Berlin, cut off the main forces of the 9th German army from the capital.
In total, the 1st Belorussian Front had 9 combined-arms and 2 tank armies, one air army (16th air army of Sergei Rudenko), two tank corps (9th tank corps of Ivan Kirichenko, 11th tank corps of Ivan Yushchuk ), two Guards Cavalry Corps (7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Vladimir Kryukov). The 1st Belorussian Front was also supported by the 18th Air Army of Air Chief Marshal Alexander Golovanov (long-range aviation) and Dnieper military flotilla of Vissarion Vissarionovich Grigoriev.

The 1st Belorussian Front had at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 18.9 thousand guns and mortars.
Three brigades of the Dnieper flotilla were armed with 34 armored boats, 20 minesweepers, 20 air defense boats, 32 semi-gliders and 8 gunboats. The boats were armed with 37-, 40-, 76- and 100-mm cannons, 8-M-8 launchers for firing 82-mm rockets, and heavy machine guns. The flotilla received tasks to support the advancing troops, to assist in forcing water barriers, to protect water communications and crossings; destroy enemy mines placed on rivers; to carry out breakthroughs into the depths of enemy defenses, to disorganize the German rear, to land troops. The 3rd brigade was supposed to capture the hydraulic structures in the Furstenberg area, preventing their destruction.

Battery of Soviet 152-mm ML-20 howitzer guns near Berlin. 1st Belorussian Front

Operation preparation

An artillery grouping with a density of about 270 barrels per 1 km of the front was formed in the main direction of the offensive (excluding 45-mm and 57-mm guns). To ensure the tactical surprise of the offensive, it was decided to carry out artillery preparation at night, 1.5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the area and blind the enemy, they concentrated 143 searchlight installations, which should have been earned with the start of the infantry attack.

30 minutes before the start of artillery preparation, night bomber aviation was supposed to strike at the headquarters of enemy communication centers. Simultaneously with the artillery preparation, the assault and bomber aviation of the 16th Air Army delivered massive strikes against enemy strongholds and firing positions to a depth of 15 km. After the introduction of mobile formations into battle, the main task of aviation was to suppress the anti-tank defense of the German troops. Most of the attack and fighter aviation switched to direct escort of combined arms and tank armies.
On April 14-15, our troops conducted reconnaissance in force in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the German defense, its firing positions and force the enemy to pull up reserves to the front line. The main events took place in the zone of 4 combined arms armies of the front's main shock grouping. In the center, the offensive was carried out by reinforced rifle battalions of divisions of the first echelon, on the flanks - by reinforced companies. The advanced units were supported by strong artillery fire. In different directions, our troops managed to penetrate the enemy's battle formations for 2-5 km.
As a result, our troops overcame the strongest lines of minefields and violated the integrity of the enemy's first line of defense, which facilitated the offensive of the main forces of the front. In addition, the German command was misled. Based on the experience of previous operations, the Germans thought that behind the reconnaissance battalions the main forces of the front would go on the offensive. However, neither on April 14 nor April 15 did our troops launch a general offensive. The German command made the erroneous conclusion that the offensive of the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front was postponed for several days.

Soviet bombers are heading for Berlin

Soviet soldiers cross the Oder river

Breakthrough of enemy defense

At 5 am on April 16, 1945, artillery preparation began in complete darkness. At the front of the main strike force, artillery suppressed enemy targets for 20 minutes to a depth of 6-8 km and in some places up to 10 km. In such a short period, about 500 thousand shells and mines of all calibers were fired. The effectiveness of the artillery strike was great. In the first two trenches, from 30 to 70% of the personnel of the German units were disabled. When the Soviet infantry and tanks went on the attack in some directions, they advanced 1.5-2 km without encountering enemy resistance. However, soon the German troops, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Fierce fighting broke out along the entire front.
At the same time, bombers of the 16th Air Army attacked headquarters, communication centers, and 3-4 trenches in the enemy's main line of defense. The 18th Air Army (heavy aviation) also took part in the attack. For 40 minutes, 745 vehicles bombed the assigned targets. In just a day, despite the unfavorable meteorological situation, our pilots made 6,550 sorties, including 877 night ones. More than 1500 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. German aviation tried to resist. During the day there were 140 air battles. Our falcons shot down 165 German vehicles.

Defending in the offensive zone of the 47th Army of Perkhorovich, the 606th Special Purpose Division suffered heavy losses. German soldiers were overtaken by artillery preparation in the trenches and many died. However, the Germans offered stubborn resistance, our troops had to advance, repulsing numerous counterattacks. By the end of the day, our troops advanced 4-6 km, capturing a number of important strongholds in the depths of the enemy defenses. Over 300 prisoners were taken.
The 3rd strike army of Kuznetsov successfully advanced. The troops began their offensive by the light of searchlights. The greatest success was achieved in the offensive zone of the right-flank 79th Rifle Corps of General S. N. Perevertkin. Our troops repulsed several enemy counterattacks and captured the important strongholds of Gross Barnim and Klein Barnim. In order to increase the pressure of the 79th corps in its offensive zone at 10 o'clock. introduced the 9th tank corps of Kirichenko. As a result, our infantry and tanks advanced 8 km and reached the enemy's intermediate defensive zone. On the left flank, the 12th Guards Rifle Corps of General A.F. Kazankin advanced 6 km in a day. Especially stubborn battles here went for the Lechin stronghold.

German troops repulsed the frontal attack of the 33rd division of General V. I. Smirnov with strong fire. Then the 33rd division and the 52nd division of General N. D. Kozin bypassed Lechin from the north and south. So they took the stronghold. Thus, during the day of a heavy battle, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army broke through the enemy's main line of defense and reached the intermediate line with their right wing. About 900 prisoners were taken.
By the light of searchlights, the 5th shock army of Berzarin went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the central 32nd rifle corps of General D.S. Zherebin. Our troops advanced 8 km and by the end of the day reached the right bank of the Alt Oder River, to the second enemy defense line in the Platkov-Guzov sector. On the right flank of the army, the 26th Guards Rifle Corps, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, advanced 6 km. The troops of the left-flank 9th Rifle Corps also advanced 6 km. At the same time, units of the 301st Infantry Division of Colonel V.S. Antonov took an important enemy stronghold - Verbig.
In the battle for the Verbig station, the Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion of the 1054th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Grant Arsenovich Avakyan, distinguished himself. Finding an enemy detachment preparing for a counterattack, Avakyan, taking the fighters with him, headed towards the house. Covertly sneaking up on the enemy, Avakyan threw three grenades through the window. The Germans, seized with panic, jumped out of the house, and came under concentrated fire from machine gunners. During this battle, Lieutenant Avakyan, together with his fighters, destroyed 56 German soldiers and captured 14 people, captured 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 24, Avakyan once again distinguished himself by capturing and holding a bridgehead across the Spree River on the streets of Berlin. Was badly wounded. For his courage and heroism, Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Thus, by the end of the day, the troops of the 5th shock army, breaking the resistance of the enemy, advanced 6-8 km. Our troops broke through all three positions of the main line of German defense, and went out in the offensive zone of the 32nd and 9th rifle corps to its second line of defense.
The troops of Chuikov's 8th Guards Army went on the attack in the light of 51 searchlights.

It should be noted that their light stunned the Germans and at the same time lit the way for our advancing troops. In addition, the powerful illumination of the searchlights disabled the German night vision systems. Almost simultaneously with the infantry, the advanced brigades of the 1st Guards Tank Army of Katukov moved. The reconnaissance units of the advanced brigades entered the battles in the ranks of the infantry. Having broken through the enemy defenses and repulsed several counterattacks of the 20th motorized and 169th infantry divisions, our troops advanced 3-6 km. The enemy's main line of defense was broken through. By 12 o'clock, Chuikov's guards and the advanced units of the tank army reached the Seelow Heights, where the second powerful line of enemy defense passed. The battles for the Seelow Heights began.

The beginning of the assault on the Seelow Heights.

Zhukov's decision to send tank armies into battle

The German command managed to withdraw part of the forces of the 20th motorized division to this line of defense, and also transferred the Müncheberg tank division from the reserve.

The anti-tank defense of the Seelow direction was reinforced by a significant part of the artillery of the Berlin air defense zone. The second lane of the German defense had a large number of wood-and-earth firing points, machine-gun sites, firing positions for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. There was an anti-tank ditch in front of the heights, the steepness of the slopes reached 30-40 degrees and the tanks could not overcome them. The roads on which armored vehicles could pass were mined and shot through. The buildings were turned into strongholds.
The rifle corps of the 8th Guards Army did not reach the heights at the same time, so the 15-minute fire raid provided for by the offensive plan was carried out as they approached. As a result, there was no simultaneous and powerful artillery strike. The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met by strong artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire.

Repeated attempts by the guards infantry and advanced tank units to penetrate the enemy's defenses were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Germans themselves repeatedly launched counterattacks with forces from a battalion to an infantry regiment, supported by 10-25 tanks and self-propelled guns, and strong artillery fire. The most fierce battles took place along the Seelow-Müncheberg highway, where the Germans installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns (up to half of the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns).
Marshal Zhukov, taking into account the complexity of the upcoming battle, decided to move the mobile formations closer to the first echelon. By 12 o'clock. On April 16, the tank armies were already completely on the Kustra bridgehead, in full readiness to join the battle. Assessing the situation in the first half of the day, the front commander came to the conclusion that, despite the powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy defenses in the second lane were not suppressed and the offensive of the four combined arms armies slowed down. The armies clearly did not have time to complete the task of the day. At 16 o'clock. 30 min. Zhukov gave the order to bring the guards tank armies into battle, although according to the original plan they were planned to be brought into battle after breaking through the second line of enemy defenses.

Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) at the command post of the Seelow Heights.
Far right - a member of the Military Council of the front, Colonel-General K.F. Telegin, far left - commander of artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel General V.I. Kazakov, second from left - head of the rear of the front, Colonel-General N.A. Antipenko.

Mobile formations in cooperation with the infantry were supposed to break through the second line of enemy defenses. The 1st Guards Tank Army was deployed in the offensive zone of the 8th Guards Army. The 2nd Guards Tank Army of Bogdanov, with its 9th and 12th Guards Tank Corps, began to move in order to advance in the general direction of Neuhardenberg and Bernau. However, leaving at 19 o'clock. to the line of advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, the tank army could not go further.

A battery of Soviet 122mm M-30 howitzers fires at Berlin

Combat operations on auxiliary directions

On April 16, the 61st Army regrouped its forces in a new direction and prepared for the offensive the next day. The troops of the 1st Polish Army went on the offensive with three divisions. The Poles crossed the Oder and advanced 5 km. As a result, the Polish troops broke through the first line of enemy defenses by the end of the day. In the evening, the Oder began to force the troops of the second echelon of the Polish army.
The left-flank strike force - the 69th and 33rd armies went on the offensive at different times. The 69th army of Kolpakchi went on the offensive in the early morning in the light of searchlights. Our troops advanced 2-4 km, breaking fierce resistance and repulsing fierce enemy counterattacks. Our troops were able to break through in the strip of the Lebus-Schoenflis highway. By the end of the day, the army broke through the main line of defense and reached the Podelzig, Shenfis, Wüste-Kunersdorf line. In the area of the Shenfis station, our troops reached the enemy's second line of defense.
Tsvetaev's 33rd Army launched an offensive somewhat later. Our troops in the wooded and marshy terrain advanced 4-6 km, breaking through two positions of the enemy's main line of defense. On the right flank, the 38th Rifle Corps reached the defensive line by the end of the day. Fortress Frankfurt.

Thus, on the first day of the offensive, with the powerful support of artillery and aviation, our troops broke through only the main enemy line, advancing 3-8 kilometers in different directions. It was not possible to fully complete the task on the first day - to break through the second line of enemy defenses, which passed along the Seelow Heights. The underestimation of the enemy's defense played its role. The powerful enemy defense and the remaining unsuppressed fire system required a regrouping of artillery and new artillery and aviation training.
Zhukov, in order to speed up the offensive, brought into battle both main mobile formations - the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov. However, they began to enter positions in the evening and could not change the situation. The Soviet command on the evening of April 16 ordered to continue the offensive at night and on the morning of April 17 to break through the second line of defense of the German army. To do this, they decided to conduct a second 30-40-minute artillery preparation, concentrating up to 250-270 artillery pieces per 1 kilometer of the front. In addition, the army commanders were ordered not to get involved in protracted battles for enemy strongholds, to bypass them, transferring the task of eliminating the encircled German garrisons to the last units of the second and third echelons of the armies. Guards tank armies were instructed to organize interaction with the infantry.

Red Army soldiers are advancing on the Seelow Heights.

The German command hastily took measures to strengthen the defense of the Berlin direction from the east. From April 18 to April 25, 2 command and corps and 9 divisions were transferred from the 3rd and 4th tank armies and the remnants of the East Prussia army to the 9th army. So on April 18-19, the 11th SS motorized rifle division "Nordland" and the 23rd SS motorized rifle division "Netherlands" arrived from the 3rd Panzer Army; On April 19, the command of the 56th Tank Corps and the 214th Infantry Division arrived from the 4th Panzer Army. Then came the administration of the 5th Army Corps and other units. The Germans did their best to stop the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Soviet artillery preparation in the area of the Seelow Heights

Two Soviet tankers pose for a photo, lying in front of the German heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.VI Ausf.B "King Tiger" from the 502nd SS heavy tank battalion (SS-s.Pz.Abt.502), abandoned in the Seelow Heights . Germany, spring 1945.

The 102nd SS heavy tank battalion was formed on July 19, 1943 after an order according to which a tank unit equipped with Tiger tanks was to be created as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, on November 4, 1943, the formation received the name of the 102nd heavy tank battalion, from July to August 1944, the battalion fought in Normandy against the landing allied forces and destroyed at least 230 enemy tanks and 30 anti-tank guns. In September 1944, the battalion was reorganized in Sennelager and placed under the command of Sturmbannführer Kurt Hartramph. In March 1945, the unit received new Tiger II tanks and was renamed the 502nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion. As part of the Vistula-Oder operation, the battalion was sent to the front in the Kustrin area.

The unit participated in the last battles in the Halb pocket and southeast of Berlin, destroying about 70 enemy tanks in the second half of April. On May 1, 1945, the battalion had to abandon its last Tiger tank near Elzholz.
Yushchuk's 11th Panzer Corps achieved some success, he advanced north of the village of Zeelov. These tankers had a sense, they dragged mattresses and attached them to the front of the tanks - some salvation from " faustpatrons".

Still, Seelow stood inside the German line of defense, and not outside it, and the tanks pressed close to the roads, not wanting to become an easy target. The day was terribly difficult - and above all because it did not give the expected results.

German 105-mm howitzers leFH 18/40, captured by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front near the town of Zeelov. April 1945

April 18 was for Zhukov, among all the hard days, a particularly difficult day. The flow of wounded from the front line did not decrease.

A Soviet orderly takes out a wounded soldier to the rear on a cart pulled by dogs. Seelow Heights region.

The fourth day of his operation was approaching, and he had not achieved the goals intended for the second day. Soldiers and officers who had not slept for several days marched forward with phenomenal silent determination.

With this incredible, desperate determination, the troops entered the third line of the German defense. Can't the enemy stand before forces desperate in their selflessness? Fate loves the brave, Chuikov made his way this time too. Stalingraders are not lost. It will not be worse. Closer to the ground and smarter in motion. The village of Seelow is already behind us. Gradually, the German forces began to weaken. General Busset saw quite clearly that his left flank could no longer withstand the pressure. 56th Panzer Corps Helmut Weidling- the main reserve force of the Germans on this sector of the front - was melting before our eyes.

The requested SS divisions - the 18th and Nordland - were late. The 9th Parachute Division, which had taken the full force of Zhukov's initial terrible blow, began to lose its combat strength. It was at this moment that the Fuhrer of the Hitler Youth, Axman, suggested that Weidling send schoolchildren with faustpatrons.

To Weidling's credit, he refused such assistance. "You can't sacrifice these kids in a cause already lost." The rage of the general embarrassed Axman, and he withdrew.

Forgetting about themselves and actually dooming themselves, the troops broke into the key point of the German defense - Munsheberg. It was April 19, at 9 pm, when the 82nd Guards Rifle Division broke into the city from the east. A little to the north, Vriesen was taken. These were decisive milestones. Chuikov took the Seelow Heights. At least thirty thousand heroes died in this terrible battle, where our soldier did not spare himself. Being at the limit of his physical abilities, Zhukov saw the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel. It was late in the evening on Thursday, April 19, that the marshal saw real signs that the enemy was weakening and submitting. The third line of German defense was taken on a front 70 kilometers wide, from Alt-Oder to Kunersdorf. By April 20, its forward units reach the suburbs of the German capital.

War Memorial on the Seelow Heights

strategic height In a decisive offensive against enemy positions, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to concentrate the most combat-ready armies - in total, according to various estimates, a strike force of at least 2.5 million people, over six thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 40 thousand artillery pieces. Aerial photography, which Soviet reconnaissance aircraft carried out several times a day, made it possible to assess the scope of individual fortifications, but over the four years of hostilities, the command of the Red Army had already formed a perfect clear idea of the measures and means of destroying enemy fortified areas. Already as part of the advance of troops during the Vistula-Oder operation, the armies and brigades in practice applied data on the structure of German fortification and supply of advanced positions. In addition, the assault on Königsberg allowed the Soviet Ground Forces not only to learn the tactics of clearing city blocks, but also to make adjustments to the actions of ground units and formations right in the course of the battle. However, the Seelow Heights, from which Berlin was a little more than 70 kilometers, differed significantly from most of the fortified objects that the Soviet troops had to deal with before - a continuous twenty-kilometer strip strewn with steep hills 30-50 meters high, on which the Wehrmacht placed not only heavy weapons, but also reinforced the cannon artillery with elite motorized rifle units and formations, including special tank battalions. On April 16, 1945, after reconnaissance in force, the active phase of the offensive operation began on the deeply echeloned fortifications of the Wehrmacht near the town of Seelow. The concentration of Soviet heavy weapons reached incredible proportions - up to 300 guns for every kilometer of the front.

“If we count on the basis of the average consumption of ammunition per hour of operation of an artillery battery and multiply all this by the number of guns, as well as the duration of artillery preparation, then the approximate figures for a day of work of artillerymen are something around 900,000 shells,” said in an interview with the Zvezda TV channel. » military historian Konstantin Chursin.

In addition to the active resistance of the German tank divisions, the destruction of which was carried out by the crews of Soviet heavy tanks IS-2 and anti-tank crews, the terrain created additional difficulties for the attackers - a vast plain on which the advancing Soviet troops were in full view. Aware of the importance of a breakthrough, by the evening of April 16 by order of Marshal Zhukov, the ground units were reinforced with a tank army - almost 500 units of tanks and self-propelled artillery began a large-scale cleansing of Wehrmacht positions, plowing every inch of land occupied by the enemy with huge shells. In part, Zhukov's plan to pin down and destroy formations of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, commanded by an experienced General Theodor Busse, who had a reputation as a professional in strategic defense, was a success already on the first day: enemy armored vehicles on the front line were destroyed by heavy artillery fire, and those occupying advanced positions German soldiers under its onslaught began to retreat to the fortified area. Defense Breakthrough On April 17, units of the Wehrmacht began to commit reserves into battle, which, in a few hours of active fire contact with the troops advancing along the entire width of the defense line, were almost completely destroyed. A day after the start of the assault, the German military who occupied the Brandenburg fortified area began to surrender. In the vanguard of the Soviet troops of the 1st Belorussian Front advancing on Berlin, one of the most combat-ready formations was marching - the 1st Guards Tank Brigade under the command of Guards Colonel Abram Temnik. It was in the 1st Guards that the soldiers most prepared for the assault on fortified areas served, whose training process Colonel Temnik personally followed. breach the enemy's defenses. Having made their way through minefields, anti-tank pillars and gouges, the first Soviet soldiers "crashed" into the first line of the area occupied by the enemy.

“It would be worth noting that the units of the 9th Wehrmacht Army on the Seelow Heights were in the most advantageous position by the beginning of the assault. Two hundred thousand personnel, supported by more than 500 of the most modern German tanks and heavy artillery pieces. The logistics were also well-established: in the rear of the defending along the railway line, the Wehrmacht troops had the opportunity to quickly move to the most dangerous sectors of the front, ”said historian Boris Makeev in an interview with the Zvezda TV channel.

A huge and well-armed garrison was able to significantly slow down the advance of Soviet troops towards Berlin: only by the evening of April 18, tank units were able to "squeeze" through the first line of defense, occupy the city of Marksdorf and partially cut off the retreat of motorized rifle units, which fled to the rear, leaving heavy armament.

The beast in the cauldron It took another two days to prepare a breakthrough through the last lines of defense and repulse counterattacks, the purpose of which, according to historians, was not so much a real desire to recapture the abandoned positions, but to exert a psychological impact on the enemy. Despite the fact that Marshal Zhukov and the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Katukov, were preparing for protracted battles for a defensive area near Seelov, the rapid retreat of units and formations of the 9th Wehrmacht Army allowed the Red Army to take a breath and prepare for a decisive assault. Two days later, to late in the evening of April 20, 1945, the Soviet troops finished with the last echelon of defense of the Wehrmacht on the Seelow Heights, and already on April 22-24, after the main forces approached, they proceeded to the final mopping up of the positions of the 9th Army. It is worth noting that they were surrounded by only a few dozen kilometers Adolf Hitler tried to save from Berlin: the 4th Panzer Army was thrown to their rescue. However, the troops of the 4th Panzer Army failed to achieve serious success: Hitler repeated the mistake, the consequence of which earlier, near Stalingrad, was the destruction of a group of troops under the command of Erich Manstein, sent to rescue Friedrich Paulus from the cauldron of the 6th Army.

“Hitler didn’t have much choice. The encircled garrison was too large and could provide significant support to the troops defending the city, so it was decided to risk the 4th tank army, ”said military historian Yuri Pasholok in an interview with the Zvezda TV channel.

By the evening of April 24, Soviet troops “covered” one of the largest boilers at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War: tens of kilometers from Berlin, almost 200 thousand people turned out to be completely surrounded with a small amount of ammunition and provisions, most of which, thanks to competent planning of the operation and timely the introduction of tank brigades managed to bury a few kilometers from the capital of the Reich. The 502nd heavy tank battalion and the Müncheberg tank division were almost completely destroyed, the personnel of which was reduced from five thousand to 224 people by the forces of Soviet artillerymen, tankers and infantry in a couple of days , as well as the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland", crushed by the advancing troops and reduced from 11 to 3.8 thousand people. Least of all, the personnel of the 9th Airborne Division were lucky: out of nine thousand German paratroopers who took up defense on the Seelow Heights, only 500 people escaped from a hail of bullets and shells back to Berlin, who were subsequently destroyed in full strength during the storming of Berlin.

The strategic combat mission assigned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to Marshal Zhukov was completed: the most combat-ready and numerous grouping of enemy troops was destroyed. The Red Army was able to move forward to Berlin.

We suffered the most terrible losses in the offensive during the Berlin operation.

For comparison, 155 thousand people died in the Stalingrad offensive operation.

In the battle near Moscow, 926 thousand soldiers and officers were killed and captured. But in that defensive and then offensive battle, 7 million people participated on both sides, it unfolded in spaces almost equal to the territory of France, and lasted six months and twenty days.

And in the Berlin operation in 22 days, from April 16 to May 8, 361,367 died soldiers and officers. Only Soviet. But the Polish army was also advancing on Berlin.

There is another indicator - average daily loss. Near Moscow - 10,910 people, near Stalingrad - 6392 people, on the Kursk Bulge - 11,313 people; in Belarus - 11,262 people. In the Berlin operation - 15,712 people.

Soviet people were not accustomed to think. I'm afraid that habit has remained to this day. Rarely did any of us ask the question: why did Berlin have to be taken by storm, to give four hundred thousand lives for it? The city is squeezed from all sides by allied forces, the superiority in strength is multiple. Well, they would have surrounded, well, they would have bombed every day, after some time they would have surrendered, they would not have gone anywhere. Why storm?

I remember people saying: to get ahead of the Americans! But after all it gave nothing and did not give. The fate of Germany was already decided at the Yalta Conference, everything was divided there - who should be where. Moreover, it is now known that the Americans could easily get ahead of us and be the first to approach Berlin. But, having estimated possible losses, they refused to storm the Nazi capital - they took care of the soldiers. And our commanders - nowhere and never. Kyiv - by November 7! Berlin - by May 1!

The general environment of Berlin was not envisaged. According to the original plan of the Headquarters, it was to be taken by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front with a frontal attack. Therefore, Stalin removed Rokossovsky from command of the front and appointed Zhukov. Subsequently, Rokossovsky said that in a telephone conversation he asked Stalin: “Why such an insult?” And in response I heard: "This is not an insult - this is a political issue." Apparently, Stalin considered - it is impossible for a person with a Polish surname to take Berlin! Rokossovsky was sent to the 2nd Belorussian, to liberate the north of Germany from the Nazis. The 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Konev advanced from the south. And only in the event of "a delay in the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 1st Ukrainian Front should be ready to strike with tank armies from the south to Berlin," Stalin ordered.

In the course of the battle, when Zhukov's troops got stuck on the Seelow Heights, and Konev's troops broke through the front and went to Berlin from the south, and Rokossovsky advanced from the north, an encirclement was created. Which all the same ended not with a siege, but with an assault.

The heaviest losses were on the outskirts of Berlin, in the very first hours of the offensive - on the Seelow Heights. They stretch for twenty kilometers along the old channel of the Oder River, the height is 40–50 meters above the Oder valley, the steepness of the slopes is 30–40 degrees. The main node of the Nazi defense was created there. Continuous trenches, bunkers, machine-gun platforms, trenches for artillery, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. For twenty kilometers in front of the heights, an anti-tank ditch was dug up to three meters deep and up to three and a half meters wide.

But in order to reach the heights, it was still necessary to overcome the open swampy valley of the Oder. All roads and approaches there were shot through with multi-layered artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire.

And our soldiers went head-on to this stronghold. In itself, the attack on the heights causes exorbitant surprise. The famous artillery preparation - 280 barrels per kilometer of the front - lasted 30 minutes. Only 30 minutes! Why not two hours or three? To suppress with fire and iron, and not with the bones and meat of soldiers! It seems that Zhukov was in a hurry, even saving minutes in order to quickly break through Zeelov and reach Berlin.

According to the plan of the Stavka, the Seelow Heights were ordered to be taken by blows from the combined arms armies, and two tank armies, Katukov and Bogdanov, were to be sent around from the north and northeast. But Zhukov changed the Stavka's plan. He writes in his memoirs that Stalin agreed with him, saying: "Act as you see fit, you know better where you are." Zhukov placed Katukov's tanks behind Chuikov's infantry. He planned to break through the defenses with an infantry attack, and then introduce two tank armies into the "clean breakthrough" - right on Berlin! But the very first wave of infantry drowned in blood and fire. The second one too.

Chuikov, commander of the 8th Guards Army, ordered the artillery to be brought closer to support the attacking infantry formations with fire. When the tractors went and pulled the guns, Zhukov ordered the tanks to move. Chuikov in his memoirs writes very carefully: “Apparently (?! - S. B.), wanting to increase the pace of the offensive and speed up the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses on the Seelow Heights, the front commander decided to bring into battle in the zone of our army the 1st Guards Tank Army of M.E. Katukov and the 11th separate tank corps of I.I. formations began to pass the battle formations of the 8th Guards Army, the roads became even more crowded, and it was impossible to get off them to the side. The tanks of the 1st Guards literally ran into our tractors, as a result of which the maneuver of the second echelons of divisions and corps turned out to be constrained ... But we were used to overcoming various difficulties ... "

Lieutenant-General Poppel, a member of the Military Council of Katukov's tank army, testifies the same: “The only road - and that was scored by the rifle corps of General A.I. Ryzhov ... Enemy cannons shot through the road. Soon, our wrecked tanks blocked the roadway, then the ditches were clogged: combat vehicles also got stuck in them. And yet the vanguard, and after it the rest of the brigades, escaped from the clinics of the enemy defense. The forward detachment managed to break through to the heights at maximum speed.

Have you submitted a picture? All roads on the marshy floodplain of the Oder are clogged with our infantry and artillery tractors. And then Zhukov, seeing this - he was at the command post of the 8th Army - gives the order to the tank army and the tank corps (and this is 1 thousand tanks!) To break through to the heights through ... the battle formations of our infantry. These testimonies of memoirists: “The tanks ran into our tractors”, “We managed to break through at maximum speed” - mean that the tanks of Katukov and Yushchuk scattered to the sides and crushed their own. Otherwise there, in that situation, it could not be. And from above, from the heights, Hitler's artillery was pounding on this jam in the valley. Moreover, our aircraft went to bomb, again on our own and others.

Meat grinder.

Tank commander Mikhail Katukov did not leave memoirs with a frank story about the assault on Zeelovo. And now his words and thoughts are conveyed to us by his widow, who, together with her husband, went from Moscow to Berlin. Ekaterina Sergeevna Katukova says that our command did not have an accurate idea of the defensive power of the Seelow Heights, all intelligence data turned out to be incomplete and incorrect. And there was no plan, except for an assault on the forehead. Her words are indirectly confirmed by the same Poppel, describing a conversation at the headquarters of the tank corps of General Babajanyan:

“- They hit point-blank! - finished the report Babadzhanyan. - It is very difficult to take Zeelov in the forehead, we can put the whole body - and still it will be useless.

Your choice?

Then Babadzhanyan drew a small arrow with a red pencil along the line of the railway, cutting through the Seelow Heights on the right flank, about five kilometers north of the city of Zeelova. The hetman quickly understood this idea of a detour and whispered approvingly: “That's right! There is nothing to climb through, you need to be smart ... "

I’ll divert attention with the main forces, - the usual cunning played in Babajanyan’s black eyes, - and I’ll push Gusakovsky along the embankment of the piece of iron. There is no steepness here, the opening for the road has been dug.”

It seems that when planning the operation, they did not pay attention to the map, they did not see that it was possible to break through by rail ...

Gusakovsky's tank brigade went into a gap along the railroad, and the rest continued to attack in the forehead. But the slopes are very steep, 30-40 degrees, with such a rise, shells can only hit the sky. And the tanks zigzagged, exposing their weak side armor. Zhukov in a separate directive ordered the commanders to be in battle formations. The tank army of Katukov lost almost the entire lower and middle command staff. This shock was so great that 60 years later, having arrived at the Seelow Heights, the 92-year-old widow of Katukov repeated: “22 commanders of tank battalions and 5 commanders of tank brigades died there ...”

During the four days of the assault on the Seelow Heights, from April 16 to April 19, 1945, 38 thousand soldiers and officers died. 33 thousand Soviet and 5 thousand Polish. But this is very old data. In reality, the exact or even approximate number of those killed is still unknown. In fact, the entire vast space in front of the heights is a cemetery that stretches for many kilometers along the valley of the Oder River.

The fact that the figures of losses on the Seelow Heights - 33 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers - are clearly underestimated, says the general statistics. In the Berlin operation the average daily losses of our troops amounted to 15,712 people. And under the Seelow Heights, based on the official loss figures, - 8250! That is two times less. Alas, this could not be, since it is generally recognized that the most difficult, bloody battles were precisely near Zeelov.

Was it really impossible to bypass these heights?! They would go around and go further to Berlin, leaving the inner ring of encirclement. I repeat: the Stavka plan provided for a bypass by two tank armies from the north and northeast. The Headquarters plan even provided for the delay of Zhukov's troops - and then Konev's troops were sent to Berlin from the south. But Zhukov, I repeat, changed the plan of the Headquarters and hit the Zeelovsky heights with tanks in the forehead.

Probably, while the tank armies were bypassing, it was possible to simply stand at Seelov - fire from guns, bomb from the air. The balance of forces in the air is - 1 Nazi aircraft to 2.5 of ours. In addition, 3 air defense corps blocked the way for German aircraft - this is almost one and a half thousand anti-aircraft guns alone. In general, a little time - and the heights could be razed to the ground.

But neither one nor the other option, nor both together, Zhukov was satisfied. Because through Seelow is a direct and main road to Berlin, 70 kilometers. And bypassing or bombing means wasting time. Zhukov had to hurry. Konev was ahead of him, sent two tank armies into the gap and could be the first to enter Berlin. And he, Zhukov, is stuck here!

Thus, a lot here comes down to the ambitions and personality of one person - Zhukov. His cruelty and complete contempt for human life were known to all. Rokossovsky writes that in 1930, being the commander of Zhukov, he was forced to remove him from the brigade, because he created an unbearable situation there. "Removed for a promotion."

Both Rokossovsky's notes and similar opinions of our other commanders can be regarded as envy of Zhukov, personal hostile relations. But after all, both among junior commanders and among the rank and file, Zhukov's cruelty and mercilessness towards people was a byword. My friend Georgy Dolgov, being with the veterans on the anniversary of the liberation of Kiev, looked at the Dnieper steeps, throwing his head back, and asked one of the veterans with horror: “Ivan Nikolaevich, you can’t just climb there! But what about you, with a cannon, and even under German fire!?

To which the veteran replied: “The German is ahead, he may miss, then you will remain alive, there is a chance. And behind - Zhukov!

But a lieutenant cannot operate on the name of a marshal, a representative of the Headquarters. For him there is a commander of a company, battalion, regiment. In extreme cases - somewhere high, high - the division commander. Here are their names he uses in everyday military life. But if an artillery lieutenant says: "And behind - Zhukov!" - that's the name for all became a symbol of toughness, ruthlessness towards one's own.

In the late 1980s, the writer Viktor Astafiev, who went through the Patriotic War as an ordinary soldier, turned to his comrade, a front-line soldier, Vyacheslav Kondratiev: “The one who“ gets to Zhukov ”will be a truly Russian writer ... A worthy fosterling of the leader. product of time.

Viktor Astafiev, peace be upon him, was a sharp man. In his words, undisguised hostility, even hatred, comes through. Maybe not only or not so much to Zhukov, but to the fact that Zhukov is being made a myth. But pay attention - "Product of time".

With these two words, Viktor Petrovich Astafiev expressed the most accurate, objective truth-truth. "Product of Time"! Almost everyone was like that! And Zhukov among them is the first student in the school of the devil.

Many marshals of that war believed that Zhukov's military successes were ensured by the fact that the Headquarters gave him unlimited resources and unlimited power. Now some researchers are arguing that Zhukov's military talents are a myth. When he was faced with the direct command of the troops, problems often arose, as in the tragic Rzhev-Vyazemsky and Rzhev-Sychevsky directions, where we, under his command, lost over a million soldiers and officers. As at the same Zeelovsky heights, when he led the assault from the command post of Chuikov's 8th Guards Army. And all successful large-scale operations were developed in the General Staff, while Zhukov was only an overseer in the troops, Stalin's ruthless scourge.

May be. But I am not writing about Zhukov's military talents, but about the price of our victories, about the system. What time, what system - such was the scourge. From this point of view, turn the time around differently, today we could live in the myth of the Great Beria. Beria - The main organizer and creator of the energy system of the USSR. Beria - Creator of the nuclear and space shield of the USSR. Beria is the Father of the atomic bomb, etc. After all, millions and millions of prisoners in the Beria GULAG built our great hydroelectric power stations, invented bombs and rockets in the same camps for design scientists, called "sharashki", erected deep underground, under the beds of mighty rivers , titanic facilities for the splitting of weapons-grade plutonium. As, for example, in Zheleznogorsk, aka Krasnoyarsk-26. The Egyptian pyramids are small hills compared to the underground halls of the mining and chemical plant. All this was built on a gigantic scale in the largest country in the world. It was built under the leadership of Beria.

By April 1945, Soviet troops stood on the eastern bank of the Oder River, from where only 60 km remained from the Kustrinsky bridgehead to Berlin (now the territory of the Kustrinsky bridgehead belongs to Poland, and the German city of Kustrin, which gave it its name, was renamed Kostrzyn in the Polish manner) .

In the western part of Germany, the allied Anglo-American troops had already practically reached the Elbe, and the situation demanded that the Soviet command launch an attack on the German capital and defeat the enemy as soon as possible.

The offensive was supposed to be carried out by the forces of three fronts: the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and the 1st Ukrainian.
The 1st Belorussian Front was to advance along the main direction to Berlin, the 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts along the flanks - on the right and left, respectively.

The 1st Belorussian Front was given the task of capturing Berlin. The front, with the forces of all its armies, was to strike along the shortest path - through the Seelow Heights on the western bank of the Oder, where there was a powerful German fortified area. The start of the offensive was scheduled for April 16, 1945.

Interestingly, according to the plan of the offensive operation, the 3rd shock army of the 1st Belorussian Front, in which my grandfather fought, was not intended to storm Berlin and was only supposed to provide support for the offensive of other armies of the front, bypassing the city of Berlin from the north.
If events had developed according to the original plan, the names of the soldiers of the army would not have been known to millions of fellow citizens. The country would not have recognized either Yegorov, or Kantaria, or numerous other heroes.
The 3rd shock army under the command of V.I. Kuznetsov was to play a secondary role and advance parallel to the main shock grouping of the front, without entering Berlin.

However, history judged otherwise and led the 3rd shock directly to the Reichstag. But more about that later.

The exact location of the enemy’s firing and artillery points on his line of defense on the Seelow Heights was unknown to the Soviet command, so units of the 3rd shock army were ordered to conduct reconnaissance in force. From 8-00 in the morning, the divisions, after a fire raid, begin the offensive.
The battle itself was carried out at such a staggering pace and with such powerful artillery support that the Germans mistook this reconnaissance for the start of the offensive of our main forces. They were forced to pull up reserves and fully opened their fire system.

Thus, the enemy grouping in the army's offensive zone was determined. Our gunners, who were clarifying the location of enemy fire weapons during reconnaissance, had to urgently make changes to their plans.

April 16, 1945. The beginning of the strategic offensive operation, which went down in history as the Zelovsko-Berlin operation.

Further, G.G. Semenov, the author of the memoirs “A shock is coming” will say better:
And it's exactly 5 o'clock Moscow time. Local - 3 hours. The air over the Kyustrinsky bridgehead shuddered from a volley of several thousand guns and mortars. An unprecedented flurry of fire hit the enemy positions. The fiery arrows of rocket projectiles, describing gigantic arcs, were instantly carried away to the west.
At 5:30 a.m. one of the searchlights beeped near our observation post. As soon as a powerful vertical beam pierced the sky, 19 more searchlights immediately turned on, blinding the enemy with bright light. At the same time, the artillery transferred fire to the nearest depth of the enemy defense. The infantry and tanks of direct support rushed together to attack.
At dawn, our attack aircraft and bombers appeared over the battlefield. Fighters covered the advancing troops from the air. The enemy, suppressed by artillery fire, offered almost no resistance at the forefront. But then, having recovered from the shock, the Nazis began to fight fiercely. Enemy aircraft also became active.
The first reports from corps commanders began to arrive at the commander's NP. But the troops moved so rapidly that at 11 o'clock in the afternoon, Colonel General V.I. Kuznetsov and I were forced to move to a new observation post, urgently prepared by sappers and signalmen in the newly reclaimed territory. The second echelons of rifle divisions advanced along the roads, went to new firing positions of the guns, and the military rear lines were brought up. A continuous stream of troops rushed to the west ...

Army troops at 5-30 in the morning, after a half-hour artillery preparation under searchlight lighting, went on the offensive. Projector lighting blinding the enemy - this is the know-how of the Soviet army - was first used in battles on the Seelow Heights and showed its best side almost everywhere.

The Seelow Heights were taken...

And we also went to Seelow, to bow to those who fell on this earth.

3. Huts in Seelow

4. Another "hut"

5. "Birds don't sing here, trees don't grow, and only we grow shoulder to shoulder into the ground here"

6. Memorial to Soviet soldiers-liberators

7. Inscription on the monument. Characteristically, in Russian.

10.

11. Graves

12.

13.

14. An unknown soldier is buried here

15.

16.

17.

18. Scheme of settlements of the Seelow Heights. The position of the enemy on the Seelow Heights was more advantageous than the positions of the Red Army